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Abstract 
My thesis contests a putative congruity between Derrida and Levinas concerning 
discussions of responsibility, ethics and otherness. It attends to the fundamental 
`metaphysical' differences between the two with respect to ontology, language 
and historicity. Consequently, it foregrounds two distinct conceptions of 
philosophy, which differ with respect to task, strategy and presentational form. 
Since Levinas's key notion of the `face' [le visage], which cannot be equated to 
any actual countenance, breaks with phenomenality - no small issue for an 
avowed phenomenology - this thesis will begin by treating the category of the 
other (or. Other) in Levinas's writings as a conundrum. By analysing the two 
major topographies of the Other developed by Levinas in Totality and Infinity 
and Otherwise than Being (with particular attention to their differences), I ask: 
who or what counts as the other for Levinas? 
Concurrently, I track Derrida's writings across his career to see if he can be held 
to subscribe to either of these models, noting the transformations that Derrida 
effects upon Levinas. By analysing them in tandem, the metaphysical and 
speculative contours of both thinkers (which if not neglected in the secondary 
literature are transformed into quasi-theological positions) come to the fore. 
Thereby, this thesis seeks to revive questions of speculative thought in 
contemporary philosophy, whilst simultaneously asking how this speculative 
dimension preserves its status as philosophy despite its break with norms of 
written form and argumentation. Crucially, this is the terrain on which Derrida, 
in `Violence and Metaphysics', had first criticised Levinas - his lack of attention 
to language and presentation meant his writing remained non-philosophical. 
`... exteriority and alterity are concepts which themselves have never surprised 
philosophical discourse. Philosophy by itself has always been concerned with them. 
These are not conceptual headings under which philosophy's border can be 
overflowed: the overflow is its object. Instead of determining some other 
circumscription, recognizing it, practicing it, bringing it to light, forming it, in a word 
producing it (and today this word serves as the crudest "new clothes" of the 
metaphysical denigration which accommodates itself very well to all these projects), 
in question will be, but according to a movement unheard of by philosophy, an other 
which is no longer its other. ' 
Jacques Derrida `Tympan' [1972] translated by Alan Bass in Margins of Philosophy 
(Brighton, Harvester Press, 1982), pp. ix-xxix; pp. xiii-xiv. 
`As has often been remarked, one of the gravest misfortunes that can affect a writer of 
great intellectual seriousness and strong ethical passions is to have his ideas 
"naturalized" by the English. ' 
Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York, Simon & 
Schuster, 1973), p. 19. 
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Introduction 
Derrida, Levinas and the question of influence 
Something of a consensus dominates the reception of Jacques Derrida' s late 
works. They have been taken to mark an 'ethic o-political' turn, determined by 
questions and concerns absent from the earlier work on deconstruction and 
grammatology. Moreover, this change has been ascribed to the positive impact 
of Emmanuel Levinas, to the extent that some see Derrida's later writings as 
"Levinasian". 
Such an interpretation has been challenged by Derrida himself on several 
occasions. In 2003, in an interview given to the French publication, Magazine 
Litteraire, having marked his distance from Levinas 1, he warned against an 
increasingly prevalent, facile reception of him as the thinker of the ethical 
response to the other, or of ethics as first philosophy. Because, primarily, this 
reception does not appreciate the enormous transformation that the concept of 
ethics undergoes in his works. 
'... 1'ceuvre de Levinas est en train de passer, fort tard dans son histoire, au 
rang de reference facile, voire de caution commune. Mais il ya un prix a 
payer pour ce qui ressemble parfois a une instrumentalisation ideologique, 
voire demagogique et depolitisante de la metaphysique de Levinas, de ce 
qu'il appelle, lui, «metaphysique», «philosophie premiere» ou «ethique», 
par opposition ä l'ontologie. La reference a l'Autre devient facile et 
incantatoire, et je trouve de plus en plus fastidieuse et bien-pensante 
l'expression <<rapport a l'autre» ou <<respect de l'autre». On assaisone ces 
mots d'un salut verbal et paresseux a Levinas, pour passer la douane du 
serieux et de l'audace philosophique avec un argument d'autorite, et le tour 
est jour. Le mot «ethique» tientparfois le meme role. i2 
`Levinas's work is in the process of passing, quite late in its history, to the 
level of facile reference, even communal surety. But there is a price to pay 
for what sometimes resembles an ideological (or even possibly demagogic 
and depoliticising) instrumentalization of his metaphysics, which Levinas 
himself called "metaphysics". "first philosophy", or "ethics", in opposition 
' 'D'uilleurs le chiasnu dopt il [Levinas] parle, le <cceur du chiasme», je ne sais pas - je suis 
mo ins siir que iamais ci ce sujet - sit donne lieu ä du «contact» ... 
'. 'Besides. regarding the 
chiasinus of which he spoke, the 'heart of the chiasmus'. I don't know -I am less sure than ever 
on this point - 'v hether it -,, i% e rise to any contact [bet\w een us] ... 
' Jacques Derrida & . lain 
David (intcr% is v. 'Derrida a\ cc Levinas' 'Magazine Litreraire 419 (April 2003). pp. 30- ; 4: p. 31. 
OP. cit. pp. -ý 
- 1. 
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to "ontology". The reference to the Other is becoming facile and 
incantatory; more and more I find tedious and commonplace the expressions 
"relation with the other" or "respect for the other". One spices these words 
([belonging to] a lazy, verbal exchange) with Levinas, in order to pass 
through the border control of philosophical seriousness and originality with 
an argument from authority, and the game is up. The word "ethics" 
sometimes plays the same role. ' [my translation] 
Although the French context for this interview differs from that of Levinas's 
English-language reception, the same enthusiasm for ethics and the Other also 
evades the serious business of analysing Levinas's metaphysics. This `body of 
sentimental commentary', of hagiographic exposition, has begun to be broken by 
the work of Stephane Moses3, Stella Sandford4, Rudi Visker5 and Howard 
Caygi116. Each attempts to displace a well-meaning but anaemic ethics, well- 
suited to the familiar philosophical categories, with a more systematic, more 
challenging and perhaps more sober reading. 
This endeavour will be extended here by analysing the two major topographies of 
the Other developed by Levinas in Totality and Infinity? and Otherwise than 
Being8 with particular attention to their differences. Concurrently, I will track 
. 
Derrida's writings across his career to see if he can be held to subscribe to either 
of these models, noting the transformations that Derrida effects upon Levinas 
and his own reference to Levinas's oeuvre as a `mutation'9. By analysing them in 
tandem, and paying close regard to points of disputation, the metaphysical and 
speculative contours of both thinkers (which if not neglected in the secondary 
literature are transformed into quasi-theological positions) come to the fore. It 
3 Au-delä de la guerre: trios etudes sur Levinas (Paris & Tel Aviv, Editions de 1'eclat, 2004). 
The Metaphysics of Love: Gender and Transcendence in Levinas (London & New Brunswick, 
The Athlone Press, 2000). 
5 Truth and Singularity: Taking Foucault into Phenomenology (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1999). 
6 Levinas and the Political (London & New York, Routledge, 2002). Hereafter references given 
in the text as L&P followed by page reference. 
7 Totality & Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority [1961] translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, 
Duquesne University Press, 1969). Hereafter abbreviated to TI followed by page reference. 
8 Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence [1978] translated by Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991). Hereafter abbreviated to OtB followed by page reference. 
9 Jacques Derrida Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas [1997] translated by Pascale-Anne Brault & 
Michael Naas (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 12 & p. 31. Hereafter abbreviated 
to : adieu followed by page reference. 
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will be shown that Derrida is an astute. sympathetic and rigorous reader of 
Levinas, but that the common understanding of this relationship is at best limited 
- deformed by received, uncritical conceptions of philosophy and its task. MI\ 
investigation begins with the notion of influence underlying those attributions of 
an `ethico-political turn'. What does it mean to present Derrida as 'influenced' 
by Levinas? 
What philosophical work does the concept of influence do? 
In general, the notion of the influence of one author over another, or an affinity 
between two writers, is only vaguely understood in the context of philosophical 
claims. Even in a certain historicist understanding of intellectual history, the 
work done by these concepts has been questioned. 
Quentin Skinner sees in the concern to identify influences a `scholar's game' that 
is nearly devoid of explanatory power1° 
The function of isolating what are thought to be leading influences and 
tracing out connections in terms of them is certainly clear enough: it seems 
a good means of abridging the enormous range of facts with which an 
historian or social scientist is typically confronted. The philosophical status 
of this activity, however, is by no means so self-evidently clear ... '.. 
He analyses what he takes to be two distinct forms of claims to influence: the 
first where one author (P, ), historically later, explicit refers to another (P1) as an 
influence -a relation of testimony; the second where a historian establishes a 
connection between the two by dint of research. 
For Skinner, testimonials per se are insufficient to support any substantive claim 
of influence. There is no procedure by which to decide between different 
explanations of this testimony without separate historical research which 
establishes any such connection independently. It is important to note, that, for 
Skinner, any claim to influence. must be doing more than claim that P, is 
paraphrasing or adopting certain terms from PI: 'The judgment that P, 
10 'Limits of l listorical Explanations' Philosophy xli (1966), pp. 199-215. 
ibid. p. '0- . 
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influenced P2 seems in effect to entail that we see repeated in P2 the elements 
which also give to PI its characteristic form. ' 12 [my emphasis] 
`Influence' is used rather loosely in philosophical literature and is often simply 
meant as a figure of speech or a gesture towards some unspecified connection. 
But if such a claim is to do philosophical work, it is important to specify what 
sort of evidential structures could demonstrate such claims. That is, what is the 
point of attesting to a `mutual fecundation' between Derrida and Levinas' 39 
How does such a claim work if it is not simply a figure of speech? 
On Skinner's understanding and argument, the problem of such a claim for 
influence is that it is hard-pressed to overcome alternative explanations, 
particularly coincidence or a general milieu of thought that both authors share14. 
Skinner's three conditions for `influence' to explain the appearance of a 
particular doctrine in a particular author are: 
1. One should be able to demonstrate a `general similarity' between the 
`characteristic forms' in question. 
2. These features should not be attributable to any third party or a general 
`cultural milieu'. 
3. Any influence must be demonstrably non-random and feasible. 
Although he slightly revises these conclusions in the later essay, `Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Ideas' 15, he maintains that, if not as impossible 
as he previously thought, the demonstration of influence is `elusive' and rarely 
12 Ibid. pp. 205-7. 
13 This unpleasant metaphor is my rendering of Salomon Malka's mutuelle fecondation. 'Un 
parcours philosophique' Magazine Litteraire 419 (April 2003); pp. 22-27. 
14 Connections between two figures `... represent only two items out of an aggregate which is not 
merely immensely large, but in which it is excluded (it has been seen) that the historian could 
ever be in a position to improve the standing of his claims by performing any of the repeated or 
controlled experiments which a scientist in similar difficulties might typically undertake. ' [op. cit. 
p. 2108] 
15 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas' in Meaning and Context: Quentin 
Skinner and his Critics edited by J. Tully (Oxford, Blackwell, 1988); pp. 29-67. 
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works. He thinks it `scarcely an exaggeration' to state that the '... whole 
repertoire of Einfluss-studies in the history of ideas is based on nothing better 
than the capacity of the observer to foreshorten the past by filling it with his own 
reminiscences. ' 16 
However, if one suspends both the aim of identifying who had certain thoughts 
first and the argument that certain themes occur in author X because she read 
book Y, then there is an important philological concern here: whether we have an 
adequate comprehension of those texts in the first instance. And whether there is 
not always a certain tacit dimension of influence informing the assumptions 
brought to bear on a text. 
The relevance of this idea can be presented through reflection on Ludwig, 
Wittgenstein's citation practice. 
`How far my efforts agree with those of other philosophers I will not decide. 
Indeed what I have written here makes no claim to novelty in points of 
detail; and therefore I give no sources, because it is indifferent to me 
whether what I have thought has already been thought before me by 
another. '" 
Contra Wittgenstein, could one not argue that it is precisely such references that 
give the reader intellectual purchase on the edifice? Identifying the influences on 
an author, or the provenance of particular conceptual chains (whether 
philosophical or non-philosophical), helps one to grasp the specificities of 
systematic thought: its `characteristic form'. 
The great virtue of a work such as Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin's 
Wittuenstein's Vienna lies in the reconstruction of the context of historical. 
cultural and philosophical influences for the Tractatus so as to force the reader to 
reconsider the received understanding of that work in the philosophical 
community. 
15 Ibid. pp. 46-7. 
17 Ludwig Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosoph ieas translated by C. K. Ogden (London & 
New York. Routledge. 1i)2'l. p. 27. 
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Their claim is that `one of the least self-explanatory books c% er published'" has 
been severed from its connection to German-language thought by the association 
with Cambridge and English-language philosophy'9. The accepted commentary 
on this work took Russell and Frege as the main influences so that Wittgenstein, 
a `pupil' of the first, was (and is) understood as overcoming the obstacles left 
facing his predecessors purely logical achievements20 
The complex assembling of historical, scientific. cultural and philosophical 
materials might appear to someone, such as Skinner. as the assembling of 
circumstantial evidence that would be prey to Ockham's razor or other 
positivistic or sceptical devices. However, the point is that the dominant 
readings do the same but tacitly. The frames of understanding and reference in 
place dominate readings, yet because of this dominance, do not question their 
status, appropriateness, parochialism or non-arbitrariness and assume what such 
concepts, projects and structures must mean. 
The very conjuncture of that reception is placed in question by the work of 
reconstruction, which makes of reading a problem. That is, it need not simply be 
presented as a hermeneutic decoding to a determinate, correct signified - as a 
reflexive foregrounding of interpretative decisions already made, it lays open the 
prejudices of the current community of readers21. That is, `influence' is not 
simply a mode of historical explanation but a prerequisite for adequate 
description. 
The strong claim of Janik and Toulmin is that `the preconceptions with which his 
English hearers approached [Wittgenstein] debarred them almost entirely from 
18 op. cit. P. 13 - 
I`' We might add that this is exemplified (or exacerbated) by key translation decisions, chiefly, the 
disastrous translation of Bild as 'picture' with its consequent connection to Russell's Logical 
. Atomism. 
`" As Janik and Toulmin note, this interpretation is itself self-consciously contesting 
Wittgenstein's legacy ww ith that of the logical positivism of Carnap and Aver. 
In Chapter ?. I will connect the genealogical practice of Derrida to Husselian Selbstbesinnung 
as a general responsibilit> in writing. 
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understanding the point of what he was saying'22. This `paradigm' clash is not 
produced because the figures involved occupy different historical epochs23. 
Moreover, the new reading produced re-integrates comments and passages 
otherwise understood as afterthoughts or ephemera back into a more 
comprehensive, productive interpretation 24. By connecting documented facts and 
references within the text (which gain weight because of their rarity) to sources 
and materials of which the English-language audience was ignorant, an object is 
reconstructed which poses more questions to philosophical orthodoxy, and hence 
is charged with a different relation to the philosophical present. 
Skinner, . Janik and Toulmin would all agree that those ignorant of the context 
from out of which ideas are produced are destined to misunderstand them. 
`... [The] philosophical problems and ideas of actual men ... confront us like 
geological specimens in situ; and, in the process of chipping them free from 
their original locations, we can too easily forget the historical and cultural 
matrix in which they took shape, and end by imposing on them a sculptural 
form which reflects the preoccupations, not of their author, but of 
ourselves. '25 
But whereas Skinner's limited, historicist aim is only to determine how it really 
was - `no agent can be said to have meant or done something which he could 
never be brought to accept as a correct description of what he had meant or done' 
- "Influence" need not be reduced to a causal explanation of the appearance of 
certain features in certain authors. However, what is to be uncovered in 
responsible discourse is the work being done by any implicit or explicit 
22 op. cit. p. 22. 
23 With respect to Wittgenstein, it is the professional specialization of English philosophy, 
institutionally disconnected from other aspects of contemporary culture, which determines a 
different context of reception. In addition, the pre-war Viennese philosophical culture was 
essentially concerned with a post-Kantian legacy, where `logic and ethics were essentially bound 
up with each other'. 
24 Skinner's antipathy to the `mythology' of coherence is really an antipathy to coherence bought 
through ill-judged paraphrasing, unjustified excision and ranking of materials. Or one that 
compulsively excludes contradiction for fear of admitting that a thinker might have changed his 
or her mind, had an off-day, or sometimes produced substandard work. His opposition to 
textbooks, readers and summary paraphrase is shared by Derrida but for dissimilar philosophical 
reasons. A coherence that is able to include more than the competing alternatives underlies the 
aim of comprehensively describing the appropriate language-game. 
`5 Wittgenstein's Vienna, pp. 27-8. 
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understanding of influence, such that the `general similarity' is adequately 
explicated and is reflexively developed with our own prejudices to the fore. The 
philological coherence of any such reconstruction depends on weight of citation 
and its ability to organise a greater range of material. The philosophical charge 
comes from its challenge to the present. Only in this conjuncture does philology 
escape scholastic academicism. 
In the specific context of understanding and evaluating the relationship between 
Derrida and Levinas, we can make a few preliminary comments. Although 
Derrida has both expressed his reservations regarding the concept of `influence' 26 
and severely criticised the hermeneutic endeavour to master or decode a text by 
pinning it down to one meaning27, this debate is still relevant. Even if we are not 
concerned to identify the intentions of the original author, and accept that citation 
can be generalised to break every context28, the determination of `influence' is 
essential for determining what Derrida terms the `protocols of reading' 29. 
Under what conditions does this question have philosophical significance? 
When the assertion of influence, or its tacit assumption, determines the 
understanding of a particular author. That is, when the demonstration of an 
isomorphism of characteristic forms alters the philosophical claims made. Our 
attention is therefore focused on the notion of a `general similarity' in 
`characteristic form'. This entails: 
26 `We are speaking of convergences, and not of influences; primarily because the latter is a 
notion whose philosophical meaning is not clear to us ... 
'. Jacques Derrida `Violence and 
Metaphysics: an essay on the thought of Emmanuel Levinas' [1964] in Writing and Difference 
translated by Alan Bass (London & New York, Routledge, 2001), pp. 97-192; p. 139. Hereafter 
abbreviated to VM followed by page reference. 
27 In light of Skinner's debt to Austin's notion of linguistic acts, see Derrida's own deconstruction 
of How to Do Things with Words. Jacques Derrida `Signature Event Context' [ 1971 ] translated 
by Alan Bass in Margins of Philosophy (Brighton, Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 307-330. 
28 Marian Hobson in her book on Derrida discusses some of the claims made by Skinner 
regarding linguistic acts more generally. Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines (London & New York, 
Routledge, 1998); pp. 205-07. Hereafter abbreviated to OL followed by page reference. 
Skinner's objections to the `reminiscences' of commentators clashes obliquely with Hobson's 
demonstration of the filamentary textual connections that cannot be controlled either by linguistic 
intention or determining the appropriate historical domain [OL 193 & 2011. 
29 Jacques Derrida with Jean-Louis Houdebine & Guy Scarpetta `Positions' in Jacques Derrida 
Positions [1972] translated and annotated by Alan Bass 2°d edition (London & New York, 
Continuum, 2004), pp. 35-78; pp. 54-55. 
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" identifying what kind of claims each makes about the other; 
" or, what claims third parties imputing such connections are making. 
As we will see, there may be institutional, rather than textual, factors behind this 
need to claim influence; Skinner's suspicions about testimony can be reflexively 
extended to the historians or interpreters making such claims. That is, what is the 
historical conjuncture under which such claims to influence are made30? This is 
the polemical edge located in Skinner's reference to `reminiscences' - there may 
be pressures to `foreshorten' theoretical terrain, just as it may simply be the 
dilettante's opportunity to demonstrate the breadth of their reading. 
It might seem strange to raise this as an issue concerning two philosophical 
figures who have only died within the last decade. The problem has to be 
understood with a slightly different inflection: what is it that Levinas and Derrida 
contribute to philosophy? What makes them philosophy? What marks their 
philosophical specificity? 
In relation to Levinas there have been a paucity of protocols reflexively advanced 
and justified, but here I suggest that part of the development of such protocols is 
the philological construction of a nexus of influences such that certain conceptual 
features are not simply accepted from the dominant discourse of the day. My 
concern will not be to decode either Derrida or Levinas, but to demonstrate what 
is left out by the adoption of inadequate protocols and through the abuse of 
influence-claims. 
30 At a certain moment. the influence of Levinas was mobilised to meet the charges of relativism, 
nihilism or worse levelled at Derrida. Butler \ rites of the 'sudden and enthusiastic turn to 
Levinas' in the wake of the `de Man affair' as being an attempt to demonstrate that 
deconstruction is on the `side of resistance'. Judith Butler 'Ethical Ambivalence' in The T<<rn to 
Ethics edited by Marjorie Garber. Beatrice Hanssen & Rebecca L. Walko\\ itz New York 
London. Routledge. 2000). pp. 15--`S. P. 19. 
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I 
The kinds of claim made for the relation between Derrida and Levinas 
In the current literature there is a variety of 'claims' that fall under the categor\ 
of influence. 
1. Levinas exerted a deep and lasting influence on Derrida. 
Any major claim is unspecified; it is not clear whether this influence is 
understood to be positive or negative, appreciative or reactive. Christopher 
Norris's 1987 book on Derrida notes that the ethical dimension of the latter's 
work is underappreciated and that research into his connections to Levinas might 
shed light on this. More telling is his comment that the common Judaic 
background, and particularly the influence of rabbinical commentary, might 
enable a different appreciation of any ethical dimension 31. One could also 
mention here the work of John Llewelyn. Though he insists on the `close 
contact' between the two authors, and presents their work as engaging in an 
`apposition' of question and answer, it is not clear to me what (if any) concrete 
claims of influence are made 32 In these cases, `influence' is doing no 
philosophical work. 
2. Derrida adopts concepts from Levinas 
Concentrating on the conceptual vocabulary of both authors, some commentators 
see in Derrida's use of the term, Other (Autre or Autrui), the signs of Levinas's 
ou ni concept33. In addition, the central role of the word, trace, has prompted 
similar assertions of homology. Simon Critchley (whose claims as to the 
relationship under inspection have vaned over the last decade) writes in the 
second edition of The Ethics of Deconstruction: 
Derrida (London. Fontana Press, 1987), p. 230. 
Emmanuel Levinas - The Genealogy of Ethics (London & New York. Routledge. 199"'). 
Appositions of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas (Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana 
University Press. 2002). 
3' The first part of this thesis \N ill concentrate on the basic orientation of these concepts in 
Lc vinas. 
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`... when Derrida speaks with least reservation on normative issues he draws 
consistently and extensively on Levinas's work. This is explicit in `Force of 
Law', where Levinas's conception of justice is cited on two occasions, both 
crucial to Derrida's argument, and is implicit but perhaps even more 
pervasive in `The Politics of Friendship', where the whole vocabulary of 
asymmetry, heteronomy and `the curvature of social space' is borrowed from 
Totality and Infinity'. ' 34 
Those familiar with Derrida's earlier work might recall the grammatological 
operators of erasure and paleonymy, which should make one wary of imputing 
any straightforward reference to Derrida's practice of citation. Moreover, even 
within a French context, Levinas is not the first to make philosophical use of 
autre or autrui. With particular reference to trace, Derrida notes: 
`C'ast un mot dont nous fimes, dejä dans les annees soixantes, des usages 
certes fort differents a tant d'egards. Mais entre simple homonymie de 
rencontre et synonymie essentielle, le meme nom condense et signe sans 
doute mieux que tout autre, ce que vous rappeliez dun point de« contact au 
cceur du chiasme». '35 
`Already by the sixties, we had made, in so many respects, clearly very 
different uses of this word. But between encountered homonymy and 
essential synonymy, without doubt, the same name condenses and signals 
better than anything else that which you called a point of `contact at the 
heart of a chiasmus'. ' [my translation] 
In Of Grammatology, Derrida had distinguished his use of the trace, drawing 
from, but exceeding, the notions of Spur found in both Freud and Nietzsche, 
from that of Levinas mobilised in the `critique of Heideggerian ontology' 36 
Although Derrida has spoken directly of his `inheritance' from Levinas, he does 
so while insisting on the both displacement performed and the conjuncture of 
several different traditions at these nodes37. The question of influence requires 
that such displacements and conjunctures are specified. 
34 The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas [ 1992] 2nd edition (Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press, 1999), p. 269. Hereafter abbreviated to ED followed by page reference. 
35 Jacques Derrida & Alain David (interview) `Derrida avec Levinas', p. 32. 
36 Of Grammatology [1967] translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak corrected edition 
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 70. Hereafter abbreviated to Gramm 
followed by page reference. 
37 It is the experience of the other as other, the fact that I permit the other to be other . which 
presupposes a gift without exchange, without reappropriation, without jurisdiction. Here I meet 
up with several different traditions, whilst also slightly displacing them .... 
There is an 
inheritance from Levinas, when he defines the relation to the other simply as justice .... 
There is 
also that paradoxical thought, Plotinian in its first formulation, but which also surfaces in 
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We can begin to see the pertinence about Skinner's warning against mistaking 
citation, paraphrase or terminological similarities for a meaningful assertion of 
influence. Similarly, the problems of general philosophical tradition and milieu 
mean that more argument has to be made to specify what can be attributed to 
Levinas. It is not enough to point at `borrowed vocabulary': that it is indeed 
borrowed, borrowed from Levinas, and maintains its previous functionality must 
all be corroborated, else these sentences are philosophically meaningless. 38 
3. The sense of ethics in Derrida is the same as that in Levinas 
The first edition of The Ethics of Deconstruction pushed a markedly different 
line - a* line bookended in the second edition by a new preface and three 
appendices, which suggest reservations and revisions39. The earlier claim is 
Heidegger, and then in Lacan: giving not only what one has, but what one has not. ' `The 
Deconstruction of Actuality: An Interview with Jacques Derrida' in Radical Philosophy 68 
(1994), pp. 28-41. 
38 We are probably obliged to mention here Leonard Lawlor's recent book on Husserl and 
Derrida. It could serve as an object demonstration of Skinner's well-founded worries about 
paraphrase, suspect citation and mistaking reference for influence. Moreover, its wilful exclusion 
of most of Derrida's writing is unwarranted. Despite the titular restriction to Derrida's writings 
on Husserl, it, in fact, advances a more ambitious `defence of the Derridean faith' on the basis of 
these works. Without a discussion of the problems of philosophical presentation, grammatology, 
ecriture (misunderstood as a synonym for the sign) and the subtle engagement with the human 
sciences, it is a deeply flawed interpretation. Moreover its draws on Levinas without concern to 
adequately justify that investment: `The turn to Levinas is obvious. Any casual examination of 
Derrida's later writings discovers countless references and allusions to Levinas. For example, in 
Specters of Marx, Derrida explicitly appropriates Levinas's definition of justice as the relation to 
the other against Heidegger's ... definition of justice as jointure. 
' Leonard Lawlor Derrida and 
Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology (Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University 
Press, 2002), p. 224. This casual index counting is taken to stand for concrete demonstration of 
`general similarity'. Describing the late Derrida as an `alchemical combination of Nietzsche and 
Levinas' only exacerbates the problem, since it is not even clear what this could mean. `In 
Specters of Marx, the clearest evidence of Derrida's strange amalgamation of Levinas and 
Nietzsche occurs when he says, "There where man, a certain determinate concept of man, is 
completed, there the pure humanity of man, of the other man and of man as other begins or has 
finally the chance of heralding itself - of promising itself. In an apparently inhuman or a-human 
fashion. ' This sole evidential support is taken from a discussion of Kojeve and Fukuyama 
regarding post-historical humanity, and is indicative of a compulsive projection of the author's 
own concerns into texts that require a far more patient treatment. Butler, in `Ethical 
Ambivalence' [op. cit. ] makes some suggestions as to how a rapprochement between Nietzsche 
and Levinas could be attempted. For a more solid survey of Derrida's engagement with Husserl, 
see Paola Marrati Genesis and Trace: Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger [ 1998] translated 
by Simon Sparks (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005). 
39 The revisions are due largely to the later appearance of Politics of Friendship, Specters of Marx 
and the two-part essay `Force of Law'. The Politics of Friendship [ 1994] translated by George 
Collins (London, Verso, 1997). Hereafter abbreviated to PoF followed by page reference. 
Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning & the New International [ 1993] 
translated by Peggy Kamuf (London & New York, Routledge, 1994). `Force of Law: The 
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determined by the contemporaneous accusations of nihilism in deconstruction (in 
light of the de Man and Heidegger "affairs"). Critchley's argument was that 
Derrida's work should be understood as ethical, provided we understand it in the 
transformed sense that `ethics' achieves in Levinas's writing. Here, there is a 
claim to general similarity based on characteristic formao 
The concern for the Other is linked to Derrida's practice of writing, re-styled as 
clötural writing by Critchley. Such writing is marked by detailed readings of 
particular texts in which Derrida seeks to locate moments of singularity and 
alterity that break with or interrupt the received context of interpretation. 
Critchley espies the motivating source, the `demand', for all ethical and political 
action in this irruption of transcendence, an awakening of `responsibility that 
leads to political action' [ED 30]. Derrida himself has expressed persistent 
doubts over this interpretation, which is still tied to classical, disciplinary sub- 
categories of philosophy, such as `ethics', `politics', `metaphysics' [cf. ED 15], 
etc., which might serve to recuperate more radical insights and suggestions back 
into a mainstream that would remain unchallenged41 
4. `Strange attractors' 
A more nuanced approach is suggested in Marian Hobson's Jacques Derrida: 
Opening Lines. Although not addressed to him, Hobson's attention to the 
particular manner of construction employed disrupts Critchley's reduction of 
Derrida's writings to the continual performance of the one function. In using the 
"Mystical Foundation of Authority"' [1989/1990] translated Mary Quaintance in Acts of Religion 
edited by Gil Anidjar (New York & London, Routledge, 2002), pp. 230-298. Hereafter 
abbreviated to FoL followed by page reference. 
40 On 'Violence and Metaphysics', Spivak writes: `Derrida reads Levinas critically, suggesting 
that he too is complicit with philosophy in the Greek. But about the openness of the question, the 
prior claim of responsibility to the trace of the other ... 
he is in agreement. ' `Feminism and 
Deconstruction, Again: Negotiations' in Outside in the Teaching Machine (London, Routledge, 
1993), pp. 121-140; p. 307 fn. 27. 
41 Richard Beardsworth has provided one of the few disputations on this terrain, challenging 
Critchley's claim that Levinas's ethics is needed to supplement deconstruction. He still accepts 
Critchley's general structuring of the intellectual and developmental relations between the two, in 
particular, the argument that Otherwise than Being responds to Derrida's earlier criticisms. 
Richard Beardsworth Derrida and the Political (London & New York, Routledge, 1996), pp. 
122-43. Rudi Visker's challenge to Critchley centres more on the possibility of producing a 
Levinasian position without recourse to metaphysics and , in particular, 
God: only as trace of 
infinity (synonymous with God and Good on Visker's reading) can the face be that which 
commands me. 
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vocabularies of others, `Barthel or Levinas for instance ... Derrida works on them 
by extending his own work into the work of the other he is referring to. He thus 
pays a kind of duty to that work, of care and respect, at the same time as causing 
it to spread out in ways that seem unpredictable. ' [OL 121] This operation is a 
`strange attractor'42. 
This interaction with different texts `leaves aside' any classificatory distinction 
`such as a move into ethics' [OL 5] and concerns itself with the new, not merely 
the acknowledgement of the singular, with both sets of co-ordinates being altered 
by the passage. A modality of philosophical writing is produced that does not 
simply demonstrate a theme of transcendence (ethical or otherwise): it `builds up 
a coherence, not by developing rules for it, but by establishing connections, 
contacts, links and extensions. ' [OL 26] 
Thereby, specific textual events occur solely with reference to particular authors 
or groups of themes. In this way, contra Critchley, Derrida's work on Levinas is 
not allowed to stand as representative for his oeuvre as a whole. Nor is it seen as 
a simple tete-a-tete: the question of the Other is constructed across a terrain 
determined by Husserl and Levinas. 
Where Critchley's account valorises the approach of writing as ethical, Hobson 
sees that "otherness" draws from a metalevel thesis about language43. Language 
as subjective field cannot be gathered into a site of present synthesis; on 
Hobson's reading, this is the `first site of responsibility to the other', not the 
attention to alterity: 
`The excess beyond synthesis in language means that other meanings or the 
possibility of other meanings, future ones as well as past, have to be deferred 
to. But that responsibility may not be answered to - it is because it may 
always possibly not be answered to that there is an ethics. The new cannot 
be programmed for, and ethical response is not merely a result of calculation 
42 Taken from `turbulence theory', `Strange attractor is the name given to a process pattern into 
which a type of turbulence appears to tending (at infinity) to settle. ' [OL 252 fn. 30] 
43 Language in Levinas does not name the determinate system of signs of natural language. It is 
already an ethical concept that becomes more thoroughly thematized as Saying in Otherwise than 
Being. 
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within any `felicific calculus' or theory of `social responsiveness' .... 
' [OL 
138] 
Importantly, she concludes that the 'Other' cannot be treated as a 'lexeme'. since 
it is a `pointer, of a slightly different status, to what cannot be represented' [OL 
141], which means that the Other cannot be interpreted as the Other person 
attributed by Critchley to Levinas's ethics. The concern for the new, the 
openness of responsiveness to otherness, troubles any emphasis on 
transcendence, or `otherwise than being' 44 . 
Dissenting again from any 
imputation of homology, she notes that, for Demda, the other of language is 
within language, an internal difference that Levinas himself has to reject. 
A reading such as Hobson's perhaps avoids the pitfalls of an 'influence model', 
since it acknowledges that Derrida works on Levinas in quite specific ways, 
developing theses which are specific to Derrida, without imputing any 
explanatory homology. Here the characteristic form, in the sense of an 
isomorphism of conceptual content, is disrupted by the variety of writing 
produced. 
5. Later Derrida is profoundly marked by Levinas 
Critchley among others has produced a chronological inflection by articulating 
an `ethico-political turn'. The suggestion here of a change in Derrida's concerns 
in the years after 1980 means that it differs from the claims found in 2 and 3 
above. Such a developmental thesis might challenge a micrological focus on 
individual texts. Yet, the nature of this `turn' is hard to pin down. 
Peter Osborne has described `At this very moment... ' as more of an appreciation 
than a critique and that in the more recent work, 'profoundly marked by 
This is further augmented in Hobson's reading of Derrida's essay, 'At This Very Moment... ' 
hich ww ill be the focus of Chapter Five. At This Ver\ Moment in This Work Here I Am' [ 1980] 
translated by Ruben Berezdin in Re-Reading Levinas edited by Robert Bernasconi & Simon 
Critchle\ (London. Athlone Press. 1901). pp. 11-48. Hereafter abbreviated to. 4TUI followed by 
page reference. 
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Levinas', there has been an `[elision] of the implications of his own earlier 
critique' 45 
From Osborne's ' formation, we would have to specify which implications are 
elided. Owing to which aspects of Levinas? Even here we would have to 
determine both the change in Derrida's systematics and whether any change was 
entirely internal, comprehensible in terms of intellectual development or whether 
polemical, historical and even non-philosophical factors were in play. In a paper 
from 1993 46 , Critchley espies a shift from a constative mode of writing 
concerned with `formulating a `theoretico-historico-interpretative grid' to a 
performative, `quasi-phenomenological' 47 mode, which `is concerned with the 
careful description and analysis of particular phenomena, in order to elucidate 
their deeply aporetic or undecidable structures'48. However, the reduction of this 
performative modality to `textual enactments' means that the conjunctural 
formation of Derrida's writings is not raised 49 . 
For Critchley, the first 
formulations of deconstruction even represent a `false start'; now, with the 
`ethico-political turn', the `grid of grammatology' is left behind. 
Given that Derrida's early work on Husserl is also phenomenological (quasi or 
otherwise)50, this seems an underdeveloped thesis, and might be understood as 
as Peter Osborne The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant Garde (London & New York, Verso, 
1995), p. 224 n. 19. 
46 Simon Critchley `Deconstruction and Pragmatism - Is Derrida a Private Ironist or a Public 
Liberal? ' in Deconstruction. and Pragmatism edited by Chantal Mouffe (London & New York, 
Routledge, 1996); pp. 18-40. 
47 Rudi Visker (Truth and Singularity p. 258) has rightly questioned the obscurity of this term, 
which is also used by Lingis in his introduction to Otherwise than Being [OtB xv]. 
48 Critchley `Deconstruction and Pragmatism', pp. 31-32. 
49 This term is not unrelated to the Althusserian sense of conjoncture. The texts associated with 
the GREPH movement, gathered in Du Droit ä la Philosophie, show an attention to the sphere or 
terrain on and in which philosophical writing is formulated - it is not an ideal, neutral field in 
which theoretical claims are advanced. Derrida Du droit ä la philosophie (Paris, Editions Galilee, 
1990). Translated in English in two volumes: Who's Afraid of Philosophy? Right to Philosophy 1 
translated Jan Plug (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002); Eyes of the University: Right to 
Philosophy 2 translated Jan Plug and others (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004). 
50 Not withstanding a perhaps complicated relation within Derrida's work between 
'deconstruction' and `grammatology', Marrati insists on the consistency between the earliest 
work and the putative `ethico-political turn'. She insists that it cannot be understood as an 
`abandoned first object' and that Derrida's characteristic writing could only be developed through 
Husserl (Genesis and Trace p. xiv). 'Deconstruction, then, is born in Derrida's work on Husserl: 
more than this, however, it is born in the work that Derrida has done with Husserl, thanks to him 
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occasional piece, too reactive in its development as a response to the also-present 
Richard Rorty51. 
By the time we get to the second edition of The Ethics of Deconstruction (1999) 
and his `Introduction' to The Cambridge Companion to Levinas (2001), this 
thesis has been strengthened to the point at which he feels able to claim that 
Derrida's recent work is `largely derived from that of Emmanuel Levinas' [ED 
268 my emphasis]: `The alleged ethical turn of Derrida's thinking might be 
viewed simply as a return to Levinas, one of the major influences on the 
development of his thinking, as is amply evidenced by the 1964 essay ['Violence 
and Metaphysics']. '52 One might again see a further complication in this latter 
sentence which runs counter to a theory of a turn or break. However, this means 
that Critchley advances three distinct kinds of claim about the relation between 
the Derrida and Levinas, each of which requires a different kind of supporting 
demonstration. 
6. Derrida, Levinas and Religion 
Although Hent de Vries does not explicitly distinguish an early from a late 
Derrida and also admits that his analyses move in directions of which the latter 
might not approve, his book Religion and Violence offers a substantial alternative 
to the primarily `ethical' readings listed above 53 . 
By focusing on the texts 
gathered in Du droit: ä la philosophie, de Vries repositions Derrida as a theorist 
of public space and the modem institution in a tradition which commences with 
Kant's Conflict of the Faculties and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
and, ultimately, against him, something that cannot be said of any of the other authors with 
whom Derrida has concerned himself. Not even Heidegger. ' [ibid. p. 181 ] It is important to also 
stress the against for it is in the decentring of temporality from the self-presence of the Living 
Present of Husserl's analysis that Marrati believes ethical tension enters into deconstruction - 
time is open to the other [ibid. p. 182]. 
51 See Rorty Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 
122 if. 
52 `Introduction' to The Cambridge Companion to Levinas edited by Simon Critchley & Robert 
Bernasconi (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 1-32; p. 3. 
53 Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida (Baltimore & London, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
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Reason54. The broader theme of the book is the deconstruction of concepts such 
as culture, identity, integration and difference that play a role in thinking and 
managing political cohesion, whilst refashioning the state-sanctioned role of 
religion and its 'troubled ecclesiastical history of censorship and toleration 55 
Modernity has been framed by the boundaries and limits that secularisation has 
still not overcome, but this is a boon for de Vries, since it is only these resources 
which allow one to address and `remedy' radical evil: `... even where the 
"religious" can no longer be identified as an integral and compelling system of 
belief ... it provides us with the critical terms, argumentative resources, and bold 
imaginary that is necessary for a successful analysis of contemporary culture. '56 
For de Vries, this is `a formally indicated religion defined as the relation to the 
other that does not close itself off in a totality. 'S7 
Correctly championing a correspondence in Derrida's work between the analyses 
of institutions, media, performativity and the various `violences' (or impurities) 
endemic to founding, conceptualising and decision, de Vries positions Derrida as 
only understandable in relation to both Kant and Levinas. Whereas Kant's 
Besuchsrecht describes a political concept of hospitality, Levinas's welcome 
given to the Other describes the beginnings of a relation that breaks with 
ontology. 
sa Conflict of the Faculties [1798] translated by Mary J Gregor (Lincoln, Nebraska University 
Press, 1992). Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason [1793] translated by George di 
Giovanni (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
ss For slightly more detail, see my review of the book. McGettigan `Therefore Religion? ', 
Radical Philosophy 116 (November / December 2002), pp. 43-46. 
56 op. cit. p. 236. 
57 op. cit. p. 16. Lawlor arrives at a comparable conclusion through an idiosyncratic 
interpretation of Specters of Marx, where he espies a call for new theologians who will approach 
the paradox of belief in God after the death of God. This includes a `pantheistic' interpretation of 
Derrida's phrasing: tout autre est tout autre. We have already mentioned the failures of this 
particular book, but, in general, those readers who impose a theological, or `post-theological', 
interpretation on both Levinas and Derrida miss the speculative, political dimension and latch on 
to passages as straightforward statements without concern for the writing strategy determining 
them or the structure and conjuncture in which they appear. This thesis will take care to 
explicate the central place of atheism and anti-theology in Levinas. See, inter alia. John D. 
Caputo The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington & 
Indianapolis; Indiana University Press, 1997). 
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The political inflection of this account distinguishes it from Critchley's later 
insistence on the `moral grammar of everyday life', but, in some ways, provides 
a more robust account of the thesis of the first edition of The Ethics of 
Deconstruction: an account of the political supplement provided by reading 
Derrida alongside Levinas58. 
Derrida on the `Ethico-Political Turn' 
Things are complicated by Derrida's own comments on these matters (and 
Skinner's reservations about such testimony)59. He has discussed explicitly both 
the idea of an `ethico-political turn' and his own understanding of his relation to 
Levinas. 
In a paper included in Deconstruction and Pragmatism, Derrida rejects Rorty's 
distinction between his own early and late work (where the late work is 
represented by Glas and The Postcard and is concerned with self-creation): the 
early work on grammatology represents the `discursive, theoretical conditions' of 
the other writings - they could not have been written without them60. But as 
early as 1980, Derrida outlined a variation in his writing strategy61. Prior to 
1970, he was concerned with the protection and preservation of the question as 
such - the continued pertinence and applicability of the philosophical. His work 
after focused on the transformation of this project into `the call to the wholly 
other'. We have already noted that any rapid equation of positions based on 
vocabulary or homologous formulations is precipitous, but we can see here the 
58 Intriguingly, de Vries insists that Levinas's own position is politically insufficient: it is not 
"deconstructive" and instead resembles the position that Adorno attributes to Augustine's City of 
God. Cf. Theodor Adorno `Progress' translated by Henry W. Pickford in Critical Models: 
Interventions and Catchwords (New York, Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 143-160. 
59 These reservations are absent from the opening paragraph of Herman Rapaport's book: `Of 
course, it is well-known that Derrida has made an ethical turn in the 1980s that has focused on the 
philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas ... 
'. The Later Derrida (London & New York, Routledge, 
2002). 
60 `Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism' in Deconstruction and Pragmatism edited by 
Chantal Mouffe (London, Routledge, 1996), pp. 77-87. 
b1 Les Fins de l'homme. A partir du travail de Jacques Derrida edited by Philippe Lacoue- 
Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy (Paris. Galilee, 1981), pp. 183-84. Cited by Spivak in `Limits and 
Openings of Marx in Derrida' in Outside in the Teaching Machine (London, Routledge, 1993), 
pp. 97 - 119, pp. 98-9. 
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potential justification underlying positions such as Critchleý, *s. Ho\tever. 
Derrida is wary of the meaning of 'turn' in any account of his work in the 1980s 
or 1990s: 
`... there never was ... a political turn or ethical turn 
in "deconstruction", 
at least not as I experience it ... 
If a "turning" turns by "veering" round a 
curve or by forcing one, like wind in one's sails, to "veer" away or change 
tack, then the trope of turning turns poorly or turns bad, turns into the 
wrong image. For it diverts thought or turns it away from what remains to 
be thought; it ignores or runs counter to the thought of the very thing that 
remains to be thought. '62 
Similarly, in `Passions' he argues that his recent writings do not represent a 
`turn', even if they do more frequently address certain ethical or political 
questions: they develop from the earlier writings63. That is to say. the early 
writings are already oriented to political and ethical issues. Much stronger 
claims are made in `Force of Law': 
`It goes without saying that discourses on double affirmation, the gift 
beyond exchange and distribution, the undecidable, the incommensurable or 
the incalculable, on singularity, difference and heterogeneity are also, 
through and through, at least oblique discourses on justice. ... a 
deconstructive questioning that starts ... 
by destabilizing, complicating, or 
recalling the paradoxes of values like those of the proper and of property in 
all their registers, of the subject, and thus of the responsible subject... and 
of all that follows from these; Such a deconstructive questioning is through 
and through a questioning of law and justice. a questioning of the 
foundations of law, morality, and politics. ' [FoL 235] 
On the other hand: 
`... some souls believe themselves to have found in Deconstruction - as if 
there it'ere one, and only one [my italics], a modern form of immorality. of 
amorality, or of irresponsibility ..., while others, more serious, 
in less of a 
hurry, better disposed toward so-called Deconstruction, today claim the 
opposite; they discern encouraging signs and in increasing numbers (at 
times, I must admit, in some of my texts) which would testify to a 
permanent, extreme, direct, or oblique, in any event, an increasingly intense 
attention, to those things which one could identify under the fine names of 
`'2 Jacques Derrida Rogues: Two Essays on Reason [2003] translated by Pascale-Anne Brault & 
Michael Naas (Stanford. Stanford LIniversity Press, 2005), p. 39. Hereafter abbreviated tc' 
Rogues followed by page reference. 
`o" . Passions: 'An Oblique Offering" [ 19921 translated by David Wood in On the Name edited by 
Thomas Dutoit (Stanford. Stanford University Press. 191)5). pp. 3-3 1. Hereafter abbreviated to) 
Passions follo\v cd b\ page reference. 
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"ethics", "morality", "responsibility", "subject". etc. ... [T]he 
remoralisation of deconstruction. which naturally seems more attracti% e 
than that to which it is rightly opposed, but ýk hich at each moment risks 
reassuring itself in order to reassure the other and to promote the consensus 
of a new dogmatic slumber. And it is so that one not be in too much of a 
hurry to say that it is in the name of a higher responsibility and a more 
intractable [intraitable] moral exigency that one declare one's distaste. 
uneven as it may be. for both moralisms. ' [Passions 151 
The thorough-going problematization of justice and law need not be inconsistent 
with a refusal to succumb to a reanimated moralism (particularly one forged in 
reaction to the charges of apolitical relativism). But we should note that the main 
wariness in Derrida's comments relates to a developmental or phased model 
which would separate off this later work - again, we should note that insufficient 
attention 'has been paid to the difference between a turn, a new inflection, a new 
strategy or a break, etc. This lacuna is mainly due to the monolithic notion of 
philosophical writing operating in many of the texts on Derrida - that philosophy 
is constitutively propositional in form and states a position which is held to be 
true by the author as individual, legal person, etc. 
Here one has the suspicion that a pedagogical shorthand has been hypostasised 
without proper warrant. There is no adequate discussion in the literature with 
which we are concerned of what it means to divide an author's work into periods, 
nor how to avoid the danger of a weak intellectual history, particularly when one 
considers the variation in writing practice evinced by Derrida across 
contemporaneous texts; one worries that an illegitimate, but commonplace, 
biographical model is being used to evade the philosophical work needed to 
advance such a claim. 
The `finite' conversation 
You know my admiration and gratitude for Levinas. I consider his thinking 
an immense event of this century. But the troubling 'appropriation' of which 
you speak is not merely catholic and conservative, it can also be that of a 
naive moralism or of a faddish and simplifying mediatisation. In order to try 
and resist, in my way in the texts which I devoted to him, I always insist 
discretely yet clearly on certain reserves, above all on political misgiving's 
(for instance on the topic of the nation of Israel, in . Adieu) or on the 
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paradoxes of his concept of 'the third' and of justice', on the always possible 
perversions of his ethics, on an inevitable 'perjury' at the heart of 'droiture'. *64 
If we are to attribute any more frequent treatment of such themes to the influence 
of Levinas, then further comments from the interview with Magazine Litteraire 
are pertinent. Repeating Levinas's reference to a `contact at the heart of a 
chiasmus', he emphasises the equivocation between the crossing and the 
encounter: each continues afterwards on a separate path. Here Derrida details 
four points of difference between Levinas and himself: 
1. Derrida worries about the discursive strategy and inner workings of 
Levinas's writing, which is not simply to do with style or rhetoric, but 
with the justification of vocabulary, logic, syntax and semantics, which 
sometimes is even borrowed from a Heideggerian ontology6s 
2. The question of sexual difference, where Derrida thinks that the 
discussion of the feminine is subject to an androcentric privileging in 
Levinas. In this context, Derrida cites his interrogation of the concept of 
fraternity in Politics of Friendship as a challenge to Blanchot and Levinas 
(bear in mind Critchley's assembling of this text in support of a later, 
Levinasian Derrida)66. 
3. The status of the animal. 
4. Finally: `Rien n'est plus different, entre Levinas et moi, que la culture et 
l'histoire politiques. Et sans doute que les choix politiques, en France et 
ailleurs. ' 67 (Nothing is more different, between Levinas and me, than 
64 Jacques Derrida `Interview with Thomas Assheuer' in Die Zeit ((March 5,1998) translated 
Peter Krapp - available at http: //www. hydra. umn. edu/derrida/zeit. html . 
65 In comments recorded in the publication entitled Alterites, Derrida makes reference to many of 
the same `differences', but he insists there that these are not `philosophical differences'. It is 
hard to understand this phrase, since what is taken to be most distinctive about deconstruction is 
precisely the treatment of these differences as being of philosophical importance. Jacques 
Derrida and Pierre-Jean Labarriere Alterites (Paris, Editions Osiris, 1986), pp. 74-5. Such 
passages should be compared to the opening remarks in `Violence and Metaphysics' where the 
new questions put to philosophy, non-philosophical questions, are `the only questions today 
capable of founding the community ... of those who are still called philosophers ... 
' [VM 98]. 
66 One could also cite here the discussion of the passages on feminine welcoming in Totality and 
Infinity in Adieu [Adieu 36-45]. `This feminine alterity seems marked by a series of lacks. ' 
[Adieu 36] 
67 A likely reference to Levinas's writings on Israel 
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our political culture and history. And without doubt bete een our political 
choices, in France and elsewhere). 
To clarify, both the second and third points relate directly to the category of the 
other `person'. The fourth relates to any ethical or political assessment of the 
two authors. Incidentally, later in the same article, Derrida writes of the risk of 
depoliticisation in the reception of Levinas, for which Levinas himself is not 
entirely innocent and insists that there is a politics in Levinas. not simply an 
articulation of an ethical demand or impetus towards politics. At the same time. 
he espies a `pretty conservative', determinate political practice, especially with 
respect to the national (from which Derrida stresses his distance), and the 
beginning of a revolutionary politics of hospitality and responsibility towards the 
other. `fette dimension revolutionnaire de l'ecriture de Levinas resisterait, 
selon moi, a toute la «recuperation>> ... 
'68 
It is this danger of recuperation that has not been dispelled by the English- 
language reception of Levinas. This is particularly acute where a reading of 
Levinas is brought close to a post-Wittgensteinian project, a reading of Stanley 
Cavell's notion of acknowledgement, or a straightforward humanism 69 
The approach taken in this thesis 
One might be forgiven for feeling rather frustrated by the vague and varied 
claims made about this relation between Derrida and Levinas, which are often 
developed without reference to each other as competing alternatives, whilst 
simultaneously and ironically valorising a notion of philosophy as conversation. 
It is hard to dismiss the idea that some of these writers suffer from a conception 
of philosophy which precludes philological analysis, and does not allow their 
received notions to be sufficiently challenged. Deleuze and Guattari have poked 
fun at the notion of philosophy as a `symposium'. or dinner part- che; M. Rorthvv 
" This revolutionary dimension in Levinas's writing could resist. in my view. all "recuperation". 
Levinas writes pace Heidegger: 'Humanism has to be denounced onl\ because it is not 
sufficiently human. ' [()rB l-S] 
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[sic]70, where rival opinions can be advanced and challenged, where a plurality of 
interpretations is valued and a happy-clappy reference to conversation, gift and 
friendship serve to mollify the achievements of difficult writers and where 
chiasme (chiasmus) is interpreted as encounter rather than isolated crossing of 
two trajectories71. These conjoined features of isolation and symposium reflect a 
weak model of intellectual production that has not been superseded in any 
putative break from Anglo-American analytic philosophy72. A constructive, 
dialectical model involves explicit argument (even negation! ), not simply the 
quasi-autistic proffering of a plurality of 'readings'. We need readings but not 
the way the idler in the garden of knowledge needs them. 
In light of Derrida's comments cited above, this thesis will begin by treating the 
category of the other in Levinas's writings as a conundrum. Since the notion of 
the other fluctuates in these various readings surveyed, I want to ask: who or 
what counts as the other for Levinas? Especially since the key notion of the 
`face' [le visage], which cannot be equated to any actual countenance, breaks 
with phenomenality - no small issue for an avowed phenomenology. 
My main contention is that Derrida's recent work is generally misread because of 
a prejudice common to both "analytic" and "continental" philosophy: the 
primacy of the constative mode of presentation, that is, philosophical writing 
states what is held to be true in propositional form. Much commentary on 
Derrida extracts thematic content from its various presentational forms, without 
concern for philosophical valency of that form. As Hobson insists, in Derrida's 
writing the organisation of ideas `affects their import' [OL 1] and this structure 
70 Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie? (Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 
1991), p. 138. 
71 `According to the x (The chiasmus) (which can be considered a quick thematic diagram of 
dissemination)... '. Jacques Derrida `Outwork, Prefacing' in Dissemination [1972] translated by 
Barbara Johnson (London, Continuum Press, 2004), p. 33. 
72 See Ernest Gellner's astute observations on the inconsequential results of moving from 
argumentation to observation or description in philosophy. Words and Things [ 1959] 
(Harmondsworth, Pelican books, 1968). Especially Chapter LX "Sociology". Perhaps 
`continental philosophy' is no longer a `cult of paradox and obscurity' (if it ever was), but its 
adherents seem to have no clear idea of the task of philosophy. Those advocating the 
obsolescence of the analytic - continental `divide', so-called `post-analytic' philosophers, are 
even closer to those linguistic philosophers cornered by Gellner. 
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is not simply an effect of style [OL 1-31. Indeed, in light of this, I would not 
want to insist on an easy separation of form and content: part of the `constative 
prejudice' in contemporary philosophy relates to precisely the manner in which 
such a separation is achieved. 
In the more recent writings which reference Levinas, my claim is that the 
ontological and metaphysical concerns presented in the early texts are 
instantiated in the formal structuring of these later essays. Any evaluation of the 
ethical or political value of deconstruction, and hence the relation of Derrida to 
Levinas, must address itself not only to the presented content of its statements 
but to the conditions of its philosophical presentation 73. 
Without foregrounding the question of formal presentation, one perhaps allows a 
dominant ethical discourse to determine the co-ordinates or criteria on which any 
evaluation of deconstruction is based. That is to say, in connecting Derrida to 
Levinas, one has already made a decision about the value of content over form: 
ethics is either that determined by Levinas, or as determined by a received 
philosophical tradition. Precisely what is `new' in Derrida's writing might be 
suppressed from the off. 
With respect to Levinas, perhaps paradoxically (prima facie), given his 
distinction between the Saying and the Said, his work is much more amenable to 
thematization, but the ambition and strangeness of project has been missed in the 
English literature74. In particular, we will see how even the translation decision 
to differentiate autre and autrui, by use of other and Other respectively, misses 
the systematic use of capitalisation of both terms by Levinas to indicate ideas. 
73 Deconstruction, in Derrida's first writings, expressly concerns itself with such presentation and 
its connection to the problem of theoretical foundation. 
74 This is exemplified by Hilary Putnam's contribution to The Cambridge Companion to Levinas. 
To present, in conclusion, Levinas as Isaiah Berlin's hedgehog, who knows one big thing well, is 
to miss completely the range of his work and writings as it attempts to displace Hegel and 
Hobbes. Visker's presentation of this project as anti-modern captures its theoretical positioning 
and contests those like Zygmunt Bauman who see Levinas as a postmodern thinker of ethics 
(Truth and Singularity p. 124 fn. 21). Putnam `Levinas and Judaism' in The Cambridge 
Companion to Levinas edited by Simon Critchley & Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), pp. 33-62. Zygmunt Bauman Postmodern Ethics (Oxford. Blackwell, 
1993). 
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Moreover, Autrui has a reference to the idea of Infinity in Totality and Infinity 
that cannot be found in the Anglo-American "tradition' of the other person or 
other minds. 
II 
Problems facing research on Derrida and Levinas 
Problem 1: Volatility in Levinas's oeuvre 
Although we have noted that Levinas is more amenable to thematization than 
Derrida, the volatility of his thought over the years means that it is a difficult task 
to nail down what is meant by a Levinasian position such that it could then be 
attributed to the latter. With only oblique retractions, long hiatuses and belated 
resumptions of thematics, there is a need for a labour of philological 
reconstruction prior to any such presentation 75. 
Perhaps `volatility' is not the right word for a writing career that began in 1930 
and continued past the publication of Otherwise than Being in 1974 76 .A 
member of the generation that received its philosophical training in France 
before the impact of Husserl and Heidegger, his early work is energised by the 
encounter of these thinkers with his earlier influences: Bergson and Durkheim77. 
By Otherwise than Being, his footnotes refer to Foucault, Derrida, Ricoeur, 
Merleau-Ponty and others. 
I here follow the third of Howard Cavgill's 'protocols' for constructing a reading of Levinas - 
one must follow the chronological development of his thought to avoid the luxury of 
anachronistic pursuit of thematic parallels that is enjoyed by many commentators' [L&P 3 J. 
`' \'isker has described these texts as a 'moving minefield' constituting a new start compared to 
the earlier tiýork (Truth and Singularity p. 235.264) even though he rules out the possibility that 
there might be a major shift, or 'caesura'. between Totality and Infinirn and Otherwise than Being 
tibid. p. 129 fn. °'. 
7' See the first chapter (if C av gill's Levinas and the Political. 
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Jacques Rolland attributes the birth of a distinctive project to the publication of 
De l'evasion in 193678. Amongst the `real discontinuities', he emphasises the re- 
appearance of that work's analysis of pleasure 40 years later in Otherwise than 
Being79. What passes uncommented is the systematic changes which preclude 
this analysis from forming part of Totality and Infinity. The analysis of shame 
and nausea, modelled on Geworfenheit and pre-empting La Nausee by a couple 
of years80, is replaced by the shame generated by the encounter with the Other as 
master who reveals the arbitrary basis of my self-assertion. Indeed the 
experience of a fatality that one cannot desert, of being `riveted to an experience 
one has not chosen', is supplanted in its philosophical functioning by the egoism 
of separation. Levinas pointedly remarks: 
`I live from the whole content of life - even from the labor which ensures 
the future; I live from my labor as I live from air, light, and bread. The limit 
or borderline case [le cas limite] in which need prevails over enjoyment, the 
proletarian condition condemning to accursed labor in which the indigence 
of corporeal existence finds neither refuge nor leisure at home, is the absurd 
world of Geworfenheit. ' [TI 146-7] [translation altered] 
But with the shift from the figure of the host to that of the hostage with the later 
work, comes a rejection of separation and the chez soi in favour of proximity and 
the trauma of a fundamental Urimpression. In his description of Saying as 
`Exposure to Another', the alternative position, presented by way of contrast, is 
his own earlier position from Totality and Infinity: 
`Saying taken strictly is a "signifyingness dealt the other, " prior to all 
objectification; it does not consist in giving signs. The "giving out of signs" 
would amount to a prior representation of these signs, as though speaking 
consisted in translating thoughts into words and consequently in having 
been first for-oneself and at home with oneself [chez soi], like a substantial 
consistency. The relationship with the other would then extend forth as an 
78 `Getting out of Being by a New Path' in On Escape translated by Bettina Bergo (Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 3-48. Richard A. Cohen attributes this genesis of a new 
project to Levinas's reading of Franz Rosenzweig's Star of Redemption in 1935, whilst Caygill 
identifies a fundamental reworking of the previously employed Heideggerian categories after 
1945 [L&P 49). Cohen `Forward to Second Edition' in The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's 
Phenomenology translated by Andre Orianne (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1995), 
pp. ix-1i; p. xxiv. Franz Rosenzweig The Star of Redemption translated by William W Hallo 
(Notre Dame, Notre Dame Press, 1985 edition). 
79 Jacques Rolland `Annotations' in op. cit. pp. 74-95; pp. 79-83. 
80 Jean-Paul Sartre Nausea [ 19381 translated by Robert Baldick (London. Penguin Books, 1965) 
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intentionality, out of a subject posited in itself and for itself, disposed to 
play, sheltered from all ills and measuring by thought the being disclosed as 
the field of this play. ' [OtB 48]81 
The diachrony produced by the proximity of the other reconfigures the thinking 
of temporality. In Existence and Existents, temporality was understood through 
the fecundity of the creation in which the present was formed as a break with 
being82. Hypostasis is the key term designating an existence that arises over and 
above impersonal Being to gain autonomy. Indeed, here Levinas insists that the 
subject does not exist before the event of this position-taking out of which the 
present is formed: a present which breaks with the Bergsonian notion of duration. 
The analysis of fecundity is altered in Totality and Infinity; it persists in a minor 
mode in the analysis of separation and egoism (the production of inner 
temporality) [TI 58] but its functional place is expanded to connect to paternity 
and the child (the creation of infinite time as a correction of Heidegger's being- 
towards-death). Such a transformation parallels the changing status of eros and 
the feminine. In Existence and Existents, the relationship with nudity is the `true 
experience of the otherness of the other' [E&E 40]. Moreover, it is the 
heterogeneity of genders from which `society and time are to be understood': 
alterity only comes from dialogue with the other83. 
Totality and Infinity's distinction between the discreet Other of intimacy who is 
the pre-condition for the dwelling and separation (the other addressed as `tu') and 
the Other as Master, addressed as `vous', is crucial for the formulation of 
metaphysical Desire and the transition from egoist being to ethical relation. All 
this is supplanted in Otherwise than Being by the `seed of folly', the contact 
more ancient than any recuperable past which prompts disinterestedness. The 
S' See also OtB 56 & OtB 115-16. 
S2 The present is formed in taking charge of present. Hence, the existential significance accorded 
to fatigue and indolence: the difficulty of creation and the `despair of the finite being who is not 
up to his ambitions'. Existence and Existents [1947] translated by Alphonso Lingis corrected 
edition (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 31-35 & 81 if. Hereafter 
abbreviated to EddE followed by page reference. 
33 One could perhaps argue that `dialogue' is transformed via `language' in Totality and Infinity 
to 'saving as exposure' in Otherwise than Bein; - but this \\ould mask the alteration of the 
:v stematics which sees nt o sexed others in Totality, and Infinite and )n. ly one unsexed other in 
otherwise than Being. 
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latter is no longer the familiar category from the philosophical tradition: a 
complicated pun in French des-inter-esse signals the potential disinterment from 
being (esse in Latin) at the heart of the subject (as distinct from consciousness) 84. 
There are other features we could also examine, for example: the changing status 
of phenomenology in Levinas's methodology; the fortunes of the metaphor of the 
`neighbour'; the relation to Sartre and Husserl; the late appearance of themes and 
vocabulary from Ricoeur's Conflicts of Interpretation 85 (most notably 
'kerygma'); the changing relation to Kierkegaard86, etc.. In order to manage this 
plethora of displacements I will focus on just two topographies: those of Totality 
and Infinity, which is described by Levinas as his `first book', and Otherwise 
than Being. Not only are these the most significant works, but they bear directly 
on the relation to Derrida, since Derrida extensively reviewed the former, and 
commentators, such as Critchley, have understood the latter as a response to that 
review. I perhaps should have made something clearer: from Totality to 
Otherwise we also find a shift in "ethical" economy from apology ('I offer my 
world to the other' [TI 91-2]) to the nazirate that renounces conatus (I fast so that 
the world might have bread [OtB 56])87. These themes too briefly presented 
above will be dealt with in detail in Part One and Chapter 4. 
But here I should flag up the importance I give to a reconstruction, a la Janik and 
Toulmin, of Levinas's influences. While the general aim of this thesis is to 
delimit the claims that Derrida is influenced by Levinas, part of this argument is 
made by foregrounding what the latter receives from Franz Rosenzweig (and 
Marburg Neo-Kantianism more generally) in the metaphysical underpinnings of 
84 Here we can still discern the diminishing of Bergson's conception of action (as opposed to 
habit). 
85 The Conflict of Interpretations [ 1969] edited by Don Ihde [ 1974] (London, Continuum, 2004) 
86 Compare TI 305 to `Enigma and Phenomenon' [1965] translated by Alphonso Lingis (revised 
by Simon Critchley & Robert Bernasconi) in Basic Philosophical Writings edited by Adriaan T. 
Peperzak, Simon Critchley & Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana 
University Press, 1996) pp. 65-77; p. 71. Hereafter abbreviated to Enigma followed by page 
reference. 
87 'There must be a nazirate so that the third world, so-called underdeveloped mankind, can eat its 
fill, so that the West, despite its abundance, does not revert to the level of an underdeveloped 
mankind .... 
To feed the world is a spiritual activity. ' Emmanuel Levinas `The Youth of Israel' 
translated by Annette Aronowicz in Nine Talmudic Readings [1970] (Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1990), pp. 120-35; p. 133. 
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the `encounter with the face as the Idea of the Infinite' and the ethico-political 
consequences of that metaphysical orientation. While Caygill has catalogued the 
importance of such events of the Dreyfus affair [L&P 7-10] and National 
Socialism, and detailed the `main currents of French philosophy' [LAP 9] in 
which Levinas received his education, my supplementary emphasis concerns 
`what is too often present in [Levinas's] work to be cited' [TI 28]. Moreover, 
this legacy in its general scope regarding the relation of Being and Idea remains 
constant between Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. It Is only by 
gauging this fundamental dimension of Levinas's writing that his full ambition 
can be discerned along with its speculative differentiation from Derrida's 
concerns. 
Problem 2: Is Levinas's writing philosophy? 
The problem with any self-styled phenomenological method is that its descriptive 
analysis and presentation cannot rely on any deductive force - it appeals to the 
reader re-enacting the same processes concurrently 88 . If one finds this 
uncompelling, then its transcendental claims are in jeopardy. This is particularly 
acute for Levinas, since his metaphysical co-ordinates rebuff any transcendental 
moment - there is no place for Husserlian Einfühlung [TI 72,210; OtB 119-20] - 
in favour of transcendence. 
How then to understand intellectual compulsion in Levinas's presentation? 
Derrida has famously referred to a development `... that is neither purely 
descriptive nor purely deductive. It proceeds with the infinite insistence of 
waves on a beach ... '. These challenges mean that 
Derrida describes it as `a 
work of art and not a treatise'. This kind of comment is leapt on by a fawning 
commentary that expresses distaste for analytical rough and tumble. But it fails 
to see the veiled criticism here regarding the pivotal function of Levinas's 
88 See Fichte and Husserl. Johann Gottlieb Fichte `A Crystal Clear Report to the General Public 
concerning the Actual Essence of the Newest Philosophy' translated by John Botterman and 
William Rasch in Philosophy of German Idealism edited by Ernst Behler (New York, Continuum, 
1987); pp. 39-115. See pages 44 if. Husserl's topics of teaching included several seminars in 
`Phenomenological Exercises': see the list of teaching topics in the Appendix to Rudolf Bernet, 
Iso Kern & Eduard Marbach An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology [19891 (Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press, 1993). pp. 235-245. 
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metaphors ('not always ... beyond rhetorical abuse' 
[VM 398 n. 7]). Such a note 
connects to the later comments, where the failure to think through the use of 
metaphor marks Totality and Infinity out as `empiricism' whose only fault is to 
be confused with" philosophy [VM 189]. 
There are extra dimensions here: 
1. If Otherwise than Being tries to escape the overly ontological language of 
Totality and Infinity by moving towards a performative mode of `textual 
enactment', this problem of philosophical status is heightened. Critchley 
has written of the `tortuously beautiful, rhapsodic incantations' of 
Otherwise than Being89. But are we not within our rights to demand an 
account of how this is differentiated from a sermon, encomium or 
hagiography? 90 Should we recall Derrida's suspicion about the 
incantatory reference to the Other in our opening citation? 
2. It is not clear how such forms of writing evade Ricoeur's masters of 
suspicion: Marx, Nietzsche, Freud. Levinas's attempts to deal explicitly 
with the problem of ideology - either mistaking it for a problem solely 
pertaining to science91 or incorporating it into the enigma or ambiguity of 
transcendence in Otherwise than Being - are far from convincing [OtB 
1521. 
3. The English-language reception of Levinas ought to be more troubled by 
the manner in which Levinas's writing is tied to French idiom. Not only 
89 `Introduction' to The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, p. 19. 
90 The excessive expressions are described as `paroxysms' by Paul Ricoeur, who insists that this 
is not attributable to style. Oneself as Another [1990] translated by Kathleen Blarney (Chicago 
and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 337-38. 
91 `The suspicions engendered by psychoanalysis, sociology and politics weigh on human identity 
such that we never know to whom we are speaking and what we are dealing with when we build 
our ideas on the basis of human facts. But we do not need this knowledge in the relationship in 
which the other is a neighbor and in which before being an individuation of the genus man, a 
rational animal, a free will, or any essence whatever, he is the persecuted one for whom I am 
responsible to the point of being hostage for him. ' [OtB 59] 
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are etymologies used extensively with suasive intent 92 , but they are 
valorised in `Meaning and Sense' 93 Metaphors and allusions are 
notoriously resistant to translation (even glossed, rhetorical force is 
diminished), but Levinas also makes arguments from grammatical 
categories, which resemble the speculative grammar of Rosenzweig94. 
That the French term for self, soi, is undeclinable [OtB 107] or that the 
pronomial form of reflexive verbs illuminates a truth of existence 95 
carries no weight in English, especially when the latter are normally 
rendered by the passive in Lingis's translations of Totality and Infinity 
and Otherwise than Being. 
Ironically these features of writing style bring Levinas close to the eulogy for `re- 
description' found in Rorty's Contingency, Irony, Solidarity. The idea of 
poeticizing philosophy by using it as the material for ironic self-creation, rather 
than public, propositional argumentation, might catch certain aspects of 
Levinas's paleonymy. A `strong poet', who doesn't argue or justify, Levinas 
could be understood to follow Rorty's self-presentation: `So my strategy will be 
to try to make the vocabulary in which these objections are phrased look bad, 
thereby changing the subject, rather than granting the objector his choice of 
weapons and terrain by meeting his criticisms head on. '96 Indeed, as we will see, 
92 `Le recueillement se refire ä un accueil. ' Totalite et Infini: Essai sur l'exteriorite [1961] 
(Dordrecht, Kluwer. Academic, 1971), p. 165. Hereafter abbreviated to Tel followed by page 
reference. An English reader finds no force in the line, "Recollection refers to a welcome", and it 
is not clear what other argument is advanced to support this analysis of the dwelling and the 
feminine from Totality and Infinity. 
93 'Here lies the essential justification and great force of Heidegger's etymologies, which, starting 
with the impoverished and flat meaning of a term apparently designating a content of external or 
psychological experience, lead toward a global situation in which a totality of experiences is 
assembled and illuminated.... Experience is a reading, the understanding of meaning an exegesis, 
a hermeneutics and not an intuition. ' `Meaning and Sense' [1964] in Basic Philosophical 
Writings edited by Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley & Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 33-64; pp. 37-8. Hereafter abbreviated to MS followed by 
page reference. 
94 See Ricoeur's comments about the need to redeem the idioms of a single language in order to 
become philosophical (Oneself as Another, p. 4). 
95 `The self involved in maintaining oneself, losing oneself or finding oneself again is not a result, 
but the very matrix [matrice] of the relations or events that these pronomial verbs express. ' [OtB 
104] 
op. cit. p. 44. 
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a certain resonance with pragmatism (in its Neo-Kantian forms) animates the 
ultimate justification of presenting this new., yet old, vocabular\ 9 
My tack will be different. I will suspend the question of the status of Levinas's 
writing the better to present the topographies of his philosophy as 
Weltanschauung or standpoint, without concern for any protocols which might 
attempt to warrant its assertability. The co-ordinates of his position can be 
isolated from the rhetorical or analytic dimension, whilst flagging up the 
consistent use of terms. 
Problem 3: The Multivalency of Derrida's Output 
Having pared down our focus on Levinas to the two major works, we are faced 
with a greater problem in our treatment of Derrida. At the time of his death, over 
fifty books and booklets were attributed to him, with more to come 
posthumously. The range and writing strategy evinced by these works is 
unprecedented in recent philosophy. The proffered developmental models 
attempt to manage these texts chronologically by separating his output into 
phases with different theoretical concerns, but these schemas fail to attend to the 
multi-track structure - the plurality of deconstructions - and the subtle difference 
between deconstruction and grammatology. While our focus will begin with 
`Violence and Metaphysics', the three texts that appeared in 1967 (Speech and 
Phenomena98, Of Grammatology, Writing andDifference99) provide the detailed 
analyses for appreciating some of its looser formulations. Grouped under the 
name "Derrida", these texts are generally misunderstood as signifying a single 
project entitled, "deconstruction". Here, I insist on three distinct but interrelated 
strands. I do not intend to group different Derridean pieces exclusively under 
one or other category; rather, these strands operate simultaneously across 
Q- Certainly, Levinas's re-presentation of philosophy as the moderation of competing demands in 
the political sphere also chimes with Rorty's deflationary opposition to foundation-mongering. 
98 Spccch and Phenomena and other essays on Husserl 's Theory of Signs [ 1967] translated by D. 
B. Allison (Evanston. Northwestern University Press, 19 3). Hereafter abbreviated to SP 
tooIlo\v, ed b\ page reference. 
"`' Writing and Differeric¬' [1967] translated by Alan Bass [1978] (Lyndon & New Yt ýo:. 
Routledge, 2001) 
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individual tracts and do not reduce to any simple stand-off between structuralism 
and phenomenology 
The first strand engages with Husserlian phenomenology, in particular the 
transition to genetic transcendental phenomenology of the Krisis-period texts and 
the rethinking of the ideality of objectivity as dependent on the iteration of 
writing 100. Derrida traces the motivation for this late development to the 
potential undermining of intuition's evidential certainty (and hence the Absolute 
ego) by the analyses of the role of temporality and the alter ego in the 
constitution of experience. In Logical Investigations, these difficulties are 
evaded by appeal to the auto-affection of the voice heard by my ear as the 
guarantor of presence and certainty '01 
Deconstruction examines the history of philosophy, through close reading of its 
texts, for unwarranted privileging of speech over writing. That this does not 
simply amount to an overturning of philosophy can be seen in the second strand 
(chiefly, in the essays of Writing and Difference). Opposing a discourse of the 
human sciences seeking to circumscribe philosophy as one of its objects, Derrida 
demonstrates the persistence of unrecognised metaphysics, dependent on 
philosophical inheritance, within those disciplines. 
Grammatology, to conclude this tri-partition, amounts to a displacement of 
Saussurian linguistics. The results of Derrida's Husserlian meditations are taken 
up into the structure of the sign by suggesting that the signified is structured not 
unlike the signifier: the intentional object is determined not simply by what is 
present. The neologism, differance, with its play on difference and deferral, 
thereby names the consequences for understanding meaning in this ne,. 
structure. Grammatology is announced as a science of writing, an aberrant 
semiotics, which, following Peirce's Rhetoric, studies the laws by which signs 
100 Edmund Husserl The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenanenologv:. 4it 
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy [1935/361 translated by David Carr i Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press, 1970). Hereafter abbreviated to Crisis followed b\ page 
reference. 
'° Edmund Husserl Logical Investigations 2"d edition [1901.191' ] translated by J. \ Findlay 
(London & Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). 
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produce other signs, and hence, the `the originarv appurtenance of desire to 
discourse, of discourse to history of the world, and the already -there-ness of the 
language in which desire deludes itself' [Gramm 139]. A taxonomic 
displacement of ontology (i. e. a non-idealist inquiry into the constituted and 
constituting subject) examines the productivity of signs and sign-systems (texts). 
discursive and non-discursive, as aggregated in the `general text'. 
Far from being simply surpassed or left behind, the grammatological operators of 
citation, erasure, paleonymy and banalisation may, as noted by Spivak, have 
`gone underground' in the genealogies and ventriloquism of the late writing1° 
A more acute reading need not see the shift of attention to the received concepts 
of ethics, law and justice as displacing the meta-level theses of deconstruction 
regarding the metaphysical status of language, speech and presence. It rather 
pays heed to the attenuated political consequences of that metaphysics as it 
`[haunts] school manuals, selected extracts, or popular opinion' [Gramm 117] in 
surreptitiously forging the (institutional) space of discourse with its forces, both 
philosophical and non-philosophical. 
In some ways, the entire question of the relation between Levinas and Derrida is 
mistaken since it has not sufficiently assimilated the radicality of Demda's 
challenge to academic philosophical writing. This is a problem for this thesis 
because it requires treatment on an altogether larger scale; all that can be done 
here is mark out the evidence for_ the necessity of rethinking the dominance (and 
efficacy) of constative, propositional writing through the demand produced from 
this particular case study. That is, Derrida's 'engagement' with Levinas 
illuminates a previously ignored hiatus in the secondary literature - it does not 
occur in a neutral, purely theoretical space. It is this dimension of Derrida's 
writing that raises a different set of problems relating to the urg«ncv of decision 
and responsibility as it reflexively relates to the very conditions of its \% citing. 
And such a responsibility can only be articulated, if at all, in relation to a broader 
question: what is the task of philosoph,, ? 
10' Spi\ ak 'Limits and Openings of Marx in Derrida'. 
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`If there were a community, or even a communism of writing, it would above 
all be on condition that war be waged on those. the greatest number, the 
strongest and the weakest at the same time, who forge and appropriate for 
themselves the dominant usages of language... ' [P©F71]. 
There is a Popperian dimension to this thesis in that it aims to test and falsify the 
hypothesis that the late Derrida is Levinasian or prompted by a simple. Positive 
engagement with Levinas (generally as a homage or an extension of his work). 
These claims regarding influence constitute philosophical claims: that the 
characteristic content of Derrida's writing can be found in Levinas. 
To this end, this thesis reassembles the material organised by Critchlev and 
shows how it can and should be read otherwise. In the course of this repetition, a 
more general thesis comes to the fore; it relates to the distortion of both figures 
through received protocols of reading and assumptions about the structure of 
philosophy. Chiefly it concerns: 
1. the relation to the history of philosophy and history more generally; 
?. the sub-categories of philosophy (metaphysics, political philosophy, ethics, 
etc. ) and their inter-relation; 
3. the relation between theory and practice or pure and practical reason. 
These are all displaced by both Levinas and Derrida. There is a constitutive 
inability to comprehend the ambition of both thinkers resulting from the 
persistent collapse of their claims into familiarity. It is this that this thesis resists 
by insisting on the speculative ambition of both writers. 
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Structure of Chapters 
PART ONE Totality and Infinity 
Chapter 1 
Totality and Infinity 1- Separation and Transcendence 
Chapter 2 
Totality and Infinity 2- the Idea of the West and the otherness of the Other 
These two chapters provide a close reading of Totality and Infinity and its 
contemporary, `Meaning and Sense', to interrogate Levinas's concept of the 
"Other" [Autrui] as the encounter with the idea of the infinite in the face. I 
examine the material, socio-cultural and linguistic conditions of possibility' for 
this encounter. Levinas mobilises the resources of his neo-Kantian precursor, 
Franz Rosenzweig, to oppose the perceived nihilistic consequences of 
structuralist anthropology's contestation of ethnocentrism. 
Levinas's speculative political project is radically distinct from its presentation 
in the English-language literature. Its politico-philosophical task is the 
production, generalisation and institutionalisation of this idea of transcendence in 
the world: only this task gives meaning to human existence. However, the 
material and cultural constraints of the encounter with the Other restrict the 
guiding idea to the prosperous inheritors of the Judaeo-Christian legacy. In sum, 
the Other opposes a valorisation of alterity qua otherness. 
PART TWO 
Au Coeur du Chiasme - the exchange between Levinas and Derrida 
Chapter 3 
Derrida's critique of Levinas in 'Violence and Metaphysics' 
`Violence and Metaphysics' is an extended review of Lev inas's major wi ork. 
Totality, and Infinity. I argue that Derrida is offering a critique of Lev inns, to 
ýý hic h there is a three-fold dimension: 
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1. Derrida contests Levinas's reading of the history of philosophy as the 
history of the Same: the tradition anticipates much of Levinas"s concern 
for the other. 
2. Levinas borrows the resources from philosophical tradition from %% hich 
he claims to be breaking. 
3. Since the presentation does not justify its discursive resources, it 
collapses into what Derrida calls "empiricism". 
Additionally, I emphasise the space Derrida devotes to a programmatic statement 
of his own speculative project in contrast to Levinas's. These statements are 
developed with respect to Derrida's main writings from the 1960s. 
Chapter 4 
Otherwise than Being 
Levinas is taken to respond to Derrida's criticisms by developing the distinction 
between the Saying [le Dire] and the Said [le Dit] in Otherwise than Being. The 
chapter begins by demonstrating how this thematization fails to meet the 
philosophical charges outlined by Derrida. It then proceeds to analyse its 
specific topography in detail. The main difference is a shift in the very idea of 
the Other to the proximal other in me interpreted as a diachrony resulting from a 
contact more ancient than memory can recuperate. 
Chapter 5 
The Metaphysical Standoff 
This chapter examines two further episodes in the "conversation" between 
Levinas and Derrida. `Wholly Otherwise' 103 is Levinas's contribution to a 
collection devoted to Derrida. It has been the subject of a rose-tinted 
interpretation in English-language literature. I demonstrate here that this 
interpretation is unsubstantiated and is based upon an eagerness to project an 
"affinity" between the two. Instead, 'Wholly Other,, vise' is a polemical re- 
statement of position against Derrida, whom he sees as trapped ýN ithin ontology. 
10' '\Vholk, Other\w ise' [ 19; ] in Re-Reading Levinas edited by Robert Bernasconi & Simon 
Critchley (London, Athlone Press. 1991). pp. 3-10. Hereafter abbreviated to WhO followed by 
page rc terence. 
43 
Introduction - Derrida, Levinas and the question of influence 
revolving in the `circle of Being and nothingness' [ýý7z0 7]. 
`At this Very Moment in this Work Here I Am' was written by Derrida in 1980, 
again for a Festschrift, this time in honour of Levinas. My reading suggests that 
its complexity in large part stems from a performative (parodic) demonstration 
of how Levinas would have to write were he to remain faithful to his newly 
introduced theory of language and its relation to what is beyond being. 
PART THREE Reading Derrida Otherwise 
Chapter 6 
Conjunctural Writings: Derrida's later writing on Levinas 
This chapter consists of a critical survey of the major texts referring to Levinas 
produced by Derrida since the mid-1980s. In contrast to readers who mine these 
texts for propositional content, I attend in particular to the practice of citation 
and argumentative structure to illustrate how these apparently "stylistic" features 
instantiate the thematics examined earlier and hence resist simplistic readings. I 
show that Derrida differs from Levinas crucially with respect to both the concept 
of the other and futural orientation. 
After the conclusion, I have included two Appendices, the first of which offers 
an interpretation of Husserl's writings from the mid-1930s to show how similar 
Neo-Kantian themes are present in his understanding of science. Appendix B 
offers a brief outline of a way to return to this material from a 'grammato logical' 
perspective. 
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Part One 
Totality and Infinity 
The aim of these first two chapters is to connect a persistent theme in Levinas of a 
fundamental, insurmountable, structural difference between Judaeo-Christian Europe 
and Asian civilisation to the thematics of the Other. The question guiding my reading 
of Levinas is simply: are all humans Others? Or rather, can all humans encounter the 
face of the Other as an idea of the infinite? And if not, what distinguishes those who 
are able to do so from the rest of humanity? 
These chapters will focus on Levinas's major work, Totality, and Infinity, and its near- 
contemporary, `Meaning and Sense', from 1964. In my view, the latter has central 
importance because it is a polemical engagement with Merleau-Ponty's advocacy of 
structural anthropology (chiefly, Claude Levi-Strauss) insofar as the latter resists any 
hierarchialisation of cultures. This `ontology of decolonisation' is rejected by 
Levinas, because, in the final analysis it leads to nihilism. 
The first chapter concentrates on a description of the basic mechanics of the ego and 
the encounter with the Other: the characteristic form of Levinas's philosophy. 
Chapter Two illustrates how these very mechanics instantiate the obstacles to 
universality mentioned above. 
45 
Chapter One 
Totality and Infinity 1- Separation and Transcendence 
`L'Autre en tant qu'autre est Autrui.... Cette experience absolue dans le face a 
face oü l'interlocuteur se presente comme l'etre absolu (c'est a dire comme 
l'etre soustrait aux categories), ne serait pas concevable pour Platoiz sans 
l'entremise des Idees. Mais l'idee platonicienne que fixe le penseur, equi'vaur- 
elle a un objet sublime et perfectionne? La parente entre l'Ame et les Idees ... West-elle qu'une metaphore idealiste exprimant la permeabilite de 1 'eire a la 
pensee? L'idealite de l'ideal se reduit-elle ä un accroissement superlatif des 
qualites ou nous amene-t-elle a une region oü les titres ont un visage, c'est ä dire 
sont presents dans leur propre message? Hermann Cohen - en cela platonicien 
- soutenait qu'on ne pent aimer que des idees - mais la notion de l'Idee equivaut 
en fin de compte a la transmutation de l'autre en Autrui. ' 
Totalite et Infini pp. 67-68 
`The other qua other is the Other. ... 
The absolute experience in the face to face, 
in which the interlocutor presents himself as absolute being (that is, as being 
withdrawn from the categories), would for Plato be inconceivable without the 
interposition of the Ideas. ... But is the Platonic Idea attended to by the thinker 
equivalent to a sublimated and perfected object? Is the kinship between the Soul 
and the Ideas ... 
but an idealist metaphor expressing the permeability of being to 
thought? Is the ideality of the ideal reducible to a superlative extension of 
qualities, or does it lead us to a region where beings have a face, that is, are 
present in their own message? Herman [sic] Cohen (in this a Platonist) 
maintained that one can love only ideas; but the notion of an Idea is in the last 
analysis tantamount to the transmutation of the other into the Other. ' 
Totality and Infinity p. 71 
The temptation was to hold this citation back, to set up a puzzle, a conundrum, 
and then provide the key. Admittedly, this is a puzzle that has been circulating 
around the secondary literature on Emmanuel Levinas in various forms for a 
number of years: what is the status of l'Autrui? 
Levinas's characteristic idea of first philosophy lying in the ethical relation 
generated by the face-to-face encounter with the Other has generally been 
understood in a familiar humanist. anti-bureaucratic sense: it is in this 
fundamental personal contact that I am struck b% my commonality \ ith the other. 
This dimension is taken to be forgotten or occluded in the monster states of the 
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twentieth century and by philosophies which privilege such state-forms. with 
their mediating institutions, as fundamental to equality. 
However, those who have sought resources in Levinas for a project of anti- 
racism have been confounded by some of his comments about non-white, non- 
western cultures. In addition, many of his advocates have been confused by the 
metaphysical apparatus assembled in support of the valorisation of the 'face' (le 
visage). These features are understood biographically or as functionless 
remnants of religious beliefs or personal prejudices. I have brought the above 
quotation to the fore, because it is in the notion of the Idea and its employment in 
a neo-Kantian fashion that one can see how these two problems are related - the 
otherness of the Other is not given, transcendental or universal - its interpretation 
as such depends on the `interposition of ideas'. My suggestion is that these ideas 
in Levinas should be understood in the neo-Kantian context of both Franz 
Rosenzweig and the cited Hermann Cohen 1. 
In Cohen's `critical idealism' the idea is understood in the form of the hypothesis, 
which is a search for ground via the activity of thought'. This production of the 
idea allows the verification of concepts and the critical grounding of being in this 
process. Taking his cue from Kepler, who is understood to inaugurate 
`authentically scientific idealism', Cohen writes: 
`Being is not ' grasped as an immediate datum -a prejudice on which 
sensualism is founded - but it is thought as a universal project, as a problem 
that scientific research must solve and whose reality it must prove. As a 
hypothesis, the idea is then by no means the solution of the problem, but 
only the exact definition of the problem itself. '3 
it is too often forgotten, when one is interested in Husserl and Heidegger, that this neo-Kantian 
sequence has largely determined the context in which, that is to say also against which, Husserl's 
phenomenology. later the phenomenological ontology of the early Heidegger (who, besides, 1: 1 - 
succeeded Cohen in his Marburg chair ... 
), in a way arose: against neo-Kantianism and in 
another relation to Kant. ' Jacques Derrida 'Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jew, the German 
[ 1989] translated by Moshe Ron in Acts of Religion edited by Gil Anidjar (Ne,, York & London. 
Routledge, 2002), pp. 1-37-188, p. 140. For the dominance of neo-Kantianism in the France of 
the early twentieth century. see Vincent Descombes Modern French Philosophy [1979] translated 
by L. Scott-Fox & J. M. Harding (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1980). And the 
discussion in C a4'4gill's first chapter [especially L&P 9 ff. ]. 
` In this regard sec Plato's . 
Ileno. Aleno' in 
. 
'feno and Other Dialogues translated by Robin 
\Vaterfield (Oxford, Oxford University Press. 200 ). pp. 99-1-43; pp. 1,4-25. 
Deutschtum und Judentram §4 cited by Derrida in 'Interpretations at « ar'. p. 155. 
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The idea is originary [ürsprunglich] in that it sets the test it itself must 
undergo. The privileging of the Idea as that which orients the task 
(Aufgabe) of practical philosophy depends for its justification or validity on 
a peculiar temporality. The idea receives its justification from a future 
transformation of the given by that very idea (the given is no longer that 
which distinguishes knowledge from thinking as in Kant since the forms of 
intuition and transcendental categories are no longer universal). 
Epistemologically speculative, this might appear as the philosophical 
equivalent of Munchausen lifting himself up by his pigtails, a form of 
bootstrapping 4. As such, the key question regards the source of the ideas. 
For both-Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig (who `is too present in 
[Totality and Infinity] to be cited' [TI 28]), and as we shall see, Levinas 
himself, that source is Judaism. The religious tradition bespeaks an 
experience that is self-consciously appropriated to guide practical 
philosophy. But its cultural determination means that insight into its 
`profound experience' could be limited: the special idea of the face might 
not be open to all cultures. 
The idea that strikes or fixes the thinker is not a sublime object, but the face - this 
is a correction of Cohen 5. And, conversely, the face is not given in 
phenomenality, but is an idea; an idea that brings us to, or brings about (and this 
difference will trouble us throughout the thesis), a region where beings have a 
face. The alter [autre] is transformed into the Other [Autrui]; the different, into 
the idea of the infinite or better. That is to say, the Other is not another person, a 
concrete person who is amenable to experience. The Other is produced, 
happens, through the practical ethics or politics of subjects. The Other orients 
4 This justification, suspended until its future completion, is the inverse of Freudian 
Nachträglichkeit, where the cause is produced after the effect - here the privileged orientation is 
anticipation for that which is still to come. Cf. Rudi Visker Truth and Singularity pp. 322-23. 
Derrida: `This thought calls upon the ethical relationship -a nonviolent relationship to the 
infinite as infinitely other, to the Other - as the only one capable of opening the space of 
transcendence and of liberating metaphysics. And does so without supporting ethics and 
metaphysics by anything other than themselves, and without making flow into other streams at 
their source. ' [VM 102] 
5 'Philosophy itself is identified with the substitution of ideas for persons, the theme for the 
interlocutor, the interiority of the logical relation for the exteriority of interpellation. Existents 
are reduced to the neuter state of the idea, Being, the concept. ' [TI 88] 
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being because it creates a value which drives and elevates practical reason, such 
that it is no longer satisfied with being and so aims at the beyond: the Other has 
meaning only through me [TI 39-40]. 
But, for Levinas, the face as idea (of the infinite) is explicitly that which has to 
be brought into the `Western' philosophical tradition from Judaism. This 
particularity does not just mark out Jewish `teaching' or doctrine (Lehre in 
Cohen and Rosenzweig) from the West but also from the 'Orient' and from 
`underdeveloped Africa'. Not that this means that Judaism is not of universal 
import, nor that `Judaism' here is straightforwardly identified with a religious 
particularism, but that there are material, socio-linguistic and cultural conditions 
that act as obstacles to its universal generalisation. 
Robert Bernasconi had raised precisely this issue of `cultural encounter' in his 
essay, `Who is my neighbor? Who is the Other? ' 6. He is perplexed by the 
manner in which Levinas draws on Husserl and, in particular. his failure to be 
`scandalized' by the latter's valorisation of Europe and its thought (as Greek 
inheritance) given that Levinas's project seemed to be directed against a certain 
complacency in Greek thought 7. Citing two interviews where Levinas had 
limited `serious' thought to the Bible and the Greeks - the rest, all else, is 
`dancing's - Bernasconi feels compelled to separate off such comments from the 
seriousness of Levinas's philosophical work: `... it would be a mistake to assume 
that the philosophical texts conceal behind their complexity the same appalling 
message that is said so directly in the interviews. '9 
While the encounter with the Other as developed may not be `sufficiently 
6 Robert Bernasconi Who is my neighbor? Who is the Other? Questioning "the Generosity ot- 
Western Thought" in Ethics and Responsibility in the Phenomenological Tradition (Ninth 
Annual Symposium of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Centers (Pittsburgh, Duquesne 
University Press. 1992). pp. 1-31. 
ibid. p. 11. 
8 Interview transcripts are cited at op. cit. p. 14. See also Levinas's interview comments: 'I often 
sax', though it's a dangerous thing to say publicly, that humanity consists of the Bible and the 
Greeks. All the rest can be translated; all the rest - all the exotic - is dance. ' Raoul `lortley 
(edited) French Philosophers in Conversation (London. Routledge. 19911, p. 18. 
Op. cit. P. 14. 
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nuanced as to be able to welcome the Other in his or her ethnic identit\ b`vond 
the prejudices that divide ethnic groups" 0, the work contains 'the most promising 
resources for addressing the enigma of persecution, hatred, and violence'11. The 
gaze of the Other is understood as interrupting egoistic complacency and this can 
lead to the critical addressing of my unquestioned attachment to my owe n cultural 
values. However, the crucial point lies in Levinas's interpretation of this 
interruption that reads it as an encounter with precisely such an Other -a 
secularization of the Judaeo-Christian idea that humankind is made in the image 
of God. Rudi Visker is right to note that the `idea of the \, est' is more central 
than Bemasconi admits12, because the `west' is the cradle of the strong notion of 
the individual 13. 
Some might balk at my use of `interpretation' above. After all, is not the 
proximity of the Other prior to all representation and hence interpretation - am I 
not chosen prior to any choice on my part? Two observations: 
1. In Totality and Infinity, the face, as face of the Other (le visage d'autrui) 
is precisely that which confounds ontology. It is the point at which 
phenomenological analysis breaks up: it does not affect us on the basis of 
a concept, it is therefore not experiential or perceptible 14. The face, as 
the face of the Other, is the encounter with the idea of the infinite. 
2. Unlike Husserl, Levinas's take on . phenomenological methodology 
eschews any transcendental feature. There is no generic notion of 
humanity at work, no analogical apperception, such that the results of my 
phenomenological description adequately uncover other subjects. There 
is no Einfühlung: the insistence on metaphysical pluralism means that any 
ýo Ibid. p. '1 -22- 
ibid. p. 2. 
12 Truth and Singularity p. 348. 
13 And even the injunction, `Thou Shalt Not Kill'. 'Peace and Proximity' [198.1] translated by 
Simon Critchlev with Peter . Atterton & Graham Noctor 
in Emmanme'l Lcvinas: Basic 
Philosophical Writings edited Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi 
(Bloomington & Indianapolis. Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 161-169, p. lb4. 
Ili See Sandford . 
llciaphvsics of Love pp. 11-1-1. 
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mention of everyday experience must ask: `for , k, hom? ' That is. the 
moment of "interpretation" may be prior to representation in that it is 
culturally determined15. 
Any thought of a `brute fact' of moral experience described by Levinas (and `et 
somehow forgotten by other philosophers) misses the mark in these two 
respects 16 
`The face is abstract. ... But the abstractness of the face is a visitation and a 
coming which disturbs immanence without settling into the horizons of the 
World. Its abstraction is not obtained by a logical process starting from the 
substance of beings and going from the individual to the general. On the 
contrary, it goes toward those beings but does not compromise itself with 
them, withdraws from them, ab-solves itself. Its wonder is due to the 
elsewhere from which it comes and into which it already withdraws. ... And Sartre will say that the Other (Autrui) is a pure hole in the world -a most 
noteworthy insight, but he stops his analysis too soon. The Other proceeds 
from the absolutely Absent, but his relationship with the absolutely Absent 
from which he comes does not indicate, does not reveal, this Absent; and 
yet the Absent has a meaning in the face. ' [MS 59-60] 
As Sandford has emphasised, transcendence is necessary here, in Levinas's terms 
for there to be anything such as meaning at all: `Morality does not belong to 
culture: it enables one to judge it; it discovers the dimension of height. Height 
ordains being. ' [MS 57] In this way, our understanding of Levinas's `ethics' 
must be completely transformed17. 
Far from a simple framing device, by opening Totality and Infinity, with 
reference to the manner in which war `renders morality derisory' [TI 21 ], peace 
becomes central. The justification of the notion of the Other as idea orienting 
practice will lie in its ability to manifest its excellence in the institution of a new 
15 'The world is not suffering from a lack of ethical systems. To exist in society is to find an 
ethics already in place. ' Robert Bernasconi The Ethics of Suspicion' Research in 
Phenomenology, Volume XX (1990), pp. 3-18; p. 9. 
16 See Bauman Postmodern Ethics p. 35. 
17 'The point is that the experience of the Other is the condition of possibility for philosophýinsofar 
as it is another way of referring to transcendence. This also means that 'ethics' as the 
presupposition of and motivation for philosophy is not philosophy itself. Not only is it not the 
case that Levinas's philosophy is an ethics, 'ethics' itself or 'the ethical' is not the main aim or 
even the main category of Levinas's philosophy .' Metaphysics of Love p. ýý. 
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form of peace'8. In this way, Levinas privileges practical reason. To privilege 
theoretical knowledge is to remain bound within the finite, within being and, on 
Levinas's reading, subject to war. However, the material and cultural constraints 
of the encounter with the Other restrict the guiding idea to the prosperous 
inheritors of the Judaeo-Christian legacy. 
From this perspective the initially abstruse analyses of the family, fraternity and 
fecundity assume a central importance: `the erotic and the family ... ensure to 
this life ... the infinite time of triumph without which goodness would be 
subjectivity and folly' [TI 280] [my emphasis]. The justification of speculative 
practice is assured only through the `convergence of morality and reality' in this 
infinite time [TI 306]. 
From Participation to Egoism 
`Egoism, enjoyment, sensibility, and the whole dimension of interiority - 
the articulations of separation - are necessary for the idea of Infinity, the 
relation with the Other which opens forth from the separated and finite 
being. Metaphysical Desire, which can be produced only in a separated, 
that is, enjoying, egoist, and satisfied being, is then not derived from 
enjoyment. ' [TI 148] 
The encounter with the Other has conditions set upon it. Who encounters what? 
A separated being, an egoist with an interiority, encounters a relation determined 
by the idea of infinity. Both these terms, separation and egoism are developed 
thematically in Totality and Infinity. Levinas advances a theory of levels or 
planes of being with four stages. These are: 
1. Participation; 
2. Separation 1- Proletarian; 
18 This thesis concurs with Miguel Abensour's insistence on Levinas as a new theorist of the 
State, contesting the terrain of Hegel and Hobbes. `L'Etat de la justice', Magazine Lineraire 419 
(April 2003), pp. 54-57. `But it is very important to know whether the state, society, law, and 
power are required because man is a beast to his neighbour (homo homini lupus) or because i am 
responsible for my fellow. It is very important to know whether the political order defines man's 
responsibilities or merely restricts his bestialities. ' Emmanuel Levinas `Ideology and Idealism' 
[1972-5] translated by Sanford Ames & Arthur Lesley in The Levinas Reader edited by Sean 
Hand (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989), pp. 235-248; p. 247-48. 
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3. Separation 2- Egoism; 
4. Desire for the Other - the "ethical". 
It is a little unclear whether the proletarian and the egoist actually `exist' at 
different levels - they are distinguished in that, in egoism, the separated being's 
needs are all satisfied. Even if the relation with the Other `grounds all possible 
relations in the world' (and Totality and Infinity is much less clear on this than 
Otherwise than Being19), one would still have to account for that stage before the 
I became aware of this structure: it is this insight that will underlie the analysis 
of the encounter with the Other in shame; the Other will teach me what I am: an 
unwarranted usurpation in being. 
There is some debate in the secondary literature regarding what these stages 
amount to. Discussing this analysis of `being in the world', Sandford argues that 
this account cannot be read `as a chronicle of man's life in and movement 
beyond the state of nature'; she holds that it cannot be `anthropological 
history'20. Richard A. Cohen, in his introduction to the English edition of Time 
and the Other, suggests that Levinas is developing a genetic phenomenology 
here21. In fact, it is more likely that Levinas is contributing to something like a 
philosophical anthropology. Not only is the account of participation, and its 
connection to the anonymous il ya of existence, bulwarked with reference to 
Lucien Levy-Bruhl, but Levinas consistently draws on Emile Durkheim for the 
notion of the sacred22. 
19 Indeed, we will argue in Chapter 4 that it is a dissatisfaction with this account of separation 
that leads Levinas to move to proximity and the `Other in me' prior to my self. 
20 Metaphysics of Love pp. 42-3. 
21 `Translator's Introduction' in Time and the Other [1947] translated by Richard A. Cohen 
(Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1987), pp. 1-27. Hereafter abbreviated to T&O followed 
by page reference. 
22 See T&O 42 and the essay by Levinas `Levy-Bruhl et la philosophie contemporaine' [1957] in 
Entre nous (Paris, Editions Grasset & Fasquelle, 1991), pp. 49-63. Husserl wrote a letter to 
Levy-Bruhl (11 March 1935). The interpretation of this letter is the subject of a debate between 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida over phenomenological method. Husserl Briefwechsel: Band VII 
edited by Karl Schuhmann & Elizabeth Schuhmann (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
1994), pp. 159-64. Merleau-Ponty `The Philosopher and Sociology' in Signs [1960] translated by 
Richard C. McCleary (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 98-113; pp. 107-8. 
Derrida `Introduction to The Origin of Geometry' [1962] translated by John P. Leavey in Edmund 
Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (Lincoln, NA & London, University of Nebraska 
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Caygill has illustrated the importance of Durkheim in Levinas's work and insists 
that his categories `persist' in Totality and Infinity [L&P 1lJ as a way in which to 
bring together anthropology and phenomenology to uncover the `elementary 
forms of experience' [L&P 32]. In Ethics and Infinity, a set of interviews with 
Phillipe Nemo, Levinas emphasises the importance of Durkheim's `eidetic of 
society': 
`Durkheim, a metaphysician! The idea that the social is the very order of 
the spiritual, a new plot in being above the animal and human psychism: the 
level of "collective representations" defined with vigor and which opens up 
the dimension of spirit in the individual life itself, where the individual 
alone comes to be recognized and even redeemed. In Durkheim there is, in 
a sense, a theory of "levels of being", of the irreducibility of these levels to 
one another, an idea which acquires its full meaning within the Husserlian 
and Heideggerian context. '23 
This is a dense paragraph containing much that might escape casual perusal. The 
connection of the spiritual and the social as the constitution of a new level of 
being is, in addition, the level at which the individual might be redeemed. It is 
this understanding of transcending the animal condition that underlies the desire 
to get beyond being. These levels of being gain an autonomy while commencing 
from those below24. That this might be intended as a historical interpretation, 
can be seen in Levinas's description of this level of participation as the level of 
primitive mentality, before there is any light [E&E 60-1]. 
The most basic level is understood as sacred or participation. If Durkheim 
presents the sacred as investing the collective representations of any community 
[L&P 57-8], Levy-Bruhl is seen by Levinas as an important correction since his 
Press, 1989), pp. 23-153; pp. 111-15. Hereafter abbreviated to Origin followed by page 
reference. 
23 Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo [ 1982] translated by Richard A. Cohen 
(Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1985), pp. 26-7. Hereafter abbreviated to E&I followed 
by page reference. 
24 This understanding of the social as autonomous level appears to sanction the avowed break 
from the either-or of Eleatic philosophy: being or not-being. But one might question the 
sophistication of Levinas's conception of ideality given that he understands Husserl as a `Platonic 
realist'. Emmanuel Levinas `The Work of Edmund Husserl' [1940] in Discovering Existence 
with Husserl edited & translated by Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith (Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press, 1998), pp. 47-87; p. 57 & 86. Hereafter abbreviated to DEwH 
followed by page reference. 
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work contributes to modern philosophy's `ruin of representation' and destruction 
of substance so that the classical understanding of exterionity as neutral being is 
overcome25. The world is not an object veiled by representations, collective or 
otherwise, but a -field of forces where the human being maintains itself as the 
product of an event of capture by sensation26. Such an engagement with concrete 
environments and landscapes is anterior to and orients representation which 
appears after in the formation of egoism qua separation27. This fundamental 
structure is uncovered by Levy-Bruhl's empirical assemblage of a mass of 
anthropological facts about primitive mentality28 where that structure is more 
visible than it is in `ours' - mentalite moderne29. 
"Separation", which in earlier accounts was called "hypostasis", is presented as 
that escape from participation [TI 90] - the possibility to withdraw from being 
and hence relate differently to it. In the later work it will be transformed into 
Desinter-esse: disinterred from being (esse), rather than disinterested 30 
Separation is the production of inner life; a system whose degree of autonomy is 
proportional to its power to maintain its interiority, built from instinct, tastes, 
and, potentially, reason31. It is characterized as action, which, as memory that 
25 `Ldvy-Bruhl et la Philosophie contemporaine' p. 52 & 58. 
26 `C'est que l'exister meme de l'etre ne se deroule pas comme subsistence tranquille de la 
subsistence, mais comme emprise et possession, comme un champ de forces oü 1'existence 
humain se tient, oü elle est engage, a laquelle, pourrions-nous dejä dire en termes de Levy-Bruhl, 
eile participe. Le saisissement du sentiment est la mesure exacte d'un tel evenement. ' Ibid. pp. 
52-3. 
27 Ibid. p. 60. 
28 Ibid. p. 52. 
29 Ibid. p. 62. Cf. Heidegger Being and Time [1927] translated by John Macquarrie & Edward 
Robinson (Oxford, Blackwell, 1978), §11 `The Existential Analytic and the Interpretation of 
Primitive Dasein' pp. 76-7. 
30 `The humanity in historical and objective being, the very breakthrough of the subjective, of the 
human psychism in its original vigilance or sobering up, is being which undoes its condition of 
being: dis-inter-estedness. ... 
The ontological condition undoes itself, or is undone, in the human 
condition or uncondition. To be human means to live as if one were not a being among beings. 
As if, through human spirituality, the categories of being inverted into an "otherwise than 
being". ' [E&1 1001 
31 `Activity does not derive its meaning and its value from an ultimate and unique goal, as though 
the world formed one system of use-references whose term touches our very existence. The 
world answers to a set of anonymous finalities which ignore one another. To enjoy without 
utility, in pure loss, gratuitously, without referring to anything else, in pure expenditure - this is 
the human. There is a non-systematic accumulation of occupations and tastes, equidistant from 
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masters the past, is the pre-condition for representation and reflection32. This 
interiority is the `refusal to be transformed into a pure loss figuring in an alien 
accounting system' [TI 54-6] and is sometimes glossed as virility. Through 
labour, enjoyment and satisfaction, the world loses its alien quality [TI 129]. It is 
at this level of separation from being, in the constitution of the I, that Levinas's 
understanding of pluralism, a plurality `required for conversion' [TI 59] to the 
Other, is enshrined; the individualised separation from being obeys no universal 
law: `Only in this way does becoming acquire the value of an idea radically 
opposed to the idea of being, does it designate the resistance to every integration 
expressed [traduit] by the image of the river [fleuve] .... A notion of becoming 
destructive of Parmenidean monism is acquired only through the singularity of 
sensation. ' [TI 60] 
Egoism is understood as the triumph of separation, separation fulfilled33. Its 
happiness is a tranquillity and a `new glory above substantiality'. That is, 
egoism is already a level beyond `the plenitude of being' [TI 113]. But this 
egoism is not yet ethically attuned to exteriority, since in its self-reliance the 
world it constructs is a world-for-it. Only free beings can be strangers to one 
another [TI 73], but for free beings to encounter each other as another free being, 
and not simply a means to its own ends, the encounter with the Other is required 
[TI68]34 
the system of reason, where the encounter with the Other opens the infinite, and from the system 
of instinct, anterior to separated being, anterior to being-veritably torn, separated from its cause, 
nature. ' [TI 133-34] 
32 We see here a legacy of Levinas's debt to Bergson's notion of active memory. 
33 If this reading of Levinas holds up to scrutiny, then it should be extended by comparing such a 
phenomenological anthropology with the express reservations presented by Derrida in his essay 
`The Ends of Man'. Moreover the comments there regarding the first generation of Husserl and 
Heidegger reception - that it removed everything that was not amenable to anthropological 
description - could be connected to an observation made in the 1990 preface to Derrida's 
dissertation where he presents his `dialectical escalation' of phenomenology as `going further' 
than Trän Duc Thao and Jean Cavailles. What is relevant here is that these two were considered 
more important than `Levinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur' all of whom might be 
understood to constitute the `first generation', whilst the first two turn back to Husserl's treatment 
of objectivity and scientificity. `The Ends of Man' [ 1968] translated by Alan Bass in Margins of 
Philosophy (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1982), pp. 109-136. Jacques Derrida The Problem 
of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy (1954,1990] translated by Marian Hobson (Chicago & 
London, University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. xv. 
34 `Egoist without reference to the Other, I am alone without solitude, innocently egoist and 
alone. Not against the Others, not "as for me... " - but entirely deaf to the Other. outside of all 
communication and all refusal to communicate - without ears, like a hungry stomach. ' [TI 134] 
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Separation, Ideas and Ideology 
The peculiar structure of separation means that it is not simply produced through 
something like Hegel's `formative activity'. Its multiplicity also exhibits 
different ideas through which the separated being understands that situation: the 
elementary forms `prefigure meaning of adventure that the soul will face in the 
world' 35 Levinas emphasises that `there is no natural religion' but links 
`ontological production' to a moment of ideation [TI 117]: `Its power for illusion 
- if illusion there was - constitutes its separation. ' [TI 55] 
The most common terms used in this context are `paganism', 'atheism', 
`barbarism', and `idealism'. Heidegger's ontology and tyranny is understood to 
be rooted in `pagan moods', where obedience to Being is obedience to the 
anonymous [TI 46-7]. In his early essay on the philosophy of Hitlerism, Levinas 
claims to uncover the pagan philosophy which is generated out of the telling 
inflections given to the ideas of freedom and destiny. 
`It is to a society in such a condition that the Germanic ideal of man seems 
to promise sincerity and authenticity. Man no longer finds himself 
confronted by a world of ideas in which he can choose his own truth on the 
basis of a sovereign decision made by his free reason. He is already linked 
to a certain number of these ideas, just as he is linked by his birth to all 
those who are of his blood. He can no longer play with the idea, for coming 
from his concrete being, anchored in his flesh and blood, the idea remains 
serious. '36 
We see here a possible connection to Durkheim's notion that society is 
constitutive for moral experience37 from which we should draw out three points: 
1. Ideas are anchored in the concrete being of the social: 
I 
I 
Opposed to consanguinity, and ideas of such ilk, an equally serious idea 
must be presented - the Idea of metaphysical pluralism oriented by the 
infinite. 
I' Levinas 'Reflection,, on the Philosophy of Hitlerism' (193-4] translated by Sýan Hand Critical 
Inqui, _v 17 (Autumn 1990). pp. (2-; 1; p. 64. 
Ibid. p. 70. 
37 Sec Gillian Rose Hegel contra Socioloi>v (London. Athione Humanities Press. 19S 1 ), pp. 15-16. 
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3. The trope of election prior to individual choice - ideas seize us from the 
first. 
In contrast to the pagan mode, the 'atheist' is a complete break from being 
understood as rootedness -a positing prior to the possibility of idealism: The 
soul, the dimension of the psychic, being an accomplishment of separation, is 
naturally atheist. By atheism we thus understand a position prior to both the 
negation and affirmation of the divine, the breaking with participation by which 
the I posits itself as the same and as I. ' [TI 58] The precariousness of separation 
is such that it depends on ideas to shore up its hypostatization; it follows 
therefore that the ethical level, instigated by the Other, resting as it does on the 
separated being's ability to relate to exteriority, will be even more precarious. 
Before turning to this notion of the Other, there is a stage we have so far 
neglected: the importance of the dwelling and the feminine Other. 
The Feminine Other: Dwelling, Love, Fecundity 
The notion of interiority in the separated being receives its concrete form and 
condition in the dwelling. Intended as a palimpsest, overwriting Heidegger's 
account, it institutes the alterity of the Other in the very process of separation. 
The domicile is not equipment, it is the primary appropriation of the elemental 
[T] 37,131,159]; the home allows a `world' to be formed [TI 152]. There is no 
enjoyment without the intimacy of the dwelling, where the absurdity of 
anonymous existence is overcome [TI 139-40]. But this intimacy depends on the 
intimacy with someone [TI 152], the feminine. 
'Recollection and representation are produced concretely as habitation in a 
(I1vclling or a Home. But the interiority of the home is made of 
extraterritoriality in the midst of the elements of enjoyment with which life 
is nourished. This extraterritoriality has a positive side. It is produced in 
the gentleness [douceuur] or the warmth [chaleur] of intimacy. which is not a 
subjective state of mind, but an event in the oecumenia of being -a 
delightful "lapse" [dýfaillance] of the ontological order. By virtue of its 
intentional structure gentleness comes to the separated being from the Other. 
The Other precisely reveals herself [se rev le] in her alterit\ not in a shock 
negating the I. but as the primordial phenomenon of gentleness. ' [TI 150. 
Tel 1611 [translation modified] 
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This chez soi amounts to the interruption of time, `the peaceable welcome', the 
creation of a domestic temporality, `in which the separated being can recollect 
itself [se recueillir], thanks to which it inhabits, and in its dwelling accomplishes 
separation. Inhabitation and the intimacy of the dwelling which make the 
separation of the human being possible thus imply a first revelation of the Other. ' 
[TI 151] 
The feminine face is the `first revelation of the Other' in the very process of 
separation38: the process of separation requires that the world be `already human' 
through an intimacy with someone: `The woman is the condition for recollection, 
the interiority of the Home, and inhabitation. ' [TI 155] 39 The home enables a 
`new energy': that of withdrawal from being and relation with something 1 do not 
live from: erotic love is distinguished in this manner from need and is 
ontologically crucial [TI 169-70]. Moreover, the dwelling becomes the very 
condition of possibility for hospitality, which will be needed to consummate the 
encounter with the other Other40. One could here draw a comparison with 
Aristotle for whom `it is impossible to do fine deeds without any resources'41. 
The foregoing discussion of the feminine Other draws in large part from 
Sandford's work in Metaphysics of Love 42 . That analysis is 
decisive for 
demonstrating the secondary role according to the feminine Other, whose 
Otherness is `qualified' as `discreet', who is addressed with the familiar, `tu' [TI 
155]. She is not the indiscreet Other `who shatters my ego', who teaches, who 
comes from height: the only reference to analogical apperception in Totality and 
38 Rudi Visker presents Levinas as utilising the `battle-cry', `no privacy! '. But this is only of 
consequence after the concrete privacy of separation (Truth and Singularity p. 11). There is no 
discussion of the feminine other in Visker's work. Incidentally, it is here that Adorno's 
discussion of interiority in Kierkegaard may have some critical purchase on Levinas. Theodor 
Adorno Kierkegaard: The Construction of the Aesthetic [1933] translated by Robert Hullot- 
Kentor (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. 49 if. 
39 As such, Levinas's attempt to rebut any accusation that the home requires a real woman is 
doomed [TI 156-7]. 
ao 'The relation with infinity remains as another possibility of the being recollected in its dwelling. 
The possibility for the home to open to the Other is as essential to the essence of the home as 
closed doors and windows. ' [TI 173] 
41 Aristotle Nicoinachean Ethics translated by J. A. K. Thomson revised edition (London, Penguin, 
1976), p. 79-80. 
42 op. cit. pp. 43 ff. 
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Infinity, normally rejected throughout, is with respect to the feminine face [TI 
262-31. 
There is a double-coding of even this discretion: the woman is analysed as either 
the homemaker or the `instrument of pleasure' 43 . The home produces the 
possibility of welcome, but love opens the possibility of self-sufficient 
complicity, indecency `forgetful of the universe' [TI 213]. The danger of 
solipsism, return to animality, `complacency' in pleasure [com-plaisance], and 
chaotic equivocation are all possibilities opened here, since there is lacking the 
frankness and truth of language [TI 260 ff. ]. 
`Equivocation constitutes the epiphany of the feminine - at the same time 
interlocutor, collaborator and master superiorly intelligent, so often 
dominating men in the masculine civilization it has entered [oü il est entre'] 
``4 
, and women having to be treated as woman [levant etre traitee en femme], in accordance with rules imprescriptible by civil society [societe policee]. ' 
[TI 264, Tel 295-96] 
Unrernarked in the transliteration of imprescriptible is a French legal term 
indicating that the law is without statute of limitation: woman's secondary status 
cannot pass away after a determinate period. 
Yet despite these dangers, this `love that issues in no concept', this 
4voluptuosity'45 is redeemed by virtue of fecundity: `the encounter with the Other 
as feminine is required in order that the future of the child comes to pass from 
beyond the possible, beyond projects. ' [TI 267] We are here in agreement with 
Sandford's conclusions: the `event of fecundity is ontological accomplishment or 
realization of the beyond'46. Without this appearance of transcendence in the 
world, the good would not be possible: only thus is infinite time opened47. 
43 See here Sandford's discussion of Levinas's references to Leon Bloy's Lettres ä sa fiancee 
(Metaphysics of Love pp. 52-3). 
44 The masculine pronoun il refers to le feminin. Several passages relevant to this discussion 
become impossible to follow in Lingis's translation because il, le, son and sa are translated into 
English as `he' and `his' instead of relating to the `feminine'. 
45 As Derrida notes, these analyses are tied to a unabashedly masculine point of view [Adieu 39]. 
46 Metaphysics of Love pp. 80-1. 
47 The transcendence of the Good - accomplished in/as fecundity - is the foundation for the 
philosophy of the ethical or religious relation. Furthermore, the elaboration of this in the terms of 
a basically Platonic movement through eros to procreation in/of the Good reveals transcendence 
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To recap, the feminine face serves three crucial functions in Levinas's system: 
I. The feminine prepares the dwelling, whose intimacy is the condition of 
withdrawal from the elements (the il y a) and hence the condition for 
separation48; 
2. Erotic love is ontologically critical in that it enables a relation to 
something from which I do not live. It is not structured like need49. This 
gains added valency as precursor to metaphysical Desire; 
3. Fecundity, by which the ego `survives itself' [TI 2471, the production of 
children, creates the `marvel of the family': the discontinuous continuity 
of infinite time required for the ethical-political project: the securing of 
the social, human plane above being. 
It perhaps needs to be stressed that, throughout, I am not merely uncovering a 
series of charges against Levinas for breaching some form of accepted political 
correctness. I am constructing the systematic function of these features. That 
Levinas pursues a form of paleonymy50, systematically reconfiguring culturally 
received "norms" relating to sex and gender differences into philosophical 
functions makes it impossible to separate "prejudices" from core features: in 
some ways, his systematization should be understood as an attempt to 
philosophically redeem precisely those prejudices51. Because of this, it becomes 
as, in some sense, masculine - transcendence of the feminine - and not merely in outward 
expression but structurally, fundamentally. ' [ibid. p. 109] 
48 `The danger is that these [domestic] limits risk dividing, not the ethical from the political, but, 
even before this, the pre-ethical - "inhabitation" or "feminine alterity" before the transcendence 
of language, the height and illeity of the face, teaching, etc. -from the ethical, as if there could be 
a welcoming, indeed a welcoming "par excellence, " "in itself, " before ethics. And as if the 
"feminine being" as such did not as yet have access to the ethical. The situation of the chapter 
"The Dwelling" and, even more, the place of the section to which it belongs ... would thus pose 
serious architectonic problems ... 
' [Adieu 38-9] Derrida's alternative suggestion - that one could 
read this text as a kind of feminist manifesto [Adieu 44] - seems very generous. 
a9 Though Moses suggests eros is simultaneously structured by desire and need, this does not 
seem to incorporate a full understanding of the metaphysical nature of Desire - eros is instead a 
bridge between the two. Moses Au-deli de la guerre p. 52. 
so In this, his endeavour should be compared to the paleonymy effected by German Romanticism 
and Idealism, converting everyday terms into a technical vocabulary. 
51 In his discussion of Existence and Existents, Caygill notes a danger located in the separation of 
public and private around this notion of intimacy. Developed without adequate exploration and 
description, he sees Levinas as naive in believing in the authentic preservation of such `pockets 
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of crucial importance to examine how these features resist the analytical 
bracketing required to present Levinas for a feminist appropriation or, when we 
turn to problems of cultural difference in the next chapter, multiculturalism52. 
The Other as Master 
The separated ego, secure in its dwelling with needs satisfied and the intimacy of 
erotic love, where the self-evidence of representations is already a positive 
accomplishment, has already encountered the Other as feminine welcome. But if 
left with this `discreet face', the separated being would only remain in its 
separation. The `indiscreet face of the Other' [TI 171] breaks with the 
phenomenal satisfaction of the world-for-me to produce the possibility of `rising 
from the animal condition' [TI 149]53. This break is encountered as shock or 
rupture. Levinas is explicit: what produces this shock is the encounter with a 
master in teaching [TI 42]54. The encounter with superiority, and not simply a 
different point of view [TI 291], is that which engages my attention in such a way 
as to produce a relationship with exteriority through the idea of the infinite55. To 
encounter the `face' as epiphany is to find oneself faced with a being `closer to 
God'56, who brings me more than I contain [TI 51]: that is, what is revealed 
exceeds my own (for-itself) existence, representation and recollection. 
In contrast to the feminine, familiar `tu', the master is the one who approaches as 
`Vous' - in height. It is essential here to recognise that, within Levinas's 
topography of planar being, the feminine Other and the Other as master serve 
of decency' - it is potentially dogmatic [L&P 651. My understanding is that it is in the operation 
of paleonymy - the take-up of these tropes into a system - that Levinas attempts to avoid such 
dogmatism. 
52 See Sandford's conclusions relating to the impossibility of reappropriating these themes for 
feminism. Metaphysics of Love pp. 129-140. 
53 Because of this distinction between Other as feminine and the Other as master, I will use 
masculine pronouns in relation to the latter. 
sa '11 luifaut, pour acceder ä la transcendance, un choc venu de dehors, celui que produit en eile 
le surgissement d'autrui. ' Moses Au-deli de la guerre p. 64. 
ss As Caygill stresses, this is a relation with exteriority which does not reduce to death or 
absorption into that exteriority [L&P 27]. 
56 Levinas `Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite' [1957] translated by Alphonso Lingis in 
Collected Philosophical Papers (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1987), pp. 47-59; p. 56. 
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two different functions: there is no experience without the feminine, but for that 
`cosy' domesticity to be ruptured, and the ethical to commence, the encounter 
with the master is needed57. `To pass from the implicit to the explicit a master 
who evokes attention is necessary. To evoke attention is not a subsidiary work; 
in attention the I transcends itself. But a relation with the exteriority of the 
master was necessary to engage attention. Explicitation presupposes his 
transcendence. ' [TI 138] 
Levinas suggests that I often pass indifferently before another person and do not 
feel the gaze58. For the trace of the face to appear, the ordinary experience must 
be `jostled' by a presence that is not integrated into the world: a presence that can 
be effaced by `humble chores' and `commonplace talk' [MS 47]. He notes that: 
`It is not the interlocutor our master whom we most often approach in our 
conversations, but an object or an infant, or a man of the multitude, as Plato 
says. ' [TI70] 
Truth itself is made possible by relation with the masterful Other. Here, Levinas 
recalls Plato's distinction between conversation with gods and conversation with 
`fellow-servants' - the master is not our equal, he is like a god [TI 71]. Levinas 
evokes the idea of the infinite to point to this inadequation. Understood as 
exterior, the master is precisely that which exceeds the phenomenal and in so 
doing reveals my own phenomenality, calls into question my hypostasis, which 
now appears `arbitrary and violent' [L&P 122-23]. Levinas utilises 
phenomenological methodology (or perhaps only its results in many places) to 
uncover structures which do not reduce to intentionality and yet have been 
57 In this way, the face of the feminine Other already precedes phenomenological Sinngebung. In 
noting the use of the term `encounter' with respect to the masterful Other, Derrida points out that 
this might be `prey' to empiricism and suggests that there is a time and an experience prior to the 
encounter with the Other [VM 404 fn. 44], though without attending to this anthropology. 
58 Levinas writes in `Meaning and Sense': `The movement toward the other, instead of 
completing me and contenting me, implicates me in a conjuncture which in a way did not concern 
me and should leave me indifferent - what was I looking for here? Whence came this shock 
when I passed, indifferent, under another's gaze? ' [MS 52] 
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dissimulated by intentionality [TI 26-8] 59. Phenomenology describes what 
appears, but `the face does not appear' [E&I 85]. 
Both Sandford and Caygill have noted that the encounter with the Other as an 
idea of the infinite is irreducible to phenomenological analysis - it is precisely 
the case that exteriority cannot be posited from a phenomenological position and 
Levinas is careful to use phenomenology only to get so far as the `break-up' of 
totality and the `gleam' of exteriority60. Still, these are indeed `speculative 
claims' that cannot be proven61, but they are not thereby brute impositions. 
Instead, the idea of the infinite encountered in the face and the idea of exteriority 
characterised by a pluralism of separated beings should be seen as affirmative 
metaphysical ideas62. This affirmation determines orientation, which overcomes 
the `anarchic sorcery of facts' [TI 70,99]. In this regard, the idea of the Other 
functions in a manner analogous to the Ideas of Reason in Kant - unification of 
experience through the setting of a task. 
It is here the fourth, ethical stage, commences. Separation is not `on the same 
plane as the movement of transcendence' [TI 148]; it is surpassed in Desire for 
the Other63. This extra level of being is more precarious. In Totality and Infinity 
it subsists through language: `... language can be spoken only if the interlocutor 
is the commencement of his discourse, if, consequently, he remains beyond the 
system, if he is not on the same plane as myself. ' [TI 101] There is language 
only if interlocutors are separated, `across a void', but they are exterior only 
through language. Language institutes the relation of transcendence; the Other is 
59 Caygill: `... the very meaning of this excessive quality of intentional thought ... 
becomes the 
object of phenomenological inquiry: consciousness as relatum has existence as an object but as 
relation is transcendent or always in excess of itself [L&P 20]. 
60 `Without substituting eschatology for philosophy, without philosophically "demonstrating" 
eschatological "truths, " we can proceed from the experience of totality back to a situation where 
totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the totality itself. Such a situation is the gleam of 
exteriority or of transcendence in the face of the other [le visage d'autrui]. ' [TI 24] 
61 Sandford Metaphysics of Love p. 124. 
62 Rose notes a key feature of neo-Kantianism: `Reason endows values with validity by 
recognizing the inner value of contents in a way which cannot be justified according to the 
criteria of disinterested understanding. ' Hegel contra Sociology p. 7. 
63 The conversion of the soul to exteriority, to the absolutely other, to Infinity, is not deducible 
from the very identity of the soul, for it is not commensurate with the soul. ' [TI 61 ] 
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inseparable from this very event {Tl 233]: the Other is `maintained in the 
expressive function of language' 64 . 
"The other is maintained and confirmed in his heterogeneity as soon as one 
calls upon him, be it only to say to him that one cannot speak to him, to 
classify him as sick, to announce to him his death sentence; at the same time 
as grasped, wounded, outraged, he is "respected. " The invoked is not what 
I comprehend: he is not under a category. He is the one to whom I speak - 
he has only a reference to himself; he has no quiddity. " [TI 69]65 
There are three points to stress here. First, this is not yet a theory utilizing the 
disctinction between the Saying and the Said, though aspects of this relation will 
appear in the central concept of apology, where speaking is the coming to 
assistance of the word said by `answering for them'. This relation is instead akin 
to Husserl's notion of reactivation [Reaktivierung] as found in the Origin of 
Geometry: the founding sense of an axiom can be lost in its subsequent 
utilization in proofs66. For Levinas, the maintenance of the relation with the 
Other, as constitutive of the Other, requires present speech, `recovering and 
deciphering the very signs its emits' [TI 172]67. 
Second, there is no pre-existing realm of transcendence to which the subject is 
granted access by this encounter. The encounter with the master is the spur to 
the production of transcendence in each instance. It insists on the infinite as 
given in advance would be to return to onto-theology. As Moses insists, the 
`geste speculatif of Levinas lies precisely in. this conception of the infinite being 
64 ` ... 
[L]anguage is spoken where community between the terms of the relationship is wanting, 
where the common plane is wanting or is yet to be constituted. ... Discourse 
is thus the 
experience of something absolutely foreign, a pure "knowledge" or "experience, " a traumatism 
of astonishment. ' [TI 731 
65 `We are therefore radically opposed to Heidegger who subordinated the relation with the Other 
to ontology ... rather than seeing 
in justice and injustice a primordial access to the Other beyond 
all ontology. The existence of the Other does not concern us in the collectivity by reason of his 
participation in the being that is already familiar to us all, nor by reason of his power and freedom 
which we should have to subjugate and utilize for ourselves, nor by virtue of the difference of his 
attributes which we would have to surmount in the process of cognition or in a movement of 
sympathy merging us with him, as though his existence were an embarrassment. ' [TI 89] 
66 'The Origin of Geometry' [1936] translated by David Carr; in Edmund Husserl's Origin of 
Geometry: An Introduction (Lincoln, NA & London, University of Nebraska Press, 1989), pp. 
157-80. Hereafter abbreviated to Ursprung followed by page reference. 
67 We shall examine this in more detail in Chapter Three and. in particular, ask why Derrida did 
not latch onto this overt moment of `logocentrism'. 
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produced (producing itself) from out of experience ('se produit en quelque sorte 
au sein meme de l'experience')68: `L'Infini, quant a lui, ne se montre pas, pas 
meme comme une absence. ... «trace 
d'une retraite» qu'aucune actualite n'avait 
precedee, et qui ne se fait presente que daps ma propre voix. En ce sens la trace 
de l'Infini est le temoinage que j'en donne. ' 69 Despite his awareness of the 
connections with Rosenzweig and his cogent discussion of the similarities to 
Kant's discussion of the sublime70, Moses seems to deflate this paradox into 
metaphor, which would seem to diminish the force of this idea that the infinite 
does not appear to those who witness it, but rather, that witnessing to it shares in 
the very production of the infinite [AqE 186]71. My reading will resist that 
deflation. 
Third, l'Autrui thereby refers to a universal possibility for the human subject, one 
that is maintained in language - it is therefore not to be confused with the 
concrete human other whom I experience. The Other appears in discourse not 
perception. This specifically ethical relation is mediated through economic 
existence, particularly hospitality, but transcends it. Therein lies its peculiar 
difficulties and risks. Indeed, it will be unclear from Totality and Infinity how far 
this "mediation" (I use this term in spite of Levinas's objections to bring this 
problem to the fore) through the lower level of being requires the transformation 
of that very level in order to `support' the production of transcendence. 
In light of these points, I need to take a detour through the current translation 
conventions pertaining to Levinas and the reading they support. 
68 Au-dell de la guerre p. 15,102. `On n'insistera jamais assez la fonction centrale de ce 
paradoxe, ou de ce Kgeste speculatif», dons la philosophie de Levinas. ' [ibid. p. 56]. `One can 
never insist enough on the central function of this paradox, or speculative gesture, in the 
philosophy of Levinas. ' [my translation] 
69 'As for itself, the Infinite does not show itself, not even as an absence. ... 
"trace of a 
withdrawal" that no actuality had preceded, and which does not make itself present through my 
own voice. In this sense the trace of the Infinite is the witnessing I give of it. ' [my translation] 
ibid. pp. 108-9. 
70 `L'idee de l'infini en nous' in Au-delä de la guerre: trios etudes sur Levinas (Paris & Tel Aviv, 
Editions de l'eclat, 2004), pp. 81-118. Moses notes that such comparisons with Kant bring 
Levinas back into the philosophical tradition from which he claimed to be breaking [ibid. pp. 99- 
1001. 
71 Ibid. p. 106. 
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Translation of Autrui and Autre 
It is customary to translate two key terms, Autrui and Autre, by the single English 
word, `other'. To distinguish the two terms translators render autrui as Other 
with a capital 0, and autre as other with a small o72. Confusing for the English 
reader is the fact that Levinas, in the French, often capitalises both terms, whilst 
also using both terms in lower case. Levinas tends to capitalise both terms when 
they operate as substantives 73. He also capitalises other terms, most notably 
desire, and we can find sentences in Totality and Infinity which contain desir, 
lower case, and le Desir, upper case. In Alphonso Lingis's translation of one 
such sentence, we get `desire engenders Desire', the definite article of le Desir 
has been' effaced 74. My thesis is that capitalisation of nouns marks their 
systematic place as metaphysical ideas in the Kantian sense; that this 
capitalisation indicates their pertinence to the `terrain' of transcendence as 
distinct from the experience of the merely separated being. 
There are two distinct ideas concerning the other person. One is the idea of the 
other person as concrete subjectivity; the second, is the Other as encountered in 
height: that is, as presenting the glimmer of what `confounds ontology by being 
beyond being', the idea of the infinite. I take l'Autre with a capital A to refer to 
the other person as concrete subjectivity75 and 1'Autrui, again when with capital 
A, to refer to the encounter with the face of the other as idea of the infinite. I 
take Autrui to orient the analysis of a particular, but fundamental, possibility for 
human subjectivity - the experience of being taken out of a world-for-me by 
72 Though Lingis, the translator of both Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, drops this 
convention without comment for the latter and translates both `autre' and `autrui' by `other' in 
the lower case. 
73 Lowercase autrui is a normally a personal pronoun; autre an adjective. 
74 'Poser la metaphysique comme Desir, c'est interpreter la production de 'l'eire - desir 
engendrant le Desir - comme bonte et comme au-delä du bonheur. ' [Tel 3401 
75 Why this is on the terrain of transcendence will hopefully become clearer after the discussion 
of fraternity below. But briefly, another concrete person can only be understood as Autre as a 
result of the insight granted into the possibility for humanity in general. `The notion of the face, 
to which we will refer throughout this work, opens other perspectives: it brings us to a notion of 
meaning prior to my Sinngebung and thus independent of my initiative and power. It signifies 
the philosophical priority of the existent over Being, an exteriority that does not call for power or 
possession, an exteriority that is not reducible, as with Plato, to the interiority of memory, and yet 
maintains the I who welcomes it. ' [TI 5I] In this way, we can read the reference to l'Aurre as the 
authentic understanding of the other human gained after the encounter with I'Autrui. 
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teaching. I should emphasise that this runs counter to the convention of reading 
Autrui as referring to the other person76: 
Richard Beardsworth has attended to the use of the majuscule and reached 
similar ideas in his Derrida and the Political: 
`... rather schematically, Levinas's distinctions are something like the 
following. Autrui or Autre is the alterity of time qua the infinite 
responsibility of the ego to autrui. Phenomenal human beings to whom the 
I is responsible ... are called autrui (lower case). Autrui (upper case) is the face of alterity 'in' phenomenal human beings, such that I am always 
responsible to others. In other terms, Autrui is the `ad infinitum' of autrui. 
and l'Autre is the alterity particular to the face, the transcendent infinite in 
the finite (what Levinas also designates l'Autre as against le Wnie). '7 
I -share the emphasis on infinite time structuring these concepts. However, I 
suggest instead that l'Autrui is reserved for the encounter with `transcendent 
infinite in the finite' and that l'Autre marks the generalisation of this insight 
across `phenomenal human beings' in a fraternal humanity. That is, I wish to 
reserve Autrui for that which reveals and produces exteriority. 
Levinas's phenomenology is transformed into idealist philosophy by 
metaphysical desire for the idea of the infinite. This idea is interpreted in the 
neo-Kantian sense as an affirmative idea of practical reason - that which orients 
the transformation of being. The infinite must be produced in the finite, or as 
Levinas terms it, it must be generalised. A society must be created which would 
justify the encounter with the other, which might otherwise remain an intimate 
delusion: thus ethics is the `royal road' to transcendence [TI 29]. Only this task 
gives meaning to the present. It is because of this temporal projection. that 
Levinas describes the metaphysical as an `aspiration for radical exteriority' - 
ethics is defined by its `transcendent intention' [TI 29 my emphasis]. Under 
current conditions, the face cannot ground politics, nor can it be encompassed 
-6 C ritchlev: '. 3utre refers to anything which is other, this computer at which 1 am tvpinýg. the 
window panes and the buildings I can see across the street. . -lutrui is reserved 
for the other 
human being with whom I hay e an ethical relation, although it remains a moot point to what 
extent. if any, Levinasian ethics is capable of being extended to non-human beings. such as 
animals. ' `Introduction' The Cambridge Companion to LeWnas p. 16. 
7' Beardsworth Derrida anal the Political p. 133. 
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and dealt with by phenomenology (it is precisely that which is refractory to 
phenomenology); instead the meaningfulness of the face can only be 
speculatively justified on the basis of transformed future conditions 
Production not Reflection 
Here, we must strictly reject the current conflation of the idea of the Other as 
Autrui with the more familiar idea of respect for the wad- in which the other 
person exceeds my cognitive appropriations78. Levinas consistently rejects the 
possibility of merely reflecting upon or recording the otherness of the other in 
favour of the need to effectuate transcendence which would thereby justify the 
encounter of the face of the other. Visker has convincingly demonstrated that the 
face would lack sufficient authority if it were simply reduced to `alien 
characteristics' that were objects for inexhaustible curiosity79. If this were the 
case, then the other would not reveal any egoism on my part. The `other's claim 
on me' cannot be understood from curiosity, or used as a means of checking sel r- 
perception (this would be too close to the Hegelian dialectic that Levinas 
opposes) but must come from a force `stronger than phenomenological 
80 otherness' . 
Unless it is the trace of the infinite it cannot demand respect81. 
Visker's analysis can be supplemented with three quotations from Totality and 
Infinity: 
`The presence of exteriority in language, which commences with the 
presence of the face, is not produced [ne se produit pas] as an affirmation 
whose formal meaning would remain without development. The relation 
with the face is produced [se produit] as goodness [bonte']. ' [TI 302 my 
emphasis] 
With reference to the discussion in the Introduction, by reconstructing the relation to Neo- 
Kantianism we at the very least highlight the failure to justify the assumed understanding that 
currently dominates. The latter convention is largely adopted because of similarity to other 
debates in the English-language tradition; to re-cite the quotation from page 10 of this thesis: the 
preconceptions with which his English hearers approached [Wittgenstein] debarred them almost 
entirely from understanding the point of what he was saving'. 
-`' This is precisely the trap Critchley falls into when he describes the face (or \'orse. the other's 
eves) as a 'palpable infinity that can never exhaust one's curiosity''. Critchlev 'Introduction' The 
CnnbrruIge Companion to Leimas p. 27. 
SO Truth and Singularity, pp. 254 ff. 
ibid. P. 'S 3 
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`But the transcendence of the face is not enacted outside of the world, as 
though the economy by which separation is produced remained beneath a 
sort of beatific contemplation of the Other (which would thereby turn into 
the idolatry that brews in all contemplation). ' [TI 172] 
"The I is not a contingent formation by which the same and the other, as 
logical determinations of being, can in addition be reflected within a 
thought. It is in order that alterity be produced in being that a "thought" is 
needed and that an I is needed [C'est pour que l'alterite se produise dans 
l'etre qu'il faut une «pensee» et qu'il faut un Moi. ]. The irreversibility of 
the relation can be produced only if the relation is effected by one of the 
terms as the very movement of transcendence, as the traversing of this 
distance, and not as a recording of or the psychological invention of this 
movement. "Thought" and "interiority" are the very break-up of being and 
the production (not the reflection) of transcendence. We know this relation 
only in the measure that we effect it; this is what is distinctive about it. 
Alterity is only possible starting from me. " [TI 39-40, Tel 29] [Levinas's 
italics, my emphasis in bold] 
The key term in these gobbets is `production' and its verbal counterpart, `se 
produire'. Levinas explains the use of this term, and, in particular, his play on its 
essential ambiguity, as follows: 
`Il va raconteur comment l'infini se produit dans la relation du Meme avec 
l 'Hutre et comment, indepassable, le particulier et le personnel magnetisent 
en quelque fawn le champ meme oü cette production de l'infani se joue. Le 
terme production indique et l'effectuation de l'etre (1'evenement «se 
produit)>, une automobile « se produit ») et sa mise en lumiere ou son 
exposition (un argument « se produit », un acteur « se produit »). 
L'ambiguäte de ce verbe traduit l'ambiguite essentielle de l'operation par 
laquelle, a la fois82, s'evertue l'etre d'une entite et par laquelle il se revele. ' 
[Tel 11] 
`[This book] will recount how infinity is produced in the relationship of the 
same with the other, and how the particular and the personal, which are 
unsurpassable, as it were magnetize the very field in which the production 
of infinity is enacted. The term "production" designates both the 
effectuation of being (the event "is produced, " an automobile "is 
produced") and its being brought to light or its exposition (an argument "is 
produced, " and actor "is produced"). The ambiguity of this verb conveys 
the essential ambiguity of the operation by which the being of an entity 
simultaneously [a la fois] is brought about and is revealed. ' [TI 26] 
The translator's gloss refers to the distinction in English between the notion that 
`nature produces a man' and evidence is produced in a court of law. But this 
82 Moses has noted the frequent use of this phrasal adverb in Totality and Infinity [op. cit. p. 50]. 
One could connect this to Derrida's attentive reading of the recurrence of 'en ce moment meme' 
in `At This Very Moment ... 
` (see Chapter 5). 
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distinction misses the ambiguity of agency. Better would be a translation that 
captures an event `happening', a car `being produced', an argument `brought 
forward', an actor 'appearing'83. The idea of the infinite happens via a subject, 
and is produced through a subject. It does not exist prior to or independently of 
its being thought84. 
With regard to the last point, there is perhaps some need therefore to clarify the 
references made by Levinas to Descartes's argument in the Third Meditation 
regarding the provenance of the idea of God [e. g. TI 49-50]. Far from being 
entranced by the argument that would demonstrate the exteriority of the maker 
from a mark that could have no other source in the mind of a finite being, 
Levinas there only seeks `... to emphasize the transcendence of the Infinite with 
respect to the I which is separated from it... ' and to insist that there is no possible 
corresponding object to the idea - it can only be an idea. 
In discussing this, Moses returns to the Cartesian distinction between 
`comprendre' and `entendre': `... 1'infini, en tant qu'infani, n'est point a la verite 
compris, mais neanmoins qu'il est entendu'ß5. His gloss differentiates the two 
senses of understanding by contrasting the `comprehension' of a panoramic 
spectacle with the aural connotation of entendre - `being attentive to the 
signification of the infinite and listening out for what it signifies to us'86. 
83 My thanks to Katherine Ibbett for clarification on this point. 
84 Caygill, in his discussion, brings to the fore the manner in which Levinas distinguishes himself 
from Heidegger: an act of thought is an `event of production', not a disclosure of being, that is 
`simultaneously brought about and revealed' [L&P 108]. `The welcome and hospitality of the 
other is the consummation of the infinity produced by the violent encounter with the other. In the 
first stage, subjectivity and its totality are shattered by the advent of infinity by means of the 
other, then they are reconstructed in the welcome and offer of hospitality extended to the other 
and the shattering that it brings with it. ' [L&P 109] My reading suggests that the private 
welcome of hospitality will require further political transformations to avoid the delusion of 
intimacy. 
85 `The infinite insofar as it is the infinite is in no way comprehended, but nevertheless it is 
`understood'. ' Cited by Moses [op. cit. p. 84]. 
86 `Peut-on aller plus loin et dire qu'en ce sens «entendre» 1'infini pourrait vouloir dire en rneme 
temps Ketre attentive ä sa signification. * et «eire ä i'ecoute de ce qu'il nous signifie». '' [ibid. p. 
85]. 
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The `vision' of the face, as an event of thought rather than a theme, must be 
`consummated' by ethics, by the welcome of the other. Again, at risk of 
repeating myself, I must respond to the face not contemplate it [E&I 87]87. 
Beyond Being and Nothingness 
In some ways, the distinction I have presented here between Autrui, as 
experience of the idea of the infinite, and Autre, as concrete subjectivity, might 
be clarified with reference to Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness 88 . 
Indeed, Visker has claimed that Levinas's work here could be understood as an 
`ethicization of the Sartrean universe' 89; that he uses all of Sartre's concepts, 
oppositions and metaphors while `stabilizing' the resulting intersubjectivity90 Le 
regard, the gaze or look, that `supplicates and demands ... is the epiphany of the 
face as a face' [TI 75]. 
In `Meaning and Sense' Levinas admits that the idea of the other's gaze as 
rupture extends Sartre's original insight [MS 60]. I would like to take my cue 
from this comment by suggesting a brief look at chapter 1 of the third part of 
Being and Nothingness, entitled `The Existence of Others' (`L'existence 
d'autrui'). 
This section ostensibly begins as a discussion of the traditional philosophical 
problem . normally known within the English-language tradition as the 
`Problem 
of Other Minds'. Sartre proceeds to displace the entire problematic by 
demonstrating how the traditional positions of realism, solipsism and idealism 
lead to contradictory conclusions: the realist is forced into an idealist position, 
etc. He suggests a novel dissolution of the problem: by differentiating between 
an experience of the other as subject and the other as object, he displaces the 
87 In producing its own object or its own truth, the subject breaks with the given. A subterranean 
motif of these earlier chapters, which cannot be given adequate presentation, suggests a close 
connection, with respect to these themes of production, between Levinas and Alain Badiou as 
both are framed by the conjunction of a neo-Kantian Platonism and phenomenology. 
88 Being and Nothingness translated by Hazel E. Barnes (London, Routledge, 1991). Hereafter 
abbreviated to BN followed by page reference. 
89 Truth and Singularity p. 130 fn. 32. 
90 Ibid. p. 339. 
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problematic and concludes that the traditional approach has tried to prove the 
existence of the other as object based on representations. In this latter case, one 
can only ever achieve an indirect, merely probable knowledge of the existence of 
the other as subject like me. But, while seemingly deflationary, he rescues the 
case for a direct experience of the other as subject [autrui-sujet]: the experience 
of being-seen, in. particular, the experience of shame [BN 256 ff. ]. 
Sartre therefore radically separates the experience of the Other as subject from 
the identification of a particular object as another subject [autrui-objet]: 
`Whether or not this consciousness exists in a separate state, the face which I see 
does not refer to it; it is not this consciousness which is the truth of the probable 
object which I perceive. ' [BN 253] As a result, the experience of the other-as- 
subject, in the look [le regard] is preserved phenomenologically as a particular, 
ambivalent experience of that which is in the midst of this world and beyond this 
world at the same time: 
`... insofar as I experience myself as looked-at, there is realized for me a 
trans-mundane presence of the Other. The Other looks at me not as he is 
"in the midst of' my world but as he comes towards the world and toward 
me from all his transcendence; when he looks at me he is separated from me 
by no distance, by no object of the world, but the sole fact of his nature as 
Other. ' [BN 270] 
My suggestion is that Levinas "corrects" Sartre's distinction of Autrui-sujet 111 
Autrui-objet, by making a clearer terminological distinction between Autrui 
Autre and, further, that Autrui makes reference to a liminal experience similar to 
Sartre's Autrui-sujet which challenges the intra-mundane world of experience 
(the world-for-us). What both share is the description of an experience of that 
'which is not me' or not from me' within my own experience. Both these 
encounters put naive unreflective existence into question. However. for the 
Levinas of Totality and Infinity, the productive encounter which seizes me in 
shock is not primarily that of shame, but the encounter with the Master glossed 
as teaching. 
It is not that the trope of shame is absent but that it is crucial], displaced. The 
master does not catch me in a shameful act. but, rather. 'puts in question the 
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naive legitimacy of freedom itself' revealing the upsurge of being in separation 
to be usurpation [TI 303]. When the I feels itself to be arbitrary, that is 
ungrounded, there morality begins. Shame, is not shame for the past, but for the 
condition of creatureliness [WhO 7]. 
`To discover the unjustified facticity of power and freedom one must not 
consider it as an object, nor consider the Other as an object: one must 
measure oneself against infinity, that is, desire him. It is necessary to have 
the idea of infinity, the idea of the perfect ... 
in order to know one's own 
imperfection. ' [TI 84] 
In this desire, something other than me is placed above my own existence 91 
Before this superiority, this height, I do not simply 'fall under the gaze of another 
freedom'92, but also seek to produce a justification for freedom itself. That is, in 
contrast to the finite, `irrational' freedom of Geworfenheit, Levinas sees the 
ethical as that which insists on the infinite as the means to redeem subjective 
existence. Wallowing in finitude is the mark of paganism and nihilism. 
Let us recap and clarify here. For both Sartre and Levinas, the shock or rupture 
is a non-presentational relation of being which destroys the pseudo-objectivity of 
the for-itself to produce the `transcending condition of [real] objectivity' [BN 
2761: `Thus in the shock which seizes me when I apprehend the Other's look, 
this happens - that suddenly I experience a subtle alienation of all my 
possibilities ... 
' [Bled 264-5]. 
But this extension is not restricted to a disagreement over the occasions which 
spark this experience. Where Sartre is forced to present the other-as-subject as 
out of reach (`... what is certain is that I am looked-at: what is only probable is 
that the look is bound to this or that intra-mundane presence. ' [BN 277]), Levinas 
is able to attempt a possible bridge between the beyond and what is presented. 
Phenomenology in Sartre uncovers an impasse, an openness in the structure of 
subjectivity - but Levinas takes this impasse to be the site of a decision. an 
91 \'iskcr Truth ýrnýl Jrri ýrrlarih p. 1-33 
°` Levinas thus describes Sartre's account of the encounter \ý ith the Other [TI 30-33]. 
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interpretation 93 
. It is here that phenomenology co-opts a neo-Kantian 
metaphysical supplement: to postulate the possibility of producing the conditions 
under which this separation is overcome, transformed or engenders the realm of 
transcendence. 
Moreover, subjectivity itself is only justified in the production of this 
supersession. Teaching itself is double-coded. It is that which calls me into 
question, but also what opens the possibility for response. It calls me to justify 
my existence by offering my world to the Other in discourse. The `incessant 
reception of teaching' and its response in apology is the very production of 
transcendence through ethical being [TI 203 & 295]. 
In these mass of figures, we see the other as `caught in tension between face and 
form'94: `Form - incessantly betraying its own manifestation, congealing into a 
plastic form, for it is adequate to the same - alienates the exteriority of the other. 
The face is a living presence; it is expression. ' [TI 66] But by shifting the `face' 
to a `subjective field' beyond "vision", social relations (ethics) become the 
production of justification through connecting the form to the face. `[Social 
relations] are the original deployment of the relationship that is no longer open to 
the gaze ... 
but is accomplished from me to the other in the face to face. ' [TI 
29O]95 
93 Unfortunately I can only nod here towards a further dimension of this central issue for Levinas 
scholarship.. It would be vital to add to this question by investigating the relation of Levinasian 
Ideas to the hermeneutic Interpretation of Heidegger's Being and Time. Briefly, the existential 
projection of authentic being-towards-death as being-a-whole must be attested by the phenomena 
themselves and not simply remain an arbitrary projection - it must discover existentiell 
attestation. `How are these two phenomena of anticipation and resoluteness to be brought 
together? ... 
In attempting to bring resoluteness and anticipation forcibly together, are we not 
seduced into an intolerable and quite unphenomenological construction, for which we can no 
longer claim that it has the character of an ontological projection based upon the phenomena? ... 
Does resoluteness, in its ownmost existentiell tendency of Being, point forward to anticipatory 
resoluteness as its ownmost authentic possibility? ' Being and Time [1927] translated by John 
Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford, Blackwell, 1978), §61 p. 349. In the development of 
the book, it is then necessary to investigate the possible temporalizations of temporality to 
uncover originary temporality - this involves a repetition of Dasein-analysis [ibid. pp. 350-52]. 
Holding in mind this tacit critique of Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, 
to which Levinas returns in Otherwise than Being (see Chapter 4), such a repetition could hold 
the key to understanding the relation between the latter and Totality and Infinity. 
94 Visker Truth and Singularity p. 142. 
95 Matthew Edgar has made the connection to Sartre and rejects interpretations that would present 
the Other as alter ego or thing in itself. Instead he focuses on ethical alterirv which is beyond 
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Hospitality, Apology, Eschatology 
The accomplishment in and of the face to face occurs through apology and 
hospitality. I both speak and offer my world to the Other as its justification. 
Crucially, this practical slant orients `inner life' in a call to `infinite 
responsibility' [TI 245]. In this way, these modalities of action are ways of 
`making the community of the goods of this world break forth from the exclusive 
property of enjoyment' [TI 76]. This `relationship established over things' [TI 
50] is the accomplishment of metaphysics [TI 300], but also `calls for 
confirmation' [TI 240]. In the judgment, justice is desired - the confirmation 
that `war does not dupe morality' [TI 21]. 
What form would such a confirmation or judgment take? We have already 
insisted upon the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason in Levinas. 
This is masked in the opening pages of Totality and Infinity because of its 
presentation as an opposition between philosophy and eschatology. Of peace, 
the overarching theme of the book, there can only be an eschatology. 
Philosophy is taken to proceed by evidences, from which perspective 
eschatology always appears as subjective illusion and lack of certainty: a branch 
of opinion or faith. But Levinas insists that `the extraordinary phenomenon of 
prophetic eschatology certainly does not intend to win its civic rights within the 
domain of thought by being- assimilated to a philosophical evidence' [TI 22]. 
Instead it proceeds by first demonstrating the break-up of totality within 
philosophy. That is, a certain phenomenology is used to find a point at which 
phenomenology is unable to account for its certitude [TI 25]. It is precisely the 
encounter with the face that marks such a point - it marks a `gleam of 
phenomenological description, but does not revert to "realism". `Operating within the confines 
of the phenomenological method, we witness the limits of phenomenology in an experience that 
ultimately disrupts the equilibrium of experience itself. The absolutely new ethical meaning 
generated in the encounter cannot be constituted by the transcendental subject precisely insofar as 
it is produced as the disruption and overflowing of the subject. ' However, the metaphysics of 
transcendence (as opposed to transcendentality) and its production is absent as is any 
consideration of the difference between I'Autre and l'Autrui. Matthew Edgar `On the Ambiguous 
Meaning of Otherness in Totality and Infinity' in The Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology; Volume 36,1 (January 2005), pp. 55-75; p. 68. 
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exteriority'. Or, rather, there is a "vision", an interpretation (though Levinas 
would resist this reading), that metaphysically reconfigures this moment of 
break-up as trace of transcendence. 
`The first "vision" of eschatology (hereby distinguished from the revealed 
opinions of positive religions) reaches [atteint] the very possibility of 
eschatology, that is, the breach of the totality, the possibility of a 
signification without context. The experience of morality does not proceed 
from this vision - it consummates [consomme] this vision; ethics is an 
optics. ' [T123, Tel 8, translation modified] 
The reason for any resistance to interpretation is found in the consommer of the 
last line, meaning both `to use' or `to consummate'. An interpretation as a purely 
theoretical alternative to phenomenology is of no consequence. Its measure is 
the manner in which it accomplishes events. Opposed to revelation as dogma, it 
produces its own breach through aiming at its vision. The very work of justice is 
necessary because it produces `the breach that leads to God' [pour que se 
produise la trouee qui mene a Dieu] - its production is its happening [T178, TeI 
77]. Hence, Levinas's opposition to counter-representations of being, since such 
structures dissimulate the necessity of effectuation [TI 27-8]. The individual and 
personal are required so that the infinite occurs [TI 39,2181. From this 
perspective, the. status of the idea of infinity is ambiguous, since as projection its 
value appears to lie in the `maintenance' of the idea of exteriority [TI 196] and 
Levinas explicitly touches on its affinity with illusion and delirium [TI 49]. 
Yet, the `privileged experience of infinity' in the face to face would be the divine 
release of the world from custom. And, ultimately, Levinas argues that it is not 
in any sense irrational, since the very rationality of objectivity is only a residue 
of practical finality from ivlzich it derives its meaning; Levinas instigates a 
pragmatism in the heart of theoretical philosophy [TI 94]. We are faced with a 
contest over ideas and the conduct of philosophy, where what results would 
decide. A "philosophy" that aims at the Good - where this Good is Platonic. and 
hence not to he traced back to any oriental wisdom' [TI 218]. 
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Eschatology is presented as a prophetic mode of orientation, but one without 
hope for the individual self and without liberation in a mortal lifespan . 
Practical philosophy will not be bound to the elevation of the given and finitude, 
but aims at a transforming event of being - the generalisation of the outburst 
(eclat) of exteriority in a pluralism of separated beings relating ethically. 
96 Cited by Derrida at VM 118. 
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Chapter Two 
Totality and Infinity 2 
- the idea of the West and the otherness of the Other 
The previous chapter outlined the fundamental structure of Levinas's account of 
the ethical relation beyond separated existence in Totality and Infiniry: here, I 
turn to the questions raised at the very beginning: that is, are all others [Metres] 
Other [Autrui]? Can everyone experience the Other in its `remoteness, alterity, 
and exteriority' [TI 34]? 
Given our account of the `stages' of being and the mechanics of separation, it is 
obvious that not all others encounter or are encountered as Others. The question 
is ill-formed; the categories do not overlap in any token-token correspondence, 
since the Other does not enter being in any concrete manner. The question 
should be: what are the conditions of possibility for the encounter with the idea 
of the infinite as the face of the Other? 
As we shall see, the topography entails cultural differences. These differences 
are both material and socio-linguistic (or even ideological). We will consider 
each in turn, beginning with the material constraints based on the account of 
need. Can one encounter the face of the other, as infinite idea, if and only if 
one's material needs are met? 
Need and Separation: the Proletarian Condition 
As fourth stage on our schema, the Other, as the idea of the infinite, is 
encountered in the face as a rupture in self-sufficient enjoyment 
1. The 
phenomenality of contentment is displaced by the idea of the infinite and its 
concomitant new mode of being, a fully human possibility which leaves the 
`plane of economy and labour' [TI 181]. But the free being is characterised as 
free from dependency. Thus Levinas argues that separation. the creation of a 
1 'Truth presuppose,,, a being autonomous in separation: the quest for a truth is precisely a relation 
that docs not rc' t on the pri% ation of need. ' [TI 61] 
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world-for-me in enjoyment, is the precondition for the encounter with exteriority. 
Beyond need, the rupture can only strike the one who 'possesses his being 
entirely' [TI 104]2. 
Here we may draw out a peculiar feature of Levinas's concept of need. Need is 
not necessarily a privative state of the individual which must be overcome. 
Insofar as need is a spur to labour, it is the condition of possibility of extricating 
oneself from anonymous being. 
`To conceive of need as a simple privation is to apprehend it in the midst of 
a disorganized society which leaves it neither time nor consciousness.... 
Animal need is liberated from vegetable dependence, but this liberation is 
itself dependence and uncertainty. An animal's need is inseparable from 
struggle and fear; the exterior world from which it is liberated remains a 
threat. But need is also the time of labor: a relation with an other yielding 
its alterity. To be cold, hungry, thirsty, naked, to seek shelter - all these 
dependencies with regard to the world, having become needs, save the 
instinctive being from anonymous menaces and constitute a being 
independent of the world ... ' 
[TI 116] 
There is a distinction here between vegetable dependence, animal need 
(instinctive being) and separation. But there is a further distinction between need 
`in the midst of a disorganized society' and a different manner of conceiving 
need. Labour (and the dwelling) is the condition, the prompt, that separates 
human existence, and hence human need, from animality. Existents are 
prompted by need to labour in and on the world so as to lodge themselves in the 
world. The ego is established through commerce and enjoyment. 
Crucially, Levinas argues that labour does not meet immediate pressing needs, 
but works towards overcoming the anxiety of the future by ensuring the 
'persistence of plenitude'. The need valorised by Levinas as essential to the 
structure of human subjectivity, is the need to create security and comfort: 
enjoyment is troubled only by concern for what tomorrow might bring. This 
futural structure constitutes the very activity of separation3. 
The totality of contentment betrays its own phenomenality when an exteriorit\ that does not 
slip into the void of needs `ratified or frustrated supervenes. .. 
[it] breaks interiority by this very 
incommensurability .' 
[TI 179] 
Here one discerns an acute differentiation of Levinas's concept of need from that of Mar- and 
Engels. Although the basic needs of eating. drinking, clothing and habitation are shared, for the 
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But Levinas introduces a ambiguity here into the concept of need. An ambiguity 
which led me to distinguish the egoist from the proletarian. 
`I live from the whole content of life - even from the labor which ensures the future; I live from my labor as I live from air, light, and bread. The limit or 
borderline case [le cas limite] in which need prevails over enjoyment, the 
proletarian condition condemning to accursed labor in which the indigence of 
corporeal existence finds neither refuge nor leisure at home, is the absurd world 
of Geworfenheit. ' [TI 146-7] [translation altered] 
The possibility of need prevailing over enjoyment is characterised as 
Geworfenheit. In the account of the dwelling, it was precisely this absurdity or 
chaos that was overcome by the home. An enjoying being who prepares for what 
the future might bring is contrasted with the proletarian whose labours only meet 
pressing immediacy 4. Hence we appear to have two kinds of need: the 
proletarian condition and the `normal' condition where need finds its satisfaction 
and produces a fully separated being; the plane of `needy being' contra the plane 
of `sabbatical existence' [TI 104]. Importantly, since need prevails over 
enjoyment, the proletarian does not attain the necessary stage of egoist being. 
Without the `self-possession' of full separation, it has no ego to rupture [TI 104]. 
Without the possibility of solitude and enjoyment, the proletarian cannot 
`maintain itself' [se tenir] in the world. Without secure dwelling it has not 
encountered the feminine other, without full separation it cannot encounter the 
face of the Other as the idea of the infinite. 
Separation from animality is not guaranteed. There is a spectrum of separation 
from needy to fully egoist. According to Levinas, both are for-itself, but in 
different ways. Levinas analyses the expression "each for himself' as 
characterizing the plane of separation, as defining the escape from participation. 
latter, the satisfaction of the basic needs leads to new needs - this is the `first historical act'. The 
temporal dimension in Levinas's account relates only to worry regarding the continued meeting 
of the first needs in the future. Without this dimension of new needs, Levinas's discussion 
remains at the level of the micrological concerns of the domestic accounts - determinately petit 
bourgeois. The German Ideology - Part One edited by C. J. Arthur (London, Laurence & Wishart, 
1974), pp. 48-50. 
A Caygill reads this structure in Existence and Existents. Time is unhinged when I have to eat `in 
order not to die' [L&P 66], but such occasions arise - the separated being can regress to the lower 
condition. 
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There is the for-itself of the hungry, who reduce to a"'famished stomach that has 
no ears, " capable of killing for a crust of bread'. Against this there is the for- 
itself of the the surfeited one who does not understand the starb ing and 
approaches him as an alien species, as the philanthropist approaches the 
destitute' [TI 118]5. 
The second reference to the proletarian condition in Totality and Infinity 
underlines this distinction. `Such is a lower proletariat which would only cover 
the comfort of the bourgeois interior and its fleshpot horizons. The totality of 
contentment betrays its own phenomenality when an exteriority supervenes that 
does not slip into the void of needs gratified or frustrated. ' [TI 179] [translation 
altered] 
That is, contentment can only reveal its phenomenality once it is reached - the 
one who is not content can only feel envy. We could recall Aristotle's 
differentiation of kinds of friends, where friendship based on mutual advantage is 
the lowest kind of friendship. The human who completes me or contents me by 
meeting a need opens only a relation of mutual advantage: in a privative society 
this may dominate, a world of exploitation6. We should further note that labour 
and enjoyment are not simply surpassed as a context for metaphysical desire: 
labour creates the conditions of possibility for hospitality, for the receiving and 
giving which characterise the authentic ethical response to the face of the other 
[TI 146]. Thus we must register a disagreement with Howard Caygill's analysis 
of labour and need. He writes: `The encounter with the other preserves freedom 
from dissolution in material scarcity or self-destructive anxiety for the future. It 
opens an `extraterritorial' space and time.... ' [L&P 116-17]. This passage [TI 
150] refers to the domestic space inaugurated by the feminine other. 
While the encounter with the masterful other opens an `extraterritorial space and 
time' the access to this space is determined in the last analysis by material needs: 
The for-itself of the hungry underlie, Levinas's admonition that war 'would result from masses 
that demand food as right'. [TR 1-33] 
6 'Food can be interpreted as an implement only in a world of exploitation. ' [TI 13-1 
ý_ 
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only free beings can be strangers to one another [TI 731. And indeed this reveals 
what is so efficient about war - it destroys the conditions for bourgeois life7. 
`The ontological event that takes form in this black light is a casting into 
movement of beings hitherto anchored in their identity a mobilization of 
absolutes, by an objective order from which there is no escape. The trial by 
force is the test of the real. But violence does not consist so much in 
injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making 
them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves, making them 
betray not only commitments but their own substance, making them carry 
out actions that will destroy every possibility for action. ' [TI 211 
The structure of need connects the human back to the world such that the 
satisfied being has never secured itself sine cura. It is only through need, 
materiality, that humans can be made to play other roles. This is why the 
political production of peace serves the role it does. It is worth examining here 
the comments of Levinas regarding Marx. On the one hand, he argues against 
any privileged insight for the suffering masses: 
`I do not believe that the oppression that crushes the working classes gives 
it uniquely a pure experience of oppression in order to awaken it, beyond 
economic liberation, the nostalgia for a metaphysical liberation. The 
revolutionary struggle is divested of its true significance and its real 
intention when it serves simply as a basis for spiritual life, or when through 
its crises it must awaken vocations. ' [T&O 61] 
This is consistent with our insistence that the ethical can only commence from 
the satisfied being 8. On the other hand, Levinas emphasises that the `true 
significance' of Marxism lies in the valorisation of needs as constituting the 
specificity of the human: a `being without needs would not be happier than needy 
being satisfied' [TI 146]. This approving focus on `economic man' includes a 
nod to alienation through an observation as to how the dignity of man is 
compromised by things. However this understanding of the centrality of needs is 
undermined by its remaining within the plane of this economics: `[Marxism] 
situates itself in the perspective of the sincerity of intentions, the good will of 
7 On the other hand, this then strengthens the first protocol of Caygill's Levinas reading: the 
ethical is understood as a fragile response to the political - not considerations restricted to the 
realm of private relations [L&P 1]. 
a Compare this argument against the historical function of the working class with the arguments 
in favour of Jewish excellence: they are held to be more responsible because of what they have 
suffered historically. Bernasconi `Who is the Other? Who is the Neighbor? ' p. 24. 
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hunger and thirst, and the ideal of struggle and sacrifice it proposes, the culture to 
which it invites us, is but the prolongation of these intentions. ' [E&E 451 
The `prolongation of these intentions' remains in being and does not move 
towards the ethical plane. I conclude then that the ethical response can only 
occur when basic needs are met. How then to read Levinas's comments on the 
stranger, the orphan, the widow'? I would suggest the following interpretation. 
The stranger, the widow and the orphan are types of people within one's own 
society whose basic needs (hunger, thirst, lack of shelter) are not met and hence 
are precluded from ethical experience - they are proletarian on Levinas's 
definition, not yet separated. 
`The plane of the needy being, avid for its complements, vanishes, and the 
possibility of a sabbatical existence, where existence suspends the necessities 
of existence is inaugurated. For an existent is an existent only in the measure 
that it is free, that is, outside of any system, which implies dependence. 
Every restriction put on freedom is a restriction put on being. ' [TI 104] [my 
italics] 
The political task is to combat these conditions, these dependencies, so as to 
maximise the potential for ethical response within a society. The stranger, the 
widow and the orphan are those who cannot be experienced as other [Autrui] -I 
cannot yet experience them in height. But in treating them as another person 
[Autre], potentially, in future, when their needs are met, they may bring me more 
than I contain - one day I may experience the shock that transcends my 
charitable interaction with them. The crux here lies in the notion of the `third 
party' (le tiers) present in the encounter with the Other [TI 213]. I am called to 
transform their condition so that they might come to form the society of equals. 
This notion of fraternity is anchored in a certain reception of monotheism which 
will be examined in more detail later in this chapter. The idea of the ethical 
points to a potential even in the destitute that I am responsible for catalyzing. 
Ideology, Idealism, the West 
If material constraints preclude some within my own society (thc '. ' idow. orphan 
and the stranger) from the movement towards transcendence, then we can extend 
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this question to relations with other cultures. And are the constraints solely 
material and economic? Is the possibility of transnational ethics proportional to 
the global extent of proletarianization? We have already read Levinas's 
comments on the restriction of serious thought to the Bible and the Greeks. In 
one of those interviews cited, Levinas decries the practice of dancing at funerals 
in South Africa. He asks the interviewer: `Have you seen it? That is some way 
of expressing sadness! '9 
This suggests that there is a cultural dimension to Levinas's consideration of 
ethical preconditions. Through this question I attempt to extend Caygill's 
analyses - the reading of Levinas from `the standpoint of political judgment' 
[L&P 1] into the core of Levinas's problematic - into the foundational claims of 
ethics and transcendence. The political does not simply `trouble' the remainder 
of his thought or remain an `Achilles heel' - it is also that which orients the 
entire speculative project. 
My strong claim will be that the problematic of the Other is from the beginning 
mobilized in a valorisation of the Judaeo-Christian legacy against those that 
come from outside Europe. That is, this is a philosophical question -I am not 
simply mobilising biographical ephemera in a forensic examination of the 
Emmanuel Levinas. Instead, I am insisting that the very ideas which support the 
systematic development of the Other are oriented by a cultural, geo-political 
`diagnosis' and is inflected by a thesis on. world history in its innermost 
workings. 
I begin with two infamous quotations which situate this question along the axis 
of geo-political particularity. The first quotation is taken from a radio discussion 
broadcast shortly after the massacres at Sabra and Chatila of 1982. The chair, 
Shlomo Malka, asks Levinas whether the Palestinian is not the other par 
excellence for the Israeli. Levinas responds by insisting: `my definition of the 
other is completely different"0. 
9 Cited in Robert Bernasconi `Who is the Other? Who is the neighbor? ', p. 14. 
10 Script of the radio discussion of 28 September 1982 is given in The Levinas Reader edited by 
Sean Hand; Oxford, Blackwells, 1989; pp. 289-298. 'An apologetic response to the revelation of 
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The second quotation is taken from a brief essay published in 1960 on the 
difficult relations between China and the Soviet Union at the time. Levinas 
raises the question of whether there can be understanding between countries 
which share such different histories and develops it by asking: `In abandoning 
the West, doesn't Russia [sic] fear drowning itself in an Asian civilisation which 
will continue to exist behind the visible, material reality [le concret apparent] of 
the dialectical resolution? "' [my translation] 
Levinas suggests that certain `particularities' will persist even after the 
achievement of the historical advance represented by the classless society. He 
continues: `The yellow peril! It is not racial, it is spiritual. It is not about 
inferior values; it is to do with a radical strangeness, which is alien to all the 
density of its past, from where no voice with familiar inflection filters: it comes 
from a lunar or Martian past. "' Caygill describes this piece as Levinas's `ugliest 
and most disturbing published work' and that it is `... difficult to imagine any 
circumstances in which the phrase `the yellow peril' can not be racist', especially 
given the dehumanising reference to the moon and Mars [LAP 184]. This essay 
is in no sense to be understood as a `lapse' - as will be seen, Levinas believes 
European excellence is located in its ideas of the infinite to which `Eastern 
wisdom' has no access. 
The past which blocks the Soviet Union from allying more fully with China is its 
`Graeco, Judaic, Christian' past. Throughout Levinas's pieces on Judaism, we 
the other as enemy would be to distinguish here between empirical and transcendental others, and 
to maintain that here Levinas was speaking of the former. A harder thought is that Levinas's 
claim is rigorously consistent with his philosophy, which we have argued recognises the 
inevitability of war. To describe the other as enemy at this point is thus entirely consistent with 
such a reading of Levinas's ethics. ' [L&P 192-193] 
11 `En abandonant l'Occident, la Russie ne craindrait-elle pas de se noyer dans une civilisation 
asiatique qui, eile aussi, subsistera derriere le concret apparent de l'aboutissement dialectique? '. 
'Le Debat Russo-Chinois et la dialectique' in Les Imprevus de l'histoire (Montpelier, Fata 
Morgana, 1994), pp. 170-173; pp. 171-172. 
12 `Le peril jaune! 11 nest pas racial, il est spirituel. Non pas qu'il s'agisse de valeurs inferieures; 
il s'agit dune etrangete radicale, etrangere de toure l'epaisseur de son passe, oü ne filtre aucune 
voix a inflexion familiere, dun passe lunaire ou martien. ' Ibid. p. 172. A strange echo can be 
here discerned between China's past, and the opaque density of the elemental [epaisseur opaque 
sans origine] which is absolutely underdetermined: it has no zero point through which any axis 
of co-ordinates would pass' [TI 159]. 
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find a similar theme: this specific past constitutes the `excellence' of Europe 
which must be preserved and extended in the face of determinate changes in 
historical and geo-political conditions. These modern conditions are: 
" the rise and defeat of Hitlerism; 
" the creation of the state of Israel in 1948; 
" `The arrival on the historical scene of those underdeveloped Afro-Asiatic 
masses who are strangers to the Sacred History that forms the heart of the 
Judaic-Christian world. ' 13 
In the essay, `Jewish Thought Today' (1961), Levinas worries that the `hordes' 
and `masses', who come from outside Europe, threaten both to undermine the 
`new-found authenticity of Israel' and to marginalise Jews and Christians, who 
could be reduced by `greedy eyes' into sects squabbling over the interpretation of 
a few books [JTT 165] 14. The theme of underdevelopment should concern us as 
a consistent term in Levinas's thought, one which I believe should be equated to 
the `proletarian' condition in its reference to the economics and structuring 
constraints of need. 
The subsequent work of this chapter will focus on Levinas's essay, `Meaning and 
Sense', published in 1964, but written just after the publication of Totality and 
Infinity. This essay responds to Merleau-Ponty's positive engagement with 
structuralist anthropology. Though Levinas praises it as the "ontology of 
decolonization", he reads it simultaneously as producing not only disorientation, 
but also in no way averting the possibility of war [MS 46] (we should contrast 
disorientation with the orientation provided by the presentation of the face [e. g. 
TI 215]). The ontology of decolonization works negatively towards the 
13Jewish Thought Today' [1961] in Difficult Freedom - Essays on Judaism translated Sean Hand 
(London, Athlone, 1990), pp. 159-166; p. 160. Hereafter references given in the text as JTf 
followed by page reference. 
14 `... but under the greedy eyes of these countless hordes who wish to hope and live, we, the 
Jews and Christians are pushed to the margins of history, and soon no one will bother any more 
to differentiate between a Catholic and a Protestant or a Jew and a Christian, sects that devour 
one another because they cannot agree on the interpretation of a few obscure books. ' [JiT 165] 
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destruction of one manifestation of totalising reason, but will leave nothing 
constructive in its place 
This is animates the repeated critique of structuralist anthropology l'. In contrast 
to the `anti-Platonism' of contemporary linguistics and anthropology (which 
situates all meaning immanent to the particular culture, language or society). 
phenomenology's value as the intuitive study of intentionality, is to interrogate 
this flat plurality of cultural meanings to bring out the dominant structures of 
subjectivity from the seemingly infinite variety of societies, languages or 
cultures. Levinas defends the Judaic concept of alterity as height in opposition 
to a notion of alterity that would be premised upon a `saraband of innumerable 
and equivalent cultures' [MS 58]. "Greece" names a culture which produces 
something that enables the `depreciation' of merely `historical cultures' [MS 42]. 
For Plato (and Husserl) this is Reason; for Levinas, the West produces the idea of 
the 'face'. 
For Levinas, immanentism results in anarchy - there is no principle by which to 
judge - and cultural relativism. There is an erroneous assumption underlying 
anthropology: it treats human meaning solely as an expression of need. For 
Levinas, human need is not animal need precisely because it has a cultural level: 
meaning is not solely oriented by satisfaction (the system of `tastes' equidistant 
from instinct and reason [TI 133-34]). Crucially, he claims that this error arises 
from allowing a model of underdeveloped humanity to determine the theoretical 
co-ordinates: `Only need taken at the level of underdeveloped humanity can give 
this false impression of univocity. ' [MS 45] Levinas is rebutting the possible 
equivalence between Western society and the tribes studied by Levi-Strauss: that 
is, Levinas contests the pertinence of these analyses for appreciating an advanced 
humanity 16. The condition of the inhabitant of the underdeveloped world w% ill be 
somewhat akin to the 'lower proletariat', whose '`reedy eyes' can only envy the 
1' I stress the . crnuctujraIist since 
Levy-Bruhl is championed against Claude Levi-Strauss in so far 
as the former maintains a hierarchy of mentalities - the 'modern' is superior to the 'primitive'. 
which can Onl\ be object and theme for the first and not vice versa. See 'Le\ %-Bruhl et Id 
philosophie contemporaine'. Cf. L&P 211 fn. 1 1. 
16 See Claude Le\'i-Strauss Tristes Tropiques translated by John and Doreen «eightman (London. 
Penguin. 1976). 
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outward display of consumption and satisfaction. In seeking to live', perhaps 
the West only appears to them as a part of their phenomenally defined world of 
pressing need. And that is to say nothing of their ability to meet the requirements 
of hospitality or their ability to understand the analysis ww hich shows desire for 
the other to underpin ordinary experience. As we shall shortly see. this harsh 
sentiment underlines comments on China in 'Meaning and Sense'. 
Phenomenology, Empathy and Anthropology 
I feel it is important here to address this issue in relation to phenomenology, and. 
in particular, Levinas's appropriation of it. In Origin of Geometry, Husserl 
writes: 
`Does not the undertaking of a humanistic science of "how it really was" [wie es 
eigentlich war] contain a presupposition taken for granted, a validity-ground 
never observed, never made thematic, of a strictly unassailable [type of] self- 
evidence, without which historical inquiry would be a meaningless enterprise? 
All questioning and demonstrating which is in the usual sense historical 
presupposes history [Geschichte] as the universal horizon of questioning, not 
explicitly, but still as a horizon of implicit certainty, which, in spite of all vague 
background-indeterminacy, is the presupposition of all determinablility, or of all 
intention to seek and to establish determined facts. ' [Ursprung 176] 
In this essay, Husserl aims to uncover the foundation of human reason shared by 
all. This is revealed in the move from proto-geometry to geometry as dependent 
on a fundamental human `empathy' (Einfühlung). But this is supplemented by a 
teleology of history (according to the production of science, and the general 
value of scientificity), to which the historical and social sciences are themselves 
indebted. A historical or cultural relativism makes a claim to `factualness' which 
`presupposes the historical a priori if this claim is to have meaning' [ibid. ]. 
Levinas has referred to this idea as exemplifying the `generosity of Western 
thought': the abstract is seen in every human, but cultures are judged according 
7 to how far those cultures also value the person [MS 58]'. But this manner of 
valuing the person is not available to Levinas himself. 
This appears to be a misreading of Husserl's argument. The value instantiated by Europe is 
science - it is this that enables a teleological narrati\ e of world time. Science e. -\presses the 
eternal in humanit\ as a whole. See Crisis or'European Sciences. 
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As already noted, for him, there is no empathy or genus belonging to or 
encompassing humanity. He explicitly opposes the notion of a European 
teleology of reason in which individuals would participate, `an inward 
maturation of reason common to all' [TI 219]. 
`Does not a mind in speaking evoke what the other mind already thinks, 
both them participating in common ideas? But the community of thought 
ought to have made language as a relation between beings impossible. A 
universal thought dispenses with communication. A reason cannot be other 
for a reason. ... 
Separated thinkers become rational only in the measure 
that their personal and particular acts of thinking figure as moments of this 
unique and universal discourse. There would be reason in the thinking 
individual only in the measure that he would himself enter into his own 
discourse, that thought would ... comprehend him. But to make of the 
thinker a moment of thought is to limit the revealing function of language to 
its coherence, conveying the coherence of concepts. In coherence the 
unique I of the thinker volatizes ... 
language would consist in suppressing 
the other, in making the other agree with the same. ' [T172-3] 
The human is held to be refractory to every `typology', `genus', `classification 118. 
The ethical is premised upon a plurality that does away with Einfühlung, which is 
appropriate only to the level of animality (and not even participation since that is 
directly related to paysage). This presents Levinas's "phenomenological" 
methodology with a problem since it cannot make any claim to transcendental 
status. However, perhaps the fundamental problem of phenomenology's 
dependence on first person intuition lies in its requirement to shore up the 
phenomenologist as the apogee of human achievement. Eurocentrism is to some 
extent constitutive insofar as the cultural and historical place of the practitioner 
must be valorised if the results of description are to have the intended status. 
According to the Cartesian Meditations, phenomenology is cogent on the basis 
that `I myself am the primal norm constitutionally for all other men [wie ich 
selbst konstitutiv für alle Menschen]' 
19. Without even Einfühlung, Levinas's 
18 `In order that a pluralism in itself (which cannot be reflected in formal logic) be realized there 
must be produced in depth the movement from me to the other, an attitude of an I with regard to 
the Other (an attitude already specified as love or hatred, obedience or command, learning or 
teaching, etc. ... 
), that would not be a species of relationship in general ... ' 
[TI 1211 
'Pour que se realise un pluralisme en soi que la logique formelle ne saurait refleter, il faut que se 
produise en profondeur le movement de moi ä i'autre, une attitude d'un moi ä 1'egard d'Autrui ... 
qui ne serait pas une espece de la relation en general. ' [Tel 126] 
19 Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology [23 & 25/2/1929] translated by 
Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960), p. 126. Hereafter abbreviated to 
CM followed by page reference. 
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relation to other cultures lacks a crucial guardrail in any historico-philosophical 
anthropology. 
Robert Bernasconi's own reading of `Meaning and Sense' sets it against 
Merleau-Ponty's essay, `Everywhere and Nowhere' 20. Here, the latter argues 
that an appreciation of the cultures of the East can enable us to recapture a lost 
sense of the relation between the body, sensibility and reason to escape such 
intellectual colonialism21. Bernasconi concludes with the following questions 
relating to the specificity of Levinas's analysis of the Other: 
`But even if the encounter between cultures leads me to doubt the norms of 
my own culture on the basis of the practices of an alien culture, does that 
make the encounter ethical? For all the rhetoric of strangerhood, is not the 
Other always other than culture? Can the Other qua Other have a cultural 
identity? ' 22 
Levinas's resistance to Levi-Strauss, beyond Merleau-Ponty's understanding, 
does not entertain the possibility of doubting his own culture. The Other is other 
to culture, it uproots me from history and cultural particularity23, but this idea of 
the Other has itself been produced in a unique historical configuration. A 
cultural meaning which exceeds determination by need in a particular direction 
provides us with the means to re-hierarchialize cultures and languages. Cultures 
will be judged on their ability to produce transcendence and, hence, peace. 
In his discussion of `Le Debat Russo-Chinois et la dialectique', Caygill writes: 
`Given the title, Levinas might have been expected, when speaking of Asia, 
to confront Europe and its dangerous metaphysics with new sources of 
universality and freedom drawn from the East. That he does not even 
contemplate this step is one of the many mysteries of this tormented text 
whose political motivation becomes apparent only in its closing lines. ' [L&P 
1831 
20 'One-Way Traffic: The Ontology of Decolonialization and its Ethics' in Ontology and Alteritv 
in , lferleau-Pone, 
Edited by Galen A. Johnson & Michael B. Smith (Evanston, Northwestern 
University Press, 1990), pp. 67-80. 
21 'Everywhere and Nowhere' in Signs [ 1960] translated by Richard C. McCleary (Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press, 1964). pp. 1? 6-58. 
op. cit. p. 76. 
`i 'Though of myself I am not exterior to history. I do find in the Other a points that is absolute 
with regard to history - not by amalgamating with the Other. but in speaking with him. Hi, tor% 
is worked over by the ruptures of history. in which a judgment is borne upon it. When man truly 
approaches the Other he is uprooted from history .' 
[TI 522] 
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I believe my reading offers a resolution to this mystery. The resources of 
Judaism, its ideas transcend their production in a particular conjunction. These 
ideas have universal applicability, but it is possible that certain cultural 
formations will find themselves blocked because of their own cultural and 
historical inheritance, sufficiently foreign for Levinas to describe it as `lunar or 
Martian' 24. 
The argument in `Meaning and Sense' proceeds in transcendental fashion, taking 
up Husserl's notion of an assumption underlying anthropology, but taking it in a 
notably different direction since Levinas can make no appeal to "validity- 
ground". Levinas asks: what is the condition of possibility for constructing a flat 
ontology of cultural meaning? 25 And concludes that orientation to the Other, the 
excellence of the Judaeo-Christian legacy, underlies structuralist ontology. 
Levinas offers us the following thought: 
`For a Frenchman there does exist the possibility of learning Chinese and 
passing from one culture into another, without the intermediary of an 
Esperanto that would falsify both tongues which it mediated. Yet what has 
not been taken into consideration in this case is that an orientation is needed 
to have the Frenchman take up learning Chinese instead of declaring it to be 
barbarian (that is, bereft of the real virtues of language) and to prefer speech 
to war. ' [MS 46] 
These two dense sentences perhaps need a little unpacking. Levinas offers his 
own gloss but we. will supplement these with additional connections. Levinas 
makes three points explicit: 
24 In his essay on Levy-Bruhl, Levinas notes that the privilege of occidental reason comes not 
from the cogito (a transcendental or universal argument) but from the independence that its 
thought has achieved from history and that this reason rests on a mentality that is itself the object 
of a choice. `Levy-Bruhl et la philosophie contemporaine', p. 61. Another reference to 
Levy- 
Bruhl precedes the following sentence: `Philosophy willed souls that are separate and in a sense 
impenetrable. ' Levinas `Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity'. p. 48. 
2' For Husserl's similar gesture against Dilthey and Lebensphilosophie please see Appendix A. 
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1. The recognition of the richness of cultures and the suggestion that they are 
equivalent, depends upon an orientation to the other; a sense of the status of 
humanity26. This is the `generosity' of Western thought. 
2. War does not only spring from a logic directed towards totality and 
domination. War also springs from the friction of contiguity ýýith other 
civilisations. Difference cannot be valorised per se, if war is to be avoided. 
Indeed, as Visker notes, the similarity of cultures can enhance mutual 
irritation and lead to competition for resources that they both value , ^. 
3. Peace does not just require the recognition of difference, but the orientation 
to the Other: the sens unique which can ground peace. This sens unique is 
uncovered by phenomenological analysis of the encounter with exteriority. 
Levinas radically distinguishes this orientation as that which gives sense to 
the plurality of cultural meanings. `The presence of the Other dispels the 
anarchic sorcery of the facts... ' [TI 99]28. Phenomenological analysis is 
extended beyond Heideggerian disclosure of being, by showing that the 
relation with `the existent that expresses himself' pre-exists the disclosure of 
being. Alterity for Levinas is not the mark of empirical difference, but the 
mark of height experienced in the presentation of the face. The element 
ignored by anthropology is the activity of the speaker who arranges and 
assembles to allow being to shine forth [MS 38, my emphasis]. To envisage 
language as the revelation (qua production as opposed to disclosure) of the 
Other produces the birth of morality. 
Let us add some supplementary points: 
1. Firstly, there is also a more pointed dimension to the question raised but not 
answered regarding China. As Bernasconi notes. Levinas seems unaware 
that the Chinese also learn to speak French29. Moreover. is there the implicit 
suggestion that Chinese is a barbarian language" Levinas glosses a barbarian 
26 Compare the claim to facrualrness discerned by Husserl above. 
27 Truth and Singularinn p. 1 fn. 19. 
S Cf Crisis 9: '. AU these "metaphv sical" questions, taken broadly ... surpass the world 
understood as the universe of mere facts. ' 
. 
=° Bernasconi Who is the Other" Who is the neighbor" p. 22' 
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language as one which is bereft of the real virtues of language'. That is, a 
language which does not allow the transcendental horizon (and limit on 
Levinas's reading) of being to appear in speech - it would remain a language 
of everyday commerce and gossip. 
2. This leads to the second point. The veiled suggestion to the anthropologist is 
the following: we have seen that your interest in these other civilisations and 
cultures depends on an orientation towards the other. But does the culture 
you examine itself reveal or valorise this orientation" The hierarchialisation 
of cultures will be produced in this way. Only those cultures that do enable 
external orientation will have something of value. 
3. We can pursue this latter point a little further. We have already offered some 
of Levinas's remarks on China. With reference to the universal 
interpenetrability of cultures, Levinas suggests that Asia brings us nothing of 
importance that we cannot translate into our own languages, nothing that is 
not dance. That is, it brings us nothing that we did not already contain - it 
and its inhabitants cannot teach us. However, reciprocity is not guaranteed: 
what we bring may exceed Chinese capacities. 
What is this basis for this Eurocentrism? We have already noted that there can J 
be no appeal to any epistemological validity-ground. `Meaning and Sense' 
represents Levinas's philosophical project as a combination of phenomenology 
and Platonism: there are a variety of ways in which truth has been revealed in the 
world: this might not represent a betrayal of truth, but the `inexhaustible richness 
of its event' [MS 42]. A contemporary Platonism, which seeks access to the 
intelligible, would aim to uncover the `transcendental function of the whole 
concrete density' from the various forms of `corporeal, technical, social and 
political existence'. In this way, phenomenology produces the possibility of a 
new understanding of the separation of the intelligible, ideal world from the 
various cultural manifestations in which it is nixed. And, on the basis of this 
uncovering, phenomenology can take up the whole density of history while 
`remaking the world in the function of the intemporal order of Ideas' [. VIS 42- 
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43]30. That is, the specific ideas relating to infinity, the Other and history, which 
Levinas takes to be peculiar to our historical contingency. Prophetic time, 
creation and eschatology oppose submission to fate31. 
Neo-Kantian Ideas and Monotheism 
As for Kant, the idea is a `concept of reason that can be met nowhere in 
experience'32. As ideas the `remoteness, alterity, and exteriority' of the Other are 
not deducible from the being of beings nor from its revelation. They emanate 
from the history of a particular culture. How then to understand an Idea of 
reason that would be culturally specific in this way? 
Durkheim is relevant here. For the latter, `social facts' [les faits socials] 
represent the elementary, foundational ideal structures that determine religions, 
cultures and societies through which experience is synthesised. In Levinas's 
early essay on Hitlerism, this dimension is explicit: ideas `prefigure or 
predetermine the meaning of the adventure the soul will face in the world'33 In 
relation to paganism, ideas are taken to originate in `concrete being'. 
In its Marburg variant, Kant's original privileging of the given of experience 
(owing to its necessary structuring by the transcendental categories), as that 
which distinguishes knowledge from thinking is displaced. Diverse ideas, with 
religious formations as paradigmatic, organise the categories and forms of 
intuition - their constitutive function grows as the claims to universality 
30 Cf Husserl: `For this renewed "Platonism" this means not only that man should be changed 
ethically [but that] the whole human surrounding world, the political and social existence of 
mankind, must be fashioned anew through free reason, through the insights of a universal 
philosophy. ' [Crisis 8] 
31 `What distinguishes the liberal experience of an individual's rational choice between different 
outcomes ... 
from the `experience of the possibilities open to him as a series of restless powers 
that seethe within him and already push him down a determined path' is not logic, but a 
commitment to the elementary form of freedom over that of fate. ' [L&P 35] 
32 Immanuel Kant `The Jäsche Logic' [1800] translated by J. Michael Young in Lectures on 
Logic edited by J. Michael Young (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 517-640: 
p. 590. 
33 Levinas `Reflections on Hitlerism', p. 64. 
95 
Chapter 2 Totality and Infinity 2- the otherness of the Other 
34 
regarding the forms of intuition and the categories are diminished' . 
In 
Durkheim's sociology, any distinction between these notions has been collapsed 
so that `social facts' are the organising nodal points of experience. Levinas's 
reading of Levy-Bruhl places him firmly in this group of thinkers (and in so 
doing puts his phenomenology in trouble). 
`Levy-Bruhl met precisement en question la pretendue necessite de ces 
categories pour la possibilite de l'experience. Il decrit une experience qui se 
joue de la causalite, de la substance, de la reciprocite - comme de l'espace 
et comme du temps -, de ces conditions de «tout objet possible)). ' 35 
`Levy-Bruhl puts in question the pretence to necessity of the categories for 
the possibility of experience. He describes an experience which mocks 
causality, substance, the reciprocity - such as space and time - of these 
conditions for `all possible objects'. ' [my translation] 
The categories of Aristotle and Kant do not apply to those `participating"`'. They 
are descriptions of cultural formations that have accreted above that primitive 
form. Hence, there is no shared transcendental structure and the given is held to 
be radically contingent. 
34 A thorough discussion of Cohen's relation to Herbart and Völkerpsychologie - which held 
both that only communal structures constitute real phenomenon and that these structures, as Ideen 
der Gestaltung, are productive (schöpferisch) and effective (wirksam) in the active lives of 
individuals, institutions and cultural artefacts - can be found in the PhD dissertation of Lydia 
Patton. Lydia Patton Hermann Cohen's History and Philosophy of Science PhD McGill 
University, 2004, pp. 64 if. http: //www. uchicaeo. edu/-patton/dissertation. pdf 
35 `Levy-Bruhl et la philosophie conternporaine' p. 51. 
There is an important Neo-Kantian confluence to be reconstructed between Walter Benjamin 
and Levinas. For example, compare the following to the critique of `empty, homogeneous time' 
in the former's `Theses on the Philosophy of History': `Le temps forme pure est inconnu des 
prinaitifs, les instants ont chacun un potentiel different, contrairement a la homogeneite du temps- 
forme. ' Ibid. p. 59-60. `The pure form of time is unknown to primitives, the instants each have 
their own different potential, in contrast to the homogeneity of the form of time [in Kant]. ' 
Walter Benjamin `Theses on the Philosophy of History' in Illuminations (London. FontanaPress, 
1973), pp. 245-55. 
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For Hermann Cohen, who held there to be no `transcendental aesthetic'' ` (space 
and time being forms of pure mathematical thought), science would then only be 
critically grounded in the Idea (his political socialism saw the necessity for 
transformation of being in accordance with a different set of Ideas)38. But the 
idea can only begin as a hypothesis - it cannot draw its validity from the 
potential arbitrariness of the given. Its justification is only found through the 
accomplishment of the task it orients39: the world is reconceived as an occasion 
for the production of the ideal object - the task for philosophy is the imposition 
of reason on being: the remaking of the world. As Caygill notes in his 
commentary on Levinas's `Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism', 
autonomy would only be achieved in the political task which `... consists in the 
sovereign imposition of the ideal laws of spirit upon the historical and natural 
world... ' [L&P 35]40. 
Having sketched the general neo-Kantian themes, it is now time to look at Franz 
Rosenzweig, himself deeply influenced by Cohen. In the Preface to Totality and 
37 'The principle of synthesis in Kant presupposes something given and is therefore not strictly in 
keeping with the transcendental analysis of 'pure' thought: 'thought starts off In something 
outside itself. This is where the weakness in Kant's grounding lies. Here lies the reason for the 
early defections in his school ... Returning to the historical ground of critique, we will not allow 
a theory of sensibility to precede logic. ' Cited in Andrea Poma The Critical Philosophy of 
Hermann Cohen translated by John Denton (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1997), 
p. 81. It is important to note that Husserl's Logical Investigations, often understood simply in 
opposition to psychologism, is equally directed against the logicism of certain neo-Kantianisms, 
such as Rudolf Lotze where validity is instantiated only at the level of logical consistency (Cohen 
himself argued that science was only the systematic presentation of knowledge in textbooks). 
Husserl's concern with intentionality attempts to break with this idealism by insisting on the 
explication of knowledge starting from meaning-structures. 
38 For Cohen the primary ethical category is the 'fellowman' [Mitmensch]. The Heideggerian 
echo of this latter figure is softened by its contrast with the 'next man', my merely numerical 
community member [Nebenmensch]. The political project is judged by the transformation of 
Nebenmensch into fellowmen. My reading of Cohen is indebted to Nickolas Lambrianou. 
Nickolas Lambrianou Origin and Becoming: - 
Anticipation, Orientation and Creatureliness in the 
work of Walter Benjamin, Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig and Hugo von Hofinannsthal PhD 
Birkbeck College, University of London, 2006. 
39 The connections between neo-Kantianism and American pragmatism (and pragmaticism) are 
evident in the work of Hans Vaihinger, the latter explicitly treating the idea as an 'as if (als ob). 
Vaihinger The Philosophy of 'As If: a system of the theoretical, practical, and religious fictions 
of mankind [ 1911 ] translated by C. K. Ogden [ 1924] (London, Routledge, 2000). Gillian Rose 
notes that the reception of Lotze in the USA in the 1870's was 'as great as Hegel and Kant'. 
Gillian Rose Hegel contra Sociology p. 5-6. 
40 The triumph of idealism is the '... tearing up the bedrock of existence' where the 'blind world 
of common sense' is replaced by 'the world rebuilt by idealist philosophy, one that is steeped in 
reason and subject to reason. " As Levinas asks in 'Reflections... ': 'What remains of 
materialism when matter has been completely pervaded by reason"' fop. cit. p. 661. 
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Infinity, Levinas indicates his debt to Rosenzweig's radical, yet skewed, 
appropriation of Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy. `We were 
impressed by the opposition to the idea of totality in Franz Rosenzweig's Stern 
der Erlösung [Star of Redemption], a work too often present in this book to be 
cited. ' [TI 28]. Recalling the reference in our Introduction to Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus, I suggest that this failure to cite Rosenzweig, which he read in 1935, is 
mainly responsible for the `quasi-phenomenological' English-language reception 
of Levinas 41. Most importantly, Rosenzweig introduces the category of the 
`face' [das Gesicht]42. 
If one reads the first part of the Star of Redemption, one is swiftly struck by the 
presentation which uses repeated oppositions between the concepts inherent to 
Judaism and Christianity and those of the Chinese and Indian religions. The 
Judeo-Christian legacy is valorised by virtue of a conceptual superiority: the 
ideas of God, world and human are defined by the specific interrelation of 
transcendence and immanence and the concept of historical timea3 
For Rosenzweig, the experience of the `face' of the other in language is not open 
to those dwelling within Asian cultures, for they have an inadequate conception 
of the relation between immanence and transcendence. In the Hindu conception 
of a world of veils, which reduces human reality to appearance, he sees too much 
separation between transcendence and immanence - nothing of value can appear 
in this world. In the Buddhist and Confucian conception of a world of excessive 
'" For Moses, Totality and Infinity's preface reprises the Introduction of Star of Redemption (op. 
cit. p. 21 ff. ) - it extends those analyses, but in offering a phenomenology of war it `radicalises' 
Rosenzweig insofar as it positions the latter's personalism as a `naive egoism'. Tellingly, 
Levinas `agrees with Hegel' - the individual cannot fight against the totality of the real without 
creating new institutions. 
42 Derrida also notes that the distinction between the eyes of the other and that the other looks at 
me is made by Scheler [VM 122]. 
43 `The mythical was dominant in the religions of the Near East and Europe until their eclipse, 
and as a stage of development everywhere. As such it represents not a lower, but the higher form 
as against the "spiritual religions" of the Orient. It is not by coincidence that revelation ... took 
road to the West, not to the East. The living "gods of Greece" were worthier opponents of the 
living God than the phantoms of the Asiatic Orient. The deities of China as of India are massive 
structures made from the monoliths of primeval time which still protrude into our own times in 
the cults of "primitives. "' [op. cit. p. 35] And a later aside: `at least the gods of myth lived. ' [ibid. 
p. 38]. 
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variation, he finds only a throng of spirits multiplying44- an excess of MIxing 
between immanence and transcendence. If the transcendent is too fully merged 
into the world then there is only a negotiation through its infinity - nothing of 
value can be extracted from this proliferation. In short, Buddhist and Fbndu 
metaphysics are presented as polar opposites, but from which there is the same 
result - the human individual is not the root of value. The weakness of India and 
China for Rosenzweig is that they are unable to live beyond the immediate 
present, since history for those cultures is simply the passage of various 
contingent arrangements - the future cannot be the site of meaning, by which to 
guide the transformation of the present. The voice of the other cannot be heard - 
they flee the 'face of the living God for abstraction 1,45 . 
The history of the Judaeo- 
Christian West, in contrast, has been formed by a more complicated interaction 
of immanence and transcendence - according to the Bible, humanity was made 
in the image of God - it finds itself suspended between the animal and the divine. 
This, combined with the concept of prophetic time, produces a wholly different 
culture, a wholly different past. Prophetic time signals the specific Biblical 
temporality whereby revelation is not given once and for all as edict to follow, 
but revealed as prophecy giving signs that must be discerned in the future to 
46 come . 
Caygill correctly connects monotheism to a freedom 'oriented to the 
present prophetically saturated with presentiments of the future rather than 
memories of the past' [L&P 33]. Rosenzweig specifically rejects Islam as pagan 
44 This notion of China overflowing with spirits (ibid. p. 351 may underlie Levinas's reference to 
the 'density of China's past'. 
45 Ibid. p. 36. Rosenzweig believes that Asia produces a primitive atheism, primitive idealism 
and primitive phenomenalism. This summary of Rosenzweig is synthesised from three brief 
sections: 'Asia: The Unmythical God' [ibid. pp. 35-38]; 'Asia: The Non-Plastic World' [ibid. pp. 
57-60]; 'Asia: Non-Tragic Man' [ibid. pp. 73-761. 
46 We should note that the criticism of Oriental philosophy in Hegel differs from that offered by 
Rosenzweig. For Hegel, Indian philosophy lacks objectivity since the end for the soul is to 
withdraw within itself: subjectivity, such as it is, remains in bad abstraction at the level of an 
empty vanity. Analogously, Chinese thought is taken to value the undetermined nothing, or 
emptiness as the highest. In both cases, the external has not been comprehended in accordance 
with the idea and is therefore not comprehended in objectivity. We have seen that Levinas 
admires Rosenzweig for his opposition to Hegelian objectivity and totality. While the criticism 
does concern subjectivity, in Rosenzweig it concerns the status of the individual not the status of 
knowledge. Lectures on the History of Philosophy - Volume I translated by E. S. Haldane & 
Frances H. Simon (New York, The Humanities Press, 1974). 
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because of its once-and-for-all-time revelation in Mohammed; Judaism would 
also share this structure were it to rest with the Pentateuch. 47 
Levinas's own essay on Rosenzweig48, where he allies himself with the `new 
thinking'49, where presented content is held to be inseparable from the one who 
presents it, explicitly addresses these themes 50 Europe, as synthesis of 
Christianity and Judaism, is taken to be the key to the salvation of the world; 
together they resist `German barbarity'51. The new concept of religion he finds 
therein is dramatically opposed to `unctuous, consoling religion'52; it prepares 
the Kingdom of God by penetrating the world with love so that the I learns to say 
"Thou" to "he". What Levinas sees as most valuable in Rosenzweig is the nerve 
to take the `anticipation of eternity' as a `valid point of departure for 
philosophical concepts'; in this way, it escapes dogmatics and quietism. I stress 
again the notion of anticipation and connect it back to the ideas - `truth is only 
verified through life'. 
47 Indeed Islam is described as a pagan plagiarisation of Judaism, with Mohammed 'taking over' 
revelation but neglecting the proper presuppositions of prophecy [op. cit. p. 116] so that the 
Koran is only a 'magical miracle' and Allah (who is not God) only an 'oriental despot' [ibid. 
p. 1181. Importantly for our later consideration of the particular excellence imputed to Judaism, 
Rosenzweig criticizes two Islamic doctrines. Since, in Islam, it is held Allah must reveal himself, 
the first is the 'fiction' that 'thinks all nations have received their prophets' [ibid. p. 165]. The 
second that each era has its own Imam to lead it righteously. Rosenzweig writes against this idea 
of eras opposed to any notion of 'growth' - 'the idea of the future is here poisoned in root. For 
the future is first and foremost a matter of anticipating, that is, the end must be expected at every 
moment. Only thus does the future become the time of eternity. ' [ibid. p. 2261 Again, here we 
could dig further, we could examine Levinas's comments on the Palestinians in light of 
Rosenzweig's sweeping rejections of Islam. Caygill has examined Levinas's strange re-citation 
of 'Poetry and the Impossible' in the foreword to Beyond the Verse, where he elides a sentence 
which had described Arabs as 'deaf to the call of conscience' and reduced their claim to Palestine 
as a 'nostalgia for birthplace and minaret'. We are now in a position to see these comments as 
produced from a systematic philosophical position: nostalgia for homeland and deafness to the 
individual being the hallmarks of paganism, nationalism and barbarism preventing the possibility 
of responding to the face of the other as idea of the infinite. Levinas Beyond the Verse: Talmudic 
Readings and Lectures translated Gary D. Mole (London, Athlone, 1982). Discussed by Caygill 
at L&P 186 ff.. 
48 'Franz Rosenzweig' [1965] in Outside the Subject (London, The Athlone Press, 1993), pp. 49- 
66. 
49 In Rosenzweig's technical distinction, `new thinking' is opposed to `apologetic thinking' 
which produces reasoning in response to events rather than commencing dialogue anew. 
so See L&P 98-9. Caygill also situates Levinas within the `horizon' of the `new thinking', though 
notes that he does not utilise the methodology of speculative grammatical analysis. But, perhaps 
there is a remnant of this in the privileged insight granted by Levinas to certain formations in the 
French language. 
51 op. cit. p. 52 
52 op. cit. p. 55. 
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The combination of Judaism and Christianity takes a startling form: 'Judaism is 
alive and true to the degree that it stays close to God. while Christianit\ is alive 
and true as a mission to the extent that is marches into the world and penetrates 
it. '53 Christianity is understood as a world spirit that must be corrected by two 
`Jewish features' : 
1. Love must be understood as commandment; an imperative that exceeds 
the worldly; 
2. The human being is the mediator of redemption - the site of production 
of the infinite. 
This renders explicit what has already been noted by Visker: `It is because the 
monotheists have enabled the world to hear the word of the one and only God 
that Greek universalism can work in humanity and slowly unify that humanity. '54 
The Europeanization of the world is the condition of possibility for the ethical 
understanding of love and the fully human possibilities of the ethical Other. 
In `Place and Utopia' 55, Levinas offers a straightforward differentiation of the 
three main forms: 
1. The pagan: it is marked by the satisfaction of the self before the other. It 
is egoist and unconcerned if it usurps another's place in the sun. 
2. The Christian: it is marked by the utopian rejection of this world in 
favour of kingdom of god. 
ý. The Jewish: concerns itself with `ethical action' which `does not flee 
from the conditions from which one's work draws its meaning' 56 
The latter two produce the elementary principles of Europe [L&P 45]. Although 
we are all human beings. for Levinas, there are differences to lose sleep over. 
A 
up. cit. P. 02. 
Visker Truth und SinE'ularirv p. 121). 
55 'place and ['topic' translated by Sean Hand [1950] in Difficult Freedom - Essaus on Judaism 
(London, Athlone. 1990). pp. 99-102. 
Ibid. p. 100. 
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The prevention of war, the possibility of peace, requires a kind of missionary 
proselytization, a conversion to the Other. The problem of the Other is not 
simply the respect and recognition of difference but the overcoming of nihilism 
by justifying subjective existence per se 57 This does not require a 'lateral' 
differentiation with reciprocal possibilities for inter-communal translation; it 
requires the manifestation of western excellence such that the other cultures of 
the world Europeanize (pace Husserl). Europe is the name for a spiritual 
58 plenitude . Europe is marked by its idealism, its desire to surpass being: 'Every 
civilization that accepts being - with the tragic despair it contains and the crimes 
it justifies - merits the name barbarian. ' 
59 In this sense, responsibility 'gives life 
a meaning and organisation that it lacks by itselfi 60. 
Atheism and De-divinisation 
We will turn to the status of this belief in Europe's excellence, but first let me 
rehearse and reject the mistaken view that these comments are merely a prejudice 
resulting from Levinas's religious belief. It is a red herring to attribute them to 
the monotheist's sense of superiority. This tactic is often used to bracket off 
Levinas's "religious beliefs" in order to recuperate or protect the "philosophical" 
core. Although Levinas concludes 'Meaning and Sense' by referring to the 
Judaeo-Christian idea of humanity as made in the image of God, this represents a 
reappropriation of Jewish thought [MS 641. Importantly it is a reappropriation 
made possible by both a secularisation which refuses to believe in the creationist 
myth, and one which depends on the changed historical conditions mentioned 
earlier (infra page 87). Levinas insists on the need to translate the Hebrew into 
Greek - the sacred writings bring concepts which could not be produced from 
phenomenology itself 1. The task for Levinas is not to repeat Greek through 
57 See Caygill's discussion of nihilism in the context of the Cold War and nuclear weapons [L&P 
70-1]. 
58 Cf. Visker Truth and Singularity p. 157 if.. 
59 Levinas `On Escape' p. 73. 
60 Truth and Singularity p. 15. 
61 In this regard, we should note that, according to Robert Gibbs, the original Hebrew word 
translated by `ethics' means `sanctification'. Robert Gibbs Correlations in Rosenzweig and 
Levinas (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992) 
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German pace Heidegger, but to teach Greek philosophy the Hebre«- concepts and 
hence to mutate it. 
On the other hand, this mutation transforms the religious dimension of these 
concepts. To use a different register: Levinas argues that certain concepts taken 
from Judaism now achieve a new legibility in the modern world. Crucially, 
reason is taken to have entered world history with the democratic revolutions of 
the eighteenth century 62 The modem world is both de-sacralised and 
disenchanted, and this secularisation is a necessary condition for the ethical 
response to the other. Levinas has no belief in a personal God, posits no afterlife. 
and constantly translates the content of the Biblical text and commentaries into 
philosophical language63. This is what Levinas means in Totality and Infinit'' 
when he refers to the `atheism' of separation that motivates both his resistance to 
the paganism of place found in Heidegger's fateful enunciation of Germany's 
destiny and his opposition to messianic Zionism. It is only from this atheism that 
the specific content of Judaic thought achieves a transformed pertinence. 
'To relate to the absolute as an atheist is to welcome the absolute purified of 
the violence of the sacred. In the dimension of height in which his sanctity, 
that is, his separation, is presented, the infinite does not bum the eyes that 
are lifted unto him. ... He is not nurninous: the I who approaches 
him is 
neither annihilated on the contact nor transported outside of itself, but 
remains separated and keeps its as-for-me. Only an atheist beiný, can relate 
himself to the other and already absolve himself from this relation. - .. The 
metaphysical relation, the idea of infinity, connects with the nournenon 
which is not a numen. This noumenon is to be distinguished from the 
concept of God possessed by the believers of positive religions ill 
disengaged from the bonds of participation, who accept being immersed in a 
myth unbeknown to themselves. The idea of infinity, the metaphysical 
relation, is the dawn of humanity without myths. Butfaith purged of myths, 
the monotheist faith, itself implies metaphysical atheism. ' [TI 771 [my 
emphasis] 
Here, the believers in 'positive religions' are equated to 'pagans insofar as they 
are 'immersed in myth'. Judaism must be purged of myths such that the notion 
b2 In essays, such as 'Messianic Texts', he argues that Jews are no longer excluded from political 
or state history and as a result messianic thinking is no longer appropriate. 'Messianic Texts' in 
Di%ticrýlt Freedom - Essays on Judaism translated by Sean Hand (London. Athlone, 1990), pp. 
59-96. 
°', As noted by Cavgill, part of Levinas's valorisation of technology is that it shows us that the 
gods are of this world [Lt&P 1541. 
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of 'God' undergoes a deflation. It is not distinguishable from the ethical 
production of transcendence. 
'The atheism of the metaphysician means, positively. that our relation 
[rapport] with the Metaphysical is an ethical behavior [comporrement 
ithique] and not theology, not a thernatization, be it a knowledge by analogy. 
of the attributes of God. God rises to his supreme and ultimate presence as 
correlative to the justice rendered unto men. ... A God invisible means not 
only a God unimaginable, but a God accessible in justice. Ethics is the 
spiritual optics. ... The work of justice - the uprightness of the face to face - is necessary in order that the breach that leads to God be produced [pour que 
se produise la trou6e qui mýne ei Dieu] - and "vision" here coincides with 
this work of Justice. ... Hence metaphysics is enacted [se joue] where the 
social relation is enacted - in our relations [rapports] with men. There can 
be no "knowledge" [connaissance] of God separated from the relationship 
with men. The Other is the very locus of metaphysical truth, and is 
indispensable for my relation with God. He does not play [nejoue point] the 
role of mediator. The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by 
his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in 
which God is revealed. It is our relations to men, which describe a field of 
research hardly glimpsed at ... that give to theological concepts the sole 
signification they bear [qu'ils comportent]. The establishing of this primacy 
of the ethical, that is, of the relationship of man to man - signification, 
teaching, and justice -a primacy of an irreducible structure upon which all 
the other structures rest ... is one of the objectives of the present work. ... Everything that cannot be reduced to an interhuman relation represents not 
the superior form but the forever primitive form of religion. ' [TI 78-79, Tel 
76-8] [translation modified] 
The reduction of these religious concepts to social relations (with God a 
correlative of the work ofjustice) is the consequence of their translation into neo- 
Kantian ideas. Although 'God' is required in Levinas's system, God is reduced 
to a synonym for the production of transcendence in ethico-political action. 
64 65 
C) ida ,I here 
insist that there is no Contra Visker Caygill [L&P 124] and Dem 
God qua being who could 'arrange for justice'; there is no holy intervention in t: ) ttý I 
the finite - God is only the production of justice, or 4 ethical action' is the 
'accession to dii, inity' 66 . This is underlined in Levinas's resistance to 
fate even 
in thcjOrtn of divine grace or predestination. 
The ethical relation is defined, in contrast with every relation with the sacred. 
by excluding every signification it would take on unbeknown to him who 
ýu1arin' p. '98. 64 Truth and Sin 
V'! 133: `... God alone keeps Le%inas's world from being a world of the pure and , rst 
violence, a vVOrld of immoarality itsc; lf. ' 
"" 'Place and Utopia'. p. 101. 
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maintains that relation. When I maintain an ethical relation I refuse to 
recognize the role I would play in a drama of which I would not be the author 
or whose outcome another would know before me; I refuse to figure in a 
drama of salvation or of damnation that would be enacted [se jouerait] in 
spite of me and that would make a game of me. ' [TI 79] 
Concomitantly, monotheism too reduces to fraternity. In the section of Totality 
and Infinity, entitled 'The Other and the others' [Autrui et les autres], Levinas 
argues that the epiphany of the face opens humanity - there is no access or 
experience of humanity before the encounter with the face: the experience of the 
third party in the eyes of the other, the experience of something beyond being, 
produces a whole new experience of humanity. This human fraternity is invoked 
over and above biological species being, but as it does so it exceeds 
phenomenological evidence [TI 213-214]. The face comes from beyond the 
world of meaning and commits me to fraternity in referring to the 'third party' (le 
tiers), 'whom in the midst of his destitution the Other [lAutrui] already serves'. 
As he writes in Otherwise than Being: my obsession with the other is only 
broken by an obsession with 'all the others' - it is this second move which 
produces the demand for justice [OtB 158]. But is important to note, that the 
encounter with Autrui is the prior condition of possibility for the valorisation of 
les Autres, such that the latter are understood as a pluralism, not as members of 
67 a genus 
The new orientation for a world in which this pluralism would not be a delusion 
takes form as an anticipation, a projection into the future: 
'Society must be [il faut que] a fraternal community to be commensurate 
with the straightforwardness, the primary proximity, in which the face 
presents itself to my welcome. Monotheism signifies this human kinship, 
this idea of a human race that refers back to the approach of the Other in the 
face, in a dimension of height, in responsibility for oneself and for the 
Other. ' [TI 214] 
157 'This moral experience, so commonplace, indicates a metaphysical asymmetry: the radical 
impossibility of seeing oneself from the outside and of speaking in the same sense of oneself and 
of the others, consequently the impossibility of totalization - and. on the plane of social 
experience, the impossibility of forgetting the intersubjective experience that leads to the social 
experience and endows it with meaning --.. ' [TI 53). 
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Let us stress, monotheism is superior to biological genus, if, and only if, the 
notion of all the others in fraternity necessarily 'refers back to the approach of 
the Other'. This kinship would not be tied to being, but engaged in an attempt to 
overwrite it. 'Transcendence or goodness is produced [se produit] as pluralism. ' 
[TI 3051 
Levinas's 'monotheism', his 'religion', might be distilled of all positive 
theological content, but it persists in valorising the historical tradition of Judaism 
as a body of ideas, practices and thought. Here is located an important 
connection to Neo-Kantian Lehre - variously translated as 'doctrine', 'teaching', 
'study' etc, but signifying a body of 'knowledge' and experience [Erfahrung] 
handed down. This unique source is reconfigured for its pertinence to current 
and future conditions 69 . 
Exemplary here is Cohen's Religion of Reason out of the 
Sources of Judaism 69 , while the pervasive themes can be seen in Walter 
Benjamin's earliest writingS70. 
The claim fluctuates in Levinas between an excellence of Europe, an excellence 
of monotheism and an excellence of Judaism 71 , but the content of that 
68 Rosenzweig contrasts the 'historical' bent of Islam in its return to the original meaning of 
Mohammed's revelation, this is contrasted with the Judaic tradition of logical deduction: 'It 
follows that Islamic law everywhere strives to go back to direct pronouncements of the founder, 
thus veritably developing a strictly historical method, while both Talmudic and canon law seek to 
make their points by means, not of historical fact-finding, but of logical deduction. For deduction 
is subconsciously determined by the goal of the deduction, that is to say the present, and therefore 
it gives the contemporary power over the past. ' Star of Redemption pp. 216-17. Note the echo of 
Cohen's hypothesis in this account of deduction. 
69 Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism [ 19191 translated by Simon Kaplan (New 
York, Frederick Ungar Publishing co., 1972). Here, religion is a 'new extension' of the concept 
of man, as individual, and humanity, which mark the limit of traditional ethical understanding 
[ibid. pp. 19-32]. It teaches ethics to say 'Thou' to 'he'. But religion is also a moral teaching for 
the 'Jewish consciousness', or it is not religion (ibid. p. 33]. 
70 'However, the original and primal concept of knowledge does not reach a concrete totality of 
experience in this context, any more than it reaches a concept of existence. But there is a unity of 
experience that can by no means be understood as a sum of experiences, too which the concept of 
knowledge as teaching [Lehre] is immediately related in its continuous development. The object 
and content of this teaching [Lehre], this concrete totality of experience, is religion, which, 
however, is presented to philosophy in the first instance only as teaching [Lehrel. ' Benjamin 'On 
the Program of the Coming Philosophy' in [1918] translated by Mark Ritter in Selected Writings: 
volume I- 1913-1926 edited M. Bullock & M. Jennings (London, Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1996), pp. 100-110; p. 109. 
71 For Rosenzweig, the Jewish people attest to a collective meta-historical experience. Mos6s Au- 
delti de la guerre p. 13. 
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exemplarity remains the same: the idea of hurnanity72. Moses reads Levinas's 
conception of the infinite as the philosophical re-presentation of the 
unrepresentable God who can only appear as a burning bush, and suggests the 
Judaic religion as the 'original coming-together of circumstances' (concours 
originaire de circonstances) that allows the infinite to form anachronistically as 
an idea (vient a Vidje)73. 
But the question incumbent upon a philosophy that does not wish to remain a 
Weltanschauung (in the sense of 'Jewish Philosophy' 74 ) is the following: what 
justifies this claim to excellence? As Adorno has noted, is there not a danger of 
6collective narcissism' here in this thought of religious collectivities? 75 Derrida 
has pursued this question with respect to Cohen's attempt to articulate the 
particular importance of the German-Jewish psyche for the state of Judaism as a 
whole in Deutschtum und Judentum (1915). Fhs three guiding questions are: 
1. What happens when a people or a group presents itself as exemplary? 
2. How did the Germans and the Jews declare this exemplarity? 76 
3. How did Cohen intend to prove this? 77 
Derrida notes the importance of Fichte for Cohen, in that the former 'discovered 
that the social Self is a national Self'78and hence allowed thought to go beyond 
Kant through the formation of a Geisteswissenschaft -a human science in the 
72 Ibid. p. 46. 
73 Ibid. p. 89. Perhaps it is worth addressing the manner in which this idea is effaced in the very 
title of the English translation of De Dieu qui vient 6 Videe (Paris, 1982) as Of God Who Comes 
to Mind. Of God Who Comes to Mind translated by Bettina Bergo (Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1998). 
74 In response to Lyotard's questioning, Levinas complains that he would be reduced to a 'Jewish 
thinker'. Autrement que Savoir: Emmanuel Levinas avec des etudes de Guy Petitdemange & 
Jacques Rolland (Paris, Osiris, 1987), p. 79. It is perhaps the weakness of Moses's reading of 
Levinas that this fundamental problem is not broached. 
75 'On the Question: "What is German? "' translated by Henry W. Pickford in Critical Models: 
Interventions and Catchwords [1963/1969] (New York, Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 
'705. '705-214, P. ý 
76 'Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jew, the German' pp. 138-39. 
77 Ibid. p. 153. 
78 Ibid. pp. 174-75. 
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sense that studies the particularities of different Volkgeister 9. Den-ida strikes up 
against this `fable', this `delirium' which prompts him to ask whether Cohen 
could have taken this account at all seriously? 80 
Illusion or Ideology? 
The insistence on the determination of the ideas by the socio-cultural forces us to 
ask: if the ideas are so determined what guarantees the transcendence of the 
transcendence? What marks it out as escaping the reduction of thought to a 
mythology - how does the atheist metaphysical relation justify that very 
insistence on the escape from ontology? 
At an epistemological level, the surprising answer to the question posed is - 
nothing. Transcendence is produced, occurs, in being, - its justification lies in 
this task of production. That is, the idea of the Other encountered in height and 
the idea of metaphysical plurality are technically illusions (even though not 
transcendental) - reason would like to encompass them but cannot. Insofar as 
unaided desire attempts to go beyond Sartre's block, it is illusory. Autrui, the 
metaphysical interpretation of this particular encounter in teaching as the 
encounter with the infinite, is an illusion, but it marks a positive, productive 
illusion that allows the existent to break from its egoism: 
'Even [the cause of the metaphysical relation to the other], older than itself, is 
still to come [a venir]. The cause of being is thought or known by its effect as 
if [comme sil it were posterior to its effect. We speak lightly of the possibility 
of this "as if' [comme si], which is taken to indicate an illusion. But this 
illusion is not unjustified fn'est pas gratuite]; it constitutes a positive event. ' 
[TI 54] [translation altered] 
79 That is, the transcendental is no longer understood as universal - different transcendental 
structures for different societies, cultures and peoples. See infia p. 96 fn. 34. See also, the 
introduction to Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism, where the historical approach to 
the various -religious formations is contrasted with the concept of religion produced 
by the 
6religion of reason' (op. cit. pp. 1-341. 
80 Ibid. pp. 149-50. For another investigation of the particular claims of Judaism see his 
discussion of Scholem's 1926 letter to Rosenzweig where the correspondent assumes that 
Hebrew is a sacred language. 'The Eyes of Language: The Abyss and the Volcano' translated by 
Gil Anidjar in Acts of Religion edited by Gil Anidjar (New York & London. Routledge, 2002). 
pp. 191-227. 
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I do not think it unwarranted to insist on a connection to Vaihincrer here 81 
Levinas insists that: 'The power of illusion is not a simple aberration of thought, 
but a movement in being itself. It has an ontological import. ' [TI 240] The face 
of the other is not given like a value - it breaks with the immanent destiny of the 
self-contained ego. It is for this reason that Levinas makes reference to the 
divine enthusiasm discussed in the Phaedrus: 'Possession by a god, enthusiasm, 
is not the irrational, but the end of the solitary ... or 
inward thought, the 
beginning of a true experience of the new and of the noumenon - already 
Desire. ' [TI 50] 82 
. 
Analogous to Cohen's socialism, where the political task of philosophy is to 
critically ground social being in the Idea (the reality of which must be asserted 
while it is developed as a hypothesis, an as if), analogous to this, the face cannot 
ground politics, nor can it be encompassed and dealt with by phenomenology (it 
is precisely that which is refractory to phenomenology); instead the 
meaningfulness of the face can only be speculatively justified on the basis on the 
transformation of being effected in its name - what world is produced as offered 
to the Other? 83, What this means, of course, is that the truth content of Levinas's 
philosophical system is its politics. Once we understand the ideas of Autrui as 
somehow an illusion, a "vision", we can understand the specific quality of 
Levinas's notion of instantiated justice as that which both preserves the 
possibility of the encounter in teaching and regulates the Desire thereby 
81 See note 30. In a note to his 1974 essay, 'From Consciousness to Wakefulness', Levinas 
distinguishes his 'comme si' from the 'uncertainty or simple probability of the philosophies of the 
66 als ob"', since they depend on 'truth qua result, to the ideal identity of the objective, and ... to 
the univocity of presence and being'. However, the 'as if' of the idea of the infinite and 'God in 
me' are glossed here as enigmas, a term whose technical significance is only developed after 
Totality and Infinity (notably in the essay, 'Enigma and Phenomenon'). The status of the 
encounter with I'Autrui is still liminal or illusory even if the results projected do not end with 
Being but with an infinite projection of the ethical as a level above being and presence, whose 
effects are not reducible to results comprehended at that lower level. 'From Consciousness to 
Wakefulness' in DEwH pp. 153-168; p. 195 fn. 26. 
82 'Heidegger shows us in what intoxication the lucid sobriety of philosophers is steeped. ' 
Levinas 'Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity', p. 53. 
83 'The relation with the Other does not only stimulate, provoke generalization, does not only 
supply it with the pretext and the occasion (this no one has ever contested), but is this 
generalization itself Generalization is a universalization - but universalization is not the entry of 
a sensible thing into a no man's land of the ideal ... but is the offering of the world to the 
Other. ' 
[TI 173-174] 
109 
Chapter 2 Totality and Infinity 2- the otherness of the Other 
engendered. As Abensour notes, the third, introduced by the encounter with 
Autrui institutes justice by regulating 'lafolie ethique'84 
The problem that Levinas inherits is what Kant termed "fanaticism': the 
85 'delusion of wanting to see beyond the bounds of sensibility' . As Levinas 
notes, the danger is that I mistake the face as the idea of the infinite, 'the 
universal being the other incamates', for the face of a particular being -I mistake 
the encounter that characterises Autrui for the encounter with the other person as 
concrete being [Autre] 86 . Reason has desire for the infinite but not the power to 
attain it. The desire for the Other qua Autrui can turn the ego into a fanatic who 
pursues this private goal at the expense of the neighbour. This danger of the 
'complicity of a private relation' [TI 2121 can only be averted by the founding of 
political institutions 97 ; the foundation of a society in which the encounter vv-Ith 
the Other would no longer be private and wracked by privation. A society must 
be created which would both reconfigure the contingent given and regulate the 
encounter with the Other, which might otherwise remain an intimate delusion. 
But this project is without guarantee: '... to be worthy of the messianic era one 
must admit that ethics has a meaning, even without the promises of the Messiah. ' 
[E&. 1 114] 
If society is not so transformed then there is no meaning. Thus, again, we must 1= 
strictly reject the contemporary conflation of the idea of the Other as Autrul, with 
the more familiar idea of respect for the way in which the other person exceeds 
my cognitive appropriations. There is no grammar of everyday morality for 
Levinas, only a transcendence which demands social transformation, which 
would extend well beyond my own death, as its validation; "ordinary life" i's 
preciselY the problem to be overcome. It is in this particular mode of futurity that 
84 Abensour 'L'Etat Je la justice' p. 56. 
85 Critique of Judgment [17901 translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, Hackett, 1987), p. 
13-5 ff'.. 
'is Ontolkwy Fundamental"' (t951) in Susic Philosophical ýVritiiws edited by Adriadn T. 
Peperzak, Simon Critchley & Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington. Indiana University Press. 1996), 
pp. I- 10; p. 7. 
S7 'In order to oppose in%ýard freedom to the absurd and its violence it is necessar" to have 
recclNed an education. Hence freedom \\ould cut into the real only bý virtue ,t institutions. T1 
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Rosenzweig distanced his work from paganism. Levinas distances himself from 
88 Heidegger's paganistic valorisation of the particular land . Paganism is that 
form of nationalism which does not see the necessity of the task of 
transfonnation of the land89. In this regard, the adoption of Levinas by many 
self-justificatory liberal theories serves only to shore up a bourgeois fanaticism 
which wallows in its paganism9o. 
Such an argument finds its echo in 'Violence and Metaphysics, where, in a 
discussion of Kant relegated to a footnote, Derrida muses about the meaning of 
the absence of a 'patient and systematic confrontation with Kant' and insists that, 
without the order of law, 'respect and the other no longer escape empirical and 
pathological immediacy' [VM401 fn. 261. 
The Excellence of Europe - un gage 
The putative excellence of the Judaeo-Christian West lies, not in a return to its 
traditional beliefs and practices, but in distilling those beliefs into ideas that 
valorise the human as the germ of infinity who forms the site for a futural task 
that produces transcendent meaning. 
Levinas does not offer a theory of superiority based on racial essentialism. But if 
one comes from a culture where there is no conception of the other person as- 
Other, as infinite, then this experience would be covered over. This is the 
spiritual peril with which China and the 'masses' of the underdeveloped world 
threaten Europe. Either they have only a language of 'daily chores' and 
88 Derrida opposes this 'violent' reading of Heidegger as it is developed in the essay 'Heidegger, 
Gagarin et nous' to insist Heidegger is not interested in a nationalistic attachment to site, but the 
'irruption of speech and promise' [ VM 408-9 fn. 791. 
89 'The metaphysical desire does not long to return, for it is desire for a land not of our birth, for a 
land foreign to every nature, which has not been our fatherland and to which we shall never 
betake ourselves. ... 
The metaphysical desire has another intention; it desires beyond everything 
that can simply complete it. It is like goodness - the Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it. ' 
[TI 33-341 
90 'Consciousness then does not consist in equaling being with representation ... 
but in 
overflowing this play of lights - this phenomenology - and in accomplishing events whose 
ultimate signification (contrary to the Heideggerian conception) does not lie in disclosing. ' [TI 
27-281 
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(commonplace talk' or they have concepts which preclude the ethIcal response to 
the presentation of the face of the other. In Heidegger's terms, tacitly informing 
Levinas, they remain at an inauthentic, everyday level. This is why, in contrast 
to the metaphysics of separation sought by Levinas, those coming from outside 
Europe are described as 'hordes' or 'masses they are fundamentally incapable 
91 of metaphysical pluralism 
Yet the epiphany of the face remains a possibility, or 'choice', for human 
existents. The question to be decided, for Levinas, is: will the envy of the 
underdeveloped world and China produce a geo-political. threat against which 
Europe must brace itself, or can Africa and Asia be converted to our 
excellenc'e ? 92 
Let us note that Levinas does not believe that Europe has indeed achieved this 
possibility, rather that in Europe the conditions of possibility - general freedom 
from the underdeveloped or proletarian condition and the cultural familiarity of 
these ideas - exist for creating this transformed politics. Thus Levinas is not 
simply producing an apology for Europe - he is calling upon Europe to build 
upon its excellence to produce a wholly new form of State: the State of Justice 
must be made manifest to all. Levinas does not seek to uphold one form of 
existing political totality over another - he believes that by translating Judaic 
ethics into Greek philosophy a new form of political project will be launched: the 
transformation of the world through the overcoming of the conditions that limit 
the possibility of ethical response. The concomitant result of this drive for peace 
is to produce meaning in the human world - this project overcomes the nihilism 
91 Levinas is already aware of his breach of political correctness avant la lettre. 'Idolatry, that is 
no doubt the State, the prototype of idolatry, since the State adores being and idol; idolatry, that is 
also the cult of the Greek gods and hence all the appeal of Hellenism. It is probably because it 
evokes Greece that idolatry can still be preferred to something else! But idolatry also 
encompasses all the intellectual temptations of the relative, of exoticism and fads, all that comes 
to us from India and China, all that comes to us from the alleged "experiences" of humanity 
which we would not be permitted to reject. ' Emmanuel Levinas 'And God created Woman' in 
Nine Talmudic Readings [ 19701 translated by Annette Aronowicz; (Bloomington & Indianapolis, 
Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 169-76, p. 176. Note that, as in Rosenzweig, the idolatry of 
the pagan Greeks is held to be superior to that of India and China. 
92 This would further support Caygill's comments that Levinas's geo-political simplifications are 
akin to those of Heidegger regarding Germany's place between the USA and the USSR [L&P 
1851. 
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which resulted from the death of God. That is, Europe finds itself %ý ith two 
horizons: the horizon of catastrophe in which its excellence is lost and the 
horizon of the production of the State of Justice. Politics. for Levinas. is 
produced in the negotiation of these two temporali tieS93. 
Must we then valonse the reasoning lucidity of Realpolitik - the foreseeing of 
war and the deployment of every means in order to win or avert it'? Levvinas 
writes: 
'The moral consciousness can sustain the mocking gaze of the political man 
only if the certitude of peace dominates the evidence of war. Such a certitude 
is not obtained from a simple play of antitheses. The peace of empires issued 
from 
, 
war rests on war. It does not restore to the alienated beings their lost 
identity. For that a primordial and original relation with beinz is needed. ' [TI 
22] 
Let us emphasise the certitude of peace. This certitude is not a teleological result 
of dialectics or a fear of mutually assured destruction. It finds its source in a 
primordial relation beyond being - the epiphany of the face of the other as idea 
of the infinite. This produces peaceful orientation - it points towards a more 
fundamental possibility of subjective existence which can become enshrined in a 
new form of political organisation. It is from this perspective that Miguel 
Abensour presents Levinas as the "Counter-Hobbes" 94 Against the rational 
pursuit of self-interest and self-presentation that brings people together for 
mutual advantage, Levinas envisions the possibility of sociality being produced t: ) t:, 
by shared desire for the Other as metaphysical desire. A sociality which must be 
both preserved and checked by novel institutions of law and justice - the inverse 
of the constriction of hostility in other accounts. 
Levinas's speculative wager is that the State of Justice which enframes and 
regulates this certitude of peacejustifies the affinnation of the illusion of the Idea I 
03 Hol%, Ilistory is not quite \\ hat it seemed. an unconditional call for justice, but suffers trom 
equi\ ocations arising from its unackno\ý ledged partialitý to\vards uniý ersal history. Holý history, 
it sccrns. is vulnerable and its universai claims open to compromise or distortion. addressing only 
a part of humanity, or, perhaps even more disastrousIv. addressinLT tIILI[ part ot humanit\ that 
considers itsclfto be the \%hole of humanitý. ' [L&, P 182] 
OF). C it. 
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of the infinite. Metaphysical philosophy would be validated through its 
instantiati 0095. 
The excellence of the Judaeo-Christian legacy lies in its valorisation of 
transcendence 96 The idea of the infinite encountered in the face is an illusion, a 
speculative wager only confirmed in the production of a new, superior form of 
political institution informed. by moral response - the idea (desire for the infinite) 
that produces a transformed mode of existing. Here again theme from Cohen 
arises: 
'The ethical value of messianism consists in this its political, one would say 
philosophy of history, meaning. The history of peoples as the history of 
humanity - that is the problem of prophetic messianism. Peace shall happen 
here on earth among people, among peoples. The swords shall be beaten into 
pruning hooks. This irreconciled opposition to what history calls world- 
politics lies in prophetic messianism. Therein lies a moral original power; 
the mightiest idea which ethics has borrowed and admitted from a province 
foreign to the philosophical method; the most instructive example for the 
insoluble historical connection between ethics and religion. 07 
Or: 'There will be no peace among nations unless our example is followed. 98 
Speculation and the Judgment of History 
Visker has commented on the peculiar 'penance' of contemporary anthropology 
that has turned on the Western imagination as its object, but where there is no 
courthouse for this reason itself". The courthouse for Levinas's project can only 
95 The orientation towards the other is also a going beyond one's own epoch. Levinas advocates 
the work of Leon Blum who works towards the goal of Israel even while incarcerated by the 
Nazis in 1941. The 'summit of nobility' is to 'act for far off things' in the moment of Hitler's 
triumph. Levinas excoriates any nostalgia, especially that which finds its expression in the 
longing for salvation. Political destiny requires a work that goes into the future: 'There is a 
vulgarity and a baseness in an action that is conceived only for the immediate, that is, in the last 
analysis, for our life. ' [MS 50-5 1] 
96 Bernasconi notes that the universality contained in Judaism ties in election: the people in 
receipt of the law equates to a humanity that has 'reached the fullness of its responsibilities'. He 
expresses strong reservations about the manner in which this is then transposed on to a schema 
that distinguishes 'self-conscious' from 'childlike' humanity. Bernasconi 'Who is the Other? 
Who is the neighborT pp. 16-17. 
97 Cited in Gibbs Why Ethics? Signs of Responsibilities (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2000), p. 341. 
98 §41 Deutschtum und Jugendtum cited by Derrida 'Interpretations at War', p. 183. 
99 Truth and Singularity p. 148 if. 
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be history itself. It bets on the future substantiated superionty of a secularized 
religious tradition. The question of parochialism or universal applicability is 
only determined by a global transformation. It is no longer a matter of Europe's 
self-respect. As'such, the stakes for such a practical reason are high (assuming 4D 
they are not already). It is not clear though what space is left for political 
judgment or self-criticism. 
The suspicion is that the meta-theoretical framework of Levinas's project 
troubles any means for diagnosing the particularities of any particular situation; 
for would this kind of acumen not require a theoretical analysis of being? 
Sandford points to this problem: 
'If, on the one hand, however, this forcible insistence on the relationship 
between philosophy and politics is part of the immediate attraction of 
Levinas's work - and that part which makes it seem as though it may be 
used as a resource in thinking every left-leaning or social-emancipatory 
(especially feminist and post-colonial) struggle - this sits, on the other hand, 
in extremely uneasy relationship with Levinas's unwillingness to think 
history or politics in terms of anything other than the same. ' [ML 19-20] 
It is not clear that there is any space for historical or political science in a 
Levinasian formationloo. Such a weakness is clear from Levinas's writing on 
Israel, which could be thought to represent the concrete instantiation of the State 
of Justice given its peculiar fusion of European democratic institutions and 
religious orientation. Levinas's writings and comments on Israel stretch over 
roughly thirty years or solo'. It is only in the 1ý80s that the early optimism for a 
exemplary pioneer state seems to dinunish 102 . Caygill is correct to'note that it is 
100 Rose's comments on Adorno appear equally pertinent to Badiou and Levinas: 'It thus remains 
in a realm of infinite striving or task, a morality, in the limited sense which Hegel criticized: a 
general prescription not located in the social relations which underlie it, and hence incapable of 
providing any sustained and rigorous analysis of those relations. ' [Hegel contra Sociology p. 33] 
101 See Chapter 5 of Levinas and the Political for an excellent survey of Levinas's judgments 
regarding Israel. 
102 See Is it Righteous to be? (1986) - where the valonsation of the adventure of Israel is reduced 
to a discussion of his inability to talk about many things 'because I am not in Israel running its 
risks'. This latter position is opposed to his earlier comments about the Diaspora forming the 
specific novelty of Israel's state. Even the Interview from 1982, cited in the opening remarks to 
this chapter, insists: no one can say "You are not in Israel, you are not allowed to judge. " Even 
within this three or four years, Levinas's position with respect to Israel has become more 
pessimistic and realistic. Is it Righteous to be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas (1986] edited 
by Jill Robbins (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2001) 
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Levinas's systematic philosophy which leads him to overestimate the 
possibilities of Israel. 
'The danger of Levinas's position lies in not fully recognising that the State of 
Israel is a modem state among states. While he does not lapse into the 
messianic paranoia of the Israeli right, he is nevertheless in danger of 
promoting idolatry, or the archaic myth of Israel as a settler society, e-ven 
twenty years after it had become a nation-state. ' [L&P 165] 
Levinas misses that the lapse into Realpolitik had already happened as the 
4 painful necessities of the occupation' slowly undid anY ethical possibility. 
Tellingly, precisely those reservations expressed by Derrida in Alterltýs become 
philosophical differences once the truth content of a position is mortgaged to its 
political imposition' 03. Section V of Derrida's 'A Word of Welcome' explicitly 
addresses this question of Zionism and political judgment. Questioning j t, I, -) 
Levinas's comments on 'political invention' in Israel' 
04, he writes: 
'Has this political invention in Israel ever come to pass? Ever come to pass 
in Israel? ... does one have the right here to silence such an interrogation, before these words of Levinas, and in the spirit that inspires them" Would 
such a silence be worthy of the responsibilities that we have been assigned? 
First of all, before Emmanuel Levinas himself? I am among those who 
await this "political invention" in Israel, amona, those who call for it in 
hope, today more than ever because of the despair that recent events 
have not attenuated .. .' [Adieu 8 1] 
To this reticent disquiet, we might add that the content of the novel ethical 
framework of Totality and Inflnity is severely restricted in its thernatisation of 
apology. In opposition to virile history, apology would appear to consist in 
'incessantly supplying a datum' to the consideration of the Judge [TI 242]. This 
extra prevents discourse gelling into a totality 105 . 
'Whoever speaks attends his manifestation, is non-adequate to the meaning 
that the hearer would like to retain of it as a result acquired outside of the 
very relationship of discourse .... Language is the incessant surpassing of 
the Sinngebung by the signification. ' [TI 296] 
103 In particular, the reference to differences over questions of history. strategy and politics. 
Jacques Derrida and Pierre-Jean Labarriýre AWrWs (Paris. Editions Osiris, 1986), pp. -, 4-5. 
104 Beyonel the Verse p. 191. 
"'5 'Judgment must be borne upon a will that could defend itself during the adjudication and 
throm, _h its apology 
be present at its trial. and does not disappear into the totaliiý of' d coherent 
dISCOUVISC. ,[ TI 24 31 
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But this repetitive stress on incessant over flowing of speech already given by 
saying leaves the apology close to the filibuster, or a compulsive donation ill- 
equiped to breaý with the position condemned earlier of the benefactor who 
needs the beneficiary as the opportunity to demonstrate beneficence. The 
overbearing host can oppress the guest with generosity 106. 
But it is precisely this incessant apology, resisting the judgment of institutional 
history which differentiates Levinas's speculation from that of Hegel, which for 
the former is the 'thought of successful mourning' [L&P 56]. This fundamental 
opposition to any final reconciliation of the real and reason unites Rosenzweig 
and Levinas - this vision is not utopian for Levinas since it does not either bring 
time to an end or valorise it in asymptotic approximation. The resistance of the 
individual to totality splits time into the 'destiny' of totality and the 'vocation' of 
107 
conscience in the ever-renewed demand on the present - the hic et nunc 
Apology is never 'successful' in this sense - though, we should ask in what sense 
6 peace' is not a 'result' even if it requires an infinite correcting. 
The Infinity of Time: Fecundity 
As announced by the preface to Totality and Infinity, war threatens morality to 
the extent that we must ask whether we are not duped by it [TI 21]. It demolishes 
all illusions 'and ensures that the'person4l egoism, that seeks only its own 
106 Derrida briefly references Pierre Klossowski's Roberte Ce Soir in the context of hospitality, 
the dwelling and the welcome of the feminine other. Written in 1953, this text in conjunction 
with Totality and Infinity's sections on the Dwelling, Love and Eros produces an intriguing 
constellation which might repay future work [Adieu p. 42-3]. 'In order that the host's curiosity 
not degenerate into jealousy or suspicion, it is for you, the guest, to discern the hostess' essence 
in the mistress of the house, for you to cast her forth from potentiality into existence: either the 
hostess remains sheer phantasm and you a stranger in this house if you leave to the host the 
inactualized essence of the hostess; or else you are indeed that angel, and by your presence you 
give an actuality to the hostess: you shall have full power over her as well as over the host. ... 
Whereupon the host shall be master in his house no more: he shall have carried out his mission. 
In his turn he shall have become the guest. ' Pierre Klossowski Roberte Ce Soir [19531 translated 
by Austryn Wainhouse (New York & London, Marion Boyars Publishers, 1989), p. 16. The 
notion of angelical visitation that determines the "Rule of Hospitality" might be connected to 
Derrida's use of the term to discuss hospitality. But again, recalling Skinner, this might simply 
be fanciful 'reminiscence' on my part. In the English-edition of Adieu, it is the only reference 
made by Derrida that is not glossed by the translator. 
107 This distinction between 'destiny' and 'vocation' is Mos6s's (Au delil de la guerre p. 62). 
However in German, Bestimmung would cover both senses. 
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personal salvation is refuted [TI 25]. 'Interiority cannot replace universality. ' 
Only a political dimension is adequate to the threat of war: 
'Apolitical freedom is to be explained as an illusion due to the fact that its 
partisans or its beneficiaries belong to an advanced stage of political 
evolution. An existence that is free, and not a velleity for freedom, 
presupposes a certain organization of nature and of society; the sufferings of 
torture, stronger than death, can extinguish inward freedom. ' [ TI 24 11 
But why does not war also extinguish the illusory structure of ethical 
orientation? '" Again, it would do so were it not for a further dimension of the 
topography - one that was already discussed in our brief treatment of the 
feminine other. Fecundity and the family are needed to ensure the unlimited 
infinity of the future 'without which goodness would be subjectivity and folly' 
(TI 280]. This future is determined by the ethical figure of 'pardon' which 
enables new beginning unburdened of the past - nothing is irrevocable if every 
instant is the first109 
Truth requires as its 'ultimate condition' this infinity projected into the future: it 
ensures transcendence by ensuring the 'convergence of morality and reality' [TI 
245,247,306]. It must take 'concrete form' through 'paternity" 10, or remain 
only an illusory 'image of eternity': one is then entitled to re-vision the actual as 
a vestibule for the future [TI 301 ]. Here, one can note the equivocation, not to 
say contradiction, in these analyses. 'Convergence of morality and reality' 
suggests a necessary transformation of being via institutions to justify the idea of 
the infinite, yet we have seen how Levinas shies away from the infinite 
approximation of being in favour of an endeavour at another level, the ethical, 
without end. 
108 'Does not the salvation of morality by means of an appeal to eschatology simply displace the 
site of deception, replacing the danger of being duped by morality with that of being duped by 
eschatologyT (L&P 106-071 
109 Mos6s Au-dela de la guerre p. 114. It is important to stress the dimension of futurity in 
opposition to the past. Contra Proust, Levinas insists that 'true temporality' lies in moving 
beyond regret for 'past occasions. On three occasions from this period he rejects 'la recherche 
du temps perdu' [TI 282; DEwH 128; DEwH 145]. 
110 'La paternitg est en effect cette experience dans laquelle le Mot, tout en restant enracing dans 
son essence propre, se voit en meme temps appeig ii la forme d'amour la plus dýsintgressge qui 
soit. ' Mos6s Au-deia de la guerre p. 54. 'Paternity is in fact that experience in which the Ego, 
while remaining wholly rooted in its own essence, finds itself called by the most disinterested 
form of love there can be. ' [my translation] 
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We mentioned that the family overcame the potential private complicity of erotic 
love, but it also is the means by which the political rejigging of Judaism is 
accomplished. The family, which maintains the continuity of the project through 
the totalizing continuity of world-time, is the very 'source of human time'. Once 
the concept of election is introduced, this paleonymy is complete: the co- 
ordinates of Jewish tradition become politic o-philosophic al categories"'. The 
'unicity' of election is found in obedience to the father' 12 . And in this election, a 
certain circularity evidences itself; fraternity is based on the structure of filiality 
mimetic of monotheism: '. -- because my position as an I is effectuated already in 
fraternity the face can present itself to me as face. ' [TI 280] As Moses notes, 
there is a fundamental asymmetry here -I must have been addressed as 'tu' 
myself to confer this upon the other' 13. 
Raised as chosen, the child learns to see others as chosen, too: 'I am I and chosen 
one, but where can I be chosen, if not from among other chosen ones, among 
equalsT [TI 279]. The very notion of face is explicitly tied to Judaic teaching 
and familial ritual: it depends on upbringing. It is not clear whether this familial 
supplement is enough to escape the reservations around ethics and politics 
covered above. Surely, war holds the possibility of breaking even this ancestral 
handing-down? 114 And what of Adorno and Horkheimer's suspicion of the 
disenchanted, enlightened world and its 'triumphant calamity' 115 9 Levinas 
concludes his essay on Levy-Bruhl with the rhetorical question: 
111 Cf. Caygill's comments on the relation of prophetic politics to Jewish identity [L&P 129]. 
112 'He [the son] is unique for himself because he is unique for the father. ' [TI 279] 
113 4 ... le moment 
de la RMIation, celui oý le Moi m9ta-9thique se transforme en Je, est 
pricisigment celui oiý il d6couvre sa d9pendance par rapport Li une r9aliti qui Vinvestit de 
Vextgrieur. ' [op. cit. p. 36]. '... the moment of Revelation, in which the meta-ethical Ego 
transforms itself into an 'F, is precisely that moment where it discovers its dependence by 
relation on a reality which invests it from the exterior'. I agree with this general point. but would 
insist that in Totality and Infinity it is determined by the paternal-filial relation (hence male) and 
depends on encountering the height of 'vous', not 'tu'. 
114 Levinas's dimension of fecundity as. an attempt to ensure the infinite time for convergence is 
perhaps a reconfiguring of Husserl's generations of scientists passing on the products of the 0 
tradition. See Appendix A on Husserl's Crisis-period to substantiate this claim. 
115 Theodor Adorno & Max Horkheimer Dialectic of Enlightenment - Philosophical Fragments 
edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr [1987] & translated by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 2002), p. I 
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'Mais la civilisation issue A monothjisme West-elle pas capable de 
ripondre & cette crise - par une orientation, libiWe de I'horreur des myths, 
des troubles qu'ils provoquent dans les esph . ts et des cruautjs qu'ils 
perpituent dans les mtTurs? ' 116 
Conclusion 
Our efforts in these first two chapters have been directed to foregrounding the 
importance of Levinas's connection to the tradition of practical transformation 
guided by ideas. As to our main question, we can see that all humans are others 
in the sense of concrete subjectivities under the concept of fraternity, but that not 
all humans can encounter the face of the Other as an idea of the infinite owinE to 
the concrete obstacles of basic material needs and the variation in the socio- 
cultural. Ironically, given the popular reception of Levinas, it is the concept of 
the face itself which generates this problem. To repeat, the idea of infinity is not 
4given' in an experience of the human face. For Levinas himself this position, in 
its uncritical humanism, would be akin to a well-meaning liberal fanaticism, not 
to say paganism, which could only ever valonse the current contingent 
instantiation of things. It lacks any sense of the infinity of transcendence as 
extenority and separation. 
The exclusion of Africa and Asia is constitutive - it springs from the core of 
Levinas's philosophy. Levinas's notion of alterity as height is mortgaged to the 
exclusion of the alterity of these other cultures as different and equal. Through 
the optic of ethnography, we can see Levinas's project as a philosophical 
anthropology - uncovering the excellence of Western Europe's concrete social 
being. From this insight springs the prophetic resistance to paganism and 
barbarism which function as if they were technical descriptions of other cultures. 
But beyond the championing of Judaism, and the recourse to Rosenzweig IS kkeak. 
inas analysis (a hangover from the nineteenth century). it hard to see hwv Levi 
supports this contention of superiorit,,,, except with reference to the future 
"" 'Levy-Bruhl et la philosophie contemporaine'. p. 63. 'But that civilisation which issued from 
monotheism. isn't it capable )f respond, ng to this : rIsis - by an orientation. freed from the horror 
ot rnýths, the troubles they stir up in spirits and the cruelti I 
translation] 
'es the- perpetuate n customs (my 
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peaceful outcome of the speculative political project and its purported resonance 
with our own upbringing in this tradition. 
Next, we turn to Derrida's reading of Levinas in *Violence and Metaph-vsIcs'. 
There we will see a different, more theoretical, form of speculation, which sees 
this recourse to religious tradition as part of a general metaphysical problem. 
1-1 
Part Two 
Au Cceur du Chiasme: the exchange between Levinas and Derrida 
Part One of this thesis detailed Levinas's theory of the Other as found in Totality and 
Infinity. It insisted on the speculative, practical dimension of that project. Part Two, 
turns to Jacques Demda's engagement with Levinas and the repercussions that 
ensued. Its focus is on four texts, written over nearly twenty years: 
1. Derrida's long review essay, 'Violence and Metaphysics', which surveys 
Levinas's output up to and including Totality and Infinity-, 
2. Levinas's very short piece on Derrida: 'Wholly Otherwise'; 
3. the late work, Otherwise than Being, which is taken to respond to Derrida's 
earlier criticisms; 
4. Derrida's Levinas Festschrift essay, 'At this Very Moment... '. 
Some commentators, such as Critchley, present these essays as a constructl". 'e back 
and forth or convivial exchange between the two, which amounts to an ethico- 
political alliance. This ties in with a certain understanding of deconstruction as a 
mode of wnting distinct in the philosophical tradition, and, in particular, distinct from 
criticism. Such a reading tends to pnvilege a 'gift' economy, with each contribution 
augmenting the other's writing, This fails to come to terms with the major 
philosophical differences between the two. 
Chapter Three offers a reading of the first text, while supplementing it with a survey I 
of Derrida's other writings from the 1960s. Chapter Four concentrates on Othenvise 
than Behi, (,,,, published in 1974, and the claim that Levinas's introduction of the ne%v 
distinction between the Saying and the Said (le Dire et le Dit) escapes the main 
criticisms advanced by Derrida. Chapter Five uses the two other essays named above 
to emphasise the persistent dispute regarding the interpretation of language, history 
Lind being. 
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Chapter Three 
Derrida's critique of Levinas in 'Violence and Metaphysics' 
This chapter argues that 'Violence and Metaphysics' should be read as a critique 
of Totality and Infinity. There is a three-fold dimension to this critique. First, it 
ej r jects Levinas's reading of history and the history of philosophy as the 
domination of the Other by the Same. Second, it disputes Levinas's positioning 
within the phenomenological tradition: the final half of the essay is devoted to 
contesting his readings of Husserl and Heidegger. Finally, it challenges the 
conception of language operating, but barely thernatised, within Totality and 
Infinity; in particular, it concentrates on problems of philosophical presentation 
and the claim to break with the history of philosophy while remaining dependent 
on its conceptual resources. This last point could be summed up by the question: 
how does Levinas authorize himself to write what he does? Demda concludes 
that Levinas's discourse is indistinguishable from empiricism or a pre-Kantian 
thematic. 
In addition to these criticisms, in the second half of this chapter, I emphasise the 
space Derrida devotes to a programmatic statement of his own speculative 
project, in contrast to Levinas's. The key co-ordinates relate to language, history 
and being, which are grouped under the rubric of a philosophy of original 
finitude (thus explicitly rejecting Levinas's championing of the positive Infinite). 
In the chapters following, I will subject the claims for an affinity between the 
two to close analysis: such an assertion is based on a failure to attend to 
"metaphysical" differences which determine modalities of alterity, or otherness, 
so different that we should perhaps treat the two uses merely as homonyms. 
Those points aside, Derrida does include Levinas within the 'community of the 
question I: those thinkers \vho are raising questions which philosophy is currently 
unable to solvc 98-102]. Preciselv because those questions have perhaps 
not been philosophy's questions, they are capable of producing a *profound 
trouhling' [sofficircr jvofondenient] of philosophy through the 'Irruption of the 
totally-other' [11.11 1901. However, despite the legitimate attempt to put thought 
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today in question, Derrida still insists that these questions 'must be examined 
unrelentingly' [VM 98]. That is, the non-philosophical that challenges 
philosophy might remain at the level of non-philosophy. As we will see, this is 
the danger Derrida espies in Totality and Infinity. That it uses up philosophical 
materials does not guarantee its status. 
I 
History and the History of Philosophy 
As we saw in the previous two chapters, Levinas's philosophy is oriented to a 
break from both anonymous being and history as a totalising structure that 
determines meaning. The "West" names both the philosophical tradition and the 
history in which it has developed, where theoretical reason dominates in its 
equation of the real with rationalityl. The "human", as distinct from the animal 
and the vegetable, is marked out by its cultural level, understood as a break from 
both primitive 'participation' and an 'absurd' existence dominated by meeting 
pressing need (glossed as 'underdeveloped'). Phenomenology can interpret the 
fundamental structures expressed by the vanety of cultures, but in order to 
understand the excellence of Europe, it must privilege the Judaic (Christian) 
concept of the human individual2 and the manner in which it is the site of the 
'breakup' of totality. 
This break-up is also that of consciousness (phenomenologically understood as 
that which allows the manifestation of being). Importantly, this break-up is 
refractory to all theoretical knowledge. It can find no place in an account of that 
which has existed or which currently exists: it escapes science or any attempt to 
understand history as a teleology of reason. Levinas reads all theoretical 
attempts to interpret the world qua given as immanentist. As cited in the 
previous chapter, an 'anarchy of facts' can only be broken by the question of 
value, vet. for him. value is only found in that which breaches this theoretical 
Ci%LIll presents Totality and Infinity as a 're ort' resulting from the investioation into the p 
complicity between philosophical and political totalitv [L&P 941. 
The individual is not the (,, cneral concept of the 'person. 
124 
Chapter 3 Derrida's critique of Levinas in "Violence and Metaphysics" 
enterprise of learning. Philosophers and scientists have only interpreted the 
world as given. 
Again, Levinas fears any such dominance by the given as a form of 'barbarism'. 
As Derrida notes, this applies to all theoretical philosophy: 'Incapable of 
respecting the being and meaning of the other, phenomenology and ontology 
would be philosophies of violence. Through them, the entire philosophical 
tradition, in its meaning and at bottom, would make common cause with 
oppression and with the totalitarianism of the sarne. ' [VM 113] 
The apparent synonymy of "being" -"given"-" same" is determined by the 
privileging of the other as that source of value drawn from beyond 3. That said, 
the model for this activity of the individual as that which produces, but is always 
left out of, history is taken from Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry 4. Though, for 
Husserl, this 'inner history' is not understood as originating from 'beyond being', 
in his emphasis on the results of the generations working towards scientific 
achievement, the individuals are lost. 
Levinas's theory of institutions understands that human freedom depends on the 
(. written text' of the law, but that these impersonal structures open the possibility 
3 Several pages towards the end of 'Violence and Metaphysics' contest Levinas's interpretation 
of Heideggerian "Being" (Sein). Derrida twice remarks that the former had understood the 
ontological distinction between Being and beings much better in his work prior to Totality and 
Infinity and insists that this distinction cannot be understood as attesting to the "subordination" of 
beings to Being. Being has no power or effect such that it governs. In addition, "letting-be" 
(Sein-lassen) is now, in Totality and Infinity, presented as a relation of comprehension of 
knowledge, when previously Levinas had written the opposite. On Derrida's reading of 
Heidegger, Being is not a concept or an 'abstract, indeterminate predicate' (the concept is on the 
'plane of ontic determination', not that of "Being"); indeed, he argues that letting-be is always to 
do with alterity and, above all, the alterity of the Other [VM 169-761. We might see here an 
equivocation owing to the neo-Kantian Platonism of figures like Cohen who distinguish the Idea 
from Being in a manner that clashes with a phenomenological analysis; where the Husserlian 
epochj is designed precisely to suspend these classical metaphysical oppositions in favour of 
sense- investigation. Here, it is not clear to me how Levinas could effect a 'radicalisation' of 
intentional analysis by escaping the restraint of the noema-noesis structure [L&P 99] - would it 
not then cease to be transcendental phenomenology as such? Heidegger persists with a form of 
intentional analysis but does not believe that it reaches the Evidenz sought by Husserl. The 
Lenigmas' [Rdtsell located are instead only resolved in authentic resolution - Selbstbestimmung 
as opposed to Selbstbesinnung. 
4 'The historical world is ... first pre-given as a soc io- historical world. But it is 
histoncal only 
through the inner historicity of each individual [durch die innere Geschichtlichkett jeder 
Einzelnen], who are individuals in their inner historicity, together with that of other 
communalized persons. ' (Ursprung 174 translation modified]. For more detail, see Appendix A. 
125 
Chapter 3 Derrida's critique of Levinas in "Violence and Metaphysics" 
of another 'tyranny': the inhumanity of works alienated [TI 243] and the 
& unrecognition of the worker' [TI 297]. Co-opting Husserl's distinction between 
indication and expression, the judgment of history, made in the third person, only 
operates on the evidences of indicative signs'. The other is excluded from such 
'totalities' or 'consistencies', as is the Other, since the face cannot manifest 
meaningfully'. Levinas avers that 'the human really is only in expression', hence 
the crucial task of apology to maintain that expressive moment: 'Judgment must 
be borne upon a will that could defend itself during the adjudication and through 
its apology be present at its trial, and does not disappear into the totality of a 
coherent discourse. ' [TI 243 my emphasis] This 'vigilance' of apology 
reactivates expression by 'making present' the 'invisible' that cannot enter the 
evidence of history'. But in goodness, this production evades being recuperated 
by those evidences: 'Justice consists in again making possible expression, in 
which in non-reciprocity the person presents himself as unique. ' [TI 297] The 
opposition of history and eschatology 'surprises' Derrida [VM 153], for the way 
in which the beyond is opposed to a 'finite totality' appears as a presupposition'. 
However, Levinas repeatedly takes up the results of Husserl and Heidegger only 
to reinterpret them. Here, Husserl's teleological twist on phenomenology is 
accepted in its reading of history, but Levinas shifts the meaning from the total 
product, science, to the neglected activity of subjects who produce it. 
Nevertheless, here is located the first major difference between the two. Derrida 
insists that history is better understood as an economy or system within which 
transcendence is operating; 'a system ... neither 
finite nor infinite' [VM 153]; a 
system in which the same and the other interrelate and produce one another 
5 Husserl Logical Investigations 'Investigation 1: Expression and Meaning' pp. 269 ff. 
6 In this regard, Levinas's ethical insistence on incessant apology can be connected to the 
Husserlian problem of Sinnesverdusserlichung (the emptying of sense) that accompanies empty, 
technical symbol manipulation [Crisis 44]. Abstract, developed mathematical sciences such as 
physics can degenerate into interpretations of formulae, without any grounding in the intuitive 
evidence of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). Similarly, for Levinas, the spoken word is destined to 
destined to alien Sinngebung without the rehabilitation of the work of truth [TI 227-281. The 
concomitant problems of history, institutions and justice resemble Husserl's account of the 
passivity of sedimentation. 
7 'The invisible must manifest itself if history is to lose its right to the last word, necessarily 
unjust for the subjectivity, inevitably cruel. ' [TI 243] 
justice requires in contrast, Caygill takes the two to be mutually implicated rather than opposed; 
the postponement and correction of institutional practices [L&P 18 1 J. 
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without recourse to the 'beyond'. We will consider this bare assertion more fully 
later when we tum (in the second part of this chapter) to the specLIatiVe 
prograrnmatics set out. Here, we concentrate on the central pages of 'Violence 
and Metaphysics', where Levinas' reading of canonical figures in the history of 
philosophy is challenged. The chief concern is the demonstration that this 
history already includes many of the themes relating to otherness. Not only does 
Levinas fail to break with a "Greek" tradition; not only is that historv not 
dominated by the given; but Levinas reduces that history to the homogeneous 
tale excoriated under the rubric of history of the same. One can read Derrida as 
uncovering this symptomatic absence of care in Levinas's approach to the historv 
of philosophy - lack of care towards these predecessors. One can see this section 
as warning Levinas that the break from philosophy is not so easy, since it seems 
that these figures have tried to think through the very problems that Levinas 
insists have always been ignored by neutralising reason. 
In this vein, Derrida: 
0 nods to Feuerbach for the constellation of height, substance and face 
[VM 125] and an alternative form of anti -Hegeli ani sm [V, Vl 1391; 
points out that Martin Buber had already anticipated the reservations 
expressed by Levinas with respect to the I-Thou relation [VM 40 1 -02 fn. 
37]; 
argues that Kierkegaard does not simply support a protest for personal 
existence against a systematic totality, but for the category of subjective 
existence in general - 'his discourse is philosophical' [VAI 137] -, 
raises doubts about the distinction made between Levinas's conception 
of Desire and that of Heael: '... one rightly suspects that things vvould 
appear more complicated. if one followed closelý the movement ()f 
certitude and the truth of desire in Phenomenology ot'Jlind. ' [VW t t-ý]- 
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locates, again in Hegel, both an insistence on the unity of the face prior 
to 'dispersion' amongst sense-organs [VM 125] and the neutralisation of 
desire by the eye, with the consequent privileging of hearing by both 
[VM 123'ff. ]; 
invokes Meister Eckhart, Malebranche and de Cusa to broaden out the 
debate over infinity, ontology, divinity and God [VM 182 ff. ]. 
Besides these particular points, the main theme developed across the essay is 
whether philosophy can still be philosophy if it breaks with the founding gesture 
of its Greek departure: the decision to treat philosophy as science [VM 101]'. 
The conceptual, technical language of philosophy maintains this moment in the 
'meta-physics' still used by Levinas [VM 102]". If, as Levinas insisted in 
Difficult Freedom, the true grounds for all understanding depends on this Greek 
conceptuality, then the Greek tradition cannot simply be a receptacle for the 
Judaic 'message 
'Such a site of encounter cannot only offer occasional hospitality to a 
thought which would remain foreign to it. And still less may the Greek 
absent himself, having loaned his house and his language, while the Jew and 
the Christian meet in his home .... Greece is not a neutral, provisional 
territory, beyond borders. ' [VM 191] 
9 This founding decision is replicated in the 'scientificity' of phenomenology. Derrida asks 
whether phenomenological methodology can be 'borrowed' when the cogency of this 
methodology depends on categories that have been rejected [VM 139). Indeed, at points, Levinas 
seems to fluctuate between Heidegger and Husserl, criticising each 'from the language of the 
other' without chasing what that entails to the end [VM 121]. 'Can phenomenological method be 
borrowed like a toolT [VM 147]. We can see here the echoes of the questions put to Levi- 
Strauss's bricolage in Of Grammatology: Levinas's metaphysics 'presupposes the transcendental 
phenomenology it seeks to put into question'. Though the 'legitimacy' of such questioning 'does 
not seem to us any less radical', it is perhaps no longer phenomenology or philosophy [VM 166]. 
'The only weakness of bricolage ... is a total inability to justify itself in its own 
discourse. The 
already-there-ness of instruments and of concepts cannot be undone or re-invented. ... the 
passage from desire to discourse always loses itself in bricolage, it builds its castles with debris. 
In the best of cases, the discourse of bricolage can confess itself, confess in its desire and its 
defeat, ... recognize that the most radical 
discourse, the most inventive and systematic engineer 
are surprised and circumvented by a history, a language, etc., a world ... from which they must 
borrow their tools, if only to destroy the former machine ... But that the engineer should always be 
a sort of bricoleur should not ruin all criticism of bricolage, quite the contrary. ' [Gramm 139] 
10 'One already foresees the unease to which a thought rejecting the excellence of theoretical 
rationality will have to resign itself later, especially in that it never ceases to appeal to the most 
uprooted rationalism and universalism against the violences of mysticism and history. against the 
ravishing of enthusiasm and ecstasy. ' [VM 107] 
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The 'rich alluvia' of Western philosophical history 'protects itself against the C 
surprise' of Levinas as is demonstrated by locating the points in philosophy 
which Levinas has to suppress, misinterpret or ignore". Derrida concentrates, in 
particular, on the acknowledged inheritance from Husserl and Heidegger and is C" 
painstaking in his contestation of Levinas's reading of the 'alter ecro' in 
Cartesian Meditations. It is this presentation of an alternative reading of 
phenomenology which brings out some of the difference I am keen to impress. 
Therefore, I will attend in detail to these pages. 
Husserl and Phenomenology 
The discussion of Husserl yields two key points relating to Levinas: 
I- The analysis of the alter ego in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation does not 
proceed as Levinas imagines. 
2. No absolute othemess is possible. 
Both of these points draw from an attention to the displaced notion of objectivity 
and how this displacement 'complicates the primacy of theoretical consciousness 
in Husserl' [VM 1061. Derrida suggests that Levinas has missed the manner in 
which in Husserl there are two meanings to the theoretical [VM 152]. Levinas's 
'protest' would be aimed at that closest to the common understanding where only 
that which can be encompassed in clarity by pure reason is deemed to be 
relevant. This opposition to the privilege of clarity and light may appear close to 
deconstructi on's problem ati zati on of the privilege accorded to the present and to 
living speech in Husserl 12 . 
But we should pay attention to the division in Totality 
and Infinity between vision and speech. Vision is the sense associated with 
science and practicality that enables the 'forgetting of the il y a' [TI 191]. t) -I 
TlioLi(-, h it appears that science 'makes possible the transcending of the subjective 
condition of sensibility', Levinas concurs with Husserl's analysis of 'Ori, -, in of I- 
As our first two chapters also demonstrate. It is not as if it is only the religious. Adaic thought 
of Rosciv\Neig, that is co-opted - it is inseparable from the neo-Kantian transformation of those 
SOUrCCS and hence inside a philosophical tradition. 
" See Speech and Phenoincim. 
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Geometry' where the meaning of all scientific production is ultimately still 
validated by its grounding in the sensible [TI 192]. In contrast, the ethical and 
alterity do not share thefor? n of things given in sensibility. The relation with the 
13 Other 'cuts across vision of forms' - its capacity is speech not vision [TI 193] 
Speech and alterity escape from the same in this manner. 
Derrida notes, however, that the second dimension of the theoretical has been 
missed. It underlies and maintains appearing in general; this includes the 
appearance of the nontheoretical. Phenomenology attends to the differential 
manner in which different modalities of thought and language give themselves in 
appearance. This is in part the motivation of the epochi: ascription of existence, 
non-existence, reality and virtuality is suspended the better to analyse the mode 
of being-given [VM 151-2]. From here we can appreciate Derrida's stress on the 
misunderstanding that sees Husserl as entirely object-oriented: 
phenomenology has surely contributed nothing if not an infinite renewal, 
enlargement, and making more supple [assoupli] of the notion of object in 
general' [VM 151 translation modified]. With the result that, for Derrida, ethics 
can only 'take root' in the prior domain of transcendental subjectivity ". 
Phenomenology enables one to speak of ethical noemas in their originality 
without insisting that they be modelled on 'real' objects [VM 152]. 
'I know the meaning of the nontheoretical as such (for example, ethics or 
the metaphysical in Levinas's sense), with a theoretical knowledge (in 
general), and I respect it as such, as what it isi in its meaning. I have regard 
for recognizing that which cannot be regarded as a thing, as a faqade, as a 
theorem. I have regard for the face itself. ' [VM 152-3] 
13 See also the second section of the third chapter of Existence and Existents, entitled 'Light'. 
Hypostasis is produced in the conjunction of light and knowing. Vision is the event of suspension 
that enables one to escape reactive 'compromise' with things. Phenomenality is existing for 
vision in light, only thereby is there a world. Light is the condition of the for-the-other. In this 
context, the epochi is the paradigmatic move of this form of consciousness [E&E 46 ff. ]. In his 
1940 essay, 'The Work of Edmund Husserl', one can find a similar claim: 'the whole of mental 
life is conceived on the model of light' [DEwH 61). 
14 In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida's reading of Husserl stresses the power of the 
intersubjective other, qua alter ego in its appresentation [Apprdsentation], and the compound 
structure of the present that resist transcendental reduction to self-identity or essence. 'While this 
is against Husserl's express intention, it does take into account what is implied by his description 
of the movement of temporalization and of the relation with the other --- .' [SP 521 
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The Other and the Alter Ego 
This expansion of the notion of object-status underpins Derrida's interpretation 
of the alter ego. He proceeds to challenge Levinas's presentation of the "Other" 
as overcoming the ethical, not to say violent, deficiencies of the alter ego. Let us I- 
recap the features of the encounter with the master. 
Having described the basic structure of the ego, the self-sufficiency of 
enjoyment, Levinas describes the encounter that disrupts this autarky. What 
ruptures the enjoying ego is an expenence of height or of mastery. This 
experience, the experience of the Other, is an experience of there-being- 
something-that-can-be-taught: the Other brings me more than I contain. The 
self-sufficiency of the ego is suspended and suspended in such a way that this 
expenence of height is not simply overcome by the assimilation of information. 
This experience is such that 1 can no longer return to the comfort of enjoyment. 
Levinas interprets this moment as an expenence of the exteriority of the Other. 
This is a metaphysical alteration to phenomenology's description of the 
'lifeworld' or of Mitsein; the social structures I inhabit in my enjoyment are 
ruptured by this encounter with the Other; the ethical relation to the Other is 
produced in metaphysical desire for this extenority. 
it is important to distinguish this from the experience of the curious intellect who 
finds that a certain phenomena exceeds his or her cognitive powers: the Other is 
not experienced as a thwarted object of curiosity (as emphasised above, the Other 
has no form), but as a master, a teacher (the given does not issue from within the 0 
ego, but is received as taught), importantly, as the one before whom I must 
ify myself. It is more urgent and fundamental than the informed hesitation of J Usti It) 
Judgment. It is visceral in that the previously self-sufficient ego can now find no 
rest in cFood conscience. Z" 
Levinas positions his break from Heidegger and Husserl by identifving a 
particular feature of' intentional life that he takes to be of fundamental 
importance. hut which c. xceeds phenomenality and phenomenolop. It is 
jvcmised upon an experience w, hich is irreducible to the resources ot 
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phenomenology, yet dependent upon phenomenal experience for its 
"appearance" [VM 103]. It is understood as an everyday fact of moral life, yet 
the face is 'beyond all phenomenology 1, which can then not account for ethics, 
speech, and justice [VM 132]. Only an explicitly metaphysical supplement can 
do them justice, and in so doing Levinas puts into question phenomenology's 
possible claims to transcendental justification: 'the other [autre] is the other 
[autre] only if his alterity is absolutely irreducible ... infinitely irreducible; and 
the infinitely Other [Autre] can only be Infinity' [VM 1291. 
That is, for Levinas, the infinite alterity of the other cannot be captured by the 
description of the alter ego: 'by Making the other ... the ego's phenomenon, 
constituted by an analogical appresentation on the basis of belonging to the the 
ego's own sphere, Husserl allegedly missed the infinite alterity of the other, 
reducing it to the same. To make other an alter ego, Levinas says frequently, is 
to neutralise its absolute alterity. ' [VM 153] Derrida definitively rejects this 
reading. - 
First, the break-up of phenomenality, the problem of inadequation. in 
intentionality, is already Husserl's problem15 in that it dominates the appearance 
of objects in general: 'the themes of non-presence contradict what makes 
phenomenology a metaphysics of presence working it ceaselessly' [VM 15 1 ]. In 
this regard, 'it is easy to show' that the alter ego, the other, is always presented to 
me as originary nonpresence". Therefore, nonphenomenality, the fragmentation 
of original evidence in the other, is the ego's intentional problem. The 
description of the alter ego is a determinate attempt to break with the humanist 
thernatization of the other as a general category. 
Derrida reads Husserlian phenomenology as already concerned with the problem 
of respect for the other: 'For without the phenomenon of other as other no respect 
15 'This impossibility of adequation is so radical that neither the originality nor the apodicticity of 
evident truths are necessarily adequations. ' [VM 150] 
16 For Derrida, no one has been more attentive to this 'singular and irreducible style of evidence' 
[VM 154]. This disagreement with Levinas goes all the way back to his dissertation: '... it is 
difficult to agree with E. Levinas that the whole of Husserl's thought is motivated by such an 
ontological presupposition. Besides, the thesis of Levinas is based only on texts that precede 
Cartesian Meditations. ' The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy pp. 203-4 fn. 4. 
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would be possible. The phenomenon of respect supposes respect of 
phenomenality. And ethics, phenomenology. ' [VM 151] That is, respect is 
allowing the other to appear; without its appearing as such, no encounter with the 
alter ego would be possible [VM 154 & CM 122]. 
'For it is impossible to encounter the alter ego (in the very form of the 
encounter described by Levinas), impossible to respect it in experience and 
in language, if this other, in its alterity, does not appear for an ego (in 
general). One could neither speak, nor have any sense of the totally other, if 
there was not a phenomenon of the totally other, or evidence of the totally 
other as such. ' [VM 153-54] 
Here, we should note that Derrida is not simply contesting Levinas's 
interpretation of Husserl, but further pressing Levinas: he must suppose the other 
17 as an ego, for his di. scourse to work as phenomenology [VM 137] . It would be 
impossible to even speak of the Other, if we have not presupposed a form of 
appearing that is other in this way. That this is primary for Husserl can be seen 
in the insistence that the 'world' is an ideal correlate [Gegenstdndlichkeit] of that 
very intersubjective experience: I can experience a world only because I am in 
communion with others [CM 107]. 
The Phenomenological Impossibility of Absolute Otherness 
This necessity of appearing moves us to the second point outlined above. On 
Derrida's commentary, there can be no absolute otherness for an avowed 
phenomenology. He suggests that the central theme of the Cartesian Meditations 4D 
is the 'irreducibly mediate nature of the intentionality aiming at the other as 
other' [VM 154]. Levinas has doubts over a form of mediation that would 
incorporate without remainder the otherness of the individual. Instead, it is a 
different form of mediation that Derrida takes to be essential if the other is to be 
respected: analogical appresentation, which respects the remainder, is necessary 
17 Though Husserl himself stresses that 'alter ego' refers to an alteration in my ego - 'the ego 
indicated by this expression being I myself in my ownriess' - but where that 'ownness' is 
troubled (CM 94 & CM 1101. Another monadic structure is constituted within my ego: 
'Somewhat as my memorial past, as a modification of my living present, "transcends" my 
present, the appresented other being "transcends" my own being ... ' [CW 115], but this is still a 
modification of my ego a 'correlate of the intentionality constituting it'. 
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to avoid its inclusion within my own egological life as a comprehended, 
encompassed moment. 
'The necessary reference to analogical appresentation, far from signifying 
an analogical and assirnilatory reduction of the other to the same, confirms 
and respects separation, the unsurpassable necessity of (nonobjective) 
mediation. If I did not approach the other by way of analogical 
appresentation, if I attained to the other irnmediately and originally, silently, 
in communion with the other's own experience, the other would cease to be 
other. ' [VM 154] 
Opposed to the complacent assimilation of even the mode of givenness of a thing 
in space, Husserl analyses the history of its relations through time and its always 
incomplete Abschattungen. The alter ego demonstrates a 'more profound 
dimension of incompleteness' [VM 155]. It opens a radical impossibility beyond 
that of perspectival comprehension, but, as Derrida notes, this radicality is a 
'double power of indefiniteness'. The radical alterity of the alter ego depends on 
its first being a body. 'The stranger is infinitely other because by his essence no 
enrichment of his profile can give me the subjective face of his experience from 
his perspective, such as he lived it. ' [VM 155] But, the stranger must first have a 
profile. Such an intentional modification of the ego is the only possible point of 
departure. If the other were entirely in the world, it would not be recognised as 
alter ego, but if it were not in the world, it could not be recognised at all. Here 
Derrida reiterates that Husserl does not deduce the alter ego from 'decency' and 
9 18 everyday life' 
We might pause here and reflect that this reading of Derrida's runs counter to the 
one developed in our previous two chapters. As Visker argues, despite this 
exemplary reading in 'Violence and Metaphysics'19, Derrida seems to forget that 
18 This is summarised by Visker as follows: 'Whereas for Levinas, to appear already means to 
lose one's absolute alterity (for to appear is to appear to someone and hence to be forced to share 
his categories) and ethics as a consequence had to do with a dimension anterior to the 
"identifying" light of phenomenology, Derrida contended that "the phenomenon of respect [for 
the other] supposes the respect of phenomenality" (VM 12 1). To invert this order of prionty. 
Derrida further contended, was necessarily to leave the realm of an ethics of originary finitude 
and to resort to the gesture of a classical metaphysics of the infinite which would describe the 
titles of the finite only by comparison. It was the introduction of the very notion of (a) God that 
Derrida was at pains to avoid. ' Truth and Singularity p. 280. 
19 Ibid. p. 155 fn. 37. 
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the 'other is still related to me through shame' 20 . In this regard, the problem of 
the relation between IAutre and IAutrui seems not to be present in Derrida's 
analysi S21 . As in Sartre, the correspondence between autrui-objet and autrui- 
sujet (experienced in shame) is destined to fail, were it not for the modes of 
teaching, apology and generosity. Derrida does recognise his failure to address 
this problem in his essay, but attributes it to a lack in Levinas's oricrInal texts: Cý 
there needs to be a stronger, more detailed analysis of relations between the ego 
and the other, and between VAutre and 1'Autrui, but these would have to be 
eidetic -transcendental descriptions [VM 161] which would put to the test the use 
of autrui in its transformation to proper noun'. 
Visker writes: Tevinas's description of the encounter with the Other as 
'experience par excellence' presupposed an intricate structure of belatedness 
(Nachtrdglichkeit) in which something that does not belong to my time or to the 
time of the other nonetheless brings them into accordance. ' 23 1 will argue in the 
next chapter that the tropes of delay, dehiscence and diachrony are only 
introduced by Levinas after Totality and Infinity. But, that said, it is important to 
ask whether our reading of the relation between the other as concrete individual 
and the Other as encounter with master falls prey to Derrida's anal ySiS24. Can 
these modes of production of the infinite produce something absolute in its 
otherness? That does not appear? '... can one speak of an experience of the 
other or of difference? Has not the concept of experience always been 
determined by the metaphysics of presence.? Is not experience always an 
encountering of an irreducible presence, the perception of phenomenality? ' [VM 
190] 
20 Ibid. p. 322. 
21 We might add that Levinas himself does not foreground it as explicitly as he could. 
22 , ... there is no concept of the Other. 
We would have to reflect upon this word "Other" [Autrui] 
in an artisan-like way, in the realm where philosophy and philology constrain each other. uniting 
their concerns and their rigor - this word "Other" circumscribed in silence by the capital letter 
which ever increases the neutrality of other, and which we use so familiarly, even though it is the 
very disorder of our conceptuality. Is it a only common noun without conceptT [VM 130] 
23 Truth and Singularity p. 322-23 
24 Even if we contest Derrida's reading in some regards, the general case should still be 
demonstrated: the two. Levinas and Derrida, are operating with fundamentally different 
conceptions of phenomenology and philosophy. 
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The problem can be framed in relation to the legal terminology - ultra vires. The 
phenomenological methodology adopted does not give Levinas the power to 
justify this move to absolute otherness. In postulating a metaphysical 
underpinning, Levinas reduces phenomenological analysis to quasi-empirical 
data to be explained. What justifies this positing of exteriority, what justifies it 
as philosophical discourse? 
'[B]y acknowledging in this infinitely other as such (appearing as such) the 
status of an intentional modification of the ego in general, Husserl gives 
himself the right to speak of the infinitely other as such, accounting for the 
origin and the legitimacy of his language. He describes the phenomenal 
system of nonphenomenality. Levinas infact speaks of the infinitely other, 
but by refusing to acknowledge an intentional modification of the ego - 
which would be a violent and totalitarian act for him - he deprives himself 
of the very foundation and possibility of his own language. [VM 155-56] 
The general theme persists: Levinas is too quick to speak of the Other so that it, 
the Other, becomes conflated with the safe ground of the other person or ego. As 
such, it appears simultaneously as a valorised humanism and metaphysics [VM 
178]. It is an excessive or exorbitant moment in Totality and Infinity. Even an 
'unphilosophical moment' in that it seems to be animated by an empiricist (or 
even common sense) impulse. 'By radicalising the theme of the infinite 
exteriority of the other, Levinas thereby assumes the aim which has more or less 
secretly animated all the philosophical gestures which have been called 
empricisms. ' [VM 190] 
Even though we are familiar with Levinas complaint that 'humanism is 
insufficiently human', and dispute Derrida's conclusion that the 'face' is a 
metaphor that is dependent on an analogy between God and man and a 'pre- 
conceptual, pre-analogical unity of Being', the interpretation of the face as 
positive infinite, as exterior, exceeds the philosophical protocols developed 
within his works - it is Lehre (the religious tradition, sedimented into our 
received cultural norms and forms) incorporated into philosophy. 
Levinas presents his thoughts as grounded in this phenomenological 
interpretation of an 'everyday experience'. For Derrida, it is not that Levinas 
contradicts himself but that 'he deprives himself of the very foundation and 
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possibility of his own language' [VM 155] since 'one cannot maintain the 
primacy of the objectifying act [the baseline of phenomenological analysis] and 
the irreducible originality of nontheoretical consciousness' [VM 107]. 
That is, this form of philosophical discourse depends on its starting point in 
finitude and cannot appeal to moments inherited from classical metaphysics, 
however mediated or transformed. The question bears on the classical relation 
between the false and the positive infinity'. Derrida insists that one cannot 
maintain the notion of the face and that of positive infinity whilst remaining 
within philosophical discourse [VM 144]. For him, along with Hegel, alterity 
makes no sense separated from negation [VM 148]. In a footnote to the 
concluding page of the essay, he cites Hegel's Science of Logic to the effect that 
difference is always related to identity: such that there can be no 'pure' 
difference and no 'pure' identity [VM 192 fn 91]. 
Confessing to a 'total deafness' before Levinas's vocabulary of the "Same" and 
the "Other", Derrida concludes that there must be 'play' of the other in the same, 
otherwise there would be only the same and the other would never appear as 
other. Thus the same is never self-same or present to self, even from the 
beginning. Alterity can be thought only as negativity and '... above all, can be 
said only as negativity, which Levinas begins by refusing' [VM 158]. History is 
this economy of the false infinite which does not congeal into a totality, but is 
violent and discontinuous. 
Levinas will explicitly deal with this question of his use of the positive infinite in 
Otherwise than Being. As it stands in Totality and Infinity, it is not clear how an 
analysis of the encounter in height can be interpreted with theoretical legitimacy 
(rather than speculative legitimation) as an encounter with the positive infinite: 
that which brings me more than I contain, only exceeds what is currently 
instantiated - the paradigmatic case of the false infinite. And Levinas is loath to 
reduce the infinite to a practical idea merely orienting activity within being. 
25 For Derrida, the false infinite is that beginning in finitude and mortality [VM 143]. 
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Empiricism and Philosophical Presentation 
The question of language is the central question for Derrida, both in respect of 
Levinas's theory-of language and in the language adopted in the presentation of 
his themes. Derrida suggests that all the questions he is prompted to raise are 
questions that relate to language [VM 136]. As we shall see, this trope persists 
throughout all his writings on Levinas'. Developed from his early engagement 
with Husserl, Derrida will understand Selbstbesinnung as a taking responsibility 
for every element utilised in discourse'. This connects him to the Kantian 
critical tradition which concerns itself with the authority of philosophical 
discourse: what procedures and writing practices warrant assertibility? That is, 
what protocols distinguish philosophy as personal Weltanschauung from 
Philosophy as critical discipline? 
Derrida is emphatic in placing Levinas in a pre-Kantian position: Totality and 
Infinity does not even ask about responsibility for its discourse [VM 162]. 
In detailing an experience that exceeds intentional analysis, yet interpreting that 
breach in terms of a positive infinite and egoity, Levinas has exceeded the self- 
evidence of his method and is thereby unable to justify the manner in which he 
articulates the Other. 'In making the origin of language, meaning and difference 
the relation to the infinitely other, Levinas is resigned to betraying his own 
intentions in his philosophical discourse. The latter is understood, and instructs, 
only by first permitting the same and Being to circulate within it. ' [VM 189] 
This is exacerbated through recourse to a classical, metaphysical schema of 
dialogue and instruction. The rigour of the descriptions of the break-up of 
phenomenality is undermined by this suture which brings back elements that 
phenomenology had been developed to resist [VM 190]. Moreover, without a 
26 The concern for language, because of its inherent connection to historicity and being will be be 
determining for Derrida's more recent writings on Levinas. For example in 'Force of Law', he 
refers to the 'difficult questions about Levinas' difficult discourse' [FoL 2501 which means that 
he cannot borrow the concept of justice and insists that Levinas has a 'wholly other language' 
and an 'entirely different discursive procedure' [FoL 256]. See Chapters Five and Six. 
27 Though Derrida understands this project of Selbstbesinnung to founder in Husserl's own work 
on the 'lack of attention paid [by Husserl] to the problem of its own phenomenological 
enunciation', 'Punctuations: The Time of a Thesis' [19801 translated by Kathleen McLaughlin in 
Eýyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 117. 
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faithful phenomenological substructure the experience of metaphysical desire 
cannot defend itself as transcendental (and hence reopens the space for 
psychologism, etc . )28 . Derrida notes that 'if one is not convinced by the initial 
propositions ... one never will be' [VM 117], which means that its logic is that of 
the anecdote - 'that's my experience, too! that or amnesis, where one forgets Cý 
the manner in which one's experience is framed in pre-given language for which 
it does not take responsibilitY29. 
In contrast, he underscores the necessary mediation of 'ipseity I, the 
Entausserung of knowing, the originary, necessary 'violence' of conceptuality". 
'No philosophy responsible for its language can renounce ipseity in general, 
and the philosophy or eschatology" of separation may do so less than any 
other. Between original tragedy and messianic triumph there is philosophy, 
in which violence is returned against violence within knowledge, in which 
original finitude appears, and in which the other is respected within, and by, 
the same. This finitude makes its appearance in an irreducibly open 
question which is the philosophical question in general: why is the 
essential, irreducible, absolutely general and unconditioned form of 
experience as a venturing forth toward the other still egoity? Why is an 
experience which would not be lived as my own (for an ego in general, in 
the eidetic -transcendental sense of these words) impossible and 
unthinkable? This unthinkable and impossible are the limits of reason in 
general. In other words: why finitude ... ? The philosophy which is the discourse of this reason as phenomenology cannot answer such a question 
by essence, for every answer can be made only in language, and language is 
opened by the question. --- Husserl knew this. ' [VM 163-64] 
The concluding pages of Derrida's essay repeat the earlier ascription of a 
traditional impulse to Levinas's motivations, that of empiricism: 
28 In a footnote, Derrida observes that he does not necessarily subscribe to the Husserlian position 
here, but it does resist Levinas's criticisms [ VM 405 fh. 51]. 
29 As Sandford also writes: 'These descriptions, assertions without argument, rely for their force 
on what one might call the phenomenological recognition of the reader. ' MetaphysiCs of Love p. 
26. 
30 It is not clear to me whether something like a theory of 'transcendental violence' can be 
attributed to Derrida's work more generally. This rhetoric of violence is developed from out of 
Levinas's own assertion that all conceptuality is violent. Is Derrida doing more than using this 
vocabulary to demonstrate that without such 'violence' there is no being or historicity at all? 
Similar comments could be offered in relation to analogous passages in Of Grammatology in 
response to Uvi-Strauss's ascription of violence to writing (Gramm 101 ff-j- Cf. Hobson's 
account in OL 30-32 and Beardsworth's general thesis in Derrida and the PolitiCal. 
31 Derrida emphasises the logos persisting in Levinas's 'eschatology': Veschatologle [VeM 192]. 
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'It is the dream of a purely heterological thought at its source. A pure 
thought of pure difference. Empiricism is its philosophical name, its 
metaphysical pretension or modesty. We say the dream because it must 
vanish at daybreak, as soon as language awakens. ' [VM 189 translation 
modified] 
He notes that the only fault of empiricism is its self-presentation as philosopkv 
[VM 189]. Thus Levinas's thought, la pensee of the essay's subtitle, is excluded 
from philosophy by being an empiricism 32 . Even if it raises serious questions, it 
is a nonphilosophy since it is unable to 'justify itself, to come to its own aid in 
speech' [VM 190]. Which leaves us with the worrying conclusion that Levinas 
merely uses phenomenological results as part of a assemblage that is only 
superficially philosophica, 33, which, in addition, fails to attend to the problem of 
metaphoricity. Derrida remarks: 'As Hegel says somewhere, empiricism always 
forgets, at very least, that it employs the words to be. Empiricism is thinking by 
metaphor without thinking the metaphor as such. ' [VM 174] Certainly this is a 
problem for Levinas. Too often to cite, he adds the following phrase to one of 
his formulations, 'this is not simply a metaphor'. Derrida insists that this 
problem must be foregrounded in philosophy since it, philosophy, is formed at 
the conjunction of natural and technical languages. 
As a concrete example, Derrida examines the use of the term 'exteriority', in 
particular the central notion of the non-spatiality of exterionty and its opposition 
to the spatiality of the Same [VM 139 ff. ]. Levinas has not developed a theory of 
language and philosophy that would adequately think through this abuse of 
language. To re-iterate his general theme - this metaphor betrays the necessity 
of a finite infinite: 'Henceforth, if I cannot designate the (infinite) irreducible 
32 'By taking this project to the end, he totally renews empiricism, and inverses it by revealing it 
to itself as metaphysics. ' [VM 1901 One might note that here is Levinas's deconstruction of 
empiricism, though one where the results are embraced. 
33 This opposition to empiricism links this essay to two key others. He suggests that etymological 
empiricism is the hidden root of all empiricism - the thought that philosophy can be 
circumscribed or reduced to an ideological formation by certain linguistic analyses. A footnote 
from this passage [VM 173-4] references Benveniste and a possible confrontation with Heidegger 
(a promise redeemed in 'The Supplement of the Copula'), while the text states that no philology 
could account for the fundamental gesture of the cogito. This opposition to a certain empiricist 
reduction - 'the very meaning of violence - making possible all straitjackets' - is found in his 
essay on Foucault's Madness and Civilization. 'The Supplement of the Copula: Philosophy 
before Linguistics' [1971] in Margins of Philosophy translated by Alan Bass (Brighton, The 
Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 175-205. 'Cogito and the History of Madness' [ 19631 in Writing and 
Difference translated by Alan Bass (London and New York, Routledge, 2001), pp. 36-76. 
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alterity of the Other except through the negation of (finite) spatial exteriority, 
perhaps the meaning of this alterity is finite, is not positively infinite. ' [VM 1421 
Such a metaphorics cannot be banned, but its strong claims are consistently 
undermined 34 .- 
Howard Caygill insists that Derrida has here traduced Levinas's attention to the 
problem of metaphor; his metaphors operate as a form of ground-clearing. 
'Levinas does not only recognise the dependence of philosophy on rhetoric, 
but exploits this dependence through disfiguring first metaphor and then the 
conceptuality that is parasitic upon it. The disfigured metaphors are 
rhetorical weeds that litter the 'thought' of 'there is' and prepare through 
theiT 'ambiguity' for the arrival of an analysis of moods. ' [L&P 55] 
There is a concern for the materiality of thought-forms that a certain 'pre- 
philosophical "picture thinking"' can productively displace. 
Intriguingly, Derrida appears to anticipate these comments when he makes a 
35 brief comparison with Henri Bergson, who, on Derrida's reading , attempted to 
destroy metaphysical discourse from within, through a method similar to 
negative theology. Bergson treats language as a historical residue or refuse: it is 
lost to metaphysics. Hence, the possibility of metaphysical intuition involves a 
peculiar method: 'Antagonistic metaphors were multiplied systematically in this 
autodestruction of language which advocated silent metaphysical intuition. ' [VM 
145] Bergson's speech has given itself 'the right to travel through philosophical 
discourse as through a foreign medium'. However, Levinas cannot make use of 
this possibility, because, he, in contrast, takes the possibility of metaphysics to be 
the possibility of speech: the face to face is constitutive of metaphysical 
plenitude made possible by language, that is, speaking. It seems that Levinas 
still writes as if his own presentation is immune to this problem, as if it had 
34 'How to think the other, if the other can be spoken only as exterionty and through exteriority, 
that is, nonalterity? ' [VM 145] 
35 1 presume Derrida is here referring to the later work of Bergson, for example, The Two Sources 
of Morality and Religion: this destruction does not seem to present in a work such as Mauer and 
Memory. Mauer and Memory 5h edition [ 1896,1908] translated by Nancy Margaret Paul & W. 
Scott Palmer (New York. Zone Books, 199 1). The Two Sources of Morality and Religion [ 19321 
translated by R. Ashley Avdra & Cloudesley Brereton with the assistance of W. Horsfall Carter 
(Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). 
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finally arrived at the truth, but where metaphors are needed in a pedagogical 
mode to bring others along with him. 
II 
Alongside this threefold critique, Derrida makes a series of comments, often 
gnomic and fragmentary, regarding an alternative philosophy of originary 
finitude. In the second part of this chapter, I connect those comments to other 
texts by Derrida in order to gauge their pertinence more generally as speculative 
programmatic statements. In this endeavour, I run the risk of reducing Derrida's 
detailed readings to a paraphrase or a summary of results. Our effort will be to 
open up ' Violence and Metaphysics' so as to insist that the essay is not simply an 
internal commentary on Levinas. In particular, I will focus on Derrida's 
"Husserlian Meditations" which dominated his early work. Our main question 
will be to think his own 'metaphysical' or 'ontological' commitments given 
Derrida's early aim, expressed in his dissertation on genesis in Husserl, to open 
phenomenology up to ontology". 
I Originary Finitude' and Husserl 
Let's begin with the reference to 'arc hi -factuality' or 'transcendental factuality' 
[VM 164], Derrida's translation of the Husserlian Urtatsache. In transcendental 
phenomenology, the first epochi suspends the question of existence, the second, 
properly transcendental, epochi, reduces what is there presented to meaning- 
structures (in their noetic and noematic components) of a variously modified 
intentionality. Access is thereby gained, to transcendental egoity in its 
significations: 'an opening in which all experience occurs as such' [VM 164]. 
The new science intended by Husserl describes these structures in their mode of 
36 'It is understandable that Husserl steps back from such consequences. All this signifies nothing 
less than the collapse of phenomenological transcendental idealism. Phenomenology. the science 
of self-evidences, given to a theoretical consciousness is methodologically first; but it needs 
beforehand a whole ontology. It is a moment of the autoconstitution of being, which is 
synthetically and originally identical to time. ' The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy p. 
128. It is this idealism that is Derrida's main object of contestation. 
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presentation and alteration". Here, Derrida quotes Husserl: 'For philosophical 
children this indeed may be the dark comer to which the ghosts of solipsism, or 
of psychologism or relativism, return. The true philosopher will prefer, instead 
of fleeing from these ghosts, to illuminate this dark comer. ' (VM 164] 
These ghosts are dispelled by virtue of the evidential weight of the clarified 
descriptions obtained thereby. As Husserl emphasises, there are two 
fundamental kinds of evidence: 'Original self-evidence [Ursprungliche Evidenz] 
must not be confused with the self-evidence of "axioms" [der Evidenz der 
,, Axiome"]; 
for axioms are in principle already the results of original meaning- 
construction [Sinnbildung] and always have this behind them. ' [Ursprung 167- 
68] Logical evidence governs the nomological dimension of science - the 
interconnection and coherence of its proposition set. Originary evidence is the 
evidence of perception, intuition and meaning-fulfilment. This distinction 
governs the entirety of Husserl's work: the 'Origin of Geometry' was written 
over 40 years after his first published work, The Philosophy of Arithmetic, yet 
returns to the fundamental theme of the 'reactivation of the primordial sense' of 
the basic elements comprising mathematical ideal unities [Origin 28]. 
In his early writing on Husserl, what subsequently becomes identifiable as 
deconstruction is first evinced in Derrida's treatment of this original self- 
evidence in its intuitionism ". This 'archetypical form of evidence', 
phenomenology's 4principle of all principles', is taken to be the 'presence of the 
phenomenon itself 'in person'. But in closely examining Husserl's own 
description of the Living Present of transcendental egoity (the basis for archi- 
factuality cited in 'Violence and Metaphysics' [VM 165]), Derrida discerns a 
problem. Not only is the phenomenon in question always temporally inflected, 
never given in its entirety, but only in "perspectives" or "moments", but the very 
'presence' of the 'present' is an internally complex flux. As he writes in his 
Introduction to 'Origin of Geometry': 
37 Husserl asserts that: 'The point is not to secure objectivity but to understand it. To deduce is 
not to explain. ... 
The only true way to explain is to make transcendentally understandable. ' 
(Crisis 1891 
38 One of the well-developed themes of Hobson's book is the connection made between Husserl 
and the developments of intuitionism in mathematics and anti-realism in the work of Dummett. 
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Living Present has the irreducible onginality of a Noýý [-Waintenant], 
the ground of a Here, only if it retains ... the past Now as such ... instead of 
purely and simply succeeding it in an objective time. But this retention %vill 
not be possible without a protention which is its very form [qui en est la 
forme mýme] .... The Absolute of the Living Present, then is nothing other 
than the indefinite Maintenance [Maintenant] of this double enveloping * But this Maintenance itself appears as such, it is the Living Present. and it 
has the phenomenological sense of a consciousness only if the unity of this 
movement is given as inde nite and if its sense of indefiniteness is 
announced [sannonce] in the Present ... ' [Origin 136-37 OG 149-50 
translation modified] 
Time is presented not as a succession of instants but comprised additionally of 
retentions (a past-present) and protentions (anticipated future -present): '... only 
the altenty of past and future permits the absolute identity of the living, , present as 
the self-identity of non-self identity. ' [VM 165] For this flux to become the basis 
for evidenced descriptions, the flux must be supplemented by a unifying Idea of 
totality in the Kantian sense: '... where the Living Present of consciousness 
holds itself [se retient] as the primordial Absolute only in an indefinite 
protention, animated and unified by the Idea (in the Kantian sense) of the total 
flux of lived experience [duflux total du v&ul' [Origin 136 OG 148-49]. 
That is, sense can only be explicated evidentially in a region unified by an ego 
and an Idea [Origin 138 fn 1641, but this idea can never itself be given 'in 
person'. There can therefore be no phenomenology of the Idea: it cannot be 
given in evidence. 
'The unity of infinity, the condition for that temporalization, must then be 
thought, since it is announced without appearing and without being 
contained in a Present. This thought unity, which makes the 
phenomenali7ation of time as such possible, is therefore always the Idea in 
the Kantian sense which never phenomenalizes itself. ... [Husserl] never 
directly defined its type of evidence within phenomenology, ý, ýhose 
"principle of all principles" and archetypal form of evidence are the 
immediate presence of the thing itself "in person. " Implicitly that means: 
of the phenomenally defined or definable thing. therefore thefinite thing. * It- [Origin. 137-81 
From this perspective Ricoeur (and consequently Derrida) concludes his 
comparative essay on Kant and Husserl with the thought that phenomcnoloL, % 
cannot tic ji-oLindcd in or ground itself - it must indicate its o\\n linuts and Zý 
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39 depend upon an interpretation There is hence no phenomenology of 
phenomenology. 
Derrida's central- critique of Husserl draws all its force from this move from the 
flux of the Living Present to the Transcendental Ego, where the latter is the 
domain for evidential sense-explication'. If its descriptions are governed by 
infinite ideas and anticipations that cannot be validated from within, 
phenomenology's claim to apodictic scientificity is put into question". 
Origin, Telos and Undecidability 
The anal y-sis that reveals the alterity at the heart of the Living Present in its very 
temporalization is further troubled by the alterity of the plurality of alter egos 
and alter cultures also structuring the transcendental field. The arguments 
offered by Husserl, for example, in 'Origin of Geornetry), to control this 
potential proliferation of Living Presents involve attempting to demonstrate a 
universal, general EinjWhlung underlying the perception of space by all rational 
creatures (a common origin) and a teleological interpretation of history as the 
progressive production of ideal structures from that starting point42. 
Derrida is unable to share either of these conclusions. In his dissertation, he 
rejects Husserl's teleology of civilisations with a cursory gesture: 'Does the 
establishing of philosophy divide humanity *in its geographical and historical 
39 Ricoeur 'Kant and Husserl' [1954] in Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology edited and 
translated by Edward G. Ballard & Lester E. Embree (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 
1967), pp. 175-201. 
40 '[Husserl's] uneasiness stems from the fact that he is trying to retain two apparently 
iffeconciliable possibilities: (a) The living now is constituted as the absolute perceptual source 
only in a state of continuity with retention taken as noriperception. Fidelity to experience and to 
"the things themselves" forbids that it be otherwise. (b) The source of certitude in general is the 
-, it is necessary therefore to keep retention in the sphere of primordial character of the living now, 
primordial certitude and to shift the frontier between the primordial and the nonprimordial. ' [SP 
671 
41 Hobson sees Derrida's contribution as 'foregrounding the intervention of the infinite' in three 
key points of Husserl's argument with respect to: time, relations to other, and language [OL 9]. 
42 This account is presented in Appendix A. Here EinAhlung has a broader sense than empathy 
(and certainly a broader sense that Levinas's persistent understanding of it as 'sympathy'). 
Literally transcribing it as 'one-feeling' would capture the intersubjective. transcendental limit 
sought by Husserl. Cf. Wittgenstein's understanding of the subject as the limit of the world. 
Tractatus Log ico- Philosophicus § 5.632 p. 15 1. 
145 
Chapter 3 Derrida's critique of Levinas in "Violence and Metaphysics" 
extension into two families, of which one would be limited to an empirical group, 
comprising on the one hand the Europeans who preceded the spiritual advent of 
Europe, on the other hand, the non-Europeans? This hypothesis is laughable. "" 
Sidelining the establishment of a general Einffihlung, Derrida attends to the 
crucial notion of proto- idealization. In marking out the point before geometry 
becomes an ideal science of axiomatics, proto-idealizations are formed from pre- 
geometrical experience but become the stable bases for calculations and 
deductions: they are liminal, with no clear separation of eidos and world. 
Ideality is accomplished when these elements are no longer dependent on reality, 
but become the first materials for future formations (Bildung)'. Derrida notes 
that there is a 'profound area where 'sense is indissociable from being: where the 
de facto is indissociable from the de jure' (Origin 46). However, he argues that, 
since these proto-idealizations are only accessed by a methodology of Riickfrage, 
questioning back from the constituted to the constitutive acts, the sense of the 
constituting acts will always be retrospectively determined by the subsequent 
structure developed 45 . Rather than stressing a pre-geometrical universal structure 
43 The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy p. 157. In 'Structure, Sign and Play', Derrida 
understands ethnology to have 'forced' Europe 'to stop considering itself as the culture of 
reference'. 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' [1968] translated 
by Alan Bass in Writing and Difference (London & New York, Routledge, 2001), pp. 351-370, p. 
356. Yet since these earlier references, Derrida has returned repeatedly to this question of Europe 
and Europe as idea. Most explicitly, The Other Heading asks what if Europe were '... the 
opening onto a history for which the changing of the heading, the relation to the other heading or 
to the other of the. 'heading, is experienced as always possibleT Europe with its de-colonial 
structuring and memory of its internecine wars has perhaps a privilege and responsibility to 
advance non-exclusion. The Other Heading: Reflection on Today's Europe [1991] translated by 
Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael B. Naas (Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 
1992), p. 17. (See also the discussion of Val6ry in the former and also Specters of Marx pp. 5-6. ) 
This theme is repeated over ten years later in 'The "World" of the Enlightenment to Come' 
where, though resisting the idea of Reason as European [Rogues 119] he writes: 'The invention 
of these maxims resembles the poetic invention of an idiom whose singularity would not yield to 
any nationalism, not even a European nationalism - even if, as I would like to believe, within 
today's geopolitical landscape, a new thinking and a previously unencountered destination of 
Europe, along with another responsibility for Europe, are being called to give a new chance to 
this idiom. Beyond all Eurocentrism. ' [Rogues 158]. Again, in more determinate form, an 
interview from 2004, calls for a Europe to position itself against 'American Hegemony' and an 
'Arab-Islamic theocracy without Enlightenment' [my italics] - Europe is something more than 'a 
crime scene. Jacques Derrida & Jean Birnbaum 'I am at war with myself in Le Monde 
(Wednesday 18'h August, 2004) translated by Pascale Fusshoeller, Leslie Thatcher and Steve 
Weissman. 
Hobson: the emergence of the mathematical object is the emergence of objectivity and the 0 
conditions of its logical availability are the conditions of its historical constitution' [OL 1821. 
45 Derrida: '... the reactivating reduction supposes the iterative reduction of the static and 
structural analysis, which teaches us once and for all what the geometrical "phenomenon" is and 
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of subjectivity underlying this scientific accomplishment, Derrida points to the 
break between the two orders of the geometrical and the pre-geometrical, where 
the sense of the former is in no way dependent upon the sense of that from which 
it originates'. Geometrical idealities sprang from pre-geometrical experience. 
"Sprang" in the sense that we will see dominate Derrida's later analyses of the 
incalculable and event. The event or decision arrives in such a way that it is not 
anticipated - it belongs to an entirely other order. 
Derrida understands this more radical independence to be the secret cargo of 
what he takes to be Husserl's unprecedented move: granting writing the central 
place in the constitution of geometry's ideal independence from subjecti VitY47. It 
is only with writing that the ideal objectality" gains persistent being, a quasi- 
independence from living, awake subjectS49. Writing appears as an amanuensis 
to ideality that ensures the perdurance of sense and frees it from its ties to the 
empirical, subjective event of its production in an individual ego. But this 
autonomy of the constituted in writing delivers it from its conditions of 
ongination. 
'From then on, writing is no longer only the worldly and mnemotechnical 
aid to a truth whose own being-sense would dispense with all writing-down 
when its possibility is constituted [qui nous apprend ce qu'est une fois pour toutes le 
<<ph6nomene>> g6om9trie, lorsque sa possibiliti est constituge]. ' [Origin 50, OG 351 
46 'How will preobjective time recognize itself in objective time after its constitution in a 
phenomenological time? ' The Problem of Genesis in -Husuerl's Philosophy p. 68. 
11 'Punctuations: The Time of a Thesis' pp. 117-18. 
48 1 use 'objectality' to translate the German Gegenstdndlichkeit and the French objectitg, in order 
to differentiate it from the English 'objectivity' used to translate ObJektivitdt and objectivitg. The 
current convention of rendering one by 'Qbjectivity' and the other by '2bjectivity' is confusing 
and inaccurate. An 'objectality' is a countable, ideal state of affairs, but not necessarily an object 
- it is a correlate of meaning- structures. 'I often make use of the vaguer expression, 
Gegenstandlichkeit, since we are here never limited to objects in the narrower sense, but have also 
to do with states of affairs [Sachverhaltel, properties, and non-independent forms etc., whether real 
or categorial. ' Husserl Logical Investigations p. 281. '[A]n expression only refers to an objective 
correlate (Gegenstdndlichkeit] because it means something, it can be rightly said to signify or 
name the object through its meaning. An act of meaning is the determinate manner in which we 
refer to our object of the moment, though this mode of significant reference and the meaning itself 
can change while the objective reference remains fixed. ' [ibid. p. 289] 
49 4 
... the objectivity of the ideal structure 
has not yet been fully constituted through such actual 
transferring of what has been originally produced in one to others who originarily reproduce it. 
What is lacking is the persisting existence [verharrende Dasein] of the "ideal objectalities" ... 
what is lacking is their continuing-to-be even [Immerfort-Sein] when no one has [consciously] 
realized them in self-evidence. ' [Ursprung 164 translation modified] 
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[dont le sens d'etre se passerait en lui-meme de toute consignation] - The 
possibility or necessity of being incarnated in a graphic sign [dans une 
graphie] is no longer simply extrinsic and factual in comparison with ideal 
Objectivity [1'objectivitel: it is the sine qua non condition of Objectivity's 
internal completion [de son achevement interne]. As long as ideal 
Objectivity is not, or rather, can not be engraved [gravie] in the world ... then ideal Objectivity is not fully constituted. ' [Origin 88-89, OG 86] 
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, Levinas understands this autonomy 
of the sign as a passivity no longer animated by subjective intention that, in 
justice, must be reanimated in apology. Reactivation [Reaktivierung] in Husserl 
traverses the sedimented cultural structureS50 to re-find the original constituting 
acts that connect the science of geometry back to the Lifeworld; in this way, 
validity is ensured". But Derrida argues that the radical autonomy of the 
inscribed means that it no longer can be governed by such an appeal to origin. 
Fhstoricity of the first event can only appear afterwards as the origin of a 
tradition given to me". The sense of the originary event is nothing in itself 
without the subsequent formation into tradition. 
Derrida highlights the possible impact of G6del (Origin 53 ff. ). The ideal of 
exhaustive deductivity of an axiomatic system was undermined by the 
presentation on the undecidable properties of closed, logical structures. For any 
consistent system, able to encompass arithmetic, there will be at least one 
50 See Derrida's essay, 'Form and Meaning' for a discussion of the metaphors of sedimentation 
and stratification in Husserl. 'Form and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language' 
[1967] translated by Alan Bass in Margins of Philosophy (Brighton, Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 
155-173. 
51 c 
... out of sentences with sedimented signification, logical "dealing" can produce only other 
sentences of the same character. That all new acquisitions express an actual geometrical truth is 
certain a priori under the presupposition that the foundations of the deductive structure have truly 
been produced and objectified in original self-evidence, i. e., have become universally accessible 
acquisitions. ... Only as 
long as this condition was satisfied, or only when the possibility of its 
fulfillment was perfectly secured for all time, could geometry preserve its genuine, original 
meaning as a deductive science throughout the progression of logical constructions. ... The 
progress of deduction follows formal-logical self-evidence; but without the actually developed 
capacity for reactivating the original activities contained within its fundamental concepts, i. e., 
without the "what" and the "how" of its prescientific materials, geometry would be a tradition 
empty of meaning Ursprung 169] That is, geometry would be a cultural formation and not 
a valid science. 
52 Hobson takes the reactivation of Riickfrage as the means of responsiveness to the other [OL 
1821. 
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sentence which is true on the standard interpretation but which is not provable 
from within the system itsel ý3. 
A very useful summary is provided by Paolo Zellini: 
'In 193 1, G6del showed that mathematics kept on revealing openings, or 
references to something other than what could be expressed by a formal 
system like Hilbert's. In other words, symbolic mathematics was not able - 
as formalism had promised - to express a closed and exhaustive world of 
signs, a complete formal system. 
'For any (sufficiently powerful) formal system of mathematics, G6del 
indicated two inevitable consequences. (1) There exist relativelv elementary 
and intuitively true propositions which cannot be deduced in the formalism 
of the system. (2) The statement that expresses the coherence of the system 
cannot itself be deduced within its own formalism, in the sense that an 
attempt at deduction would lead to the absurdity of a relation such that I : ý- 1. 
... G6del's proof could well be considered the contribution of genius to the 
art of paradox, revealing the incomparable value of impossibility, of an 
obstacle, as a vehicle for understanding the absence of the infinite-as- 
totality in this world ... the absurdity of an explicit revelation of the infinite in the ranks of ordinary appearance 54 
From the point of view of our analysis, the proto-idealization assumes added 
importance as the 'relatively elementary and intuitively true propositions' which 
would be validated not by the consistency of the resulting system but in original 
evidence, by the connection to the Lebenswelt and hence would overcome 
undecidability. This would explicitly (and not uncontroversially) align Husserl 
with an attempt to respond to Gbdel in these texts written in the rTud-1930's, a 
few years after the latter's paper on undecidability. But Derrida's undermining 
of the basic structure of originary evidence means that the evidences prior to the 
axiomatics of geometry (a secondary grounding) could never close down the 
problem of validity without a completed telos that could, pace G6del. never be 
complete. Axiomatics supposes a sedimentation of sense upon an onginary 
Sinnbildung, but this originary act is retroactively prey to whateverfiaureforms 
Cie velop. 
'The sense of the constituting act can only be deciphered in the web of the 
constituted object [1a trame de Vobjet constitlij]. And this necessitýý is not 
5 -1 Kurt Godel On Formally Undecid(ible Propositions of Pruzcwia Ifathematica and Related 
SYstems [19-31] translated by B. Nleltzer (New York. Do%er Publications, 1992) 
'j Paolo Zellim A Bra: fffiswn- o. t'hyinitA, [19801 translated b%- David Marsh (London, Pen, -, uin 
Books. 2004), pp. 177-8. 
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an external fate, but an essential necessity of intentionality. The primordial 
sense of every intentional act is only its final sense, i. e., the constitution of 
an object (in the broadest sense of these terms). That is why only a 
teleology can open up a passage, a way back toward beginnings [Cest 
pourquoi seule une tileologie peut s'ouvrir un passage vers les 
commencements]. ' [Origin 64 OG 53-54] 
So we see, for Derrida, the supplementary arguments regarding the origin and the 
telos are crucial to maintaining the scientificity of Husserlian phenomenology. 
The origin cannot do without a telos, and vice versa: 'The phenomenological 
attitude is first an availability of attention for theTuture of a truth which is always 
already announced. ' [Origin 148] The whole Husserlian problematic of validity 
is challenged. 
While Husserl might believe that such a method can shore up geometry against a 
primordial or original sense, and so reach evidential certainty, Derrida insists that 
there is no end or origin for such sense -investigation. Undecidability for Derrida, 
as influenced by Gbdel, means that a telos is never completable and that the 
origin can never determine definitively the meaning of a formation, 'whose unity 
is always to come [a venir] on the basis of what is announced in the origin' 
[Origin 53]: future developments render its meaning open to change. Under the 
term, traditionality Derrida insists instead on an endless circulation between 
being and sense as the structure of the transcendental field (which is no longer an 
ego in the monadic sense of Husserl and may tend towards Jean Hyppolite's idea 
of a subjectless transcendental field of writing [Origin 88, OG 84]55). 
It is important to emphasise three points here regarding undecidability. 
1. If '... the notion of the un-decidable [in-d9cidablej ... retains a 
mathematical value from some unique source of value vaster than the 
project of definiteness itself' [Origin 53 OG 391 56 , if ideas are employed 
55 In relation to Hobson's discussion of transcendentality and ideality [OL p. 219 ff. ], I believe 
Husserl differentiates the ideal structure of cultural sedimentation - which gains objectivity (or 
independence from subjectivity) through writing - from the transcendentality that is alone able to 
guarantee the univocity of sense-intention and hence enable evidential fulfilment in intuition and 
provide a foundation for valid science by determining the general scope of a particular ideality. 
56 This idea of a reserved "space" will re-appear in his meditations on the khdra. E. g., 'The 
democracy to come would be like the kh6ra of the political. ' [Rogues 82] 
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to curtail the limits of this indefinit( 
inability of phenomenology to 
deconstruction would be more 
phenomenology. It would therefore 
orientation in Levinas and Husserl as 
phenomenological aim. 
. ness, then in making explicit the 
close down transcendental i ty ý 
theoretical than Husserlian 
reject the practical decision to 
unphilosophical, as betraying the 
2. Transcendentality, in being unable to delimit itself, must open itself up. 
To what? In the dissertation, Derrida talked of a "dialectic" between 
phenomenology and ontology (meant in a non-Heideggerian sense). I 
hazard the idea that this is the place for thinking the relation between 
phenomenology and grammatology. Importantly, such an idea would 
displace the reading which situates Derrida in a phenomenological camp 
opposed to a structuralist one as if the theoretical terrain only comprised 
two discrete positionS57. If transcendentality is not enclosed, or more 
importantly self-enclosing, then it cannot close off the empirical (the non- 
transcendental) in any clear manner. Hence the later employment of the 
term 'quasi -transcendental"'. 
57 'It is already clear that Derrida is employing Husserlian phenomenology as a foil for engaging 
in a critique of structuralism and the closure that the idea of structure implies. ... Derrida's 
approach to the problem of genesis and structure --employs the resources of Husserlian 
phenomenology in an uncritical and sympathetic way in order to focus ultimately on 'un 
probleme de cloture ou d'ouverture' ... which displaces both geneticism and structuralism. ' [ED 631 This suggestion is aitributed by Critchley to Peter Dews's Logics of Disintegration. Perhaps 
the biggest obstacle to a philosophical engagement with Derrida has been this positioning of him 
as phenomenological without appreciating the consequences of undermining the Husserlian 
'principle of all principles'. Peter Dews Logics of Disintegration: PostStructuralist Thought and 
the Clairnsfor Critical Theory (London & New York, Verso, 1987). 
58 Hobson cites Blanchot's observation that phenomenology was 'carried over into structuralism' 
insofar as the human was assimilated as a formalized set of operations [OL 71 and then develops 
this idea by suggesting that de-con-struction should be understood as being formed in the 
different directions of the 'double prefixes' ('de' and the 'con'), in relation to structuralism [OL 
16]. In 'Letter to a Japanese Friend', Derrida describes deconstruction as being forged within the 
dominance of structuralism. Deconstruction is understood there as a 'gesture' both anti- 
structuralist and in need of 'the structuralistic problematic'. It is in the genealogical adoption of 
the Rackfrage, that deconstruction is 'more historical' than structuralism. 'Letter to a Japanese 
Friend' (19831 in Derrida and Diffigrance; Edited by David Wood & Robert Bernasconi 
(Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. 1-5. See also Jacques Derrida 'Force and 
Signification' translated by Alan Bass in Writing and Difference [1967] (London & New York, 
Routledge, 2001); pp. 1-35, p. 32. 
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3. Without the evocation of ideas in this " ay. their function of unifying 
consciousness and discourse is absent. The throws up a problem of 
intelligibility - deconstruction cannot ground its own presentation in an% 
classical manner. 
This displacement does not however overthrow the importance of archi- 
factuality. The descriptive sciences, whether historicist or objectl\, Ist, suffer 
from an 'empiricist cult of fact and causalist presumption'. The onginarý, 
investigation of idealities, their initial production and their institutional 
developments as culture, cannot simply be treated as fac tS59 . Nor as ideal and 
supertemporal (iiberzeitlich) are they ahistorical - since they both develop o,., cr 
time, and gain their validity from a first oncyinary connection (production) to the 
lifeworld. Derrida notes that a 'new scheme is created': '... on the one hand, it 
brings to light a new type of profundity or historicity; on the other hand, and 
correlatively, it determines the new tools and original direction of historical 
reflection' [Origin 26; OG 4]. Though opened up to the empirical in a manner 
different from Husserl, Derrida still attends to the institution of ideal structures 
and identifies the uniqueness of inaugurating facts in history. But this 
'Factuality' does not spring from one single, common origin, nor does the origin 
dominate subsequent history. 
For Husserl, this illuminates the intersubjective constitution of subjectivity. For 
Derrida, it is the leap from non-ideality to ideality that interests him. This stron(,! 
notion of the event is tied to a theoretical fidelity to the essence- analyses of static 
phenomenology. Such "events", as unique, constitutive facts form the 
presuppositions of empirical scientific discourses. Phenomenolo2,,,, concerns 
itself with the scientificity of such discourses, through the determination of their 
a priori Factuali tY60 . The 'philosophical nonsense' of empiricism or rationalism 
would consist in not seeing this transcendental structure of Factuality, the fact 
5q In this respect. Hobson identifies the doubled nature of Derrida's relation to Husserl: n(, [ to 
repeat his work. but neither to lose his rigour in its opposition to empiricism, historicism and 
[)s\ cholognsm [OL 91. 
'ure precedes every material historical investi-ation ()0 '[Historical phenomenology] simpily de i 
and has no need of facts is such to reveal to the historian the apriori sense of his activity and 
k)h-JeCTS, [01-1gill 1121. 
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itself cannot account for its relation to sense. Derrida's aberrant phenomenology 
would still position itself as first science despite its ragged, opened-up refiguring 
of transcendentali tY6 
1. 
This complex analysis underlies the references to 'several origins of the world in 
general' [VM 161]. The impossibility of evidential origination of any groundi 1ý7 1 ýý ing 
sense repositions the structuring of consciousness by other intersubjecti %'I ties. I 
can no longer begin from my own sense: 
'The discursive and dialectical intersubjectivity of Time with itself in the 
infinite multiplicity and infinite implication of its absolute origins entitles 
every other intersubjectivity in general to exist and makes the polerrucal 
unity of appearing and disappearing irreducible. Here delaý, is the 
philosophical absolute, because the beginning of methodic reflection can 
only consist in the consciousness of the implication of another previous, 
possible, and absolute origin in general. ' [Origin 152, my italics] 
The problem thus generated radically exceeds the problem of alterity as found in 
both Husserl and Levinas. Alterity is the 'sign ... that one may no longer draw Z-- 
inspiration from within the coherence of the Logos', but this does not warrant the 
move to a religious inspiration that still remains an eschato-logy beholden to 
classical metaphysics and the "dogmatic" surety of first person speech. 'This 
origin is an inscribed inscription. ' [VM 159] 
The above summary, compressed and violent, only seeks to insist upon the 
distance thus generated between Levinas's understanding of phenomenology and 
DeMda's work. We should note that the attention to the event, the relation 
between constituted and constituting are persistent themes in the later work on 
ethics, politics and law. We have here in nuce the third aporia of the decision 
from 'Force of Law': justice only appears as madness from within an economy of 
exchan2e [FL 257] and the insistence on the dimension of avenir in the ftitur(e). 
For somethiniz to arrive, for something to happen, means precisely that it cannot 
be anticipated or prefigured. The resonances generated between these statements 
61 , 
... since the sin i, acts 
[actes fondate irs] gularities of origins are those of instituting I of 
every ideal signification and. in particular ofthe possibilities of science and of philosophy, 
then their history is the most independent, the most concrete. and the fir,, t of ýsclences. ' 
Ori'Qin 49] JOG 233-34] 
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and the paradigmatic examples of the works wntten during the 'ethico-political 
tum' suggest that this break cannot be marked by a jettisoning of Derrida's 
technical, 'grammatological gnd. We will see the notions of responsibilit%. 
decision and, in particular, propaedeutic in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
But we now turn to the 'ontological' implications of this rethinking of 
tran scenden tali ty. 
Historicity and Being 
It is much neglected, but one should note that Derrida's comments on histoi-N, and 
historicity are most explicit in 'Violence and Metaphysics'. This is not 
accidental. It is partly to do with the opposition to Levinas systematics, but also 
to do with a decision to drop the term "history" or rather not to persist with the 
'old name' after the transfori-nations detailed below. 
Derrida sides with original finitude over and against Levinas's understanding of 
the human as the site of the production of a positive in finity. He appears to 
sympathise with Levinas in the attempt to escape from 'envelopment' by Hegel 
but argues this cannot be done under the prophetic gesture towards the 'absolute Z: ) 
other'. It has to be done, as Husserl might be understood to do, by attending to 
the irreducibility of intentional incompleteness and the alterity of other ongins, 
... and by showing that since [intentional] consciousness is irreducible, it can 
never possibly, by its own essence, become self-conscious, nor be reassembled 
absolutely close to itself in the parousia of an absolute knowledge' [VM 149]. C) 
Peter Osborne is one of the few to have commented on the evocation of essential 
finitude in this essay [VM 163-4]. 
'Is it true as Derrida maintains, that *the only effective position to take in 
order not to be enveloped by Hegel' is to 'consider the false-infinity ... 
iiTeducible' I V11 149]" Is there not a disjunction, in fact, between the 
original finitude and the false-infinity - that is to say, between Heideý_-zer 
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and Kant? Does the experience associated with Heidegger's existentialism 
really reduce to Kant's? It seems unlikely. '62 
I concur with Osbome's doubts over such a conflation. But it seems that this 
gesture on the part of Derrida is already hedged with doubts; in some ways, these 
terms serve as placeholders merely marking an opposition to Levinas*s 
endeavour. We will turn shortly to the attempt to understand history in its 
relation to infinity, as distinct from Kant's discussion of reason's antinomies 
regarding the world's finitude or infinitude. However, Derrida's discussion of 
63 Heidegger from 'Ousia and Grammj' is worth consideration here 
Describing Being and Time as a 'decisive step beyond or within metaphysics', he 
notes that it 'brings to light the omission which permitted metaphysics to believe 
that it could think time on the basis of a being already silently predetermined in 
its relation to time' [Ousia 47]. But this 'making explicit' still 'remains with 
metaphysics' [Ousia 48] to the extent that it is still 'governed' by Aristotelian 
concepts [Ousia 61]". Moreover, this metaphysics assumes a more dominant 
role in Heidegger's conceptualisation of authenticity and the distinction between 
primordial and fallen temporality. Derrida asks: 'why determine as fall the 
passage from one temporality to anotherT [Ousia 63] Crucially for 
distinguishing his finitude from Heidegger's, he highlights in a footnote the 
metaphysical decision to ask the 'question of the meaning of Being on the basis 
of Dasein' [Ousia 64 fn. 39]. Here we see Derrida's opposition to existential 
analysis: the breach of transcendental egoity-renders the decision to focus on 
Dasein question-begging and lies in contrast to a move towards a subjectless 
62 Osborne The Politics of Time p. 122. Marrati argues convincingly that Derrida's project 'has 
never been the Heideggerian project of originary finitude' [Genesis and Trace p. 184], but does 0 
not note that Derrida had given the phrase such a central place in 'Violence and Metaphysics'. 
63 Jacques Derrida 'Ousia and Grammi: Note on a Note from Being and Time' [1968] translated 
by Alan Bass in Margins of Philosophy (Brighton, Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 29-67. Hereafter 
abbreviated to Ousia followed by page reference. 
6414obson's summary of this 'dominance' is worth citing: '... a more powerful philosophical 
trend has privileged the 'now', and thus time as presence and predication as a punctual point of 
synthesis between subject and object. The effect is to constitute intellectual entities in the sense 
of turning them into ob-jects, objectifying them, making of them already given objects of which 
something can be predicated, instead of working with our modes of apprehending them. ' [OL 
118] 
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field of investigation 11. Again, we might see the practical orientation of 
authenticity in resolute anticipation as gearing the philosophy to what still might 
be cast as a world-outlook". For Derrida, philosophy will not be determined at 
this level of what still remains the first-person orbit of a being": the 'co- 
belonging' of being and 'man' (governed by self-presence) is what Derida 
believes to be at issue in deconstruction". This 'fundamental ontology' is 
insufficiently "ontological" in opening up to the empirical. 
In a long footnote to the much later essay, 'The "World" of the Enlightenment to 
Come' (2002), Derrida attempts to clarify his relation to Heidegger by making 
four points [Rogues pp. 173-5 fn. 14]: 
1. Heidegger's Destruktion of the history of metaphysics did not oppose 
logos - it claimed to offer a 'more originary reinterpretation' of it. 
2. Deconstruction does not present itself as 'diagnosis' as if it were able to 
circumsciibe 'something called Metaphysics'; deconstruction 'is 
65 Marrati: 'It is this logic of presupposition (Voraussetzung) that allows the boundaries of the 
existential analytic to be delimited, a logic whose legitimacy and force Derrida wants to follow 
right up to the point at which the rigor of any such delimitation vacillates. ' Genesis and Trace p. 
156. 
66 Marrati reads Derrida's opposition to Heidegger's privileging of anticipation and protention as 
fidelity to the Husserlian analysis of the passivity of time [ibid. pp. 125-271. '1 have tried to 
describe the opposition that separates an anachronic temporality thought by way of the trace 
[Derrida] from a temporality the finitude of which falls under the sign of the originary 
[Heidegger], a finitude that appears as the impossibility of either origin or end from a finitude 
that, on the basis of a possibility of the end, refers back to- the origin. ' [ibid. p. 1381 Compare the 
following passage from Derrida's disgertation: '... Husserl refused to recognize that any point of 
departure for philosophy and for sense is an a priori synthesis whose absolute evidence refers to 
an indefinite that is irreducible; this was to refuse to cause philosophy to be born into an 
existence whose finitude was apparent to itself' The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy 
p. 5. 
67 Again Marrati identifies the decision to start with Dasein as determining since by starting with 
a being 'that can itself testify', Heidegger proceeds to give present to the related terms: proper (or 
6ownmost' [eigenj and authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]. It is the 'very choice that generates every 
evaluation and every possible hierarchy' [op. cit. p. 165] with the result that, for Derrida, 
Heidegger 'insufficiently disrupts this horizon of the originary and the proper that is the first 
target of any thought of the trace as temporal ization, as spacing, as alteration' [ibid. 184). 
68 Derrida 'The Ends of Man' pp. 133-34. Here the horizon of metaphysics is glossed at the 
horizon of the 'Indo-European linguistic milieu', though Derrida admits he should not pretend to 
know what this means [ibid. p. 125], though it will connect with Of Grammatology's claim to see 
'logocentrism' as the metaphysics of Western phonetic writing [Gramm 90]. Derrida treats 
Hegel's championing of Western phonetic writing in 'The Pit and the Pyramid'. *The Pit and the 
Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology' [1971] translated by Alan Bass in Margins of 
Philosqphýv (Brighton, Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 69-108. 
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inscribed, undertaken and understood in the very element of the language Iz 
it calls into question' [Rogues 174]. 
3. Deconstruction does not 'desediment' tradition to return to a dissembled 
originary, authentic meaning. 
4. Deconstruction puts the question in question: 'Deconstruction does not 
seek to discredit critique; it in fact constantly relegitimates its necessity 
and heritage, even though it never renounces either a genealogy of the 
critical idea or a history of the question and of the supposed privilege of 
interrogative thought. ' [ibid. p. 175] 
Derrida concludes 'Ousia and Gramm. C by noting the change of horizons 
involved'in shifting to the epochality of Being: the horizon of this question is no 
longer framed by Dasein, finitude or historicity [Ousia 64]69. We should note 
that Derrida himself withdraws from this thematics of fundamental ontology in 
'Violence and Metaphysics'. That this is done mostly in the footnotes to the 
essay is perhaps not without significance. One note specifically nods to the 
function of a placeholding that is not yet a paleonymy 70 . 
6... 46 ontology" does not refer to the concept of ontology which Heidegger 
proposes to renounce ... but to the unfindable expression by which it must be replaced. The word "historical" also must be modified in order to be 
understood in consonance with the word "ontological" of which it is not an 
attribute, and in relation to which it marks no derivation. ' [ VM 4 10 fh. 87] 
Elsewhere the reference to history is described. as merely (contextual 71 . Derrida 
seems to think that it cannot be removed from its traditional reference to 
teleology and eschatology and if it is no longer tied to presence it cannot operate 
philosophically as before [VM 186-8]. That is, without the guiding telos, 
69 That is not to say that Derrida is convinced by the thought of epochality in Heidegger, just that 
it represents a different problematic. See 'Letter to a Japanese Friend', p. 4. 
70 'Why should an old name, for a determinate time, be retained? Why should the effects of a new 
meaning, concept, or object be damped by memory? ... one of the terms retains its old name so 
as to destroy the opposition to which it no longer quite belongs, to which in any event it has never 
quite yielded, the history of this opposition being one of incessant struggles generative of 
hierarchical configurations ... ' (Dissemination 3-4] 
71 'There is no such thing as a "metaphysical-concept. " There is no such thing as a 
C 4metaphysical -name. " The "metaphysical" is a certain determination or direction taken by a 
sequence or "chain. " It cannot as such be opposed by a concept but rather by a process of textual 
labour and a different sort of articulation. ' [Dissemination 6] 
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religious idea or 'firm direction of the will' it is unclear what the concept of 
history signifies. In consequence, DerTida suggests removing all reference to the 
finite and the infinite [VM p. 407 fn. 70]. 
The abandoning of the terms 'finitude' and 'infinity' relate to an attempt to 
escape from the thinking of such terms under the kind of rubric found in Kant's 
first antinomy. Here the thesis presents a world beginning in time and limited 
with respect to space, while the antithesis has the world as infinite in time and 
space". The critical synthesis of this dialectical impasse is to insist that the 
world is not given as an object in magnitude, but only constructed in the course 
of a 'regress' from appearance to appearance. The regress is determined as 
I. ndefinite, without end, in proceeding towards, but never attaining, either a limit Z71 
or an absolute totality incorporating the unconditioned. 
jThe world] exists only in the empirical regress of the series of 
appearances, and is not to be met with as something in itself. If, then, this 
series is always conditioned, and therefore can never be given as complete, 
the world is not an unconditioned whole, and does not exist as such a whole, 
either of infinite or of finite magnitude. 73 
This would seem to chime with Derrida's description of the system as a 
structural totality: 
JI-evinas's reading of Husserl] presupposes, once more, that the totality Is 
finite (a supposition in no way inscribed in its concept), that history as such 
can be a finite totality, and that there is no history beyond the finite totality. 
Perhaps one would have to show, as was suggested above, that history is 
impossible, meaningless, in the finite totality, and that it is impossible. 
meaningless, in the positive and actual infinity; that history keeps to the 
difference between totality and infinity, and that history precisely is that 
which Levinas calls transcendence and eschatology. A system is neither 
finite nor infinite. A structural totality escapes this alternative in its 
functioning. It escapes the archaeological and the eschatological. and 
inscribes them in itself. ' [VM 153] 
In this regard, we should note three crucial differences from Kant regarding C-- 
Derri da's 'turn' to the indefinite: these relate to the function of the 
'2 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason [17,81.1 -S-, ] translated bv Norman Kemp Smith I nd 
impression (BasijiLstoke &- London. MacMillan, 1933), [A 426 /B 4541 p. 3396- 
Ibid. A 505 /B 533 p. 448. 
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unconditioned, unity and the series in this understanding of knowledge and the 
ideas of theoretical reason. For Kant, human reason is architectonic requiring 
unity in knowledge. Although the ideas have no transcendent role (the notion of 
an indefinite world in its series of conditions cannot be present in an object of 
experience), in their regulative role governing and directing the synthesis of the 
understanding they are constitutive of the possibility of experience as such. The 
ideas are 'ultimate ends toward which all the endeavours of reason must 
converge"' in that they outline the prescribed completeness of determination of 
the object conditioned'. 
As Kant stresses, the unconditioned must be thought to bring unity and 
consistency to the understanding by uniting all acts into a whole. The three 
inferences carried out on the basis of the categorial, hypothetical and disjunctive 
syntheses point to the unity of the thinking subject, the unity of the world (as 
series for appearances), and the unity of the conditions of objects of thought in 
general. The role of the ideas is necessary in giving direction to the 
understanding with regard to this totality"; that is, the very production of the 
synthesis depends on these ideas and hence all experience is subordinated to the 
unconditioned; the unconditioned orients the synthesis of the conditioned. 
Importantly, the regulative rule for the task of extending experience and 
correcting knowledge is described by Kant as 'doctrinal"' in that it determines 
empirical use of understanding 'as if it were an axiom which determined a priori 
the objects in themselves"'. In setting the idea as a problem, reason guides the 
understanding, bringing about the concept it contains. This is understood as a 
progressfrom conditioned to unconditioned. 
74 Ibid. A 463 /B 491 p. 422. 
75 Ibid. A 508 /B 537 p. 450. 
76 Ibid. A 326 /B 383 p. 318. 
77 Ibid. A 516 /B 544 p. 454. 
78 Ibid. A 517 /B 545 p. 455. 
79 In 'The Ends of Man', a footnote on Kant marks the classical structure of this situation: the 
human is finite but is distinguished from animality by virtue of being able to think the 
unconditioned - thus this is the very definition of the 'eschato-teleological situation' [op. cit. pp. 
121-221. 
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Although Derrida. supports an indefinite, extensional negation of the finite given, 
Derrida's 'false-infinity' is not framed by the search for an archia or 
unconditioned [VM 176-77]. Even the transcendental is opened to the 
conditioned on Derrida's analysis. The problem of intelligibility will be to the 
fore in a history without telos, but there is no place for progress here'O nor, given 
the multiple origins in transcendentality, does it privilege the notion of unity. 
But chiefly, the attention to history as an economy, a complex structural totality 
means that the notion of world as a series of discrete "appearances" is rejected". 
This economy is only given in its contradictions and departures from totality 
which do not head out on a linear trajectory guided by an idea, but instead is 
marked as excess or overflowing. This rethinking of an immanent, finite 
transcendence again seems to come close to Heidegger. 'It is transcendence 
itself. If speech is a movement of metaphysical transcendence, it is history, and 
not beyond history. ... 
Metaphysics is economy: violence against violence, light 
against light: philosophy (in general). ... 
This polemic is language itself. Its 
inscription. ' [VM 146] But in this reference to language, we find opened a path 
that also leads to structuralism. Opposed to Levinas's reduction of history to the 
circuit of the same, la parole can indicate both speech and the piecemeal acts by 
which the economy of la langue is altered over time. In this regard, the stress on 
the space for rupture and alteration within the economy (which can be 
transformed in a way the series cannot) reveals its play Ueu], which alone 
enables the thinking of God [VM 133] even if theology is concerned to reduce 
that play through the imposition of the positive infinite, however ineffable [VM 
183 ]82. 
80 This would be the teleological and eschatological legacy in the concept of history that leads 
him to think it suspect. In Rogues, Derrida opposes the 'urgency' of the 'here and now' (that 
does not wait) to the regulative idea and its 'remote future' [Rogues pp. 86-921. 
81 From this perspective, I concur with Hobson's rejection of Bennington's suggestion that 
diffirance 'just is the postponement to infinity of the Kantian Idea' [OL 240 fn. 56]. For 
Hobson's discussion of the role of the Kantian Idea in Husserl and Derrida's reading of it see OL 
46-58. 
82 Ventriloquizing Bataille, where writing opposes Erinnerung, Derrida writes: 'In interpreting 
negativity as labour, in betting for discourse, meaning, history, etc.. Hegel has bet against play, 
against chance. He has blinded himself to the possibility of his own bet, to the fact that the 
conscientious suspension of play (for example, the passage through the certitude of oneself and 
through lordship as the independence of self-consciousness) was itself a phase of play; and to the 
fact that play includes the work of meaning or the meaning of work, and includes them not in 
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The comments and abortive analyses turn in on and against themselves. 
83 Appearing to accept a fundamental historicity of the living present , it seems to 
oppose itself to finding meaning in a history or Historýy, since that depends on 
giving an ethical validation to the temporalization and histoncization [Gramm 
139]. There is history in a certain sense but its overdetermination by the classical 
metaphysics of time and presence (viz. the unity of the series) means its 
continued use is problematic, since a philosophical concept of historv cannot 
escape a comprehension of what is produced by sense, which has only ever been 
thought on the basis of presence and as presence. 'To put it quite summarily, one 
seeks in vain to extract the question of meaning (the meaning of time, or of 
anything else) as such from metaphysics, or from the system of so called 
44vulgar" concepts. ' [Ousia 51]" As emphasised by Marrati, there can only be a 
vulgar concept of time, because time 'belongs to metaphysical conceptuality' per 
se: 'the construction of another concept of time could be no more than a 
reorganization of other metaphysical predicates 185 
We find this in the thought of the 'closure' (cl6ture) of history from the b 
concluding pages of Speech and Phenomena. 
'The history of being as presence, as self-presence in absolute knowledge, 
as consciousness of self in the infinity of parousia - this history is closed. 
The history of presence is closed, for "history" never meant anything but 
the presentation of Being, the production and recollection of beings in 
presence, as knowledge and mastery. Since absolute self-presence in con- 
terms of knowledge, but in terms of inscription: meaning is a function of play, is inscribed in a 
certain place in the configuration of meaningless play. ' 'From Restricted to General Economy: A 
Hegelianism without Reserve' [1967] translated Alan Bass in Writing and Difference (London & 
New York, Routledge, 2001), pp. 317-350, pp. 328-29. 1 
ý3 'If the hving present. the absolute form of the opening of time to the other in itself. v, the 
absolute form of ecolo-ical life, and if egoity is the absolute form of experience, then the present, 
the presence of the present, and the present of presence, are all originally and forever violent. 
The living present is originally marked by death. Presence as violence is the meaning of finitude, 
the meaning of meaning as history. ' [VM 166] 
S-4 Cf. the comments on time in 'Ousia and Graininj': 'Time, then. would be but the name of the 
limits within which the granzine is thus itself comprehended. and. along \wh the ýrainnie. the 
possibility of the trace in general. Vothing other has ever been thought by the name of t' C ime. 
Time is that which is thought on the basis of Being as presence, and if somethina ... is to be 
thought bevond the determination of Being as presence, it cannot be a question of something that 
could still be called vinc. ' [Ousia 601 
`5 Genesis and Trace p. 3- 
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sciousness if the infinite vocation of full presence. the achievement of 
absolute knowledge is the end of the infinite. ý, ýhich could only be the unit% 
of the concept, logos. and consciousness in a voice without differance. ' [SP 
1021 
It seems that it is not simply Heidegger who must change horizons from Dasein's 
temporality to a consideration of Being's epochality. As Demda summanses 
contra Levinas's interpretation, Being is always dissimulated, in its 'errincy as 
beings in its being determined [VM 180]. 'Without this dissimulation of Being 
by the existent there would be nothing, and there would be no history. That 
Being occurs in all respects as history and as world means that it can only retire 
beneath ontic determinations in the history of metaphysics. For historical 
"epochs". are metaphysical (ontotheological) determinations of Bein a ýý hich thus 
brackets, reserves itself beneath metaphysical concepts. ' [VM 180] In Derrida's 
notion of the trace and the ascription of 'logocentnsm I to the history of Western 
philosophy we see this legacy detoured, an inheritance that again attempts to 
deflate the 'reemergence' of eschatology in this account [ VM 18 11. 
Marrati" and Hobson [OL 12] note Derrida's wanness ývith respect to the notions 
of epochs as stage of history which would be both determined as unities 
according to certain fundamental characteristics and determined as epochs of a 
unified history. It is not clear what assures us of these co-ordinates. Yet Marrati 
makes no mention in her book of the very epochality of Derrida's coinage, 
logocentrism. Although distinct from Heidegger", and insisting on a ne'x 
understanding of epoch", it is precisely this point at which the speculative 
'exorbitance' of Derrida's early work reaches its peak. 
Hobson is attuned to this problem. It is only this exorbitance, the attempt to 
achieve a 'point of extenonty' with respect to logocentnc metaphysics. that I 
86 Mar-rati Genesis and Trace 'Being is Not Gathered' pp. 87-113. 
Q- "' 'Derrida undertakes to sho\, Nr that wherever the sending of being divides itself, and it has to 
divide itself in order for there to be history. this divisibility challenges the legein and the very 
idea of destination, of a unitary destination. ' [ibid. p. 95] 
one must understand the expressions "epoch", "closure of an epoch". -historical 
oenealogy" in a new way-, and niust first remove them from till relativism. ' [Grainni 14. my 
italics] 
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allows logocentrism as an epoch to appear. But this move is problematic: 'what 
is the position from which the unity of an epoch can be understoodT (OL 17]" 
On the one hand, according to Hobson, there is a 'hyperbolic move' which 
precipitates a totality in the move to exceed it [OL 40]: this would bring Derrida 
close to a certain movement in Hegel". On the other hand, there is the attempt to 
demonstrate that the metaphysical claims from within this 'totality' cannot be 
maintained. History does not end in any 'vulgar sense', but its accepted 
comprehension within a framework of valorised presence is no longer in effect. 
History was 'expressed as the unfolding of the structure or schema of an 
absolute will- to-hear-oneself-speak' - this is now not able to be maintained [SP 
102]. But what begins now? 
The speculative dimension to writing is located in the attempt to steer a 'passage 
between two epochs' [Gramm 24]. Where one of the epochs is a conceptuality 
'destined, or already submitted, to decay' [Gramm 85] and the other cannot be 
understood as a 'nonknowledge that is knowledge to come' [comme savoir a 
venir] [SP 103]. An epoch that is already underway is not instigated by Derrida 
or deconstruction: he addresses a 'delimitation of the ontology of presence' at 
large in the current era. The epoch of logocentrism is marked by the privileging 
of speech, as the voice hearing itself, over writing". The auto-affection of the 
voice heard by my ear as the paradigm of presence guaranteeing certainty can be 
traced from Plato to- Husserl 92 But presence is 'no longer that. to which 
89 In 'Interpretations at War', Derrida compares Cohen's 'fable' about the German-Jewish psyche 
with his own: 'from what external location can one claim to pronounce upon this truth of truthT 
[op. cit. p. 159] 
90 For more on the relation between Hegel and Derrida, see Gaschd's The Tain of the Mirror: 
Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1986). 
91 The point of exteriority may well be geographic or, rather, the epochal designation of 
logocentrism is geographically delimited. Of Grammatology notes that Japan and China bespeak 
of civilizations 'developing outside all logocentrism', where the 'strange valorization of speech' 
is not encountered [Gramm 89-90]. Elsewhere, Derrida asks whether there is metaphysics (as we 
understand it) 'outside the Indo-European organization of the function "to be"'. 'The Supplement 
of the Copula', p. 199. 
92 In 'Violence and Metaphysics', Levinas is included under this rubric of a dead conceptuality. 
The gestures made against logocentrism are repeated here. We have already noted the use of 
6 eschato-logy', but Derrida also questions Levinas's privileging of the presence of the speaking 
speaker, and concomitant suppression of the written, to ask: can one not invert all Levinas's 
'16] Noting en passant that the writer in statements on the voice and use writing instead? [VM 1W. 
absenting from presence is better able to address the other, he -then asks 
how an avowed Judaic 
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everything refers in the last analysis' 
93 
; in this climate, Derrida opposes false 
94 dawns as well as premature post-mortems 
In 'The Ends of Man', Derrida foregrounds the writing that responds to this 
epochal predicament. There would appear to be two choices: 
1. The preparation of an 'exit without changing terrain', where the openness 
of the foundational concepts and gestures is repeatedly demonstrated. 
But: 'The continuous process of making explicit, moving toward an 
opening, risks sinking into the autism of the closure. 95 And where the 
danger of such autism, in its consolidation, might be the reduction of 
philosophy to an existential project. 
2. A writing which decides to change terrain to effect a discontinuous break. 
The risk here is that one is deceived and rather than breaking, one is 
simply reconstituting the old terrain under the vestiges of a new 
vocabulary - this would be a 'more naive and strict inhabitation of the 
old structure' 96 . 
inspiration could 'belittle' the letter. He concludes that the thought of the 'trace' 'should lead to 
a certain rehabilitation of writing' (though this concept only appears in the essays after Totality 
and Infinity, Derrida was able to make 'brief allusions' to them prior to the first publication of 
this essay) [VM 127]. A long footnote on Levinas's similarity to Eric Weil contains as a 
penultimate sentence the following: 'One should ask whether the predetermination, common to 
these two systems, of violation and of pure logos, and, above all, the predetermination of their 
incompatibility, refers to an absolute truth, or perhaps to an epoch of history of thought, the 
history of Being. ' [VM 403 fn. 42] Some examples o, f Levinas's privileging of speech: 'The 
presence of the interpretative key in the sign to be interpreted is precisely the presence of the 
other in the proposition, the presence of him who can come to the assistance of his discourse, the 
teaching quality of all speech. Oral discourse is the plenitude of discourse. ' [TI 96] See also TI 
97. 
93 'Diffdrance' p. 24. 
94 Though arguing that deconstruction is not to be as the psychoanalysis of philosophy ('Freud 
and the Scene of Writing' [1966] translated by Alan Bass in Writing and Difference [1967] 
(London & New York, Routledge, 2001), pp. 246-291, p. 246), it is 'necessary to think both the 
law which somehow governed the desire for a center in the constitution of structure, and the 
process of signification which orders the displacements and substitutions for this law of central 
presence - but a central presence which has never been itself, has always already been exiled 
from itself into its own substitute. ' ['Structure, Sign and Play' p. 353. ] 
95 Op. Cit. P. 135. 
96 Derrida gives an example of this risk: 'To know why one says "structure" is to know why one 
no longer wishes to say eidos, "essence, " form, Gestalt, "ensemble, " "composition, " "state, " 
44system, " etc. One must understand not only why each of these words showed itself to be 
insufficient but also why the notion of structure continues to borrow some implicit signification 
from them and to be inhabited by them. ' 'Force and Signification' p. 380 fn. 2. 
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Here, Derrida insists that there cannot be a simple choice between these two 
strategies -a new writing must pursue both tacks: 'one must speak several 
languages and produce several texts at once". The change of style in writing 
98 
must be plural 
This plurality can be hypostasised in a certain manner. On the one hand, 
deconstruction 'indefinitely questions presence within the closure of knowledge' 
[SP 102] subjecting those texts to an undermining from within. Part of this effort 
is directed to uncovering the metaphoricity of the language utilised by 
philosophy and other sciences: uncovering their everyday legacy and the implicit 
valorised metaphysics with which the former is imbued. On the other, 
grammatology will trace the 'indefinite drift of signs' decoupled from the trope 
of presence". Grammatology will not be able to 'write its discourse on method 
or to describe the limits of its field. ' [Gramm 4] The reason being that it 
attempts to question a certain pre-given, and unquestioned conception of 
language, whilst, at the same time, having to articulate these questions within 
that pre-given conceptualityloo. 
97 The preface to the essays collected in Margins of Philosophy announces an attempt to displace 
philosophy through 'philosophically intransigent analyses', that would write otherwise so that 
the philosopher can no longer recognize himself or herself in philosophical texts. 'Tympan' 
[1972] translated by Alan Bass in Margins of Philosophy (Brighton, Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 
ix-xxix. 
98 Cf. Hobson's discussion of the closing paragraphs of 'Structure, Sign and Play' and her 
remarks regarding hesitation and incoherence [OL 25]. 'Ernst constructed himself ... not by 
linear repetition, with no stages in procedure at all, nor by an embedded repetition, like Russian 
dolls, where the stages are separate, but by a movement which can loop between stages .... It is a 
tangled hierarchy. Likewise, Derrida's commentaries loop between text and metacommentary: 
they cannot be prised off what they comment on, and this is true in detail too: if one pattern of 
thinking, of grouping of texts ... seems to have hegemony, it is soon turned like a glove, re-sited, 
becoming part of what it seemed to control. ' [OL 17 1] 
99 For a further dimension of grammatology, and the manner in which it troubles a reading of 
Derrida's work, please see Appendix B. 
100 '... every text of metaphysics carries within itself, for example, both the so-called "vulgar" 
concept of time and the resources that will be borrowed from the system of metaphysics in order 
to criticize that concept' (Ousia 601 
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The trace and diffirance 
Derrida's formulations with respect to this possible exceeding of logocentrism 
vary at times testing the limit of hyperbole and confusing those (me) attempting 
to paraphrase in order to demonstrate some lemma or other'O'. This confusion 
ought simply to demonstrate a gulf between him and Levinas's futural 
orientation as the strategic imposition of a pre-determined idea. 
But the manner of Derrida's own speculation might be such that we worry about 
02 the extension of that very term, speculation, to him' . The consequences he 
seems to advance are that with the 'demise' of presence as an unquestioned 
philosophical anchor, we no longer know what knowing is. The question seems 
to be whether this is merely a sceptical point or if the gestures 'beyond' can be 
understood as effecting or inaugurating any new epoch. Or whether such a 
question can be asked depending as it does on a certain precomprehension. Or 
whether such a precomprehension is always inevitable ". But it cannot be 
anticipated as the 'truth' that will redeem the cur-rent epoch - in the sense of 
being its ultimate reference. 
101 Hobson: '[A]ny attempt either to construct a rigorous system or to exit from metaphysics 
seems to be condemned to be a version of the Liar paradox, the metaphysical discourse which 
says that all metaphysical discourse is vitiated, and ... this is an account often given of Derrida's 
work. ' [OL 24] 
Derrida: 'The concepts of originary diffigrance and of delay are unthinkable within the authority 
of the logic of identity or even within the concept of time. The very absurdity betrayed by the 
terms provides the possibility ... of thinking beyond that logic and that concept. The word "delay" must be taken to mean something other than a relation between two "presents"; and the 
following model must be avoided: what was to happen (should have happened) in a (prior) 
present A, occurs only in a present B. The concepts of originary diffigrance and originary "delay" 
were imposed on us by a reading of Husserl. ' 'Freud and the Scene of Writing', p. 427 fn. 5. 
102 'In the delineation of diffigrance everything is strategic and adventurous. Strategic because no 
transcendent truth present outside the field of writing can govern theologically the totality of the 
field. Adventurous because this strategy is not a simple strategy in the sense that strategy orients 
tactics according to a final goal, a telos or theme of domination, a mastery and ultimate 
reappropriation of the development of the field. Finally, a strategy without finality, what might 
be called blind tactics, or empirical wandering if the value of empiricism did not itself acquire its 
entire meaning in its opposition to philosophical responsibility. ' Derrida 'Diff6rance', p. 7. 
103 It is in this context that one can understand the otherwise gnomic reference to Jorge Luis 
Borges: 'Perhaps universal history is but the history of the diverse intonations of a handful of 
metaphors. ' [VM 114, translation adjusted]. Derrida makes the radical suggestion that one might 
never escape from within this extreme historicisation created by language as material condition of 
thought unable to be mastered in intuition and therefore meaning. 
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'In order to exceed metaphysics it is necessary that a trace be inscribed 
within the text of metaphysics, a trace that continues to signal not in the 
direction of another presence, or another form of presence, but in the 
direction of an entirely other text. Such a trace cannot be thought more 
metaphysico. No philosopherne is prepared to master it. And it (is) that 
which must e-lude mastery. Only presence is mastered. ' [Ousia 65] 
The 'trace' does not effectuate a voluntarist break with language inherited - the 
very text of metaphysics shelters the trace and enables it to be named. The 
thought of the trace '... can no more break with transcendental phenomenology 
than be reduced to it' [Gramm 62]. And not simply phenomenology, for it owes 
its charge to more than one tradition. In 0 Grammatology, Derrida asks: why 
use the word 'trace'? [Gramm 70] And provides the following answer: 
'If words and concepts receive meaning only in sequences of differences, 
one can justify one's language, and one's choice of terms, only within a 
topic and an historical strategy. The justification can therefore never be 
absolute and definitive. It corresponds to a condition of forces and translated 
an historical calculation. Thus, over and above those that I have already 
defined, a certain number of givens belonging to the discourse of our time 
have progressively imposed this choice upon me. The word trace must refer 
to itself to a certain number of contemporary discourses whose force I intend 
to take into account. Not that I accept them totally. ' [Gramm 701 
Reconstructing the conjuncture of those givens in France of the 1960s may prove 
to be indispensable (and not simply an exercise in intellectual history), but is not 
possible within the remit of this dissertation. In the Introduction to this thesis, 
we noted how the 'trace' connected Levinas and Derrida, who has subsequently 
stressed the differences in the usage of the term made by the two of them'04. We 
have also noted the link to Heidegger. Here, in both 'Diff6rance' and Of 
Grammatology, Derrida nods to two other authors: 'This deconstruction of 
presence accomplishes itself through the deconstruction of consciousness, and 
therefore through the irreducible notion of the trace (Spur), as it appears in both 
Nietzschean and Freudian discourse. ' [Gramm 70] This adds a conflicting 
dimension to the 'trace': the subterranean character of Nachtrdglichkeit "I 
(foreign to the Selbstbesinnung of phenomenology) informs the opposition 
104The next chapter will examine the Levinasian idea of the trace in the traumatic past which was 
never present. 
105 For more on time, Nachtrdglichkeit and Verspatung as well as Demda's relation to Freud see 
'Freud and the Scene of Writing'. 
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contained in the trace (and text as 'chain of traces') to discourse - the 'the 
present, living conscious representation of a text within person who reads or 
writes it' [Gramm 101]. 
'The living present springs forth out of its non-identity with itself and from 
the possibility of a retentional trace. It is always already a trace. This trace 
cannot be thought on the basis of a simple present whose life would he 
within itself; the self of the living present is primordially a trace. The trace 
is not an attribute; we cannot say that the self of the living present 
"primordially is" it. ... This protowriting is at work in the origin of sense. ' [SP 851 
But we must be wary of hypostatising this notion, remalninc, as it does parasitic 
no proper trace. ' [Ousia 66] No upon metaphysics. 'There is no trace itself 
trace is proper to itself - it is this self-present reflexivity that it challenges. But it 
serves to struggle to think, gesture towards, the moments covered over by the 
privilege of presence in the same texts. As such, 'trace' must always be 'sous 
rature', serving a function within the economy of the text and project, but always 
overdetermined by its negation of ontological presence and its avowed avoidance 
of na: fve empiricism with its concomitant nominalism. 
Is the 'trace' tied to writing in this way? If so, what is its relation to diffýrance' 
This might be too quick, but it seems that diffýrance is taken to be more 
fundamental, or 'older' than Heidegger's ontological distinction. 
'If Being, according to the Greek forgetting which would have been the very 
form of its advent, has never meant anything except beings, then perhaps 
difference is older than Being itself. There may be a difference still more 
unthought than the difference between Being and beings. We certainly can 
go further toward naming it In our language. ' [Ousia 67] 
The 'trace' would be that which escapes from any complete determination 
throuah sincrular reference, but diffýrance suggests a writing without presence 
and without absence. '... ývithout history, without cause, without archia, ýýIthout 
tclos, a writing that absolutcly upsets all dialectics, all theoloL, %. all teleology. all 
ontology. A wi-iting cxceeding everything that the historv of metaphysics has 
eIIIIIII its comprehended in the form of Aristotelian arannn-, poi Tit. ts hne, 'n 
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circle, in its time, and in its space. ' [Ousia 67] One might hazard the analogical 
structure: Being ý* beings =- diffirance <* trace. 
The (non-) notion of diffirance, apparently not a concept, makes its first 
appearance in the final, difficult pages of the introduction to Husserl's 'The 
Origin of Geometry 1) 
'The impossibility of resting in the simple maintenance [nowness] of a 
Living Present, the sole and absolutely absolute origin of the De Facto and 
the De Jure, of Being and Sense, but always other in its self-identity; the 
inability to live enclosed in the innocent undividedness of the primordial 
Absolute, because the Absolute is present only in being deferred-delayed 
[diffirant] without respite, this inability and this impossibility are given in a 
primordial and pure consciousness of Difference. ' [Origin 153 translation 
modified] 
'L'impossibilite de se reposer dans la maintenance simple d'un Present 
Vivant, origine une et absolument absolue du Fait et A Droit, de 1'Etre et 
A Sens, mais toujours autre dans son identit, 6 ii soi-meme, l'impuissance a 
s'enfermer dans Vindivision innocente de lAbsolu originaire, parce qu'il 
West present qu'en se diff6rant sans reldche, cette impuissance et cette 
impossibilite se donnent en une conscience originaire et pure de la 
Diffigrence. ' [OG 1711 
Again, its functional role is to 'think' 'the non-full, non-simple, structured and 
differentiating origin of differences' 106 , perhaps to think time in more originary 
fashion"'. But in which case, it is not clear whether origin can still be used"'. in 
the eponymous essay, Derrida essays the idea that there is only a 'strategic 
justification' of diff9rance - its work depends on the conjuncture in which it is 
located. 
Can the theological designation of this concept be avoided by noting that it might 
one day be superseded, as Derrida. suggests? Can we think the duration of its 
conjunctural relevance? Could this be profitably pursued in relation to 
106 'Diffdrance' p. II- 
107 Hobson: '... for Derrida's He. idegger, time is the impossibility of escaping that synthesis 
whose index is the way tense operates in language. ' [OL 120] 
108 Marrati Genesis and Trace p. 107. Derrida: 'To say that diffirance is onginary is 
simultaneously to erase the myth of a present origin. Which is why "originary" must be 
understood as having been crossed out, without which diffigrance would be derived from an 
original plenitude. It is a non-origin which is onginary. ... diffirance is determined outside and 
teleological and eschatological horizon. Which is not easy. ' 'Freud and the Scene of Writing' p. 
255. 
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Heidegger's Umkehrung in its epochal horizon? In seeking to put somethinsz to Cý - 
question, to dramatize a question for philosophy does it risk opportunism? 
Would it come close to what we diagnosed in Levinas, a wagger" 
Or is its 'negative' procedure, attempting to make as rigorous as possible this 
questioning, still distinct from the foresight of Levinas? In the essay. 
'Diff6rance', Derrida rejects both the prophetic and the kerygmatic 
interpretations of this writing. Its determinate opposition to certain tropes 
remains consistent, while being troubled over the problems thus generated for 
persisting within this discourse' 09 
Phenomenology and Responsibility 
Phenomenology is still crucial for both the demonstration of these themes even if 
these themes then challenge the very self-constitution of that philosophical 
procedure"'. What it enables to appear is the break-up of self-consciousness as 
simple self-presence. But this break-up does not mark a sceptical limit, rejecting 
all knowledge, only that we do not know what knowing is in the broader 
philosophical sense. It has always been tied to either a teleology that 'reduces all 
dehiscence between writing and wanting-to-say [Meinen or vouloir-dire]'111 or 
collapses into a nonphilosophical empincism that cannot think factuality as such. 
Phenomenology brings awareness of the historized structuring of the being of 
factuality ('it is thought itself in the consciousness of its complete historicity'). 
But such an awareness demands that the 'philosopher' negotiates the potential 
inauthenticity of language and take responsibility for the assertibility of that 
speech: 'In that respect, phenomenology as Method of Discourse is first of all 
Selbstbesinn ling and 11"erantwortung, the free resolution to -take up one's oýýfl 
scnse" (reprendre son sens), in order to make oneself accountable. through 
speech. for an imperiled pathway. ' And this responsibilitv is opposed to the 
'09 'The i0rzire differance isfinite. It can therefore no longer be concei%ed within the opposition 
of finiteness and infinity, absence dnd presence, negation and affirmation. ' [ SP 102] 
110 *For phenomenology alone can make infinite historicity appear: i. e.. infinite discourse and 
infinite dialccticalness as the pure possibilM and the ver% essence of Being in manifestation. ' 
I OG 170 translation modified] 
Dissemination p. 17. 
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projected management of this field through ideas and anticipations, even though 
it will require the co-opting of such motifs in determinate conjunctures. The 
reductive, genealogical method of the Riickfrage is the essence of this method, 
where responsibility is 'shouldering a word one hears spoken [une parole 
entendue], as well as taking on oneself the transfer of sense, in order to look after 
its advance [pour veiller sur son cheminement]. ... it is thought itself in the 
consciousness of its complete historicity [son historicite integrale]. ' [Origin 149 
OG 166] This marks an intensification of the traditional understanding of 
responsibility and, importantly for this thesis, it connects responsibility not 
simply to 'ethical relations' but to the very practice of writing"'. Again, this 
theme would be present from the earliest published writings. 
All philosophical discourse must then derive its authority from a certain 
phenomenology, which becomes under Derrida's transformation a propaedeutic 
for decision, which would not be a 'neutral preface or perambulatory exercise of 
thought' [Origin 149]. As such, phenomenology's clarification ('exhaustion') of 
sense in its eideticity and historicity is the precondition for approaching 
factuality with appropriate seriousness: 
'The "why" can only emerge [surgir] from the possible (in the metaphysical 
or ontological sense, and not in the phenomenological sense) nonbeing [non- 
etre] of historical factuality; and nonbeing as nonhistory [le non-etre comme 
non-histoire] only discloses [laisse divoiler] its eventuality on the basis [a 
partir de] of a consciousness of pure sense and pure historicity, i. e., on the 
taking up of possibility in the phenomenological sense [Cest-el-dire d'une 
conscience de possibilit6 au sens phJnom, 6nologique]. ' [Origin 150 OG 167- 
68 translation modified] 113 
112 In his translator's introduction to Otherwise than Being, Lingis describes the goal of Husserl's 
Crisis texts as 'absolute self-responsibility' in theoretical life; the will to supply a reason for 
every fact [OtB xil. This distinguishes the philosophical attitude for Derrida: 'a philosopher 
would feel that he or she first of all had to understand, analyze, give reasons and be responsible 
for the supposed meaning of his or her language. ' [Rogues 1361 
113 'But we do not believe anymore [ne croyons pas non plus] either that this question can ever, in 
philosophical discourse, simply precede transcendental phenomenology as its presupposition or 
latent ground (fondement]. On the contrary, this question would mark within philosophy in 
general the moment wherein phenomenology completes itself [s'achýveraitl as the philosophical 
propaedeutic for every philosophical decision -a moment moreover conceived by Husserl. Since 
this propaedeutic is always announcing itself [s'annonVant] as infinite, that moment is not a 
factuality but an ideal sense, a right which will always remain under phenomenological 
jurisdiction, a right that phenomenology alone can exercise by explicitly anticipating the end of 
its itinerary. ' [Origin 150 OG 167 translation modified] 
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Responsibility or propaedeutic suggests an affirmation, but this affirmation or 0 
anticipation can in itself not be foregrounded philosophically as responsible 
discourse and indeed limns the strategic dimension of deconstruction. often 
referenced by Derrida but unfortunately (along with 'force') left underdeve loped. 
Transcendental Propaedeutic and Empiricism 
Such a propaedeutic is unending. In 'Hors-texte' Demda connects it to the 
Hegelian self-presentation of the concept, this 'methodology' is not 
4preliminary', it is the very production of science, a 'living historicity of 
method' 114 But a method without shored-up origin and end. The decision 
comes not simply when urgency interrupts the foregoing analysis but marks the 
exorbitant commencement itself - having to start from 'wherever we are'" 5 
without the redemption of the methodological structure in its unfolding of the 
positive absolute: 'The preface can become a discourse on method, a treatise on 
poetics, a set of formal rules, only after the forging of the irruptive track of a 
method that is actually put into practice as a path that breaks ground and 
constructs itself as it goes alone, without a predeterm-ined itinerary. " 16 
But this 'departure' from the norms of philosophical bad faith, which believes 
that it can give itself methodological assurances for its content, appears as 
radically empiricist or voluntarist [Gramm 162]. Empiricism names an approach 
to philosophical presentation but one which springs from a failure to subject the 
categories of thought to investigation. Above all, for the Derrida of the 1960s, it 
is the danger that accompanies all attempts to reduce philosophy to a cultural 
phenomena that can be circumscribed by the human sciences without first testing 
the metaphysical 'secret cargo' of those same sciences, which still belong to that 
philosophical inheritance. The understanding of empiricism as a philosophical 
position depends upon a pre-critical stance valonsing position-taking t! - 
114 Dissemination pp. 1-'- 1-3 
115 . NVe have to be-in wherever we tire ... in a tem where \ýc already believe ourselves to be. 
[Gramm 1621 
1 't) Dissemination p. -29. 
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(Standpunksphilolosophie) without concern for the inability to sustain that 
discourse - it is implicitly philosophy as Weltanschauung or technique. 
As written, deconstruction must leave a sign of its working and of what remains 
unresolved as it works through the text of metaphysics: 'Without that track, 
abandoned to the simple content of its conclusions, the ultra-transcendental text 
will so closely resemble the precritical text as to be indistinguishable from it. ' 
[Gramm 61] 117 It is this sign that attempts to distinguish the apparent 
assemblage or parataxis of figures (Freud-Nietzsche-Heidegger-Levinas) 
producing the 'trace'. 
In his comments in Of Grammatology on the necessity of bricolage (a form of 
theft), Derrida notes that the bricoleur cannot 'justify the discourse' adopted but 
that the idea of breaking with bricolage depends on a 'creationist theology"". 
'The already-there-ness of instruments and of concepts cannot be undone or re- 
invented. ... it builds 
its castles with debris. ... 
The idea of the engineer breaking 
with all bricolage is dependent upon a creationist theology. Only such a 
theology "' can sanction an essential and rigorous difference between the 
engineer and the bricoleur. ' [Gramm 138-39] However not all bricolages are 
equally worthwhile - they must criticise themselves! Such criticism could only 
be produced by accumulating conflicting materials which are allowed to work off 
each other as conflicting palimpsests' 20 . It is only this 
dimension which can 
distinguish critical bricolage from nominalist, historicist empirical practice 
without recourse to onto-theology (to which Levi-Strauss's distinction between 
bricoleur and 'engineer' still belongs). Propaedeutic and responsibility 
constitute a vigilance '... which takes history, that is finitude, seriously; a 
philosophy aware of itself as historical in each of its aspects ... and aware of 
itself, as Levinas says in another sense, as economy. But again, an economy 
117 It is my contention that in the ethico-political turn, that track has partly 'gone underground' in 
order to better activate certain other dimensions of grammatology. The critical presentation is 
sacrificed to the reproducibility of certain texts. See Appendix B. 
118 On the same topic, see Derrida 'Structure, Sign and Play'. 
119 Derrida observes that Uvi-Strauss's discourse 'is produced through concepts, schemata, and 
values that are, systematically and genealogically, accomplices of this theology and this 
metaphysics' (Gramm 1351 
'20 Cf. Spivak 'Translator's Preface' to Of Grammatology pp. ix, lxxxvil (especially p. lxxv). 
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which in being history, can be at home neither in the finite totality which Levinas 
calls the Same nor in the positive presence of the Infinite' [VM 146]. 
This not-being- at-home must underwrite deconstructive writing even as it 
121 contests legibility and intelligibility For this reason, 'Inhabiting' or 
'inworming' mobilises the 'irreducible necessity of a trick of writing' [Gramm 
24], whose outcome is unclear, and whose ambition might merely be 'to draw 
out ... a signification which a presumed future reading will not be able to 
dispense with' [Gramm 149]. Its own constitutive indefiniteness cannot draw a 
line under any achieved result. 
'The movements of deconstruction do not destroy the structures from the 
outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, 
except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, 
because one always inhabits, and all the more when does not suspect it. 
Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and 
economic resources of subversion from the old structure ... the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work. ' [Gramm 
241 
It demonstrates the opening or hesitation in the dominant discourses, but its 
attempt to expand writing or graphics by 'using up' the tradition or writing by 
4crossing out' [rature] commits itself in different directions, which are not 
12 1 These references to intelligility and legibility raise the question of the connection between 
Barthes and Derrida. For Barthes, 9criture is that which exceeds the historically conditioned 
forms of legibility and intelligibility, but it can do so only by theft and dissimulation. This 
attempt to go beyond legibility is expressed by Barthes as follows: 
'To act as though an innocent discourse could be held against ideology is tantamount to 
continuing to believe that language can be nothing but the neutral instrument of a triumphant 
content. In fact, today, there is no language site outside Bourgeois ideology: our language comes 
from it, returns to it, remains closed up in it. The only possible rejoinder is neither confrontation 
nor destruction but only theft; fragment the text of culture, science, literature, and change its 
features according to formulae of disguise, as one disfigures stolen goods. Faced with the old 
text, therefore, I try to efface the false sociological, historical, or subjective efflorescence of 
determinations, visions, projections; I listen to the message's transport not the message, I see in 
the threefold work the victorious deployment of the significant text, the terrorist text, allowing 
the received meaning, the (liberal) repressive discourse that constantly attempts to recover it, 
slough itself off life an old skin. The social intervention of a text (not necessarily achieved at the 
time the text appears) is measured not by the popularity of its audience or by the fidelity of the 
socio-economic reflection it contains or projects to a few eager sociologists, but rather by the 
violence that enables it to exceed the laws that a society, an ideology, a philosophy establish for 
themselves in order to agree among themselves in a fine surge of historical intelligibility. This 
excess is called: writing. ' Barthes SadelFourierlLoyola (1971] translated by Richard Nfiller (New 
York, Hill & Wang, 1976), p. 10. [my italics] Derridean icriture might be presented as the 
philosophical redemption of Barthes's suggesting as it does that the language site is not quite the 
circumscribed place found here in this passage. 
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necessarily exclusive (in both senses). The 'game of the world' must be thought 
before the forms of play (the movement and generation of signs) in it can be, but 
this 'game of the world' can only be thought through the horizon of its closure, a 
closure broached- hesitantly and aporetically. 
6 
... the attempt to achieve an opening toward the beyond of philosophical discourse, by means of philosophical discourse, which can never be shaken 
off completely, cannot possibly succeed within language ... except by formally and thematically posing the question of the relations between 
belonging and opening, the question of closure. Formally - this is by 
posing it in the most effective and most formal, the most formalized, way 
possible: not in a logic, on other words in a philosophy, but in an inscribed 
description, in an inscription of the relations between the philosophical and 
the nonphilosophical, in a kind of unheard of graphics, within which 
philosophical conceptuality would be no more than a function. '[VM 137- 
1381 122 
It is this 'impossible system' which cuts through the ensemble of problems 
constituting Levinas's position: 'The possibility of the impossible system will be 
on the horizon to protect us from empiricism. Without reflecting here upon the 
philosophy of this hesitation, let us note between parentheses that by simply 
articulating it we have already tackled Levinas' own problematic [nous avons 
d9ja abord9 la problematique propre de Levinas]. ' [VM 104, VeM translation 
123 modified] 
122 From one perspective, Derrida suggests the linear conception of time as exhibited by Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason may depend on the manner in which the space of inscription as 
experienced in reading and writing now dominates the manifold of sensibility. There could be a 
different transcendental aesthetic guided by a new form of legibility. 'A transcendental question 
on space concerns the prehistoric and precultural level of spatio-temporal experience which 
furnishes a unitary and universal ground for all subjectivity, and all culture, this side of empirical 
diversity, as well as the orientations proper to their spaces and their times. ' [Gramm 290] This 
new form of legibility may further fundamentally alter our relation to past writing, we could be 
re-read according to a different organization of space: 'because we are beginning to write, to 
write differently, we must reread differently' (Gramm 87] Several of Derrida's more notorious 
texts not discussed by this thesis should be understood as part of this experimental endeavour. 
See especially: Jacques Derrida Glas [1974] translated by J. P Leavey and R. Rand (Lincoln, NA, 
University of Nebraska Press, 1986). Jacques Derrida The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud 
and Beyond [19801 translated by Alan Bass (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
123 1 have opted to alter the translation of the final sentence, believing that 'aborder' with its 
polyvalent sense of accosting and boarding (in both maritime senses) cannot be allowed to pass 
simply as 'come close to' if that is meant to imply proximity or affinity. It can be synonymous 
with 'entamer' the use of which by Derrida is discussed in detail by Christopher Johnson. Si ystem 
and Writing in the Philosophy of Jacques Derrida (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1993). 
175 
Chapter 3 Derrida's critique of Levinas in ""Violence and 'vletaphy'SICS" 
Conclusion 
The two parts of this chapter have attempted to demonstrate the 'metaphý'sical' 
terrain upon which Derrida disputes Levinas's conceptions of altenty, being, 
exterionty and the other. In the first, I re-presented 'Violence and Metaphý, sics' 
as a critique of Levinas's Totality and Infinity in that it: 
0 contests Levinas's understanding of phenornenoloýgy and the history of 
philosophy; 
0 opposes any notion of absolute othemess and Levinas's use of the 
"Same" and the "Other"; 
0 insists upon the primacy of the transcendental field and the essential place 
of sense-explication for phenomenological Selbstbesinn ling-, 
0 defends the Husserlian alter ego, or at least contests Levinas's reading of 
the Fifth Cartesian Meditation; 
The chief result is to suggest that Totality and IntinitY be understood as 
nonphilosophy or empiricism since it does not take sufficient care over its 
language and presentation to achieve philosophical presentation: its results are 
produced ultra vires - imposed beyond the ability to justify located in its 
methodology. 
The second part attempted a truncated summary of several of Derrida's works in 
order to gesture towards the meta-level commitments of what, in 'Violence and 
Metaphysics', Derrida terms a philosophy of 'onginary finitude'. I have tried to 
demonstrate the manner in which Demda's writing around history and language 
diverges from Levinas's understanding of Being and the Beyond such that the 
homonym 'trace', found in both authors, has to be understood as a tangential 
contact: Derrida does not inherit this terrn from Levinas in an,,,, straightforward 
manner. there is no significant 'general similarity' of 'characteristic form'. 
DeiTida's own or speculative moment is connected to the epochal 
claims associated %0th the understanding, of logocentnsm as the 'metaphysics of 
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phonetic writing' and its privileging [Gramm 31. Logocentrism does not name 
being as a whole but only one form of its organization - the one we find 4- 
ourselves in but which is now 'closing off'. What comes after is neither a 
beyond nor a discrete new stage - neither distinct nor discontinuous, it does not 
culminate in or grant meaning to the logocentric epoch. 
Finally, in trying to present deconstruction and grammatology as an aberrant 
development from phenomenology and structuralism, I hi ghli ghted how the % cry 
problem of writing is developed in relation to themes of undecidability, 
responsibility, event and interruptive decision. Formed in this early work, these 
are not new or peculiar to the wntings understood beneath the aegis of the 
'ethico-political turn'. Nor, from this perspective, are they produced in response 
to the influence of Levinas. 
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Otherwise than Being 
The previous chapter gave a detailed explication of Derrida's first essa% on 
Levinas, 'Violence and Metaphysics'. The framework for the persistent cntical 
themes that govern their intellectual relationship was laid there. There is a 
twofold dimension to this critique: 
1. Levinas takes insufficient care over the problem of philosophical 
presentation in his borrowings from the Western tradition. 
2. Derrida's philosophy of 'onginary finitude' contests the very notions of 
the Same and the Other and the idea of a positive ethical Infinite. His 
metaphysical commitments differ fundamentally with respect to 
language, being and history even as he puts the coherence of these themes 
in question. 
In this chapter, we turn to Levinas's move from Totality and Infinity to 
Otherwise than Being. Otherwise than Being can be seen as responding to 
Derrida's criticisms in at least two senses: first, Levinas offers explicit responses 
to specific questions put by Demda regarding, for example, the positive infinite, 
second, he makes major alterations to his philosophical co-ordinates. Otherwise 
than Being is seen as introducing the major distinction between the Saving and 
Said, but the alterations are much more fundamental and replace the topography I 
set out in Chapters One and Two. Through the thernatics of diachrony and 
proximity, the other is located in the deepest aspect of the temporalization of the 
subject: its -signifyingness" must be made manifest through the responsibility 
taken on by the psyche. The new function of this term offers the possibility of 
itniqueness not to be found in the ego's participation in reason and being through 
consciousness. The glory of the psyche is to be found in its creation of more and 
more responsibilities, best exemplified by the practice of the nazirate: taking the 
bread out of one's own mouth to L,,, i\! e to the other. Whcre the ethical in Totality 
and lizflnity in\ olved justification and apology. offerin2 m% world to the other in 
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discourse; here the good will be non-discursive but constructed onlý through acts 
of giving and substitution. 
This new structure will be the focus of the third part of this chapter. The second 
part is a brief discussion of the comments offered by Levinas in relation to 
philosophical presentation, empiricism, scepticism and ideology. But I begin bý 
concentrating on Critchley's The Ethics of Deconstruction. 
I 
The Ethics of Reading 
As mentioned in my Introduction, Critchley has offered three distinct, though not 
necessarily conflicting, theses concerning the relationship between Demda and 
Levinas. The strong claim of the first edition of The Ethics of Deconstruction 
(1992) was that Derrida's writing should be understood as ethical provided we 
understood it as ethical in Levinas's sense. That claim is my focus here. The 
other claims - that the "later Derrida" is "profoundly marked by Levinas" and 
borrows from Levinas at key junctures - will be examined in the final chapter. 
These are distinct claims that are inflected chronologically. The first claim aims C 
at all of Derrida's writing, including 'Violence and Metaphysics'. In detailin2 C) - 
this, Critchley also provides an account of the manner in which Otherwise than 
Being adequately responds to Derrida. Fhs reading is detailed, articulate and 
symptomatic of recent English-language reception's attempt to efface or ignore C) 
the early technical aspects of deconstruction, a common failure to move beyond 
the slogans of deconstruction towards a more concrete engagement with its 
workings and aims. 0" 
Following from the work of Ellis 'Miller'. Critchley insists that deconstruction 
I -should 
be understood as an ethical demand' which 'a,, vakens responsibility that 
leads to political action'. NN'hat is particular about deconstruction in these 
E,, 
-,, 
The Ethics of Reading: Kant, de Man, Eliot. Trollope, James and Benjamin (-Nc%\- York, 
Columbia University Pres,,;, 198 11) 
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accounts is that it concerns itself with moments of altenty within texts that are 
suppressed by the given, dominant readings, whilst. at the same time. avoiding 
the reduction of the text to its material conditions of production. Both poles 
mark positions which assume that meaning is either ultimately transparent or 
extractable. Deconstruction, as a practice of reading, uncovers the eýasions 
constitutive of readings which support stances or standard interpretations. 
Hence, the purpose of reading is to interrupt the received context of text and 
world. This patient, counter-intuitive reading is glossed as ethical and becomes 
the stimulus towards a political engagement with both the forces which generally Z__ I 
determine acceptable readings and the concrete practices which depend on 
similar protocols'. It is a concern for what is excluded: 'Politics begins as tý 
ethics. ' [ED 46] 
Critchley writes: 4... it is to be hoped that my book will take up 'NIIIIer's 
fascinating, but finally aporetic formulation of the ethics of reading and deepen it 
philosophically with specific reference to Levinas, in order to show that its 
necessity is ethical in a sense not so far discussed by him [Miller]. ' [ED 47] 
Instead of simply offering a sensitivity to that which is excluded, the ethical, as 
characterised by Levinas, marks the authentic response to the 'putting into 
question of my spontaneity by the presence of the other' [ED 5]. The Other 
[Autrufl, as other person, as singular other, produces the condition of possibility 
for ethics by challenging its subsumption into an order or structure through a role 
or position. As Critchley writes, 'the paradigmatic ethical moment is that of 
being pre-reflectively addressed by the other person in a way that calls me into 
question and obliges me to be responsible' [ED 46]. Responsibility becomes an 
issue insofar as a dimension previously avoided, effaced or ignored comes to the 
fore and ruptures habitual, unthinking conduct. It is then a question of respecting C, - 
this encounter that can now not be avoided, effaced, or ignored without 
irresponsibility. The responsible relation. as a face-to-face between two 
indi % idual eLos. suspends social norms. 
One of Miller's main challen, -, cs is to contest a desire for intellectual master% over tc\ts through 
ret'Crctice to 'somethin-, -, nontextual outside the text'. 
Op. cit. p. 6. 
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In this context (though I have already contested this reading of Levinas), 
deconstruction depends on a similar commitment to responsibility before 
singularity and alterity. Not only is there a duty of scholarship. but Critchley 
insists: 
'I would go further and claim that there is a hermeneutic principle of fidelm - 
one might even say 'an "ethic o-political duty... (un devoir ithico-politiquo - and 
a minimal working notion of truth as adaequatio underlying deconstructiVe 
reading, as its primary layer of reading. If deconstructive reading is to possess 
any demonstrative necessity, it is initially by virtue of how faithfully it 
reconstructs that dominant interpretation of a text in a layer of 'commentary'. ' 
[ED 24-251 
These notions of fidelity and adequation repeat Miller's claim that deconstruction 
is nothing more or less than good reading as such' where reading is marked by 
the refusal to deviate from the text 3. And indeed, Demda writes of a 
commentary that would first be faithful to Levinas's 'audacities' [VM 103] that 
follows the displacements effected by his texts [VM 108], where the questions 
raised are 'the questions put to us by Levinas' [VM 104]. But these questions are 
both perplexing and result from the first violence of commentary which reduces 
these texts to their conceptuality and systematic function [VM 397-98 fn. 7]. 
CrItchley and Miller's account of the practice of readine, centres on a 'doubling' C$ 
of the commentary by the responsible injunction to locate moments of alterity 
within the text. The ethical structure of reading is located in this prior 
willingness to affirm and seek out that which may not even be nameable under 
current conditions of intelligibility. 'My argument is that an unconditional 
categorical imperative or moment of affirmation is the source of the inJunction 
that produces deconstruction and is produced through deconstructive reading. ' 
[ED 41] [in italics in original] Thus the marked patience and attention to detail Z: ) 
of Derrida's reading is produced through this demand to seek within the tD 
dominant reading those moments where altenty is effaced. excluded or 
marginallsed. 
'As a reader, so it seems, I sliould abo\ c all have respect for the text. not deviate b% one iota in 
my report of the text from %ý hat it says. ' The Ethics of Reading p. 10 
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However, the violence of conceptuality described by Derrida as his oýýn activit\- 
here already pursues systernaticity over alterity - i. e., how do these claims ýý ork-'? 
The double gesture of deconstruction is misunderstood by Cntchley insofar as he 
sees it as a double reading that produces a detailed commentarv, but then brings 
this into contradiction with itself. This characterisation is too abstract and 
developed without reference to a sufficient number of specific deconstructive 
readings. No movement of this sort is contained in 'Violence and '. N4etaphysics'. 
But this might mean that it is not to be understood as deconstructive. \Ve have 
argued that it is a combination of critique and programmatic statement. There is 
nothing particularly 'deconstructive' about its formal construction, even the brief 
sections that refer to writing were mostly added to the 1963 text for its collection 
in the 1967 publication of Ecriture et Diffiýrence'. Dominique Janicaud is right 
to criticise Cntchley for talking of deconstruction in the singular, and though tý CD 
Cntchley recognises this, he mistakes it as a reference to other individuals such 
as de Man [ED 250]. It is to be proven that a text bearing Derrida's signature is 
itself deconstructive'. 
The explicit treatment of Levinas remains at the level of detailed commentary 
and criticism, an examination of his readings of Hegel, Husserl and Heideg 4 ger. 
What rYUght be termed 'deconstructive' about the essay concerns the comments 
on history developed in relation to the following question: what would Levinas 
have to do to present this admirable concern for the other within philosophical 
discourse" 
is concept It is through these passages that Critchley mediates hi of 'cl&ural 
writing': a writing that directs itself against an intelligibility constituted by an 
exhausted' tradition, 'while searching for escape from that tradition'. Thus 'a Zý 
deconstructive reading perpetually breaches this closure, disrupting its limit and 
allowimi the movement of altenty to interrupt anv unity of logocentric textualit"', 
and epochality' [ED 29-30]. It is in this act of opening towards the other, or of 
' See Robert Bernascom 'The Trace of Levinas in Derrida' in Derrida and Differance edited by 
David \Vood & Robert Bernascom (Evanston, Northwestern Universitv Press. 198S), pp. 1-3 - -29, 
Scc l'til'ra the discussion of writing and plurality of styles in Chapter Three (pp. 164-6J 
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suspending the legitimacy of that which dorrunates, that for Critchleý marks the 
ethical dimension of deconstruction [ED 88]. 
He reads this practice as a resistance to structuralist totalitv found throu2hout 
phenomenology and thereby connects deconstruction to remarks that Levinas 
makes concerning history [ED 68]. For Levinas, a history of intenont% would 
break with 'economic' history by producing a history for those without works or 
texts. For Critchley, 'Cl6tural reading is history read from the standpoint of the 
victims of that history. It is, in a complex sense, ethical history. ' [ED 30] 
An explicit reference to 'doubling' that might be seen to support this reading can Cý - 
be found in 'Signature, Event, Context' (197 1): 
'-deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed immediately to a 
neutralisation [of classical metaphysics and its vestiges]: it must by means 
of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practise an 
overturning of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the 
system. It is only on this condition that deconstruction will provide itself 
the means with which to intervene in the field of oppositions that it 
criticises, which is also a field of nondiscursive forces. ,6 
DeMda here acknowledges that the conditions of possibility for an intervention 
consistent with deconstruction, that is one that overtums and displaces, without 
reproducing ungroundable metaphysical commitments, require a 'doubling' of 
gesture, science and writing. This 'doubling', or 'dual writing', responds to the 
linguistic determination of philosophy: no. language is immune from 
metaphysics, metaphysical language is the 'only available language'; yet, one has 
to learn how to write 'while not subscribing to its premises But this quotation 
does not straightforwardly outline a practice directed towards alterity. And here 
we should be mindful of the comments given in the previous chapter regarding 
his 'deafness' to the division made by Levinas between the Same and the Other. 
From this perspective. \vc might already note a slippage in the arcrument or 
presentation. It is one thing to link the deconstructive passage bemeen two tý 
cpochs to concern for alterity. It is another to equate this %ý Ith Levinas's concern 
'Signature, E\ent. Context', p. 329 
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for the Other. Firstly, Derrida does not subscribe to Levinas's notion of 'internal 
history'. From our discussion in Chapter Three we can here repeat two points: 
1. Derrida emphasises that acknowledgement of the Other must first be the 
'letting-be' of -the other in its mode of appearing in being from within the 
'Same". Alterity must be already within the same for there to be play in 
the same - being is not closed in on itself. The other 'cannot be 
absolutely exterior to the same without ceasing to be other' [VM 158]. 
2. The 'finite totality' opposed by Derrida is that utilised by Levinas not by 
structuralism. The notion of economy or system is opposed to any 
understanding of a finite totality and a infinite that would transcend that 
totality. 
Derrida's reading of the history of philosophy as the history of logocentrism is 
based upon his diagnosis of an insufficiently justified, metaphysical valorisation 
of presence throughout this history (up to and including Heidegger). That 
"phenomenology", through its intensification of the problem of grounding, has 
enabled us to achieve this insight does not mean that it is valorised contra 
structuralism. Indeed, Derrida's examination of the workings of Evidenz in 
Husserl and its connection to the speaking, self-present voice, shows that one 
cannot inhabit phenomenology securely, in good conscience'. Moreover, this 
lack of justification and the concomitant undecidability does not come from 
without: Derrida will repeat the notion of self-deconstruction and later, auto- 
immunisation'. 
7 .. To let be" is an expression of Heidegger's which does not mean, as Levinas seems to think, to 
let be as "object of comprehension first, " and, in the case of the Other, as "interlocutor 
afterward. " The "letting-be" concerns all possible forms of the existent, and even those which, 
by essence, cannot be transformed into "objects of comprehension. " If it belongs to the essence 
of the Other first and foremost to be an "interlocutor" and to be "Interpellated, " then the "letting- 
be" will let the Other be what it is, will respect it as interpellated-interlocutor. The "letting-be" 
does not only, or by privilege, concern impersonal things. ' [VM 172] 
8 See Jacques Derrida Speech and Phenomena. 
9 Derrida 'The "World" of the Enlightenment to Come (Exception, Calculation, Sovereignty)' 
[2002] in Rogues pp. 118-59. 
184 
Chapter 4 Otherwise than Being 
Structuralism is already part of this 'decay' of a model that had always 
previously pnvileged presence. Here, it is important to stress undecidability, 
alterity within, as the privileged consequence over any breaching (as if there 
were two demarcated epochs already given and identified between which one 
could hop). In French, les clOtures are the hoardings which surround a building 
to be demolished - deconstruction attempts to erect or show the closure of a 
certain form of conceptuality, which is to some extent the closure of an epoch of 
history. So long as this concept is determined by a notion of meaningful 
presence it no longer operates as it did, but this does not point to an end of 
history. This does not equate to a writing that oscillates between two orders or 
effaces one in favour of the other, as in Levinas. Suspending the legitimacy of 
what dominates, foregrounding undecidability, might open towards the to-come 
but this is not the Other in Levinas's sense as Idea guiding practice and its 
positings. The strong stress Demda makes on differentiating futur from avenir - 
relates directly to this point. Levinas requires a futur to justify his present 
practice, Derrida the iý-venir, that which is to come and is not anticipated by the 
current instantiations. Elsewhere, he will write of an attempt to intensify 
transformations already underway and to prepare institutions for the future. 
Such fundamental differences are further effaced by Critchley when he turns to 
the distinction, introduced in Otherwise than Being, between the Saying Lle Dire] 
and the Said [le Dit]". If the Said is the statement, assertion or proposition that 
can be systematically arranged in philosophy,. the Saying is that 'performance' 
which cannot be 'caught in constative propositions'. The speaking of the Other 
as Other produces an interruption of logos, but an interruption that occurs 
through the Said. The question with which Levinas wrestles is the following: 
'How is the Saying, my exposure to the Other, to be Said, or given a 
philosophical exposition that does not utterly betray this Saying? ' [ED 71 How 
does the ethical, the transcendent, signify in ontological language? the C clý 
introduction of the Saying and the Said, addresses this problem by attempting to 
10 Caygill in contrast insists that this is not the 'ke%, ' to Othenvise than Being [L&P 13 1]. 
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find an 'opening beyond philosophical or ontological language wi . thin 
language"'. 
That is, the introduction of the distinction between the Saying and the Said 
appears in Otherwise than Being in such way as to be interpreted as a response to 
the criticisms made by Derrida in his review of Totahtý, and Infinity. As 
Critchley writes: 'If there is an under-determination and a certain philosophical 
na*fvet6 about the possibility of an ethical languagre in Totality and Infinity, then 
this is completely transformed in Otherwise than Being ývhere the aponas 
entailed in the attempted expression of the ethical in the language of ontology 
become, arguably, the central preoccupation. ' [ED 259] 
Critchley notes that the ethical Saying must proceed 'through an abuse of 
language' [ED 18] and this 'abuse' is identified with that doubling practised by 
deconstructive writing. Otherwise than Being is taken as a paradigmatic example C) 
of the 'performative enactment' of ethical writing: it proceeds throuoh a 4 C) 
particular 'rhythm' of seriature -a knot of interlaced interruptions: 'Levinasian 
textuality ... obeys a sýriatural or cl6tural rhythm of binding, and unbinding 4: ) 
which preserves the absolute priority of the ethical obligation. ' [ED 128] tn 
The general schematic of the argument for homology between Levinas and 
Derrida is as follows. Levinas presents the Other as that which interrupts the 
Same, or the self-consistent Said (materially instantiated in laws, institutions, 
etc. ). This duality of Saying / Said is mapped onto a distinction between 
performative and constative. Because deconstruction appears to put in question 
the self-consistency of the Same and, at the same time, to be concerned with the 
limitations of constative presentation it is seen to be consistent with the 
Levinaslan project. 
will concentrate on scýriature in the next chapter. Suffice to saý here that it is in 
I act a term coined by Demda to describe Levinas's wrlting in Othenvise than 
1 will arýaue that it is not a positive ascription but a parodic demonstration 
11 Scc Autrement cluc Savoir where Le\mas understands Derrida's criticisms of his ýwrk as a 
criticism of his '[)orTo%\ ing' from authors whom he criticizes. Autrement (luc Saiwir. pp. 68-9. 
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of the manner in which Levinas's metaphors disrupt the conceptual framework 
presented. In addition, Derrida will not accept so clean a distinction between the 
constative and the performative as offered by Critchley, since pace Husserl's 
distinction between axiomatic and originary evidence, Derrida will insist that no 
constative statement can stand by itself in such fashion. 
This reading would have Levinas himself moving towards a clOtural writing. 
Unfortunately, Critchley's valorisation of this distinction" means that he ignores 
two important questions: 
1. Does Levinas correctly identify the criticism that Derrida produces in 
'Violence and Metaphysics'? 
2. And does the introduction of the Saying and the Said meet this criticism? 
To flesh out these questions, let us turn to Critchley's account of the turn from 
Totality and Infinity to Otherwise than Being which can be found in a section in 
his forth chapter entitled 'Scepticism'. Earlier, in The Ethics of Deconstruction, 
Critchley raises the rhetorical question: 'doesn't Derrida show that Levinas's 
overcoming of ontology is dependent upon the totalizing ontologies it sought to 
overcomeT [ED 13] In the innocent posing of this question, Critchley accepts 
that Levinas's comments on scepticism in Otherwise than Being are directed 
against Derrida's reading [OtB . 153ffl. In summarising 
Derrida's argument in 
'Violence and Metaphysics', Critchley presents it as the criticism of a self- 
contradictory discourse that even as it bespeaks another metaphysics of 
experience depends upon the language that it is seeking to criticise [ED 161]. 
12 We should perhaps note that Critchley does not wrestle with the issue of speech and writing. 
Derrida makes only cursory reference to this problem but that reference bites deep. Given 
Derrida's analyses of writing, when he asks whether one could invert all of Levinas's statements 
regarding the voice so as to use writing instead, isn't one obliged to note how central this 
question is to Derrida's general project? Not only does Derrida no * te that 
the writer makes himself 
[sic] absent and thereby better addresses himself to the other, but he also observes that Blanchot, 
a writer sympathetic to Levinas. disputes the pre-eminence granted to oral discourse and 
identifies it as a vestige of humanism. [VM 126-1271 
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Although not a scepticism, Levinas insists that the response of Saying is inspired 
by scepticism's suspicion of dogmatism. The persistent return of scepticism 
throughout the history of philosophy, despite its repeated refutation, shows that 
something of its'inspiration haunts philosophy, and that this refutation always 
takes the form of showing that scepticism disallows the pertinence of its 
comments as soon as it opens its mouth. In contrast, Critchley takes Levinas to 
be offering a VOtural critique of critique, which shows how scepticism returns 
after its refutation' [ED 162]. He equates this repositioning of an animating 
scepticism to the necessary problem of writing from within that which one 
opposes". Here lies the beginning of the romanticised understanding of Derrida 
and Levinas's 'conversation' or worse, 'exchange of gifts'. 
Our previous chapter emphasised the repeated objection that Totality and Infinity 
remains an empiricism that does not achieve the level of philosophical 
presentation. Critchley briefly deals with this reading at the beginning of his 
book: 'This seemingly disparaging remark would lead one to believe that 
Derrida's own position is opposed to - or at least differs from - that of 
empiricism. Strangely, this is not at all the case. ' [ED 141 Referring to Of 
Grammatology's discussion of the empiricist gesture within Derrida's work 
(Gramm 162], Critchley concludes that 'Derrida is trying to explicate certain 
necessities within discourse which all philosophers ... are obliged to face' [ED 
15] ". This is inadequate. Chiefly, this reading of deconstruction fails to 
foreground the reference to bricolage in 'Violence and Metaphysics' and Of 
Grammatology. It does not attend to the distinction made between bricolages - 
13 This reading dominates Critchley's thinking to the extent that he claims that phenomenology is 
premised upon the refutation of scepticism, insofar as phenomenology is founded by the 
'Prolegomena' to Husserl's Logical Investigations. But more accurately, psychologism is the 
target of that piece. Husserl is concerned to show that the laws of logic are not simply a 
contingent feature of the human psychology, but a transcendental condition of the possibility of 
meaning per se. That is, Husserl investigates intentionality after having shown that the meaning 
of the underlying Objectifying Act is only possible given logical laws that have normative 
character. Husserl grounds the ideality of meaning and language in the structural adequation 
between meaning and experience in the intentional act. This adequation of meaning and object of 
intentional act founds phenomenological methodology and depends upon the self-evidence 
Evidenz] of meaning. 
14 Critchley repeats this reading in the second edition of The Ethics of Deconstruction: 'Derrida is 
not denouncing an incoherence in Levinas ... rather he is wondering about the meaning of the 
necessity that provokes incoherence: a necessity to which Derrida's own discourse is subject. ' 
[ED 2571 
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some of them criticise themselves and leave an 'ultratranscendental track, that 
distinguishes it, however slightly from empiricism. What Derrida identifies in 
his critique, is not the problem of self-contradictory discourse, but that of 
justification of discourse. 
Certainly Derrida repeats formulations such as the following: 'We are not 
denouncing here an incoherence of language or a contradiction in the s%stem. 
We are wondering about the meaning of a necessity: the necessity of lodging 
oneself within traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it. ' [VI/I 139] But the 
philosophical challenge is to respond to that necessity by a new form of writing. 
a hyper-critical self-conscious writing that finds it necessary to use new 
operators: the graft, paleonymy, erasure, etc.. Levinas nowhere in Totalit-v and 
Infinity struggles with the demands of presentation. 
This is the de jure problem of critical philosophy - how is one justified in 
speaking this way? This distinction is tied to phenomenological Selbstbesinn ling 
- taking responsibility for sense through an investigation of conceptual resources 
and the quasi -transcendental structure of subjectivity. It is not that it triies to 
speak philosophically about that which cannot be spoken of philosophically, nor 
that it inevitably borrows from what it criticises, but that it does not make this a 
problem that it reflects upon, it does not raise its presentation to the level of 
philosophy by sufficiently justifying both its discourse and the object of that 
discourse. That is, Derrida does not irmtate the traditional arguments against 
scepticism but instead maintains the post-Kantian problematic of critical 
philosophy - how does one justifv the methodology, concepts, language and 
linguistic protocols adopted. Because Otherwise than Being is a niore 
metaphysical work than Totalitýý and Infinity, this problem of language is 
intensified not resolved. What is crucial is Levinas's relation to empiricism. not 
scepticism. 
NIN, reading is that Levinas, and Cntchley, both fundamentally misconstrue the 
I 
charges levelled at Levinas by Demda and that the alterations introduced by 
Othenvi'se than Bein,,,, make Dernda's criticism morc pertinent. Otherivise than 
Bein,,, continues to csp(-)use a Husserlian phenomenology - it is apparently the 
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method used to identify where concepts and being break up [OtB 183-84]. 
Levinas's metaphysical supplement to that break-up depends on mo planes. the 
ethical and the given of separation. The ethical may be unnameable in the 
language of the Said, but it is "postulated" as an idea, for Derrida. the 
unnameable is that which is not-yet-known, that which is to come. Where 
CrItchley writes of 'reduction' and the task of the philosopher as 'enacting a 
spiralling movement', an 'oscillation' between two orders [ED 2591, he nusses 
the fundamental point; Derrida's question is: what has justified the postillation of 
the two orders in the first place? It cannot be phenomenolooical description. 
This is more fundamental than the presentational issue of how to talk about the 
ethical order in the order of the Said. And it is not a problem confrontina 
deconstruction since that does not postulate an alternative plane of being as a 
positive infinite - the closure of an epoch is not postulated from a point external 
to that epoch. 
In answer to our first question, we can say, 'no' - the main criticism made by 
Derrida in 'Violence and Metaphysics' has been misunderstood by both Levinas 
and Critchley. The second asks whether the introduction of the Saying and the C 
Said can meet this criticism. Before concluding, we need to examine some other 
comments that Levinas makes about critical philosophical presentation. These 
relate first to ideology. 
11 
Empricism, Scepticism and Ideology 
In 'Violence and Metaphysics', Derrida suggested that Levinas had a certain 
non-Marxist conception of philosophy as ideology in that reason was held to 
cover over its \, iolent aims in the suppression of the other and its complicity with 
a certain bureaucratic reduction of the individual [ý`Al Efl. In Othenvise thall 
is Beino. Lc\inas responds to questions about whether his own discourse i 
ideological or illusory. What is revealing is the manner in which the 
fundamental question is evaded in his response. 
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It is developed in relation to the distinction between being and not being. where 
the otherwise than being marks an excluded middle as capacity of the human: the 
potential to escape the objective order. 
'Even if the ego were but a reflection forming an illusion and contenting 
itself with false semblances, it would have a signification of its own 
precisely as this possibility of quitting the objective and universal order and 
abiding in itself. Quitting the objective order is possible in the direction of a 
responsibility beyond freedom as well as toward the freedom without 
responsibility of play. ' [OtB 197 n. 24] 
There are different possibilities for the human individual to leave objective 
being, exemplified by the opposition of play and responsibility. Ho,, %-ever, the 
possibility of disinterestedness only lies with responsibility ". Levinas's 
endeavour is to avoid a philosophy of immanentism, associated with Zeno, 
Spinoza and Hegel, where existence 'has no exits' [OtB 176]. Levinas raises, or 
stirs up, the possibility that not all meaning proceeds from essence. 
Involving a pun in the French, disinteresse implies selflessness but also can be 
read as dýsinter-esse - to remove oneself from being, as in the Latin verb to be, 
esse (&re). Play is allied with distraction and intoxication as a false attempt to 
evade the seriousness of responsibility. Justice, on the other hand, requires dis- 
inter-estedness which, Levinas claims, separates all 'truth from ideolocxv' [OtB 
45, OtB 190 fn. 341. Here is confirmed Derrida's diagnosis regarding Levinas's 
use of the term: ideology relates to a motivation hidden behind reasoning', every 
move of consciousness on behalf of itself (consciousness's conatus) is 
rationalization or 'Ile' [OtB 1311. Since the disinterested has no such motivation, 
it is free from such suspicion. 
'The word bertci-, and the Good it expresses ... perhaps makes all our 
discussion suspect of being "ideology. " But the least intoxicated and most 
lucid humanity of our time ... has in its clarity no other shadow, in its rest no 
other disquietude or insomnia than what comes from the destitution of the 
others. its insomnia is but the absolute impossibility to slip a%ýay and distract 
oneself. ' [OtB 931 
15 Teing is play or d6tente. without rcsponsibility. where ever\, thing possible is permitted. ' [OrB 
6] 
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The clarity of consciousness is overshadowed by other unethical concerns, while 
the disinterested is only oriented by destitution. This concern is pure to a degree 
which renders all 'science' suspect insofar as it privileges truth-content over the 
individual. Levinas attributes this modem phenomenon to Hegel who reduces 
existence to the game of unfolding the combinations of reason: 'It has made us 
think that [truth] rather resides in the unsurpassable plenitude of the content 
thought. In our days truth is taken to result from the effacing of the living man 
behind the mathematical structures that think themselves out in him, rather than 
he that thinks them. ' [translation altered] [OtB 58] The human sciences 
exemplify this concern for empirical content in an atrophied theoreticism that 
studies the conditioned nature of thought over and against practical demands 
created by the fact of destitution. Here Levinas repeats the Kantian gesture of 
the primacy of the practical orientation of reason over the theoretical. 
'[The scientist] runs the risk of taking his desires as realities without 
realizing it, of letting himself be guided by interests which introduce an 
inadmissible trickery into the play of concepts (despite the control and 
criticism that his partners or team-members can exercise), and of thus 
expounding an ideology as science. The interests that Kant discovered in 
theoretical reason itself subordinated it to practical reason, which becomes 
reason pure and simple. It is just these interests that are contested by 
structuralism, which is perhaps to be defined by the primacy of theoretical 
reason. But disinterestedness is beyond essence. ' [OtB 58] 
That is, the concern for theoretical truth can be in the service of a state- 
dominated status quo. The very suggestion that Levinas'. s concepts and system 
might be ideologically subtended is rebutted by the counter-claim that sees any 
such question as politically motivated by a cynical indifference". It is only 
through orientation by practical reason that dogmatism, ideology and a certain 
quietism is avoided". Regarding the last, Levinas rejects the 'wolf-stepping 
16 The human sciences have to mimic a cynical, sober society: 'in order to account for the 
impossible indifference with regard to the human which does not succeed in dissimulating itself 
in the incessant discourse about the death of God, the end of man and the disintegration of the 
world ... but in which the wreckage preceding the catastrophe itself, 
like rats abandoning the ship 
before the shipwreck, come to us in already insignificant signs of language in dissemination. ' 
[OtB 59] One might hazard the 'reminiscence' that 'dissemination' here names Derrida. There is 
a further reference to the 'jetsam of dissemination' at OtB 47. 
17 Cf. Caygill's suggestion that the distinction between theoretical and practical reason is 
suspended in Levinas [L&P 1001. 
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movement of discourse' found in the later Heidegger: the 'extreme prudence to 
not frighten the game perhaps dissimulates the impossibility of not flushing it 
out' [OtB 182]. To this end, transcendence is contrasted with 'house-keeping' 
[OtB 184]. 
This transcendence is integral to the valuation of the human found in those issues 
which prove rebarbative to science and are excluded without warrant. The pure 
experience of fraternity proves to transcend the questiom 'men stand who have 
never been more moved ... than by other men in whom they recognize an 
identity even in the indiscemibility of their mass presence, and before whom they 
find themselves irreplaceable and unique in responsibility' [OtB 58]. It becomes 
a form of baseline, ethical cogito. Although Levinas mentioins the 'suspicion' 
generated by psychoanalysis and sociology, and indeed references Ricoeur's The 
Conflict of Interpretations here [OtB 191 fn. 43], he concludes: 
'But we do not need this knowledge in the relationship in which the other is a 
neighbor and in which before being an individuation of the genus man, a 
rational animal, afree will, or any essence whatever, he is the persecuted one 
for whom I am responsible to the point of being hostage for him, and in 
which my responsibility, instead of disclosing me in my "essence" as a 
transcendental ego, divests me without stop of all that can be common to me 
and another man, who would thus be capable of replacing me. ' [OtB 59] 
Somehow the very notion of responsibility evades essence, being, consciousness 
and all that is prey to the masters of suspicion (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud)". That 
is, there are 'complexes' that cover over the individual, but these 'do not alter 
this holiness, but sanction the struggle for exploited man' [OtB 59]". 
But surely it is one thing to advocate a feeling of compassion for fellow humans, 
another to interpret this as responding to the holiness of 'man""? Is it only 
18 See Paul Ricoeur Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation translated by Dennis 
Savage (New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1970), p. 32ff. 
") 'One can call it utopian, yet it is the exact situation of men, at least in our time, when 
intellectuals feel themselves to be hostages for destitute masses unconscious of their 
wretchedness. Intellectuals are today mistrustful of a philosophy of the one keeper of his brother, 
the-one -for- the-other set forth as significations par excellence; they would scornfully call 
it 
humanist and even hagiographical. ' [OtB 166, cf. OtB 184] 
20 On the alterity of the other, '... on ne peut pas mettre en question la sainteti. . .. La prioriti 
de 
Vaurre sur moi, je Vappelle saintetg. ' (one cannot question the holiness .... The priority of the 
other over me, I call holiness) Autrement que Savoir, p. 72. 
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because of holiness that any struggle is sanctioned? The charge of ideolov', in z::: c I: ) - 
Levinas is dismissed with what amounts to a one-line argument and contrasts I= 
badly with Ricoeur's appreciation of the need for a hermeneutic method to 
mediate itself through the discourses of suspicion. 
But where is the argument to demonstrate that this ascription of saintliness is not 
merely subjective? What is Levinas's argument in favour of prophecy as 
opposed to reducing it to an ideological fonnation? 
'That prophecy could take on the appearances of information circulating 
among others, issued from the subject or from influences undergone by the 
subj, ect, starting with those that would come from its own physiology, or 
from its wounds or its triumphs - that is the enigma, the ambiguity, but also 
the order of transcendence, of the Infinite. The Infinite would be belied in 
the proof that the finite would like to give of its transcendence; entering into 
conjunction with the subject that would make it appear, it would lose its 
glory. Transcendence owes it to itself to interrupt its own demonstration. Its 
voice has to fall silent as soon as one hears from it its message [Sa voiX doit 
se taire dýs qu'on en icoute le message]. It is necessary that its pretension 
be exposed to derision and refutation, to the point of suspecting in the "here I 
am" that attests to it a cry or a slip of a sick subjectivity. But of a 
subjectivity responsible for the other [autre]! There is an enigmatic 
ambivalence, and an alternating of meaning in it. In its saying, the said and 
being are stated, but also a witness, an inspiration of the same by the other 
[Autre], beyond essence, an overflowing of the said itself by a rhetoric which 
is not only a linguistic mirage, but a surplus of meaning of which 
consciousness all by itself would be incapable. Here there is a possibility 
both of ideology and of sacred delirium: ideology to be circumvented by 
linguistics, sociology and psychology; delirium to be reduced by philosophy, 
to be reduced to signification, the -one -for-the -other, a mission toward 
Another [vers Autrui] in the glory of the Infinite. Transcendence, the 
beyond essence which is also being-in-the -world, requires ambiguity, a 
blinking of meaning which is not only a chance certainty, but a frontier both 
ineffaceable and finer than the tracing of an ideal line. It needs the diachrony 
that breaks the unity of transcendental apperception, which does not succeed 
in gathering together [rassembler] the time of modem humanity. in turn 
passing from prophecy to philology and transcending philology (for it is 
incapable of denying the fraternity of men) toward prophetic signification. ' 
[OtB 152, AqE 238 translation modified] 
There are several important points contained in this passage. Firstly, one could 
note the re, -, Ister of 
incarnation that brings the *Judaic' themes close to those 
enfolding the incarnation in Christian atonement theorv - i. e.. the necessarv II- 
exposure and humility endured by the prophetic and the -Niessiah. 
The Infinite 
must be incarnated through the subýject but in so doing commits itself to an 
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essential ambiguity or enigmaticity, whose surplus can only be measured bý the 
inspiration generated. Secondly, although the human sciences might circumvent 
this problem of inspiration, they cannot ultimately account for the experience of 
fraternity otherwise. Thirdly - and this is elided in Lingis's translation 2iven its 
retreat from any distinction in the English between Vautre, 1'Autre, and I'Autrin 
- 1'Autrui is positioned in the airriing at transcendence that plzilosophicalýy 
reduces sacred delirium - that is, the religious transformation of enthusiasm into 
a practice of social relations as outlined in Chapter Two. Fourthlý, ', 
transcendental apperception is held to be incapable of collecting modem 
humanity into a constructive, productive force. This latter point in favour of 
transcendence over and against transcendentality is not investigated further in 
Otherwise than Being. It rather repeats the persistent theme, practical reason and 
that for which one can hope in the name of fraternity displaces any question of 
ideology. 
This invoked diachrony leads to the discussion of scepticism and the challenge of 
writincy from within manifest being towards the beyond. Levinas admits that his 
book is intended as philosophy and therefore makes recourse to systematic 
language,. but that objections against his misuse of that language are 'facile' and C) I-D 
like those thrown at scepticism [OtB 155]. The 'extraordinary possibility' of 
scepticism lies in its reminder to philosophy that the said, which is unable to hold 
up its independent truth claim, depends on a pre-originary saying that cannot be z: - 
fully thernatized [OtB 192 fn. 181. '[Theoretical propositions] do not answer the 
proximity of the neighbor. ' [OtB 155] But the attempt to reveal this deficit must 
be made in language: t: ) 
'By the very fact of formulating statements, is not the universality of the 
thematized. that is, of being, confirmed by the pr Ject of the present 01 
discussion, which ventures to question this universality? Does this discourse 
remain then coherent and philosophical? These are farniliar objections! ... 
our whole purpose was to ask if subjectivity, despite its forcianness to the 
said. is not statcd by an abuse of language through which in the indiscretion 
of the said everything is shown. Everything is shown by indeed betraving its I-t 
rneaning, but philosophy is called upon to reduce that betrayal. by an abuse 
that justifies proxirnitý itself in which the Infinite comes to pass. ' [OtB 155- 
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Despite the invocation of scepticism, the endeavour remains closer to negative 
theology since it insists from the beginning on postulating something beyond 
language at which the abuse of language aims. The demand is on Levinas both 
to justify that postulation and the success of the abuse of language. On the one 
hand there is the saying of the speaker who produces what congeals into the said, 
this saying can also be an unsaying and is essential to the diachonic passing from 
prophecy to philology and back [OtB 62]. On the other hand, there is a 
signifyingness that belongs to a different diachrony - the diachrony which 
resides at the heart of subjective temporalisation: the explication of this 
diachrony attempts to justify the assertion that 'subjectivity is foreign to the 
said'. The intelligibility of this structure will animate substitution and 
responsi6ility". 
The key move in this argument is the insistence that the oscillation between 
prophecy and philosophy or philology is never maintained simultaneously - it is 
never allowed to come together in the coherent presence of a system. This 
should be seen as a response to Derrida, since in 'Violence and Metaphysics' he 
makes the point explicit: 
the expression "infinitely other" or "absolutely other" cannot be stated 
and thought simultaneously; that the other cannot be absolutely exterior to 
the same without ceasing to be other; and that, consequently, the same is not 
a totality closed in open itself, an identity playing with itself, having only the 
appearance of alterity, in what Levinas calls economy, work, and history. ' 
[VM 158 my emphasis]" 
The later might be seen to prompt the opening frames of Otherwise than Being, 
and indeed the title: 'To be or not to be is not the question where transcendence 
is concerned. The statement of being's other, of the otherwise than being, claims 
21 In his introduction to the translation of Otherwise than Being, Lingis distinguishes two kinds of 
saying: one (A) that is expressive of inner sensation which is distinct from the saying (B) that 
makes entities 'exhibit themselves': 'There is a sensitivity to the other, a saying that is the 
sensibility's being-for-the-other [B], which sustains the saying that is nominalization and 
predication (A]. ' [OtB xxvi] I think it is more accurate to distinguish B in terms of 
'signifyingness' - the attempt to 'say' it always requires 'unsaying' since it is to treat it as 
something that can be exhibited by entities, which is an always abusive assumption. Though 
Levinas does write of 'saying without the said' in this regard. 
22 This comment is supplemented by a footnote to the cited segment 'the other cannot be 
absolutely exterior I: 'Or at least cannot be ... ' (VM 404 fri. 45]. 
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to state a difference over and beý'ond that which separatcs being from 
nothingness - the very difference of the beyond, the difference of transcendence. * 
[OtB 3] The insistence of departing from synchonicity breaches Derrida's 
charge. Levinas writes: 
'The periodic return of skepticism and of its refutation signify a temporality 
in which the instants refuse memory which recuperates and represents. 
Skepticism ... 
is a refusal to synchronize the implicit affirmation contained 
in saying and the negation which this affirmation states in the said. The 
contradiction is visible to reflection, which refutes it. but skepticism is 
insensitive to the refutation, as though the affirmation and negation did not b 
resound in the same time. ' [OtB 167-168 my emphasis] 
The claim is that post-factum reflecting consciousness oversees the coherence of 
the set of statements but is not sensitive to a difference between the saying of the 
said, and saying as exposure. 
For Levinas, Western philosophy is philosophy of the Same, because it believes 
that the saying is exhausted in the said, but scepticism uncovers what is covered 
and dominated in this privilege of the said [OtB 168]. What Levinas attempts to 
valorise is this interval that eludes synchronised statements. He distinguishes in Cý 
this regard two kinds of intelligibility: 'To intelligibility as impersonal logos is 
opposed intelligibility as proximity. ' [OtB 167] 
Tn certain aspects, this might chime with Derrida's opposition to logocentrism, 
were it not for the fact that Levinas's opposition to the impersonal depends on a 
privileging of presence since it is primarily the valorisation of, the voice and sclf- 
presence - the very personality of the first person. As we will see, this does not 
quite resolve the issue, since Otherwise than Being will reposition the psyche as 
the fundamental structure underneath the speaking ego. This set aside. Levinas 
points towards a writing form that would evade the apparent need to subordinate 
the second intelligibility of proximity, to the first of logos and statement". But 
such philosophical writing , vould still endeavour to indicate this unthernatisable 
onginary saying, and in this way its task is 4 ... to measure the pre-ontologrical 
'3 .... -ery discussion which %ýe are pursuing at this moment counts by its said, since in since the N 
thernatizing we are synchronizing the terms. forming a system among them. using the %erb to he. 
placing in being, all signification that allegedly signifies beyond being? Or must ýýe reinvoke 
alternation and diachroný as the time of philosophy"' [OtB 167] 
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weight of language instead of taking it only as code (which it is also)' [OtB 43]2' 
Here this task again echoes Husserlian phenomenology, in its reference to 
reduction: 
'We must go back to their signification beyond ... the comprehending 
activity or passivity in being, the said, the logos and the amphibology of 
being and entities. The "reduction" is made in this movement. It involves a 
positive phase: to show the signification proper to the saying on the hither 
side of the thematization of the said. ' [OtB 43 cf. OtB 53] 
Philosophy, for Levinas, would perform an 'endless critique' of the said and in 
doing so loosens 'the grip of being' [OtB 44] in order to uncover the more 
fundamental signification that is accessed only from the said, the 'simultaneity' 
which is only the situation of the speaking ego [OtB 77]. 
Levinas's discussion of ideology and scepticism do not adequately respond to the 
critical questions put by Derrida in 'Violence and Metaphysics' and hence 
Critchley's attempt to connect the Saying / Said distinction to Derrida's 
deconstructive writing is fundamentally misguided. 
III 
The New Topography of the Psyche 
However, the introduction in Otherwise than- Being of the contrast and non- 
simultaneity between the signifying of originary proximity and the speaking ego 
(speaking takes place in the same time as being) opposes the model of separation 
from Totality and Infinity, 'as though speaking consisted in translating thoughts 
into words and consequently in having been first for-oneself and at home with 
oneself [chez soi], like a substantial consistency' [OtB 48]. 
"' 'If man were only a saying correlative with the logos, subjectivity could as well be understood 
as a function or as an argument of being. But the signification of saying goes beyond the said. ' M 
[OtB 371 One could also connect the notion of the 'pre-ontological weight' of language with 
Derrida's interest in the 'originary appurtenance' of language and desire. 
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The separated ego in its dwelling was precisely a substantial consistency only 
subsequently ruptured by the master. Levinas equates the saying of proximity to 
a no longer dwelling, a visceral 'fission' of self: 'This being tom up from oneself 
in the core of one's unity, this absolute non-coinciding, this diachrony of the 
instant, signifies in the form of one-penetrated-by-the-other. The pain, this 
underside of skin, is a nudity more naked than all destitution. ' [OtB 49] 
Otherwise than Being offers a completely different account of human individuals 
as others. No longer is there offered an account of the separated egoist being 
encountering a teacher who brings more than the being contains. Nearly every 
aspect of this model is absent". 
'These are not events that happen to an empirical ego, that is, to an ego 
already posited and fully identified, as a trial that would lead it to being more 
conscious of itself, and make it more apt to put itself in the place of others. 
What we are here calling oneself, or the other in the same, where inspiration 
rouses respiration, the very pneuma of the psyche, precedes this empirical 
order, which is part. of being, of the universe, of the State, and is already 
conditioned in a system. Here we are trying to express the unconditionality 
of a subject, which does not have the status of a principle. ' [OtB 115-116] 
If in Totality and Infinity, exteriority is produced through metaphysical Desire, 
here that exteriority is held to precede any empirical order, and therefore any 
hypostasis: the 'oneself', the 'other in the same' is already 'conditioned in a 
system"'. Otherwise than Being makes no reference to a master or teaching, but 
in a couple of essays contemporary with it.. the question of 'awakening' or 
(sobering' is raised for which an 'empirical encounter' is necessary". 
'In the awakening, between the Same and the Other, a relation irreducible to 
adversity and conciliation, alienation and assimilation appears. Here, the 
25 Though such an 'absence' could indicate that the two analyses cover different 'terrain', and are 
not understood to be mutually exclusive, Levinas's failure to explain this relation leads one to 
suspect that the earlier positions are retracted. For an alternative account, see UP 93-96. See, 
in addition, infia Chapter 1, p. 75, fn. 93. 
26 We might ask how it is within a system, yet able to escape being, but we have already noted 
that the limited thinking of 'being' is constitutive of Levinas's philosophy. 
27 See 'From Consciousness to Wakefulness' [1974] in DEwH 153-68. 'Philosophy and 
Awakening' [1977] in DEwH 169-79. In a contribution to Autrement que Savoir, Levinas insists 
that the encounter [rencontrej is the 'conjoncture ori . ginelle et indispensable' a form of 
'interpellation' where *quelqu'un disant <je* s'adresse a autrui* (someone saying T addresses 
another) [op. cit. p. 681. 
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Other, instead of alienating the uniqueness of the Same which it disturbs and 
holds, only calls it up from the depths of itself to what is deeper than itself. 
whither nothing and no one can replace it. Would this already be 
responsibility for the other person? The Other calling the Same in the 
deepest part of itself! ' [DEwH 16 1] 
While there might appear to be a conflict between this awakeninL, and the 
repudiation of becoming 'more conscious' contained in the previous citation. 
consistent in the two is the theme of returning to 'inner depths' covered o-ver, 
rather than reaching out to the height of the Other. It is still necessary for the 
subject to be "uprooted" from its egoism [DEwH 163], and indeed this uprooting. 
in which the primary nature of identification is unsettled, takes place through the 
gaze of the Other [DEwH 165] - undoubtedly an implicit reference to Sartre 
more than Husserl". The encounter with the other at this level reveals the more 
originary traurnatism, 'the first movement towards the other person' [DEwH 178- 
791. 
Returning to Otherwise than Being, we can see that Levinas takes his new 
resources from Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. Here 
he finds an account of the composite nature of the present in temporalization 
whose discontinuity is covered over by the activity of the conscious ego. The 
section from "Time and Discourse" on Sensuous Lived Experience is replete with 
references to this text [OtB 31ff. ]. Utilisincy the vocabulary of retention and 
protention", Levinas describes consciousness as the management of time that can Z: -) 
be recuperated - the activities of memory and historiography attempt to construct 
what has been lost, but there is something more ancient than these are able to Cý 
recapture: the flow of the Urimpression (primal impression) in which perceived, 
perception and perceiver are mixed [OtB 32]. Levinas takes this to be the true 
definition of the presencing of the present - an upsurge that overcomes or 
exceeds objectifying consciousness. Here: 
2'ý 'In the -secoiidariness" in which, facing the face of the other (and all the expressivity of the 
other body of %vhich Husserl speaks is the openness and ethical exigency of the face). the 
primordial sphere loses its priority, subjectivity aýýakens from the egoloLical - from egoism and 
cý-lotism. ' [DEM 177J 
Beirig is a manifestation in \\hich uncertain memory and aleatory anticipation are moored; 
being is a presence to the gaze and to speech, an appearing, a phenomenOrC [Enigtna 66] 
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'Husserl will then have liberated the psyche from the primacý- of the 
theoretical neither in the order of know-how with equipment nor in that of 
axiological emotion, nor in the thought of Being. different from ffic 
metaphysics of entities. Rather, objectifying consciousness, the hegemoný' of 
re-presentation, is paradoxically surmounted in the consciousness of the 
present. " [OtB 33] 
This living present can only be recuperated by a consciousness that thernatizes it 
and puts it back into the 'normal order'. Levinas claims that Husserl's great 
discovery is this living present that escapes non-theoretical intentionalitý' - its 
significations are not those of appearing, consciousness and representation [OtB 
65]. Unfortunately, in Levinas's view, Husserl sought to objectify this field. 
'A -putting the self-identity of the living present out of phase, in the 
intentionality of retentions and protentions, the flow looks like a 
multiplication of modification dispersing from the living present. In Husserl. 
the time structure of sensibility is a time of what can be recuperated. The 
thesis that the non-intentionality of the primal retention is not a loss of 
consciousness, that nothing can be produced in a clandestine way, that 
nothing can break the thread of consciousness, excludes from time the 
irreducible diachrony whose meaning the present study aims to bring to light, 
behind the exhibiting of being. ' [OtB 33-34] 
We see here the key moves: the equation of this diachrony with a sensibility that 
is not amenable to consciousness's representation and the labelling of this 
structure the psyche. The psyche has a function in Otherwise than Being that it 
did not have in Totality and Infinity (if indeed that term even appeared in the 
earlier book). Instead of providing an account of an ego qua hypostasis in being, 
which is then ruptured, the new account of diachrony places the rupture prior to 
any egoic formation at the very root of internal temporalization, at the 
'astonishing divergence of the identical from itselff [OtB 28]. The dehiscence 
or diastasis of the identical underlies any unity of apperception which is always 
'recapture and reminiscence"', the ego-subject's consciousness is simply part of 
the 'way being carries on' [OtB 134]. 
30 . Being's essence is the temporalization of time, the diastasis of the identical and its recapture 
or reminiscence. the unity of apperception. Essence does not first designate the edges of'solids or 
the mo\ Ing line of acts in \\hich a light glimmers: it designates this "modification" without 
alteration or transition. independent of all qualitative determination, more formal than the silent 
using up of things which reveals their becoming alread,, weighted do\\ n with matter. the creaking 
ota piece of furniture m the silence of the night. ' [OtB 29-30] 1 
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The question is whether this remainder can be redeemed. Levinas believes it 
can: 'Already the synthesis of retentions and protentions in which Husserl's 
phenomenological analysis, through an abuse of language, recuperates the lapse, 
bypasses the ego. ' [OtB 51-52] It is necessary however to develop the 
appropriate abuse of language. Critchley summarises this as follows: 'Levinas's 
basic and extraordinary claim is that the concrete case in which time 
temporalizes itself as diachrony is in the everyday event of my responsibility for 
the Other. The Other's alterity is that which I cannot lay hold of, that which 
always exceeds my grasp or my free decision. ' [ED 166] The move that Levinas 
has to make is to demonstrate or construct this connection between a remainder 
and an 'everyday experience': fraternal responsibility. This is the primary 
motivation for the development for the thematics of signifyingness and saying". 
As noted by Lingis, no 'metalanguage' can capture this remainder or distension: 
'Philosophy has to exist in this ambivalence, between the intelligibility of system 
and synchrony and the intelligibility of signifyingness itself which is assymetry 
and diachrony. ' [OtB xxxviij The distinction between the saying and the said 
attempts to foreground this problem to avoid the absorption of everything into 
the said. But it also poi nts to this 'primal impression' as a saying without a said 
[OtB 45], a fundamental signifyingness not incorporated into the said at all. This 
should be stressed, since on occasions it seems that the saying is understood only 
as an attempt to speak the beyond being, the infinite, in the language of being. 
The 'saying without the said' points to a fundamental result of phenomenological 
research, one that is again taken up and reinterpreted by Levinas. So, 'What does 
saying signify before signifying a saidT [OtB 461 
31 One could speculate here on the influence of Derrida's essay on 'The Origin of Geometry', 
which insists on the themes of delay, dehiscence, and difference at the core of the Living Present: 
separation of constituted and constituting (understood in the Western tradition as Thought and 
Being) would happen after the fact. 'Difference would be transcendental. The pure and 
interminable disquietude of thought striving to "reduce" Difference by going beyond factual 
infinity toward the infinity of its sense and value, i. e., while maintaining Difference - that 
disquietude would be transcendental. And Thought's pure certainty would be transcendental. 
since it can look forward to the already announced Telos only by advancing on (or being in 
advance of) the Origin that indefinitely reserves itself. ' [Origin 153] 'Transcendantale serait la 
Diffirence. Transcendantale serait Vinquiitude pure et interminable de la pensie ceuvrant ei 
, vr6duire. * la Diffirence en e-xcgdant Vinfiniti jactice vets Vinfiniti 
de son sens et de sa valeur, 
c'est-a-dire en maintenant la Diffigrence. Transcendentale serait la certitude pure d'une Pensie 
qui, tie pouvant attendre iers le Telos qui s'annonce d9jci qu'en avanqant sur l'Origine qui 
indifiniment se riserve. [OG 17 1 
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'It [saying] imprints its trace on the thematization itself. which hesitates 
between, on the one hand, structuration, order of a configuration of entities, 
world and history for historiographers and, on the other hand, the order of 
non-nominalized apophansis of the other, in which the said remains a 
proposition, a proposition made to the neighbour, "a signifyingness dealt" 
[significance baillee] to the other. ' [OtB 46-47] 
By shifting the connection to the other here, Levinas believes he has found the 
source of the attention through which intentionality is awakened in the first place 
[OtB 29]. In this way, he breaks with an intersubjectivity of we and dialogue, 
which always assumes the 'we' that is to be demonstrated (not to mention, the 
32 
presumption of free beings engaging in banter) [OtB 119-20] . Intentionality 
begins instead in proximity -a thernatization of the way in which sensibility 
itself motivates consciousness [OtB 63]33. Proximity understands intentionality 
to commence from a command or a wound, a trauma irrecuperable to memory 
[OtB 88]. 
'The saying in which a speaking subject is exposed to the other is not 
reducible to the objectification of a theme stated. Who then came to wound 
the subject so that he should expose his thoughts or expose himself in his 
saying? ' [OtB 84] 
Proximity underscores a disjunctive, disturbing, forgotten (though never present 
to consciousness) engagement with the other: this is an engagement with 
'humanity' [OtB 81-83] but without mediation or ideality [OtB 100]. The 
question is then raised: what is opened by uncovering this structure? It must 
somehow construct a different possibility for consciousness and the ego on new 
terrain: 
'We must stay with the extreme situation of a diachronic thought. 
Skepticism ... set forth and 
betrayed the diachrony of ... conveying and 
betraying. To conceive the otherwise than being requires, perhaps, as much 
audacity as shown by scepticism shows, when it does not hesitate to affirm 
32 'Astonished to find itself implicated in the world of objects ... consciousness will search its 
memory for the forgotten moment in which unbeknownst to itself it allied with objects or 
consented to apperceive itself in union with them. Such a moment, when awakened by memory, 
would become, after the event, the instant of an alliance made in full freedom. Such a reduction 
refuses the irreducible anarchy of responsibility for another. ' (OtB 76] 
33 'The other to whom the petition of the question is addressed foes not belong to the intelligible 
sphere to be explored. He stands in proximity. ' [OtB 25] 
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the impossibility of statement "hile venturinL, to realize this impossibility by 
the very statement of this impossibility. ' [OtB 7] 
As already noted, and in contrast to some current readings. Levinas does not Z1- 
espouse a scepticism. Instead he seeks a new path with diachrony. Its audacity 
lies in equating the hold the Good has over the present with that diachron--,.! which 
prevents the subject from 'joining up with itself like a transcendental ego' [OtB 
57]. Emblazoned in two section headings from Chapter Five, Levinas opposes 
the "Subject as Speaking that is Absorbed in the Said" to the "Responsible 
Subject that is not Absorbed in Being". The responsible subject attempts to 
extend the diachronic remainder and resist the pull of unified egoity, of self- 
possession, by maintaining or exposing the basic vulnerability of sensibility. 
This is an interpretation akin to that already discussed in Part One of this thesis. 
With respect to this vulnerability, Levinas holds that sensibility is meaningful in 
a manner that undercuts Husserl's understanding of meaningful intentionality 
[OtB 66]. One might see a slip based on the play in the notion of 
meaningfulness, but the claim remains that the psyche is constituted in 
conjunction with the attempt to preserve this diachronic structure (what 
'signification signifies before it gets bent into perseverance 1. n being in the midst 
of a Nature' [OtB 68]) outside consciousness and ecyo. This figure is repositioned zn 
through the synonym of 'maternity" - the psyche is presented as being bound to 
others before its own body [OtB 67,108 etc. ]. The relation to the neighbour as 
one of indebtedness is the embodiment of this new mode -a mode alternatively 
described as an 'obsession with all the others' [OtB 77]. 
We should pause here to make a few observations before moving to consider 
both this new structure of psyche and ego as competing components ý\, ithin the Zt7 
individual and the new Infinite generated by the practice of nazirate. giý'Ing the Cý IC 
bread out of one's own mouth, appropriate to this 'matemal'. vulnerable psyche. 
We will ask in what way it can be understood to escape being. 
34 . Not because. as preori-inal, it would be more originary than the origin, but because the 
diachrony of sensibility. which cannot be assembled in a representational pre,, cnt, refers ,, ) an 
irrecuperable pre-ontolugical past. that of maternitý .' 
[OtB S1 
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In relation to this use of 'maternity', Sandford has argued that the new catecrory 
cannot be understood to undo or replace the category of 'paternity' in Totalirý' 
and Infinity, nor can it displace the concerns outlined in the earlier chapters about 
'tý, 35 Levinas's sexism. She further notes that maternity does not generate fratemi 
.. 
I agree. However, whilst not generating fraternity, maternity is the name for a 
psychical structuring that best preserves fundamental fraternity. As re2ards this 
new thinking of affective sensibility, Sandford notes that Derrida either failed to 
take this into account in 'Violence and Metaphysics' or assumed it was 
subordinated to conceptual formation S36. I feel that this dimension was simpl-,,, - 
absent from Totality and Infinity and that Derrida's asides regarding the 
'encounter' with the master led to this fundamental rethink. Need is surpassed 
by desire in the earlier work, and desire is in no sense tied to sensibility there - it 
is desire for the infinite Other. Though that encounter is also a disturbance or 
shock, irreducible to phenomenology, it is distinct from the trauma described in 
the later book. Shock breached a formed ego, trauma is held to lie beneath all 
consciousness and ego-formation. The claim to a new intelligibility, or 
meaningfulness, of sensibility in proximity is a new, distinct topographý' of the 
other. Sandford continues by querying this claim: 'It is the possibility of being 
intelligible otherwise, rather than recalcitrant to intelligibility, that concerns 
Levinas here, thus seemingly undermining the idea that it is affectivity that is 
doing the work. ' 37 She insists that the claim that the senses have a unique 
meaning is unjustified, with the consequence that the phenomenological 
underpinnings of this narrative 'collapse 131. My suggestion is that Levinas 
believes ethics qua response is doing the work that redeems the affective 
remainder - the wound or command or trauma - as long as ethics is understood 
as the nazirate and not the earlier thernatization of apology. 
In apology, my world, the egoist usurpation from being, is offered to the Other Z: ý 
once its arbitrariness is revealed. Here there is no conscious world-for-me as .,, ct. 
In this way, though agreeing with Sandford's conclusions, I feel there is a further 
35 Thelletaphysics oj'Love pp. 90-92. 
Ibid. p. II 
Ibid. p. I IS. 
-'s Ibid. p. 1 25-27. 
-1().; 
Chapter 4 Otherwise than Being 
step to be investigated here - the manner in which the nazirate develops from the 
4 matemal' psyche and instantiates the glory of the Infinite. The nazirate is a 
practice of ritualised fasting whereby what would have been eaten is given to 
others: 'There 'must be a nazirate so that the third world, so-called 
underdeveloped mankind, can eat its fill, so that the West, despite its abundance, 
does not revert to the level of an underdeveloped mankind .... To feed the world 
is a spiritual activity. "' 
To further detail this conception of subjectivity, it is necessary to understand the 
radical disjunction or distension introduced into this structure by Levinas: the 
self is not identical to the ego. The psyche will be seen to play a different role 
too. 
The PsYche 
As already noted, consciousness is understood as consciousness of being, while 
subjectivity, the self, is associated with the 'other in the same' [OtB 25]. The self 
[le soi, or se, soi] is distinct from the ego [le Moi] [OtB 15]. The self is 
understood as a 'passivity that cannot be taken up' by ego and its consciousness 
[OtB 54]; it is that which is wounded or named by the command [OtB 53]. It is 
that which is individualised, as me (moi in lower case) [OtB 127; AqE 201]. The 
me is not an example or realisation of the general category of ego - the latter 
being associated here with the transcendental. ego and an assertion of identity 
across multiple times [OtB 99]. In this regard, the me is individualised in a 
manner distinct from the I (je), which on Levinas's reading is a fiction: 'there is 
nothing that is named I; the I is said by him that speaks' [OtB 56]. He goes on: 
'The pronoun already dissimulates the unique one that is speaking, subsumes it 
under a concept. But it designates only the mask or the person of the unique one, 
the mask that leaves the I evading concepts, the I involved in saying in the first 
person, absolutely unconvertible into a noun. ' [OtB 56]' 
39 'The Youth of Israel' p. 133. Caygill notes that Levinas proposes the West's general adoption 
of the nazirate so that 'it does not revert to the level of an undeveloped mankind' [L&P 156]. 
'0 'With that (what? ] right does the idealist extract the ego from being and confer upon it a 
transcendental status, when the subject returns to being in the very stability of its statusT [OtB 
1631 
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The self, which cannot be described on basis of intentionality and 
representational activity [OtB 53], is a 'restless', a 'knot' that does not represent 
the disruption of, the other, but rather goes towards the other without concern for 
conscious recuperation [OtB 84]. In the recurrence of this "movement", a unique 
structure is deposited, or tied, that is represented stylistically by Levinas's 
predeliction for reflexive, pronomial verbs, which unsettle the agency encoded in 
transitive sequences ". The self, le soi-meme, is not an 'ideal pole of 
identification across psychic silhouettes' [OtB 104]. Instead it forms a unique 
arrangement that is neither thing nor being. 
'The uncancellable recurrence of the oneself in the subject is prior to any 
distinction between moments which could present themselves to a 
synthesizing activity of identification and assemblage to recall or 
expectation. ... The oneself does not enter into that play of exposings and dissimulations which we call a phenomenon (or phenomenology, for the 
appearing of a phenomenon is already a discourse). ' [OtB 104] 
So what is it then? The oneself, or psyche, is held to be a particular form of 
'dephasing', where the ego or same is prevented 'from coinciding' [OtB 68]. 
This effect is achieved through substitution - the assumption of responsibility. 
Through service to the other, a uniqueness (individuation in the accusative 
form") is produced that accords with the primary intelligibility of signification 
[OtB 69]: 'The psyche, the-one-for-the-other, can be a possession and a 
psychosis; the soul is already a seed of folly. ' [OtB 191 n. 3] Responsibility 
produces or maintains the psyche's signiftingness in face of the expansive ego. 
And, concomitantly, is able to respond to 'the plot of what appears in the face of 
another [Autrufl' [OtB 97]. The 'philosopher' can avoid this epiphany [OtB 95]? 
but thereby commits themselves to egoist fate 43 
41 'The self involved in maintaining oneself, losing oneself or finding oneself again is not a result, 
but the very matrix (matrice) of the relations or events that these pronomial verýs express. ' [OtB 
104] Here the maternal metaphor, matrice also meaning 'womb', is fully intended. 
42 Cf. Being and Time where individuation is achieved through appreciation of the Jemeinigkeit 
of death. As Lingis observes, through this singularizing the individual is delivered from the 
4anonymity and indifference of being' [OtB xxvi]. 
43 'To be without a choice can seem to be violence only to an abusive or hasty and imprudent 
reflection, for it precedes the freedom non-freedom couple, but thereby sets up a vocation that 
goes beyond the limited and egoist fate of him who is only forrhimself, and washes his hand of 
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Levinas explicitly rejects any understanding of the ps%-che in terms of the 
unconscious, which he sees as still participating in the play of consciousness and 
the dominance of being, though he tends to interpret psýchoanalysis as 
psychotherapy which attempts to cure the sick subject [OtB 194 fn. 6] ". Since 
the psyche, is already a 'psychosis' [OtB 142] (the 'maddened subject channels 
transcendence' [Enigma 67]), one can anticipate his anxiety on this score. Yet 
somehow, the self is the defeat of the ego's identity and, at the same time, a 
unique structure that does not reduce to consciousness". 
The key term, generally recognised as being introduced in this work, is 'hostage'. 
Rather than the 'host' who welcomes the Other into the dwelling and offers 
hospitality, the 'hostage' names the passive structure of substitution: '... the 
sacrifice of a hostage designated who has not chosen himself to be hostage, but 
possibly elected by the Good, in an involuntary election not assumed by the 
elected one. ' [OtB 15] This passivity is understood as an inversion of Being's 
conatus and ruse [OtB 75], 'the-one-for-the-other' of substitution 'derogates from 
the finality of the interestedness of man inhabiting the world' [OtB 94]. While 
still signifying through generosity, the other is no longer the one before whom I 
justify myself in discourse nor does it depend on a prior consistency or identity. 
This new giving is repeatedly framed in the following formulations: 'to take the C) Z-1 
bread out of one's own mouth', 'to nourish the hunger of another with one's own 
fasting' [OtB 56]. We should stress that this is not giving from surfeit, but b Z7) 
depriving myself *not in order to have the ment of giving it, but in order to give C7 - 
it with one's heart' [OtB 72] to crive jealously and always have more to give [OtB 
84]. 
In a (-), loss on Marxism. Levinas believes that this exposure is more fundamental 
than the passivity and alienation inflicted upon the labounng classes: 
the faults and misfortunes that do not begin in his own freedom or in his present. It is the setting 
up ofa being that is not for itself. but is Cor all, Is both being and disinterestedness. ' [OtB 1161 
44 Comparc the reference to Foucault in and Phenomenon' [Enigina 178 fn. 5]. 
It inight then be askcd, ho\ý far it is a 'di,,, cmer\ and ho\\ far a 
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'This passivity is, to be sure, an exposedness of the subject to another. but the 
passivity of the subject is more passive still than that which the oppressed 
one determined to struggle undergoes. The most passive. unassurnable, 
passivity, the subjectivity, of the very subjection of the subject. is due to my 
being oppressed with responsibility for the oppressed who is other than 
myself. ... It is because my passivity as a subject, my exposedness to the 
other is physical pain itself that I can be exploited-, it is not because I am 
exploited that my exposure to the another is absolutely passive, that is, 
excludes all assumption, is despite myself. ' [OtB 55] 
The passivity of exposure undercuts the earlier analysis, from Totality and 
Infinity, of need and underdeveloped humanity. Levinas nods to this difference 
in a footnote where he marks the contrast with his new anal-,,,, sis of sensibility as 
signifying in proximity: 'In Totality and Infinity the sensible was interpreted in 
the sense of consumption and enjoyment. I [OtB 191 n. 8]. Consumption and 
enjoyment were fundamental to the formation of the separated ego, whereas 
responsibility is now premised upon a 'de-coring' [dinucliation] of the ego. The 
other now inspires pain that prompts the taking on of the infinitely increasing 
debt of responsibility in substitution. The unrecoverable wound of proximity 
attacks the complacency of the ego in its enjoyment, but this signifyingness gains 
its meaning from this very opposition to the ego's need for enjoyment [OtB 73- 
4]. Here is the specifically human, penitent possibility rather than the possibility 
of suicide, 'Not in elevated feeling, in "belles lettres" but as in a tearing away of 
bread from the mouth that tastes it, to give it to the other. ' [OtB 64] 
In this recurrence of debt and substitution in this approach to the other, the me 
become substantial in ipseity". The impossibility of evading these commitments t: ) 
in its repetition generates the psyche. This is held to be a new mode of infinition 
producing 'Inwardness': 
'To be oneself as in the trace of one's exile is to be as a pure withdrawal 
from oneself, and, as such, an inwardness. Inwardness is not at all like a waý, 
of disposing of private matters. This inwardness without secrets is a pure 
witness to the inordinateness which already commands me, to give to the 
other taking the bread out of my own mouth, and making a gift of mý, mvn 
skin. ' [OtB 138] 
See Lingis's 'Introduction' [OtB \xii-\xiii]. 
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Opposed to good 'conscience'. this responsibility requires a necessary iteration 
of exposure [OtB 1531 and thus gains ipseity. This is again a form of 
bootstrapping, or 'levitation'. Responsibility increases in proportion to the 
degree of substitution - there is no horizon that bnngs such demand to an end. 
Substitution, or the taking on of responsibilities, produces a recurrence of self 
that is neither intentional nor understood in terms of the traditional categories of 
altruism, benevolence, or love [OtB II I]". 
This is Levinas's understanding of ipseity -a formation of self through the 
accusative, in contrast to Kant's recognition of the ego. He argues that the 
'aging subject' cannot reckon on identification of ego with itself, since it depends 
on consciousness and mernory, but that it would still be unique through the 
substitutions arrogated or the persecutions directed agrainst it. In this way 
another order is produced that does not reduce to that of being [Enigma 7 t]. This 
ipseity is not reciprocal or reciprocated: 'To accuse the innocence of the other, to 
ask of the other more than he owes, is crirrunal. ' [OtB 195 fn. 18]. 
I gain my identity through others without dialectical recuperation of the self's 
precipitates and this process is without lirrut: 'The debt Increases In the measure 
that it is paid. ' [OtB 12] To avoid colluding with meaningless being, the 
diachronous subject and its remainder are interpreted as a debt contracted before 
freedom. This is the speculative interpretation of fraternity that eludes the 
theoretical discourses surrounding humanity".. This structure is understood as 
glory. 
This infinite intensification of indebtedness is not mentioned by Critchley. It is 
this concept which would be rebarbative to a postmodernist ethics of the Other, 
since its religious (not to say, "sacred") dimension seems to have resonances 
with Bataille's potlatch. 
"7These all depend on a classical understanding of the operation of the person or will - here, 
individuation occurs through substitution in the production of an 'Incarnated passivitý without 
reference' [ OtB I I-' I- 
. 18 Nly substitution for another is the trope of a sense that does not belong to the empirical order 
of' psychological events. an Ein/nIthing or a compassion which signify bv virtue of' this sense. ' 
[OtB 1-`ý 
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'The recurrence in the subject is thus neither freedom of possession of self by 
self in reflection, nor the freedom of play ... It is a matter of an exigency 
coming from the other, beyond what is available to my powers, to open an 
unlimited "deficit, " in which the self spends itself without counting, freely. 
... Essence ... fills every interval of nothingness that would interrupt it. It is 
a strict-booking where nothing is lost or created. ' [OtB 125] 
But in many ways, it is a moment of extreme assertion, which can barely be 
discussed as philosophy at all (in an endnote, Levinas calls 'substitution' the 
'hagiography of society' [OtB 193 fn. 33]). As Levinas himself notes, the very 
idea 'appears demented to the order of contemplation'. It is worth then 
considering the multiple references to Plotinus, which appear to operate as a kind 
of argument from authority: the conception of such a Good was once part of 
philosophical discourse [OtB 95,118 ]49. 
Exemplified by Abraham's 'me voici', 'I am here', it marks a responsibility 
'answering for everything and for everyone' [OtB 114], responsible even for the 
'persecuting by the persecutor' [OtB 75], that signifies through giving [OtB 50]. 
Me voici sloganizes the practice of substitution through which Levinas claims 
contological categories are transformed into ethical categories' [OtB 115], which 
as a form of inspiration is the very psyche formed though and for the other. A 
'substantiality' produced not through self-positing but exposure, opposed to 
apology through which 'consciousness regains control' [OtB 1021". 
The Glory of the Infinite 
In this form of recurrence of substitution, as a new form of infinition, Levinas 
believes himself to have evaded the traditional problems associated with the 
infinite. He asserts that the infinite here is not a 'figure of negative theology', 
since 'all negative traits become positive in responsibility' [OtB 121. As 
response to the infinite, responsibility produces the infinite in the 'witness bome' 
49 See also 'Enigma and Phenomenon' [Enigma. 178 fn. 4. & Enigma 179 fn. 25]. In 'Philosophy 
and the Idea of Infinity', Levinas writes: '... we believe we are following a tradition at least as 
ancient, that which does not read right in might and does not reduce every other to the same. 
the tradition of the other is not necessarily religious ... it is philosophical. ' [op. cit. p. 
531. 
50 See also Visker Truth and Singularity p. 27 1. 
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in the formation of the psyche: I am commanded by my own mouth' [OtB 
147 ] 51. 
The are several moves here, not all of them foregrounded by Levinas. "'here did 
the interpretation of diachrony as infinite come from? It is possible to follow 
Levinas in his account of the infinition of responsibility as a *glorious increase of 
obligation"'. But it is not clear how this responsibility is understood to respond 
to a pre-given Infinite, nor how such infinition is not the indefinite increase of 
responsibility. 
Although the thematic substructure has changed, the face still plays the key role 
here. It cannot signify the Idea of the Infinite in the Cartesian manner described 
in Totality and Infinity, as an idea coming from without that leads to desire for 
the exterior". The face obsesses and marks the commencement of the 'plot of 
infinity' [OtB 193 fn. 31], but this obsession is a response to destitution, not 
mastery or height. This destitution connects to the wound or command at the 
heart of the diachronic temporalization of the subject: the face bears a trace of 
the past. 'The trace of a past in a face is not the absence of a yet non-revealed, 
but the anarchy of what has never been present, of an infinite which commands 
in the face of the other, and which, like an excluded middle, could not be aimcd 
at. ' [OtB 971 
As noted by Derrida, the 'trace' did not have a systematic place in Totality and 
Infinity, but assumes a more central role in the works that come afterwards. The 
trace operates as a term to indicate an essential non-phenomenality or enigmatic 
or 
, ivenness. 
Firstly, the face is not a countenance nor does the neighbour appear 
51 'The Infinite does not appear to him that bears witness to it. On the contrar-', the votness 
belongs to the of the Infinite. It is by the voice of the witness that the Glorv of the Infinite is 
Lflonfied. ' (OtB 1461 
-s' 'The more I answer the more I am responsibleý the more I approach the neighbour \ý ith %ý-hich I 
am encharged the further a%%, i\, I am. This debit which increases is infinity as an infinition of the 
infinitc, as gloi-ý .' 
[OtB 931 
ý3, The exposure to the other is not something added to the one to bring it from the lnýýard to the 
outside. ' [OtB ý01 
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in the face: as image all proximity would be annulled [OtB 911. The neighbour 
does not have a form, its face marks the collapse of phenomenality [OtB 87-88]-4. 
'A face is not an appearance of sign of some reality, which would be 
personal like it is, but dissimulated or expressed by the physiognomy, and 
which would present itself as an invisible theme. The essential of the thesis 
here expounded is not any kind of conjunction of themes, is not a structure 
formed by their superposition. A face does not function in proximity as a 
sign of a hidden God who would impose the neighbour on me. It is a trace of 
itself, a trace in the trace of an abandon, where the equivocation is never 
dissipated. It obsesses the subject without staying in correlation with him, 
without equalling me in a consciousness, ordering me before appearing, in 
the glorious increase of obligation. ' [OtB 93-94] 
In this redescription of diachrony in the 'ethical language' of the trace 
phenomenological methodology is supplanted. Abandonment and destitution, 
the desolation of the trace, are also riven by an obsession which can be never be 
correlated in consciousness or representation or assembled into presence, but is 
not reducible to nothingness [Enigma 179 n. 14]. 'This is its enigma: '... this 
trace of infinity shows itself enigmatically, like a blinking light. But this new 
plot does not remain in a negative theology. Its positive character still leads us to 
the notion of substitution. ' [OtB 193 n. 31] 
But what justifies this equation between the disjunction (or non-correlation) and 
the Infinite? Levinas stresses that the trace is an 'insinuation' that requires a 
4private convocation': 6... unless we retain it, it has already withdrawn. ... It 
remains only for. -hirn who would take 
it up. Otherwise , it 
has already restored 
the order it troubled [Enigma 70] It is always possible to doubt it. 
'It is up to me to retain or to repel this God without boldness, exiled because 
allied with the conquered, hunted down and hence ab-solute, thus 
disarticulating the very moment in which he is presented and proclaimed, 
unrepresentable. This way the Other has of seeking my recognition while 
54 'What sort of signalling could he send before me which would not strip him of his exclusive 
alterity? Absolving himself from all essence, all genus, all resemblance, the neighbor, thefirst 
one on the scene, concerns me for the first time (even if he is an old acquaintance, an old 
friend, 
an old lover, long caught up in the fabric of my social relations) in a contingency that excludes 
the a priori. ' [OtB 861 
" 'The mode in which a face indicates its own absence in my responsibility requires a description 
that can be formed only in ethical language. ' [OtB 94] 
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preserving his incognito ... we call eni ma ... contrasting it with the 9 tý indiscreet and victorious appearing of a phenomenon. * f Enigma 70] 
1 intend the echo from the first chapters to resonate. Again. the ans%ýer is onl% 
the subject's responsibility justifies this inflection of the trace. which is a 
withdrawal where no actuality had preceded' [OtB 140]. The extenon't% of the 
Infinite is a 'revelation made by the one who receives it ... 
b-v the inspired 
subject whose inspiration, alterity in the same, is the subjectivity or psyche of the 
subject' [OtB 156]. The Infinite is glonfied and produced only through 
subjectivity [OtB 148], but at the same time, the non-egoistic subject is 
manifested only through this infinition of responsibili ty56: 'The subject is born in 
the beginninglessness of an anarchy and in the endlessness of obligation, 
gloriously augmenting as though infinity came to pass in it [comme si en elle 
Vinfini se passait]. ' [OtB 140, AqE 239] 
Responsibility does not collapse into being, but at the same time, it avoids a 
collapse into nothingness - it is intended to break the exclusive disjunction 
between being and not being, but this means that its 'infinite' is of another order: 
indefinite but not the indefinite extension of the real. 
'Beyond the bad infinity of the Sollen it [responsibility] increases infinitely, 
living infinity, an obligation more and more strict in the measure that 
obedience progresses and the distance to be crossed untransversable in the 
measure that one approaches. The giving then shows itself to be a 
parsimony, the exposure a reserve, and holiness guilt. It is life without 
death, the life of the Infinite or its glory, a life outside of essence and 
nothingness. ' [OtB 142 translation corrected] 
On this question of the bad infinite there is an extended reference to Hegel in a 
t ootnote: 
'He, -, cl thus 
formulates the bad infinite: "Something becomes an other: this 
other is itself somewhat, therefore it likewise becomes an other. and so on 
ad infinitunz. This Infinity is the wrong or negative infinity, it is onlý a 
=zation of a finite: but the finite rises again the same as e%er, and is ne\cr 
got rid of and absorbed. " ... In the situation we have 
described the other 
, 71 
'The infinite does not signal itself to a subjectivity. a univ, alreadv furmed, bv order to turn 
to\\ard the neighbour. In its beiný, subjecti%ity undoes the essence by ýLibstituting itself 'Ur 
another. ' [OtB I-, ] 
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does not become likewise an other: the end is not reborn, but moves off. at 
each new stage of the approach, with all the altenty of the other. ' [OtB 193 
fn. 34] 
Lingis's translation, no longer following his earlier convention. elides the 
movement in the final sentence between 1Autre and I'Autrui. 
'Dans la situation dicrite, l'Autre ne devient pas pareillement un Autre, - le 
fin ne renaft pas, mais s'jloigne, a chaque nouvelle itape de Vapproche, de 
toute Valtiritj d'Autrui. ' [AqE 149 fn. 1] 
At each stage of approach, the infinite alterity of the Other is respected, it is not 
encompassed by the substitution nor is it approached by degrees: it is not aiming 
at an end. Responsibility increases infinitely but not so as to overlap the infinite 
altenty of the other. In this regard, one can see Levinas's objections to theology 
which attempt to thernatize that infinite alterity or present a 'world behind the 
scenes' [OtB 5]. The approach repeatedly reinscribes the infinite distance: an- 
archic in that no principle governs it". Visker has argued that this formulation 
does indeed avoid the problems associated with the bad infinite: '... the other's 
alterity is for Levinas, absolute in a different sense and less or differentl-ý 
absolute than the absoluteness of the bad infinite. "' "God" and the "Infinite" 
become unsettled by this opposition to being and principle and instead only serve 
as placeholders for a practical orientation that attempts to re-animate a religious 
tradition". 
'The revelation of the beyond being is perhaps indeed but a word, but this 
"perhaps" belongs to an ambiguity in which the anarchy of the Infinite 
resists the univocity of an onginary or a principle. It belongs to an 
ambiguity or an ambivalence and an inversion which is stated in the word 
God, the apex of vocabulary, admission of the stronger than me in me and 
of the "less than nothing, " nothing but an abusive word, a beyond themes in 
a thought that does not yet think or thinks more than it thinks. ' [OtB t56] 
-S-, . The infinite "presents" itself anarchically. but thernatization loses the anarchy which alone can 
accredit it. ' [OtB 197 n. 251 
3- fn. 5. Truth and Singularltý, P. I 
-ý () . But to hear a God not contaminated by Being is a human possibtlitý no less important and no 
less precarious than to bring Being out of the oblivion ýN hich t sa d to ha\ e fallen in 
metaphysics and in onto-theology. ' [OtB \1n] 
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That is, Levinas argues that no proof could be offered for this assertion or 
postulation of infinity - the Infinite would be belied in proof of its transcendence 
[0t-B 152]. In this context, he introduces a reference to prophecy akin to that 
made in Totality and Infinity. Of necessity, prophecy can appear and be taken 
simply as 'information circulating'; the trace of glory can be effaced simply in its 
appearance in the form of a statement. This raises the problem of voluntanism - 
does it only exceed information through the decision to read it as a sign of a 
transcendent possibility? 
'We call prophecy this reverting in which the perception of an order 
coincides with the signification of this order made by the one that obeys it 
[cet ordre faite par celui qui y oMt]. ' [OtB 149, AqE 2-33 my empýasis 
translation modified] 
Lingis had originally translated 'faite' as '4cyiven' (possibly because the sentiment 
is so extreme, or appears to undercut the claim to the Infinite). But this 
'bootstrapping' infinite is non-dogmatic and a-theological, and hence maintains 
itself within a philosophical terrain. The Infinite is not posited as existing Cý 
externally, independent of its production by the subject in responsibility and 
sincerity. 
'Language would exceed the limits of thought, by suggesting, letting be 
understood without ever makýing understandable, an implication of a 
meaning distinct from that which comes to signs from the simultaneity of 
systems or the logical definition of concepts. The possibility is laid bare in 
the poetic said, and the interpretation it calls for ad infiniturn. It is shown in 
the prophetic said, scorning its conditions in a sort of levitation. ' [OtB 169- 
170, my emphasis] 
This levitation finds its justification in the manner in which there is produced a 
break from being, systems and conatus. A humanism rather than a brute 
existence. Levinas's poetic intent produces yet another synonym in the form of a 
neolocyism. Mein, names 'God' without divine charactenstics [OtB 16-11 - it 
inaugurates a religion that maintains the enigma and distance of the infinite in the 
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face [OtB 12]1. In so doing, it de-sacralizes the notion of the creature made in 
God's image" 
'It is in prophecy that the Infinite escapes the objectification of 
thernatization and of dialogue, and signifies as illeity. in the third person. 
This "thirdness" is different from that of the third man, it is the third party 
that interrupts the face to face of a welcome of the other man. interrupts the 
proximity or approach of the neighbour, it is the third man with which 
justice begins. ' [OtB 150] 
Illeity as a form of 'thirdness' gives content to a notion of fraternity that exceeds 
Einj'Uhlung in that it demands to be produced - it is not given. But that form of tý I 
'thirdness' is distinct from le tiers, the third party who interrupts the face to face. 
The generalization of this structure is glossed as the 'birth of meaning in the 
obtuseness of being' [OtB 128], or alternatively, as the possibility of explation. 
Accepted as a premature thought early in the book [OtB 14], by the climax, 
Levinas writes: 'Expiation occurs in the last analysis with the extraordinary and 
diachronic reversal of the same into the other, in inspiration and the psyche. ' 
[OtB 146]. Expiation is held to occur by transforming the 'everydayness' of 
fellow feeling from a transcendental structure of subjectivity into a transcendent 
possibility to be realised. 
At this superstructural level of orientation or aim, the themes from Totality and 
Infinity persist. But they take on a now form, radical generalisation of 
responsibility through the form of the nazirate supplants apology. The latter is 
more palatable to contemporary thought. Robert Bemasconi has commented on 
the 'Impossible demands' placed on the individual through such practices; it 
'would be to condemn oneself to a form of madness"'. In their exorbitance, theý, 
challenge received ethical meaning - indeed. Levinas holds that such *ethics, 
forms the 'g-lorious augmentation' of 'holy' subjectivity. flow do such phrases 
60 . It is the trace of a relationship with illeit\ that no unity of apperception grasps, ordering me to 
a on. exceeding the psychology of faith ind of the oi responsibility. This relationship is relig-1 
faith. ' [OtB 1681 
61 ct'. Visker Truth and Singularity p. 1.336. 
(12 ., Fhc Ethics Ot"SLISIlicion', p. 10. 
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function in Levinas's writings? How could he employ them unless he was 
untouched by the hermeneutics of suspicion? "' 
Yet we have already seen that, in the purity of responsibility for the other, 
Levinas believes he has the base-line approach that is free from all ideological 
considerations, since it is free from consciousness and the conatus of being, 
where conatus is understood as ego-preservation and advancement. That such 
responsibility is meant is incontestable: 
'The subjectivity of the subject is persecution and martyrdom. ' [OtB 146] 
'To. support the world is a crushing charge, but a divine discomfort. It is 
better than the merits and faults and sanctions proportionate to the freedom 
of one's choices. ' [OtB 122] 
Responsibility escapes the 'ennui' of the ego, who can only play distracting 
games in a world free of meaning [OtB 124]. It certainly worth remembering 
that Levinas here draws on several historical precedents in both the Christian and 
Judaic tradition. Ascetic practices of the self were part of our cultural world - 
fasting, mortification and penance still play a role in Catholicism. One can 
consider the anchorite tradition - not simply hermits, but including figures such 
as Simon Stylites. Even within the modem philosophical tradition, one can recall 
Kierkegaard's insistence on the difficulty of 'becoming a Christian' in the 
modem world that has forgotten the demands of faith. To recall a Jewish legacy, 
it is worth consulting Scholem on the practices' of penitence of the Hasidic baal 
teshuvah'. The Hasidic systematization of penance reached a form previously 
unknown in Judaism by understanding the soul itself as an act of penitence". 
Fasting played the central role but there are also accounts of practitioners sitting 
with their bare feet in ice for one hour daily". 
63 Ibid. 
64 See Gershom G. Scholem Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism 2 nd edition (19461 (New York, 
Schocken Books, 1974). 
65 ibid. p. 78. 
66 Scholem: 'Here we are undoubtedly faced with the after-effects of a Christian influence. The 
whole system of penitence, particularly in the codified form given to it by Eleazar of Worms in 
several of his writings, closely corresponds to the practices prescribed by the early medieval 
Church in its literature on the subject ... ' [ibid. p. 104] 
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when the righteous one makes himself an offering for sin he shall see 
his offspring, he shall prolong his days; the will of the Lord shall prosper in 
his hand; he shall see the fruit of the travail of his soul and be satisfied; by 
his knowledge shall the righteous one make many be accounted righteous; 
and he shall bear their iniquities ... because he poured out his soul to death, 
and was numbered with the transgressors; yet he bore the sin of many, and 
made intercession for the transgressors. ' Isaiah 53,10-12 
Scholem notes that from this passage, the Hasidim developed the belief that the 
truly just suffer for their whole generation": a belief that became enshrined in the 
folk tradition of the Lamedvovnik: the thirty-six hidden just men who justify the 
world before God": 'were it not for them, God would annihilate the whole of 
mankind"'. 
Levinas's aim in Otherwise than Being is to incorporate a much more radical 
religious sensibility into philosophy. Philosophy, as phenomenology, comes to 
perceive the break-up of consciousness in the diachrony of the present [OtB 165], 
and also provides an ethical language to express the paradox of phenomenology 
[OtB 121]: this language designates the approach and is also able to criticise the 
reification of the laws of the city [OtB 165]. But the 'rendings of the logical text' 
are not to be 'mended by logic alone' [OtB 170]. The history of the West 'bears 
traces in its margins of events carrying another signification'- one which might 
truly distinguish humanity from animality: 'One has to find for me another 
kinship than that which ties him to being, one that will perhaps enable us to 
conceive of this difference between me and the other, this inequality, in a sense 
absolutely opposed to oppression. ' [OtB 177] The nazirate is a fast for others, 
without seeking reciprocation. 
67 There may be further profit in considering Levinas 'religion' in light of the Hasidic belief in 
devekut - the transformation of the profane into the holy sphere 'begins with the decision to 
cleave to God': an obsession that needs to be mitigated. See Scholem 'Devekut, or communion 
with God' in The Messianic Idea in Judaism and other essays on Jewish Spirituality (London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1971), pp. 205-27. See also, Putnam's discussion of mitzvoth in 
'Levinas and Judaism'. 
68 Scholem considers this belief to be drawn from Islamic influences. 'The Tradition of the 
Thirty-Six Hidden Just Men' in The Messianic Idea in Judaism and other essays on Jewish 
Spirituality (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1971), pp. 251-56. 
69 Jorge Luis Borges 'The Lamed Wufniks' in The Book of Imaginary Beings [ 19671 translated by 
Norman Thomas di Giovanni revised edition (London, Penguin Books, 1974), p. 90. 
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Yet, this nazirate belongs to 'our' monotheistic, cultural inheritance which 'does 
not recognize ... what is not the 
highest', i. e. the non-monotheistic, in 'open- 
eyed ignorance' [OtB 177]. With these superstructural constants, we can see that 
there is still no place to equate Levinas with an ethics of acknowledgement of the 
other -a transformative idea dominates such that the given could never have the 
appropriate value. Despite the transformation of the problematic of the other, the 
idea of the self as hostage to the Other depends on a moment of speculative 
interpretation that exceeds phenomenology. Levinas's conception of the other 
still depends on a metaphysics that cannot be evaded - there is no alterity without 
the 'religion' that allows the Infinite to come to pasS71. 
Conclusion 
In Adieu, Derrida raises explicitly the question of the relation between Otherwise 
than Being and Totality and Infinity in relation to the transformation of subject- 
as-host to the subject-as-hostage: 
'Inseparable from a new conceptual and lexical configuration, from new 
words or words struck with a new impression ("vulnerability", "traumatism", 
"psychosis", "accusation", "persecution", "obsession", etc. ), "substitution" 
carries forth quite continuously, it seems to me, the 61an and the "logic" of 
Totality and Infinity, though it dislodges even more drastically the primacy of 
intentionality ... ' [Adieu 56] [my italics] 
Levinas now grounds ethical subjectivity in sensibility itself, which is expressed 
by the concept of 'proximity'. Whereas before the experience of mastery was the 
mark of the exteriority of the Other, here the other is an alterity already effecting 
sensibility itself. And while on the surface this might seem to meet 
understandable suspicions about the applicability of the Other from Totality and 
Infinity, it does not meet the problem of justification. Whereas previously only 
those who were encountered through height fell under the category of Other, in 
Otherwise than Being, the category has been expanded to include more than 
masters and teachers. But this apparently equitable development renders the 
religious humanism of the work more suspect, whilst failing to meet the queries 
regarding the status of the infinite and the ideological function of the work 
70 Cf. Visker Truth and Singularity pp. 257-58. 
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overall. Without the guard-rail of Husserl's refutation of psychologism and the I- 
phenomenological method which depends upon it, the metaphysical systematics 
of Levinas are open to the reservations which are produced by alternative 
systematics. Levinas's metaphysics has become even more uncritical. 
If we wish to pursue the question of 'Influence' here, then we should observe that 
Derrida's impact is located more in the break with egoity and the focus on 
diachrony, than on the introduction of the saying and the said, which in any case. 
does not meet the demands of critical philosophical presentation. The persistent 
implicit references to Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry' in Otherwise than Bei'n,,,,, 
suggest that it is Derrida's introductory essay, with its break-up of Living 
Presence in delay and dehiscence, that had more of an impact than 'Violence and 
Metaphysics'. 
In the following chapter, we will examine two essays that form an exchange C) 
between Derrida and Levinas. We will see that this pair contrast markedly and in 
no way form a dialogue. At issue is the possibility of making a claim for 
transcendence from the everyday experience of responsibility. 
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The Metaphysical Stand-off 
At the beginning of the last chapter, we presented certain objections to Simon 
Critchley's charactensation of deconstruction as clotural wn'tln_q. We noted that 
this idea of a doubled writing - first producing a detailed, faithful commentarv 
and then opening this commentary up by focusing on moments of ellipsis and 0 
slippage was monolithic and developed abstractly without reference either to the 
variety of Derrida's writings or the philosophical backdrop to those writings. 
To insist on the distinction between deconstruction and critique without 
examining the different forms of critique in modem philosophy (Kantian, 
Benjaminian, Frankfurt immanent, etc. ) forces us to ask whether critique (or 
Kritik) has been confused with a more general, everyday understanding of 
criticism qua approval or disapproval. Undecidability ought not to be interpreted 
such that any point of disputation is suspended. If it marks a meta-level thesis 
about the impossibility of grounding meaning via reference to intention, ongin or 
telos (whilst also resisting the subsumption of philosophy to empirical sciences), 
then it challenges Levinas's teleological, strategical imposition of the idea on 
being. Derrida not only has a very different conception of what is demanded of a 
philosophical presentation but also in no way shares Levinas's conception of 
metaphysics (and consequently either history or politics). Given our presentation 
of Levinas's speculative system, this is of central importance and disrupts aný 
understanding of influence. 
The concern in this chapter is to further break the critical unanimity surrounding 
the relationship of Derrida and Levinas. Here, I examine two essays: Levinas's 
'Whollv Otherwise' and Derrida's 'At this Very Nloment in This Work Here f 
Arn'. Both CritchleN, and Bernasconi base their argument for an -affinitv- 
between Levinas and Derrida on these essays. I %ý ill argue that they have failed 
to attend sufficiently closely to these texts in their cagerriess to demonstrate their 
thcscs. 'Wholly Otherwise' and 'At this Verv 'Nioment ... ' should 
be read a-s i-c- 
staternents of position against etich other. 
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Tracing these points of disagreement regarding Levinas's philosophical 
presentation urges Derrida into novel contortions as he demonstrates the inability 
of certain key metaphors to do the work Levinas intends, so that the distinction 
between the Saying and the Said is undermined. In contesting Critchley and 
Bernasconi's readings, we will also interleave Hobson's reading of this second 
Derrida essay on Levinas. Marked by a much more profound and accurate 
engagement with the writing of the essay, it allows us to see the manner in which 
Levinas is worked into a palimpsest. 
'Wholly Otherwise' 
'Wholly Otherwise' has been cited by Simon Critchley as an example of an 
'ethical reading of deconstruction' [ED 11]; a "double-handed" reading which 
both highlights Derrida's dependence on the metaphysical txadition, but also 
allows something beyond the metaphysical tradition to been discerned darkly 
[ED 145]. The essay is notable for its strange introduction which contains a 
double analogy prompted by Derrida's work. To my own eye, this essay is a re- 
statement of position contra Derrida: its demarcation lines laid out to emphasise 
the crossing of paths, rather than the encounter, of the chiasmus evoked in the 
subtitle to its final section. 
Compared to Critchley, my reading is pessimistic and deflationary. It 
emphasises the framing device of the rhetorical question and the characterisation 
of Derrida's project as creaturely. The philosophical disagreement between 
Levinas and Derrida centres on the interpretation of the sign and the signified. 
Does Derrida's work, asks Levinas, 'cut into Western thinking' in a manner 
similar to Kant's differentiation between dogmatic and critical philosophy [WhO 
3]? Let us emphasise that Levinas does not settle this question (a strategy we 
have seen before in his writing). Instead, we are presented with an admission 
that Derrida produces a timely 'awareness of the difficulty of thinking'. 
However, for Levinas this is insufficient: 'In the meantime we walk in a "no 
man's land", in an in-between which is uncertain even of the uncertainties which 
flicker everywhere, Suspension of truths! ' [WhO 31 The 'precise texts which are 
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so strange' of Derrida practise the epochi of Husserlian phenomenology yet do 
not reconstruct on apodictic certainty. 'At the start everything is in its place, and 
then, at the end of a few pages, or paragraphs, under the effects of a formidable 
questioning, nothing is left for thought to dwell in. This is, beyond the 
philosophical scope of propositions, a purely literary effect, a newfrisson, the 
poetry of Derrida. ' [WhO 4] 
How are we to understand this re-description of Derrida as a poet or one who 
produces afrisson of literary effect? We know that this is not of itself structured 
by a simple opposition of literature to philosophy, since Blanchot, as so often, Is 
cited less than two pages later. Is it meant to echo Derrida's celebrated footnote 
[VM 398 fn. 7], already cited, about the rhetorical force of waves striking the 
beach that leave 'a work of art, not a treatise'? Levinas, too, raises the question 
of the non-philosophical (and perhaps more pointedly, the task of philosophy 
which is to produce more thanfrisson). We could take this phrase as a gloss for 
the double analogy that follows immediately: 
'This is, beyond the philosophical scope of propositions, a purely literary 
effect, a new frisson, the poetry of Derrida. When I read him, I always 
recall the exodus of 1940. A retreating military unit arrives in an as yet 
unsuspecting locality, where the caf6s are open, where the ladies visit the 
"ladies' fashion store, " where the hairdressers dress hair and bakers bake; 
where viscounts meet other viscounts and tell each other stories of 
viscounts, and where, an hour later, everything is deconstructed and 
devastated: houses closed up or left with their doors open, emptied of their 
occupants who are swept along in a current of cars and pedestrians, through 
roads restored to their "former glory" as roads when, in an immemorial past, 
they were traced by great migrations. In these in-between days, a symbolic 
episode: somewhere in between Paris and Alenqon, a half-drunk barber used 
to invite soldiers who were passing on the road to come and have a free 
shave in his ship; the "lads" ... he used to call them 
in a patriotic language 
which soared above the waters or floated up from the chaos. With his two 
companions he shaved them free of charge - and it was today [ce 'fut 
aujourd'hui]. The essential procrastination - the J'Uture diffirance - was 
reabsorbed into the present. Time came to its end with the end or the 
interim period of France. Unless the barber was as delirious as the fourth 
form of delirium described in the Phaedrus, in which, since Plato, the 
discourse of Western metaphysics has remained. ' [ WhO 41 [my italics] 
Does Derrida recall the exodus of 1940? Does he need to be reminded of it? 
Perhaps some people have lived through events that mean that they have already 
awakened from slumber? These questions cannot be resolved from within this 
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text. However, this does mean that it is an ambiguous, perhaps back-handed 
rather than 'double-handed' analogy, that compares the effects of Derrida's texts 
to the arrival of retreating units that deconstruct and devastate the town: 
'philosophy as defeat' ["0 4]. 
This in-between, (purged of ontic resonance, liberated from the alternative of 
truth and falsehood' [nO 3] is a no-man's land - the enemy has not yet arrived. 
This in-between produces the half-drunk barber' who offers that sign of the 
deferred utopia today. As Critchley notes, the reference to a free shave informs a 
French idiom which could be compared to the English expression, "Jam 
tomorrow! ". Demain on rase gratis ... ce fut aujourd'hui! Tomorrow's jam 
today! The sign of utopia is here, today, in the fleeing panic of retreat. I hand 
over to Critchley: 
'That Levinas should apply this image to Derrida shows that he considers 
that the impossible takes place in his work. ... Levinas is obliquely hinting 
that the futural movement of diffigrance, its temporization, which always 
defers the fulfilment, or parousia, of presence, is reabsorbed into the 
present, thereby fissuring the latter and usurping its authority. ' [ED 1534] 
But could we not read this otherwise? For does not this interpretation bracket off 
the recent history that is the context for the barber's actions? Is not the free 
shave, le rase gratis, the sign of a future arrived, transformed by its arrival in this 
context? Isn't Levinas rather suggesting that the end'of the metaphysics of 
presence, the. mark of the arrival of a new thinking, arrives in a no-man's land of 
terrifying uncertainties? The dismantling of authority is to be feared if it can 
produce nothing that resists the onward march of barbarism. Here, Derrida. is 
allied with Heidegger - the repetition of the road's "former glory" a sly aside - 
this too is no cause for confidence, no sign of resolute authenticity. In one of his 
late essays on Husserl, written in 1974, he described deconstruction as the 
'rearguard action' of a philosophy in retreat that is unable to find any meaning 
other than that of the ontiC2. 
1 Derrida? Or Derrideans, '... those who - dreadfully well-informed, prodigiously intelligent, 
and more Derridean than Derrida - interpret his extraordinary work with the assistance of all the 
key-words at once, without having or leaving time to return to the thinking of which these words 
are contemporary. ' [WhO 61 
2 Levinas 'Philosophy and Awakening' [1977] DEwH 169-79; p. 170. 
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Levinas's closing ironic, Platonic alternative determines the tone - gentle C 
mocker . In his second section, whose title Le Passe-temps is again double- Y C) 
edged, he swiftly details the problems accruing to deconstruction as compared to 
his own thinking of the relation of the Infinite to Being. 
'The defection from presence led up to the defection from the true, to 
significations which do not have to comply with the summation of 
Knowledge. Truth is no longer at the level of an eternal or oninitemporal 
truth - but this [deconstruction] is a relativity that no historicism would ever 
have been able to suspect. A deportation or drifting of Knowledge, even 
beyond the skepticism which remained in love with the truth, even if it felt 
incapable of embracing it. Henceforth, significations do not converge on the 
truth - truth's no great matter! Being won't be able to go the whole way: its 
bankrupt way of life demands new respites, a recourse to signs in the midst 
of a presence that steals away from itself-, but only other signs are produced 
in the signified of these signs. ... A system of signs is liberated, a language 
guided by no full meaning, signifiers without a signified. Diff6rance is thus 
said by way of a dissemination in which presence is deconstructed, a 
postponement without limits to be respected, which time is, or, more 
precisely, which pass-time [passe-temps, which could be rendered as 
6pastime' in English ] itself is. A play in the interstices of Being where the 
centers of gravitation are not the same as those of the world. But are there 
centers? Is there gravitation? Is there? [Y a-t-il? ] Everything is otherwise if 
one can still speak of Being. ' [WhO 5] 
Why has this passage escaped Critchley's attention? It seems clear enough: these 
are familiar complaints against deconstruction. It's all a play of signs without 
referents, reference or meaning !3 Note the closing sentence of this paragraph - it 
gives Levinas his title: my work is 'wholly otherwise' because one can still speak 
of Being. There is nothing in this text to suggest that this is not Levinas speaking 
without restraint. Indeed, even in texts where the reference to Derrida is more 
positive, this positive ascription is restricted; Derrida's insight into Being as 
logocentric is co-opted by comparing two paths: the path that leads to knowledge 
,4 and play Ueu], or the path 'that signifies infinity . What 
is at issue is an arrested 
thinking 'that reasons upon signs as signifieds' (Derrida), the self-dislocating 
3 Cf. Hobson [OL 601. 
4 'But philosophy, as an extreme lucidity, still correlative with being and expressed in a language 
that Derrida calls logocentric. is already unsaving itself. In its said, the paths that lead to 
knowledge and presentation, on the one hand, are distinguished from the path that - otherwise 
than being or before the essence of being - signifies the Infinitity [sic] of the other. A distinction 
that remains an enigma and dia-chrony. ' From Consciousness to Wakefulness [A partir de 
Husserl] ( 19741 in DEwH 153-68; p. 196 fn 3) 1. 
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play of the world [cf. VM 158], versus a thinking for which the sign is 'the extra- 
,5 ordinary event 
In the following 'paragraph, Levinas rebuffs Derrida's extensive, patient reading 
of 'Violence and Metaphysics' with a brief, crude tu quoque 6. At the same time, 
it mistakes Derrida 7s criticism for a rebuttal of scepticism and fails to appreciate 
the problem of Levinas's 'nonphilosophical' writing. Against Derrida's 
"polemic" he insists on the "truth of truths" in the relationship of Said, Unsaid 
and Otherwise Said. He explicitly preserves this idea of the 'truth of truths' 
against diffigrance: 
'Perhaps the truth of truths does not have the style of verbal dissemination, 
but it is from the same nonworld (the end of "eternal truths") of which 
empiricism and historical relativism can imagine neither the agony nor the 
figures drawn by their convulsions. It is not therefore absurd that a rigorous 
reflection lets us catch a glimpse of these interstices of Being where this 
very reflection unsays itself. One can see nothing without thernatization, or 
without the oblique rays which it reflects back, even when it is a question of 
the nonthematizable. ' [ WhO 6] 
Let us quickly gloss this passage. Levinas suggests that the 'truth of truths' 
breaks from the 'dissemination': it belongs to a different order (and 
deconstruction appears to be grouped with empiricism and relativism). For 
Critchley, '... Levinas goes on to show that there is a moment of dislocation in 
deconstruction, where the latter's 'rigorous reflection' also 'lets us catch a 
glimpse of these interstices of Being where this very reflection- unsays itself' 
[ED 145]. That is, to say, Levinas performs the double movement which stresses 
the elliptical, open nature of deconstruction. 
But, setting aside the issue of whether deconstruction could make reference to 
the 'interstices of Being', if we examine the above passage from which Critchley 
draws his supporting sentence, we can see that Levinas is not referring to 
5 The face attends expression and 'always remains master of the meaning it delivers' in this 
fashion it is distinguished from the animal and from plastic forms. 'Philosophy and the Idea of 
the Infinite', P. 54. 
6 'What remains constructed after the deconstruction is, certainly, the stem architecture of the 
deconstructing discourse which employs the present tense of the verb "to be" in predicative 
propositions. ' [ WhO 51 
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deconstruction, but to his own writing in contrast to deconstruction. As he goes 
on to state, 'Derrideans' have no access to this 'subsoil' of the empirical [WhO 
61. 
On my reading, 'Wholly Otherwise' is a polemical re-statement of position 
against deconstruction. It concludes by positioning Derrida as the thinker of the 
'Being of the creature, without recourse to an ontic account of divine operation' 
["0 7f . This 'lesser being of the creature' is deflationary in that it is situated 
in a plane of radical inaccess to truth: language is the a medium, or element, 
rather than an instrument at the 'disposal of the speaker'8. Such a contrast should 
be seen as sufficiently fundamental to disbar any immediate, unmediated, or 
unqualified comparison between Derrida and Levinas. 
Again, Levinas raises a pair of rhetorical questions: 'But is not the attempt at a 
positive utterance of this failure of presence to itself still a way of returning to 
the presence with which this positivity merges?... But is there no way out of 
ontologyT [MO 7] Of course, the tacit answer is, yes - my way. Levinas sets 
up a conception of language that is empirical ('exhausts itself in presence and in 
the lack of presence'); this he attributes to Derrida. In contrast, he offers his 
conception premised on the interrelation of Saying and Said. This contrast 
depends on a crucial disagreement over the interpretation of the sign. For 
Levinas, the sign 'does not begin as Said' - this would be merely creaturely. 
'... the sign has not grown on the soil of the ontology of the Said in order to 
receive its paradoxical relational structure from it.... Like the Saying, the 
sign is an extra-ordinary event ... of exposure and subjection to the 
Other, 
the event of subjectivity. It's the one-for-the -other. It's the signification 
which does not exhaust itself in simple absence of intuition and presence. ' 
[WhO 71 [my italics] 
7 In many ways, this account chimes with George Steiner's description of Derrideans as 'faithless 
Augustinians'. A phrase that perhaps ought to be reclaimed! 
8 The reference to the creature here differs from that found in the essay, 'From Consciousness to 
Wakefulness [A partir de Husserfl' ( 1974]. There the stress is on the human's place in being as 
the 'excluded middle' that is able to extract itself from being: 'Should the otherwise - nonrepose 
or nonperdurance in the Same, nonstate - that thus un-says itself from being, be called creature'? 
Perhaps. But on condition that we do not understand it as a lesser being, or as some kind of a 
modification or derivative of being. ' [DEwH 1661 In the context of 'Wholly Otherwise, the 
creaturely marks the outlook that refuses any legitimacy to the beyond. 
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What is closed off to 'deconstructive analysis' is the idea of interpreting the 
surplus as the 'better' coming from beyond. And with that, Levinas signs off. 
opposing his Cartesian lineage to 'dissen-ýination' [RIhO 8]. 
One is startled by the chutzpah of a writer who, in a volume devoted to Derrida. 
can deal with Derrida so cursorily. A crude analysis of this short essay would 
find that most space is given over to stating his own position and the other part to 
a questionable reading of Derrida, aligning him with other strands in the historv 
of philosophy (ones Derrida himself opposes). But shouldn't one be more startled 
by the current consensus that this is an 'ethical' response to Derrida? It is blunt, 
bad-tempered, knowing, back-handed and really only concerned to promote 
Levinas above Derrida. Nothing in the text supports Critchley's positive spin on 
the opening analogies - the sentences he cites do not praise deconstruction and he 
has nothing to say about these passages quoted above which repeat familiar 
critical stories about deconstruction. They are simply ignored. Why does this 
matter? Firstly, the notion of clOtural writing has produced a rose-tinted reading 
of the relationship between Derrida and Levinas. In its effort to project a certain 
affinity, it betrays its own avowed fidelity to the text. Secondly, and this we will 
develop now, it produces a completely different setting for 'At this Very Moment 
"At this Very Moment. - .' 
In 1980, Derrida contributed 'At this very moment ... ' to a Festschrift 
for 
Levinas. And, he repeats Levinas"s gesture of ingratitude: a re-statement of 
differences. However, he produces a much more detailed work, and one which 
can be counted as among the most obscure from Derrida's output. 'At this Very 
Moment ... ' is a very complicated essay, not 
least with respect to its structure. It 
appears to be constructed as a dialogue: if one follows a certain typographical 
convention the dashes that open certain paragraphs appear to indicate a 
change in voice. though it should be noted that Derrida nowhere insists on this 
tcxtual convention9. In addition, the form of the second part of the cssaý 
0 Cf. the convention used b\ Maurice Blanchot in The Infinite Conversation [19691 translated by 
Susan Hanson (, \Iinneapoli,,,. Nlinncý,, )ta Uni\ersity Press. 1991). 
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concludes with a free-form, barely intelligible chain of words which appears 
almost to be a stream of consciousness prayer - though to whom it might be 
10 addressed is unclear 
Our concern here is with the first part, a detailed commentary on one particular 
section from Otherwise than Being; a section whose discussion of scepticism has 
been taken to be a response to Derrida's critique of Totality and Infinity in 
'Violence and Metaphysics'. It is there that Levinas articulates his break from 
the language of ontology. It has been argued that, in response, Derrida 
withdraws aspects of the criticisms made in 'Violence and Metaphysics' by 
recognising the force of the introduction of the distinction between the Saying 
and the Said. If this is the case, it is not made explicit; such a reading appears to 
be based on an unwarranted extrapolation from one briefpassage in this essay. 
Taking my cue from the re-statement of difference in 'Wholly Otherwise', I want 
to insist on the persistence of a metaphysical dispute between Derrida and 
Levinas. Levinas's distinction between the Saying and the Said still depends on 
the binary of two orders: Being and the Beyond Being of the Infinite. Although 
there is a definite change of register in Derrida's essay, the proponent of 
diffigrance and arche-writing engages with Levinas's writing itself. I argue that 
Derrida deploys a classic deconstructive move in this essay: he interrogates the 
metaphors employed by Levinas in order to demonstrate the inability of 
Levinas's metaphysical system to maintain the distinction between Being and 
that which is Beyond Being. The metaphor of the "retied knot" which serves to 
illustrate how the interruption of the Said by the Saying can be preserved in the 
Said of philosophy, disrupts the very possibility of a subject distinguishing 
between the Saying and the Said in thefirst place. 
10 In the interview with Magazine Littgraire (April, 2003), Derrida indicated that he had 
attempted to allow a certain feminine voice to speak: 'Elle protestait doucement, mais sans 
complaisance, contre le privilýge androcentrique, voire patriarchique qui laisse tant de marques 
dans les textes de Uvinas... '. '[That voice] protested softly, but without complaisance, against 
the androcentric (even patriarchal) privilege which leaves so many marks in Levinas's texts. ' (op. 
cit. p. 321. 
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My presentation will focus on quotations from the text. These will be used to 
illustrate the displacement Derrida's reading performs on Levinas's text. This 
displacement may be contrasted with the first stage of Critchley's "clOtural 
reading" which -is a commentary marked by fidelity to the text. Derrida's 
imposition of the term seriature to describe the logic of Levinas's text represents 
the culmination of this displacement. Seriature is not positive ascription - it 
insists on the movement of series [serie] and erasure [rature] that animates the 
notion of the retied knot in spite of Levinas's intentions in using the metaphor. 
As noted by Hobson, Derrida's neonymy is 'often baroque and parodic' [OL 26]. 
Language Unbound 
Citing a key passage from 'At this Very Moment of a strange withdrawal or 
reticence on the part of Derrida, Bernasconi writes: 
'In any event, far from defending the position he adopted in 1964, Deffida 
appears to reverse roles with Levinas without a moment's hesitation. No 
sooner has he posed the question of how Levinas inscribes the wholly other 
in the language of being - the question which dominates "Violence and 
Metaphysics - than Derrida immediately withdraws it: "Shouldn't one 
reverse the question, in appearance at least, and ask oneself if that language 
is not of itself unbound, hence open to the wholly other, to its own beyond, 
and in such a way that it is less a matter of exceeding that language than of 
treating otherwise its own possibilities". "' 
Critchley follows Bernasconi in onenting his reading around this same sentence. 
It is important to cite the original Derridean text more fully. This "reversal" is 
not a withdrawal of the original criticisms made in 'Violence and Metaphysics'. 
'How does he [Levinas] manage to inscribe or let the wholly other be 
inscribed within the language of being ... within its syntax and 
lexicon, 
under its law? How does he manage to give a place there to what remains 
absolutely foreign to that medium, absolutely unbound from that language, 
beyond being ... ? Mustn't one reverse the question, at 
least in appearance, 
and ask oneself if that language is not of itself unbound and hence open to 
the wholly other, to its own beyond, in such a way that it is less a matter of 
exceeding that language than of treating it otherwise with its own 
possibilitiesT [ATVM 16-17] 
11 'Skepticism in the Face of Philosophy' in Re-Reading Levinas edited by Robert Bernasconi & 
Simon Critchley (London, Athlone Press, 199 1), pp. 149-16 1; p. 156. 
231 
Chapter 5 The Metaphysical Stand-off 
What does "reverse" indicate here? Does it mean that Derrida takes back or 
retreats from his original questions? Or something quite different? I take it to 
mean that the question that one asks Levinas - how do you relate to the Beyond 
in the language of the Same? - assumes a model of language that might not be 
correct. Why assume that language is bounded, finite, homogeneous and that the 
Beyond comes from outside language? Couldn't we instead think of language C) 
itself as unbounded and already open to the other in its iteration and 
dissemination? Such an interpretation would gel with the 'deafness' to the Same 
and the Other found in 'Violence and Metaphysics'. Derrida then proceeds to 
connect this question to the event of the Other - how responsible is Levinas's 
discourse in presenting the event of the Other as an event from Beyond and not 
an event i. mmanent to the very possibilities of language? 
To elaborate on this concern, Derrida attends to what Hobson refers to as a 
'token reflexive phrase': the manner in which a linguistic act attaches to a 
particular event or thing in space and time [OL 135]. 'At this very moment ... ' 
[en ce moment meme] is used by Levinas in two distinct ways on three occasions 
within a couple of pages [OtB 167-701. In the first instance it refers to the saying 
of the speaker who is able to use language to predicate and organise the said: the 
animating intentionality that gives meaning 12: the 'en ce moment' refers to this 
presence 
13 
. 
In the third instance, this phrase is used to indicate the tearing of such discursive 
14 
activity by the other: the failure of synchronization 
12 Levinas remains a Husserlian in this regard. 
13 'But does the reason characteristic of justice, the State, thematization, synchronization, re- 
presentation, the logos and being succeed in absorbing into its coherence the intelligibility of 
proximity in which it unfolds? Does not the latter have to be subordinated to the former, since 
the very discussion which we are pursuing at this moment [en ce moment] counts by its said, 
since in thernatizing we are synchronizing the terms, forming a system among them, using the 
verb to be, placing in being all signification that allegedly signifies beyond being? ' [OtB 167, 
AqE 2601 
14 'The interruptions of the discourse found again and recounted in the immanence of the said are 
conserved like knots in a thread tied again, the trace of a diachrony that does not enter into the 
present, that refuses simultaneity. 
'And I still interrupt the ultimate discourse in which all the discourses are stated, in saying it to 
one that listens to it, and who is situated outside the said that the discourse says, outside all it 
includes. That is true of the discussion I am here elaborating at this very moment (en ce moment 
meme]. ' [OtB 170; AqE 2641 
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'For the first use of the phrase in Levinas points to an act by which language, 
even in indicating singularity, unique location, undoes the singularity and the 
uniqueness by reappropriating words and placing them within different webs 
of meaning;. the second use points to an interruption in the circulation of 
meaning, constituted by the pull of the interlocutor, and interruption without 
which meaning is not possible. ' [OL 195] 
But nothing preserves this second 'moment' of interruption except the activity of 
the first - the synchronizing activity of language as enunciated. Somehow, the 
first 'reties' that which was interrupted but in such a way as to preserve the 
interruption - in a 'knot'. Derrida's analysis interrogates the metaphor and 
suggests that this means that there can not simply be a knot in isolation' 5. 
'But there must be a series, a beginning of a series of that "same" (at least 
two occurrences) in order for the writing that dislocates the Same toward the 
Relation to have a hold and a chance. E. L. would have been unable to make 
understandable the probable essence of language without that singular 
repetition, without that citation or recitation which makes the Same come to 
rather than returning to the Other. I said a "chance" because one is never 
constrained, even when obligated, to read what is thus rendered legible. ' 
[A TVM 24] 
Derrida repeats his suspicions of even identifying such a knot and reading it as 
enigmatic trace of the beyond. In this concept of the trace, Levinas insists on its 
nonphenomenality, but if it is nonphenomenal in this way (a withdrawing), then: 
6... nothing forces us to read it like that. It can always be interpreted 
without passing beyond, the beyond here not opening out to anyone or 
anything at all. The second "at this very moment" can always be made to 
return to the first, enveloping it anew, ignoring the series effect or reducing 
it to a homogenous concept of seriality, ignoring what this seriality bears of 
the singulary other and of the out-of-series (hors-serie). Everything would 
then return to the same. ' [A TVM 24-25 ] 
We see here the repetition - or stand-off - of the two positions. In many ways, 
Levinas's diagnosis in 'Wholly Otherwise' is correct. In a manner of speaking, 
15 'The structure of the 'knot' in Levinas, the difference, we are led to expect, between the two 
instances of the same phrase, enable us to read the trace as trace of something not appearing as a 
phenomenon. In Derrida's discussion, the Levinasian text is respected; but it is also urged 
towards a supplementary process, towards one where interruption becomes interruptions. They 
are absolute but plural and thus not stable units, but refer out to other knots, other interruptions. ' 
[OL 2001 
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Derrida does stand for the creaturely, "originary finitude", and Levinas for the 
infinite (divine) event of transcendence. Levinas, in both Otherwise than Being 
and 'Wholly Otherwise', is content to simply differentiate the two positions. 
Derrida, however, within the tradition of critical philosophy, continues to ask 
whatjustifies Levinas's interpretation of language and the Other. The question 
of language is therefore crucial in philosophical presentation. 'Violence and 
Metaphysics' structured its critique around Levinas's reading of the history of 
philosophy; Otherwise than Being is constructed in a different style and so 
necessitates a change in register. But the fundaments of the question remain - 
how can Levinas write of the transcendent and how can it be philosophy? This 
essay might even be understood to go further than 'Violence and Metaphysics' 
since it questions the stability of this conceptuality. 
Derrida's point of leverage is the constellation of metaphors chosen by Levinas 
to articulate the specific textuality of a philosophical text that preserves the 
interruptions of the Saying by the Said. In 'Violence and Metaphysics', we saw 
how the crux for Derrida was whether Totality and Infinity could even be read as 
philosophy since it seemed to rest in an empiricism content to trust in the 
transparency or instrumentality of its metaphors. Again, we are faced with the 
same question - is it philosophy? Or is it empiricism? 
The key metaphor is the "retied knot" that re-seams the tears caused by the 
interruption of the Saying in the Said. A deconstructive reading of this metaphor 
shows how it contests the very structure set up in Levinas's reading. That is, 
Derrida's insistence on the necessity of investigating how "Levinas's Work 
works ??, how it can write what it claims, reveals the fundamental instability of the 
de facto distinction between both the Saying and the Said and Being and the 
Infinite that comes from beyond Being. Thus, in contrast to both Bernasconi and 
Critchley, we should insist that Derrida does reiterate the questions of 'Violence 
and Metaphysics' albeit in a different manner' 6. Rather than drawing attention to 
a lack of care for presentation, Derrida interrogates Levinas's new thematics on 
this issue. 
16 Bernasconi 'Skepticism in the Face of Philosophy' p. 156. 
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Bernasconi has warned against allowing the models of philosophical disputation 
to overwrite a quite distinct phenomenon: 'The discussion between Derrida and 
Levinas which i's so often assimilated to standard models of argument - 
refutation and response - and thereby enclosed within philosophy, bears the mark 
of another kind of encounter, one not governed by the model of knowledge or 
even of truth. ' 17 It is perhaps stretching the issue to present the exchange 
between Derrida and Levinas as a discussion; nor can it fairly be glossed as the 
'ethical encounter' of Totality and Infinity - Derrida himself has insisted on its 
18 finitude 
If we are meant to treat it as some form of intimate correspondence, then it is 
unclear how it is open to us to read it productively. Or perhaps we are meant to 
revel in its creativity, as writing? The philistine haunts this thesis - deadened to 
nesh sentiment and troubled by the consequences of repeating the charges of 
others that this 'philosophy' (if that is even what it is for Bernasconi) is not 
concerned with truth. Deconstruction is certainly a different species of 
philosophical writing, but it is not thereby uninterested in knowledge and truth - 
indeed, this thesis repeats the epistemological concern of Derrida - Levinas 
cannot justify his writings as knowledge or ethics. 
Affirmation of contandnation 
The metaphor of the "retied knot" "obsesses" Otherwise than Being. Across 
several detailed pages, Derrida interrogates its functioning as Levinas seeks to 
justify how it is possible to write about the Saying in a philosophical text. 
Importantly, this is not faithful re-presentation, but commentary as interrogation 
of what covers over important philosophical themes: writing, language and the 
metaphysics of being. 
17 Ibid. p. 159. 
18 We should note that Levinas made no explicit response after writing 'Wholly Otherwise' and 
that both this text and the sections in Other-wise than Being supposedly marked by 'Violence and 
Metaphysics' suffer in comparison to the patient, extensive readings produced by Derrida. 
235 
Chapter 5 The Metaphysical Stand-off 
The 'retied knot' offers a way to understand the manner in which the saying that 
interrupts the said can still be preserved without being assimilated by the said. 
Derrida's challenge is chiefly developed through the problem of contamination. 
What allows these interruptions to be interpreted as moments free from 
contamination by the given? On the writing of interruption, Derrida notes: 
'That is the strange force of a text which frees itself to you without apparent 
defense, a force not that of the written, to be sure, in the current sense of the 
term, which obligates the written in simply making it possible. The 
disturbance which it refers (the Relation it relates to the other in linking to it 
the recit) is never assured, perceptible, or demonstrable: neither a 
demonstrative conclusion nor a phenomenal showing. By definition it is not 
a controllable disturbance, it is not readable within the inside of logic, 
semiotics, language, granimaticality, lexicon, or rhetoric with their 
supposedly internal criteria, because nothing is less certain than the rigorous 
limits of such an inside. 
'The internal element must have been holed or broken through ... torn, even 
more than once, in more or less regular fashion, so that the regularity of the 
tear (I would even say the strategy of the tear, if this word, strategy, did not 
betoken too much - for him, not for me - toward economic calculation, the 
ruse of a strategern and warring violence at the very point when on the 
contrary everything must be so calculated that calculation should not have 
the last word over everything) may have obligated you to receive the order 
which is gently given to you, confided to you, in order to read thus and not 
otherwise, to read other-wise and not thus. ' [A TVM 25] 
This passage begins by insisting that the disturbance of the Said by the Saying is 
neither perceptible (available to 
phenomenological analysiS) nor 
intuition and hence amenable to 
demonstrable through metaphysical 
axiomatics'9 
There are no internal criteria for interpreting an "encounter" as such an 
interruption and hence one is not obligated to read it thus (is it then a wager? A 
decision? Even a projection? ). Moreover, Derrida introduces a theme alien to 
Levinas's own considerations, by suggesting that a certain regularity must attach 
to these interruptions for the assertion of the model of the Saying and the Said to 
cohere with what is available to intuition. But such an idea of regularity would 
immediately begin to undermine the understanding of the tear as coming 
19 In this way, the Levinasian trace is anarchic [L&P 149]: 'Or are they not also the embers still 
glowing beneath the ashes ... the truth 
illuminates whoever breathes on the flame and coaxes it 
back to life' - from 'Means of Identification' cited by Caygill [L&P'-)001. 
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uncontaminated from beyond being. We can discern here a veiled structuralist 
riposte to Levinas: the meaning of the tears comes from the structure in which 
they are preserved, not from the tears themselves. 
In other words, Derrida again raises the question of justification and then 
suggests that even a 'dogmatic' assertion of this metaphysical model would 
engender certain paradoxes. As this conunentary develops, Derrida's own 
vocabulary begins to overwrite Levinas's 
20 
. 
'Apparently he likes the tear (dichirure) but detests contamination. Yet 
what holds his writing in suspense is that one must welcome contamination, 
the risk of contamination, in chaining the tears and regularly resuming them 
within the philosophical text or tissue of a recit. This resumption is even the 
condition upon which what is beyond essence may keep its chance against 
the enveloping seam of the thernatical or dialectical. ... The risk of 
contamination must be regularly accepted (in series) in order to leave its 
chance to the noncontamination of the other by the rule of the same. ' 
[A TVM 261 
In our analyses of Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, we noted that 
the task envisioned by Levinas involves the production of the infinite within the 
given, in such a way as to direct a political transformation of being (and hence 
render it meaningful). Here, in emphasising 'resumption', Derrida recalls this 
interaction of the Infinite and Being: the face demands a response, it is not to be 
contemplated [E&I 88]. Resumption plays the role of the 'profile' of the alter 
ego: it is the condition of interpretation. The human is the site at which Being is 
undone by the possible arrival of transcendence; that which, Levinas sometimes 
describes as 'inspiration' or 'prophetism' but which is thernatised in Totality and 
Infinity as Desire and in Otherwise than Being as glory. The risk, so often 
glossed by Levinas as 'a fine risk', that Being might cover over the interruption 
must be accepted in order to challenge the given in the first place. This 
noncontamination cannot be guaranteed and so it is a question of preserving it. It 
20 'But this series, says Derrida, is multiple in its complication: the knots which are retied and 
reknotted insert interruptions and prevent even continuity in the Interruption. And DerrIda 
continues his sentences in this work on Levinas in a style which brings together contradictions, 
but which makes their discontinuity unabsolute. He may use a flowing rhythm, a syntax which 
sweeps subordinating phrases into coordination, thus giving a sense of addition ... ' [OL 1971. 
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is a question of knowing how it might be preserved without some element of 
contamination. But this entails that there is no rapport sans rapport. 
For Levinas, language as discourse, as thernatization, covers over the Relation to 
the Other, but the Relation to the Other is the condition of possibility of 
language. That which tears language is also that which produces it. Demda 
insists that this means that contamination cannot be avoided. 
'... the moment of the Other, marks the instance of the tear by a Relation 
which will have made "only possible" the continuum itself, that will 
therefore not have been (or have come to be) the continuum it seemed to be. 
The absolutely future anterior of the tear - as an absolutely past anterior - 
will have made possible the effect of the seam. And not vice versa. But 
only on the condition of letting itself be contaminated, resumed, and sewn 
up within what it has made possible. ' [A TVM 27 my emphasis] 
Again, to repeat my general point through particular instances, the other that 
makes possible the continuum by its immanent transcendence, operates in such 
a way that the continuum cannot be interpreted as homogeneous or as a set of 
discre(e)t(e) cuts. As Derrida previously wrote, suggesting it as the question to C) b 
, govern the entire reading of Totality and Infinity: 'one wonders whether history D tD 
itself does not begin with this relationship to the other which Levinas places 
beyond history' [VM 1161. 
Further, the issue of knots and contanunations can be generalised so that what 
supposedly distinguishes Levinas's books from others within the history of 
philosophy (and even those of other disciplines) - the 'ethical saying', is placed 
in question: 
'Knotted threads are formed in it, recapturing the tears, but otherwise. They 
allow the discontinuous to appear in its trace, but since the trace is not to be 
reassembled into its appearance, it can always resemble the trace , vhich 
discontinuity leaves \vithin the logical discourse of the State, of philosophy. 
of medicine. ... but here, nonphenomenality must obligaie us. 'Xithout 
constraint. to read the trace as trace, the interruption as interruption 
according to an (is such no longer appropriable as phenomenon of essence. 
The structure of the knot must be other, although it resembles it quite a lot. 
You are never required to read or recognize the trace of interruption, it onk 
comes about through you for whom it is freed. and yet he will have. whollý y 
otherwise. obligated you to read what one is not obligated to read. ' [A 7-1,11 
27-2S] 
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This passage directs itself at Levinas's claim that the State does not 'untie but 
cuts knots' and in the forms through which it polices these cuts are not retied - 
'the intervals are'not recuperated' [OtB 170]. Knots are invoked to counter this 
state, they must not be indiscernible for then no block to fate would be produced 
[OtB 105 ]21 . They must interrupt in a counter narrative - hence the paradox: 
interruption must be nonphenomenal, but phenomenalized in a narrative. It 
would then be a question of how one knew which activity one was engaged in - 
the seaming over of the state or the seaming into counter-narrative. Again. 
Derrida repeats the problem: although the knotted thread is invoked it in fact 
only serves to identify a general feature of any writing whatsoever - not the 
peculiar feature of Levinas's own writing. If there is no appearance of the trace, 
then it is not clear how we are justified in insisting that it does not pertain to 
other writings: how are we obligated but never required to recognize the trace? 
Derrida pursues this idea to conclude that, to be distinct from symptomatic 
discontinuities in other discourses, the knot that preserves the Saying must 
assume a determination within the element of the Same. Levinas himself 
recognizes this problem in his analyses. Derrida states the problem bluntly: 
there are many ways of confecting such an inextricable mesh [which would 
preserve proximity] rather than another, since the risk has to do with their not all 
being equivalent. There a philosophy, or an aesthetics, a rhetoric, a poetics, a 
psychagogy, an economy still remains to be negotiated: between, if -this could 
still be said, the before and the beyond. ' [ATVM 291 [my italics] Derrida's 
suspicion is that there is a different way to account for the features of language: 
at key points he forces his own adopted distinction between the constative and 
the performative into the analysis [e. g. ATVM 35] 22 . The significance of this 
21 The reference to the knotted thread is accompanied by reference to the Fates on two occasions: 
, ... we must try to articulate the 
break-up of a fate that reigns in essence, in that its fragments 
and modalities, despite their diversity, belong to one another, that is, do not escape the same 
order, do not escape Order, as though the bits of the thread cut by the Parques were then knotted 
together again. ' (OtB 8] See also [OtB 105]. 
22 '... the urging of microstructures and micrologies in other*s work into this particular embedded 
dissymmetry, enables Derrida to relate others' work to his own concerns without simplified 
general repetition of a general form. ' [OL 196] 
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move being that the distinction is immanent to language as finite and vet 
unbounded. 
This suspicion is developed in novel and concrete form by a consideration of the 
status of the language used in Otherwise than Being. The thernatization of what 
is nonthematizable disrupts the classical order of simultaneity and logical 
systematicity; Levinas's own understanding of how the work works tums every 
word into only a provisional rhetorical placement, with the effect that 'we get 
23 
caught up in a network of quotation marks' 
'If you wish to talk of E. L's operation when he sets himself into "this 
work", when he writes "at this moment", and if you ask "What is he doing"', 
and "How does he do it? " then not only must you dis-locate the "he" who is 
no longer the subject of an operation ... but you must right away clarify that the Work, as his work gives and gives again to be thought is no longer of the 
technical or productive order of the operation. ... There, near but infinitely distanced, the dislocation is to be found in the interior without inside of 
language which is yet opened out to the outside of the wholly other. The 
infinite law of quotation marks seems to suspend any reference, enclosing 
the work upon the borderless context which it gives to itself: yet behold here 
this law making absolute reference to the commandment of the wholly 
other, obligating beyond any delirnitable context. ' [ATVM 34] 
Note the repetition of the charge offered by Levinas against Derrida in 'Wholly 
Otherwise' - Levinas's Work is endlessly deferred, without reference, anchored 
only by the encounter with the Other on which it depends in a decision to 
interpret it thus always held in place by quotation marks and a certain rhetorical 
irony - for it cannot claim as its meaning what it ostensibly means. Paradoxical 
in its structure: there is no reference, yet it insists on its 'before the law'. 
Disseminating in language as a only a potential infinite, it claims status in respect 
of a positive infinite. Hobson describes this 'strange relation' as a double-bind 
between necrotiation and the non-necrotiable [OL 141], but how is not simply that 
madness or delusion which Levinas fears? 
Hobson aq, -Lies that this structure '... allows 
for entities which are out of the %%eb 
of traces, where are unintuitable and unpresentable, but to which ý\ c have some 
23 'The work of E. L. comprehends an other manner to think obligation in the -one must-. an 
othei- manner ol' thinking the \\()t-k. and e\en of thinking thought. One must therefore read it 
otherwise. read there "otherwise" the "one must". and otherwise the otherwise. ' [ATI W 3-3] 
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sort of access, paradoxically and imperfectly, by a process of negotiation and 
contamination' [OL 200]. Yet, it would seem that Derrida takes the argument in 
the other direction precisely questioning what sort of 'access' can be claimed 
philosophically for the 'unintuitable and unpresentable'. This underlies the two 
pages on 'illeity' where the two orders of the positive infinite and language 
cannot be made to latch onto each other. Derrida culminates this line of 
investigation with a fantastic, hysterical, performative sentence to demonstrate 
how one would have to write to comment faithfully on. Levinas: 
'Now it would have been necessary to say, it must therefore be said, that 
"he" has withdrawn nothing whatever, "he" has made appear the possibility 
of that withdrawal, he has not made it appear, he has let it appear, he has not 
let it appear, since what he has let (not to be but to make a sign, and not a 
sign but an enigma), what he has let produce itself as enigma, and to 
produce itself is still too much, is not of the phenomenal order, he has "let" 
44appear" the non-appearing as such (but the non-appearing never dis- 
appears into its "as such", etc. ) on the limit of the beyond, a limit that is not 
a determinable, visible, or thinkable line, and that has no definable edges, on 
the "limit", therefore, of the "beyond" of phenomenon and of essence: that 
is to say (! ) the "he" himself. That's it, the "he" himself, that is to say (! ), 
the Other. "He" has said "He", even before "I" may say "I" and in order 
that, if that is possible, "I" may say "I". ' [ATVM 35-36] 
It is this series of erasures that suggests to'Derrida the concept of seriature (a 
neologism comprising the word "serie" and "rature" [erasure]). Levinas's very 
writing practices a certain citationality: using but not subscribing to the hither 
side of language which always betrays the beyond. But what does it mean for 
this beyond to be marked by a pronoun? The very gesture appears to betray its 
arbitrary imposition and 'menaces the authenticity of the trace' and the 
distinction between the trace and the sign [ATVM 37]. We return to the problem 
of Totality and Infinity - how do the two orders relate? LAutre and LAutrui; 
the "he" beyond language and the "he" within language. 
Levinas is only able to append his name at the end of a shifting displacement of 
faulty wordS24 . As such, the authority of the author is transformed. 
Much of the 
commentary has picked up on Derrida's neologism s9riature, as if it were 
24 'The words there describe (constate) and produce (perform) undecidably a written and a 
writing immediately implying the I-now-here" of the scnptor. ' [ATVM 211 Compare Derrida's 
discussion to that found in Hegel's discussion of 'Sense-Certainty'. Hegel Phenomenology of 
Spirit (1806] translated by AN. Miller (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 58-66. 
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championed as a valorised description of Levinas's 'exemplary textuality' (e. g.. 
Critchley [ED 173]). But we should note that it forcefully challenges Levinas's 
own self-understanding since it generalises his own dominant metaphor of the 
'retied knot' to undermine the opposition between Saying and Said. Derrida's 
challenge is as follows: why interpret dejacto (by fiat) the knots as occasions of 
transcendence interrupting language rather than as products of language itself?. 
Seriature may result from the diffirantial structure of language. 
It is necessary to stress the violence intended by Derrida's commentary. 
Propelling its metaphoricity to the limit, Derrida overwrites Otherwise than Being 
with what he terms seriature. This first part of 'At this Very Moment ... ' is in 
effect a palimpsest: diffigrance effectuates the phenomenon identified by Levinas 
without appeal to that which cannot be justified from within a phenomenological 
methodology. If the beginning of the same is already doubled, then the very 
understanding of the Same as Self-Same is challenged, then '[t]here is no more a 
"negative" contamination than there is a simple beyond or a simple inside of 
language, on the one side and on the other of some border. ' [ATVM 38] Sgriature 
marks the culminating displacement of the Levinas's metaphysics by forcing the 
metaphor of the retied knot to its limit and beyond. Not only does Otherwise than 
Being not achieve the level of critical philosophical presentation, its very 
conceptual architecture is shown to be unstable. Saying is displaced by 
generalised writing: the themes of 'Violence and Metaphysics' return or, rather, 
remain. 
Following Hobson's analysis, we should conclude that, far from being an 
instrument, language itself is a variegated and complex structure that 'cannot be 
gathered into a site of present synthesis' [OL 138]. But this failure of synthesis 
does not mark a lack, or limit, beyond which the other or illeity lies. If the other 
appears in 'phantasmal form' and 'points ... to what cannot 
be represented' [OL 
141] this is not because that other is beyond being. Hobson summanises the 
4strange attractor' of the 'other' produced through Derrida's engagement with 
Levinas as a 'shadowy entity, enabling subjectivity and referentiality without 
presence' [OL 144], but we should stress that it is not the positive infinite of 
Levinas's 1Autrui, illeity or glory. 
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Derrida's insistence on language and phenomenality means that ethics, if there is 
any, falls within finitude: 'The excess beyond synthesis in language means that 
other meanings Or the possibility of other meanings, future ones as well as past, 
have to be deferred to. But that responsibility may not be answered to - it is 
because it may always possibly not be answered to that there is an ethics. ' [OL 
138] Ethics is caught up in relation to the heteron -, it begins with the law and 
the calculable in their internal self-differentiation. The 'call' comes from within 
"being" not from without. In this sense, contra Visker, 'At this Very Moment 
does not "return" to Levinas's distinction between the same and the other - 
the other is not an absolute alterity beyond being for Derrida and, indeed, is only 
apparent through negotiation and calculation 25. 
Coda - Bois! 
Derrida's change in register is an attempt to engage Levinas after having failed 
to engage him with 'Violence and Metaphysics' - Levinas read it, and took it 
badly. The change in register attempts to solicit a response. Levinas is invited 
or, perhaps, commanded to drink up. Critchley makes much of this word, "bois", 
which concludes the strange final paragraph of 'At this Very Mornent... ' [ATVM 
46-47]. He contextualises it within the story of Rebekkah from Genesis, the 
offer of water as the gift of hospitality to the stranger 26 . It is the ethical gift. 
My pessimism moves in a different direction. In French "bois" carries two 
different meanings, the imperative of boire, 'to drink', and the noun, which could 
be translated as 'wood'. What enables us to decide here between the two 
translations? What does this equivocation indicate of language and of wnting 
that breaks with Levinas's theory? Secondly, the imperative carries a different 
register within a tradition framed by the final instruction issued to Socrates: 
drink. The gift to quench thirst? or the command of the jailer? Given Levinas's 
earlier refusals, might the latter not be to mind. One could continue on this 
25 Compare Visker Truth and Singularity pp. 290-92. 
26 "'Bois" - Derrida*s Final Word on Levinas' in Re-Reading Levinas edited 
by Robert 
Bernasconi & Simon Critchley (London, Athlone Press, 1991), pp. 162-189. 
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trajectory and ask whether one can be so confident in the operation of the 'gift, 
within the works of a writer who has mused on the troublin-2 double meaning of 
pharmakon - cure and poison. What is Derrida's gift intended to do? And %ý hy I= I 
did Levinas not drink? He made no further engagement with De 0M 
My contention throughout is to emphasise both the fundamental philosophical 
differences between Derrida and Levinas and the problem of wntincy as it Z-1 
crucially determines Demda's text. It is perhaps important to note that 'At this 
Very Moment ... 
' is delivered before the explosion of interest in Levinas in the 
mid-1980s: Derrida's engagement becomes less direct in the later work. These 
writings are the subject of the next chapter. We will try to remain immanent to 
the form of these writings while demonstrating the manner in which that very 
form keys into the philosophical claims that demarcate this persistent dispute. 
"44 
Part Three 
Reading Derrida Otherwise 
Chapter Six 
Conjunctural Writings: Derrida's later writing on Levinas 
'... when Derrida speaks with least reservation on normative issues he draws 
consistently and extensively on Levinas's work. This is explicit in 'Force of 
Law', where Levinas's conception of justice is cited on two occasions, both 
crucial to Derrida's argument, and is implicit but perhaps even more 
pervasive in 'The Politics of Friendship', where the whole vocabulary of 
asymmetry, heteronomy and 'the curvature of social space' is borrowed from 
Totality and Infinity. ' 
Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction' 
I take the above quotation to orient this chapter, which turns to a set of writings 
including 'Force of Law'. The main argument advanced will be that to identify 
where Derrida 'speaks with least reservation' amounts to an enormous 
philological problem. The idea of the philosopher as figure, or intellectual, 
pronouncing on normative issues is almost alien to his concerns-. Moreover, 
when references to or readings of Levinas appear in his works after 'At this Very 
Moment', we will see that this problem of authorial voice is, if anything, 
exacerbated. One could almost say that when the name Levinas appears in these 
later texts, more reservation is "manifest" than inany of his other writings. 
For Visker, the meaning of this Indecision' or 'hesitation" is unclear, but marks t: ) 
a new affinity which supplants the critique of 'Violence and -Metaphysics 
I find it hard not to conclude from this that Demda has moved himself into 
a position that is so close to Levinas that it has become impossible for him 
to state exactly what his remaining 'reticence' might amount to. And yet. 
instead of seeing here only a "difference in signature" as Derrida suggests. I 
I Second edition - [ED 2691. 
2 See the comments i-clating to Sartre in Jacques Derrida 'Intervlc%ý with le nouvel observ, mýul' 
[19811 translated bý David Allison et. al. in Derritia and DitýCrance edited b\ David Wocd 
Robert Bernasconi (Evanston, Northwestern University Press. 1988), pp. -I -, S-. 
Truth and Siml, ularlrv P. 
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should like to risk the hypothesis that the difficulty he experiences in 
articulating what is philosophically at stake in his hesitations is due to the 
fact that they cannot be articulated once one has neutered the logic of the 
I yes' before all yes and no, which seems to be at the core of Derrida's 
'inheritance' from Levinas. ' 4 
Indeed, it is striking how both Visker and Critchley come to the same conclusion 
but starting from different premises - or rather, different interpretations of the 
same premises: for the former, reservation is the sign of alliance, for the latter, 
the absence of reservation. The endeavour of this chapter is to read Derrida 
otherwise. When dealing with the author of Of Grammatology, one should be 
extremely attentive to the practice of citation. As we shall see, the recent 
writings which "address" Levinas, at times come close to ventriloquism that 
generates* a 'structural doubling' through 'irony, repetition and quotation' [OL 
61]. 1 shall invoke the term conjunctural writing, to insist on the manner in 
which Derrida's "opinions" retreat behind the construction of sites at which 
different strands of the philosophical tradition contest the space of Levinas's 
system. That is, nowhere since 1980, when dealing with Levinas does Derrida 
write without formal devices to displace the notion of 'speaking without 
reservation'. Such a writing differs from both the writing of 'Violence and 
Metaphysics' and 'At this Very Moment ... ' but preserves in its 
formal 
constitution an opposition to Levinas's treatment of the history of philosophy: in 
so doing any simple opposition between form and content is displaced 5. Taking 
into account the thernatics developed in Chapter Three, this concluding chapter 
emphasises the critical problems underlying a. writing that displaces the current 
conception of philosophical writing: writing what one, as individual, holds to be 
true. 
This sixth chapter will examine four further examples of Derrida's writings on 
Levinas: The Gift of Death 6; "A Word of Welcome", which comprises the main 
Ibid. p. 315. 
5 'Derrida takes 'writing, 'trace', 'Inscription' as the unmetaphorical locus of a relation to the 
history of philosophy. But this constellation of terms also has the advantage that by and of itself 
it works to undo the distinction between form and content, being both theme and medium for the 
theme (discussion of writing is done in writing). ' [OL 13] 
6 Jacques Derrida The Gift of Death [1992]; Translated by David Wills-, Chicago & London, 
University of Chicago Press, 1995. Hereafter abbreviated to GD followed by page reference. 
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body of the book, published in English as Adieu: To Emmanuel Levinas; On 
77 Cosmopolitanism ; 'Force of Law . It will also briefly discuss The Politics of 
Friendship. Often read as simply demonstrating Derrida's homage to Levinas, or 
the developmentof Levinasian themes, these works are in fact far more complex. 
What has been chiefly ignored is the polemical intent of situating the work of a 
philosopher who claimed to break with the history of Western philosophy back 
into that context. In giving full weight to these precursors (chiefly Heidegger, 
Kant and Kierkegaard), Derrida's own voice is withdrawn or displaced in a 
manner distinct from that examined in the previous chapter. Moreover, the 
moments where Derrida appears to drop his philological ventriloquism point to 
fundamental philosophical and political differences with Levinas, but even here 
the embedded relation of these moments, as 'junction points' within those texts 
[OL 74], means they resist injudicious thematic extraction. While The Gift of 
Death can be seen as staging a head-to-head between Kierkegaard and Levinas 
along the axis of religion and ethics, 'A Word of Welcome' confronts a charged 
reading of the theme of hospitality with Kant's articulation of cosmopolitanism. 
In both works, the preliminary for these dramatic climaxes is Derrida's insistence 
that Levinas be read alongside Heidegger. These constellations, or 'polylogues' 
in Hobson's acute phrase [OL 228], serve to estrange the major tendency of 
sycophantic Levinasianism, which writes as if Levinas did indeed inaugurate a 
clean break in philosophy. 
The Gift of Death 
The Gift of Death is marked by an extreme reticence, a withdrawal of the 
authorial voice into the presentation of commentary. Although some have 
extracted a thematic "Derridean" content from this work, this has been achieved 
8 by ignoring the form of the essay . Here 
I will emphasise, the nested structure of 
a complex weaving of voices. It should be noted that here 'commentary' is not 
7 Jacques Derrida 'On Cosmopolitanism' [1997] translated by Mark Dooley in Jacques Demda 
On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London and New York, Routledge, 2001), pp. 3-24- 
Hereafter abbreviated to Cosmo followed by page reference. 
8 See in particular: Peter Hallward 'Translator's Introduction' in Alain Badiou Ethics: An Essay 
on the Understanding of Evil translated by Peter Hallward (London, Verso, 2001), pp. vli-xlvli. 
The quotations Hallward uses to support his reading of Derrida are often taken from passages 
where Derrida is either summarising other thinkers or commenting from within their positions. 
247 
Chapter 6 Conjunctural Writings - Derrida's later writing on Levinas 
equated to 'the most faithful reading'; often this commentary or re-representation 
forces certain themes and affinities to the fore in a manner which might be 
contestable. 
The Gift of Death is divided into four chapters 9. The first begins from within Jan 
Patoc'ka's Heretical Essays in the History of Philosophy'O. Within the first 
paragraph, having mentioned a constellati on of secrecy, the sacred and 
responsibility, Derrida compares PatoC'ka to Levinas, who also wams against 
paganism as characterised by demonic or delusional rapture. This conjuncture 
displaces an easy understanding of Derrida as 'following on' from Levinas or of 
Derrida owing his conception of the 'Other' to Levinas. For in light of the 
developments of this thesis, we can see that Patofta's theory on the relationship 
between Christianity and the history of the European subject rivals Levinas's 
claims in scope and content. But whereas in Levinas, Judaic concepts must be 
translated into Greek to inform a political project, in PatoC'ka the Christian event 
gives access to a particular form of historicity that produces a subject formed 
around a secret core". 
The first two chapters present this reading of PatoC'ka in such a way as to bring 
out the common filiation with Levinas, that is to say, Heideggerl 2. Derrida's 
third chapter complicates this trajectory by introducing Kierkegaard to intensify 
the point of disjuncture around the secret as it determines the spheres of the 
ethical and the religious. PatoC'ka analyses. the singularity of the event of 
Christianity as the development of a new concept of secrecy, which breaks with 
the secret mysteries of pagan religion. This new religion is 'an irreducible 
condition for a joint history of the subject, responsibility and Europe' [GD 21. If 
9 The French edition of Donner la mort contains an extra essay, 'La littdrature au secret: une 
filiation impossible' - in Donner la mort (Paris, Galil6e, 1999), pp. 159-209. 
10 Heretical Essays in the History of Philosophy [1991] translated by Erazim Kohdk, edited by 
James Dodd (Chicago, Open Court, 1996). 
11 Derrida perfoms a similar move in 'Hostipitality' [sic], where he brings Levinas into contact 
with Louis Massignon, a Christian thinker who develops the concepts of "hostage" and 
C& substitution". See Jacques Derrida 'Hostipitality' [1997] translated by Gil Anidjar in Acts of 
Religion pp. 358-420. Derrida speculates that Levinas adopted the concepts from Massignon. 
12 Though Derrida makes no mention of Husserl, this account, like Levinas's, is analogous to 
Husserl's (see Appendix A). 
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the demonic confuses the boundanes between the human, the animal and the 
divine in a participatory celebration of being, for Pato6ka, the religious subject is 
the subject who circumvents this being through formation of the responsibility. 
European History is produced by this new form of subjectivity. This does not 
simply equate to a genealogy of religion but is instead a genealogy of a historical 
subject whose genesis is traced through the history of Europe. The problem of 
modem, technological civilisation is that it is unaware of this ono-in and this 
history of responsibility: the European subject is marked by its burden of self- 
justification before others. What is demanded today of historical man [sic] is that 
he recognise and acknowledge this history. Acknowledged because the problem 
itself cannot be transcended or dissolved: history is 'neither a decidable object 
nor a totality capable of being mastered, precisely because it is tied to 
responsibility, to faith, and to the gift' [GD 5]. It emphasises, instigates or 
presents an economy of dissymmetry. To wit, the Christian subject is produced 
between two orders, the finite and the heavenly, which are discontinuous and 
disjunctive. Responsibility, here, involves negotiating this schism. It is crucial 
to note that this breaks with the model offered by our reading of Levinas where 
the idea of the infinite must be produced in the finite. Levinas's project becomes 
meaningless without the infinite time of fecundity in which such a project can be 
realised. Pato6ka's, Christian subject is divided between two orders which cannot 
be reconciled in this fashion' 3. 
Death has a fundamentally different function within these two schemes. Levinas 
has no concern for the afterlife whereas the Christian subject's responsibility is 
constituted by this boundary which possibly opens to another order. The person 
is constituted in this trembling before the other order, in a *culture of death' 
where is experienced the "interior force" of the gaze of God. The subject is 
constituted in leaming to die: 'a new discipline of the soul' [GD 1.21 14. This vl2il 
over death - the anticipation of dyincy - produces the soul and is the vel-% essence 
of philosophy: 
13 For Levinas, PaWka would be a theological thinker who *,: ongeal,,, the beyond into another 
realm of being. 
14 Spccters ol'. 11tirx begins \ý ith the statement: 'I would like to learn how to li% e finally' [()p. :c 
XVII]. 
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'For one never reinforces enough the fact that it is not the psychi that is there 
in the first place and that comes thereafter to be concerned about its death, to 
keep watch over it, to be the very vigil of death. No, the soul only 
distinguishes itself, separates itself, and assembles itself within itself in the 
experience of this meletj tou thanatou. It is nothing other than this concern 
15 for dying as a relation to self and an assembling of self. ' [GD 14] 
At this point Derrida draws the reader's attention to analogies with HeideglcDrer's 
analysis of Dasein. However, when considering the complicated structure" 
reproduced within PatoC'ka's analysis of secrecy and responsibility, he 
distinguishes the two on the following basis. Though both can be read as 
Christian heresies, Derrida takes the Heidegger of Being and Time to be 
6repeating on an ontological level Christian themes and texts that have been "de- 
Christianized" Pato&a, on the other hand, '... reontologizes the historic 
themes of Christianity and attributes to revelation or to the mysterium tremendum 
the ontological content that Heidegger attempts to remove from it. ' [GD 23] 
Although Derrida pushes PatoC'ka towards responsibility and thereby produces 
echoes of Levinas in his evocation of the asymmetry of the response demanded 
by responsibility, his reading is developed through an emphasis on dissidence 
and heresy - an insistence 'on what is apart and secret ", what escapes religion 
qua institution 17 As in Levinas, this responsibility demands a new form of 
political organisation, which breaks with the 'Greco-Roman concept of the 
state '18; to overcome the decline of technologi cal modernity, a re-appropriation 
of the. Christian tradition is required, one. which acknowledges the mysterium 
tremendum of responsibility. This secret would demand transcendence in a 
15 See Aporias for an extended meditation on the meaning of death in relation to Heidegger and 
ethnographic and historical accounts of funeral customs. Aporias (Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1993). 
16 Complicated since Christianity both breaks with and represses Neoplatonism: 'Platonic 
mystery thus incorporates orgiastic mystery and Christian mystery represses Platonic mystery. ' 
[GD 91 But in this repression it is maintained operating inside Christianity; mystery incorporated 
is not destroyed but is formed as responsibility in its disciplining of fervour. 
17 Do the concepts of conversion and apostasy have their counterpart in Levinas's thought? 
18 'One should understand that in saying that Christianity has not been thought right through 
Pato&a intends that such a task be undertaken; not only by means of a more thorough 
thernatization but also by means of a political and historical setting-in-train, by means of political 
and historical action; and he advocates that according to the logic of a messianic eschatology that 
is nevertheless indissociable from phenomenology. ' [GD 281 
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social context where state would no longer be a community of persons equal in 
freedom, but free though relation to a transcendent god. 
This Christian model operates on a different economy to that presented by 
Levinas in Otherwise than Being. For the good is inflected as the giftforgetful of 
itself. That is, Neoplatonic Christianity instigated the concept of the gift that 
withdraws its generosity. Contra Pelagian salvation which is merited by works, 
this gift effaces its merit in its withdrawal. Although the gift to God is thereby 
transformed into sacrifice, this is not the sacrifice of Levinasian glory (which 
seems to come close to Patoc'ka's depiction of the orgiastic). It is rather the 
sacrifice of the subject, in that the subject can never know if the good has been 
performed - the subject is constituted around a secret only God can know. This 
'terror of the secret' displaces the complacent relation of subject to object. God 
comes from another order and sees what is invisible' 9- 
Derrida observes that the arguments of the three 'intersect in spite of their 
differences' [GD 43 ]20 and brackets off the thought that it is far from clear that 
one can distinguish PatoC'ka from Heidegger and Levinas along the axis of 
Christianity. However the themes of Europe, its history and future, are displaced 
by the first's hyperbolic and heretical form of Christianity. For PatoC'ka seems to 
insist that responsibility is thoroughly Christian in its emphasis on private 
secrecy as structuring the individual subject. In the second half of the book, 
Derrida begins to interrogate this concept of secrecy to specify what such a break 
might constitute. 
Part Three, Whom to Give to (Knowing Not to Know), marks an intensification in 
the problematic of the secret by introducing the figure of Kierkegaard. Again the 
chapter begins nested in another's voice: it moves from Patocka to St Paul and on 
19 'Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them: otherwise ye have no 
reward of your Father which is in heaven. Therefore when thou doest thine alms, do not sound a 
trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may have 
the glory of men. Verily I say unto you, They have their reward. But thou doest alms, let not thy 
left hand know what thy right hand doeth: that thine alms may be seen in secret: and thy Father 
which seeth in secret himself shall reward thee openly. ' Matthew 6: 1-4. 
20 In a brief aside, Derrida notes that in none of the discourses is sexual difference considered. 
'Sexual difference would be a being-up-until-death. ' [GD 45] 
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to Johannes de Silentio, Kierkegaard's pseudonym. Demda offers a genealogy of 
the Christian experience of fear and trembling before the secret - the God \\ hom Z-- 
we do not see and whose will we cannot know. 
In setting up this tradition, Derrida introduces God as wholly other [GD 56ff]. 
The expression. tout autre is taken from Levlnas's Totalitv and Infiniry. and 
echoes the 'Tout Autrement' of Levinas's piece on Derrida. In Fear and 
Trembling 21 , Johannes de Silentio examines the double necessltý of the secret of 
Abraham: he must keep the secret of God's command. but he can only keep the 
secret since he is unable to translate it into the order of the ethical - the public 
accounting in words before others. A responsibility that implies secrecv contests 
a certain space of Levinasian discourse: the Other demands that I make account 
of myself. But here the impossibility of speaking is not because Abraham falls to 
express what the Other demands, for Abraham cannot comprehend what God has 
demanded. 
Johannes de Silentio presents the possibility that the ethical itself is a 
22 - temptation in not speaking Abraham transgresses order, but if he were to 
speak he would transcend God's order. Abraham's me voici is before God, not 
others. Where Kant distinguishes between the action performed out of duty from 
that merely in conformity with duty, Kierkegaard suggests that there may be an 
absolute duty beyond both. The knight of faith is not simply Christian since the 
sacrifice of Isaac is common to Islam, Judaism. and Christianity. Insisting on the 
madness of the moment of decision, Kierkegaard's re-presentation of the story of 
the father of faith is posed against both the Hegelian system of mediated reason ZD 
and ethical Sittlichkeit and the good sense of the modem Protestant Church. His 
repeated disjunction is: either there is the possibility of direct, unmediated 
i-clation with God or there is no faith. The duty to God involves a sacrifice of the 
duty to all the others, and from this perspective, ve can see that, despite its 
antipathy to Hegelian mediation. Levinasian responsibility to the Other remains 
21 'Fear and Trembling: A Dialectical Lyric' [18431 translated bý Walter Loýýrie in Fear and 
Frembling tind the Book on Atiler kLondon, Everyman's Library, 11)1.14,. pp. IA 10. 
22 'It impels me to speak. to reply, to account t0i somethine. and thus to dissolve my singularit% 
in the medium of the cmicept. ' [GD 61 
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an economy of religion to the extent that the privacy of the relation to the 
particular other is organised within the space of institutions and the demands of 
justice emanating from the third. 
Although Derrida does not mention it, through the conjunction with Kierkegaard, 
the secularised notion of God at work in Levinas comes to the fore: there is no 
personal God for Levinas. From out of this consideration of Y-.. ierkegaard, 
Derrida precipitates the sense that duty is as much constituted by alterity and 
singularity as responsibility 23 . It takes the form of the sentence that will be used 
as the title of the forth section: tout autre est tout autre. This is translated by 
David Wills as 'Every other (one) is every (bit) other'. Derrida intensifies the 
demand of the other to encompass the habitual preferences of everyday life: the 
individual subject is never able to justify the decisions that involve sacrificing the 
demands of some others in favour of the demands of other others: 'But I am 
sacrificing and betraying at every moment all my other obligations; my 
obligations to the other others whom I know or don't know, the billions of my 
fellows (without mentioning the animals that are even more other others than my 
fellows), my fellows who are dying of starvation or sickness. ' [GD 69] 
This demand has attracted startled attention from some commentators as it seems 
to register with Levinasian "hyperbole", such as, 'when we sit down at the table 
in the morning and drink coffee, we kill an Ethiopian who doesn't have any 
coffee 124. Yet this intensification of-responsibility is the theme that continually 
arises from an examination of the concepts. ) inhabited as they are 
by a 
fundamental aporia (safeguarded only by tenuous convention). 
'What is thus found at work in everyday discourse, in the exercise of justice, 
and first and foremost in the axiornatics of private, public, or international 
law, in the conduct of international politics, diplomacy, and war, is a lexicon 
23 4 As a result, the concepts of responsibility, of decision, of duty, are condemned a priori to 
paradox, scandal, and aporia. Paradox, scandal, and aporia are themselves nothing other than 
sacrifice, the revelation of conceptual thinking at its limit, at its death, at its finitude. ' [GD 681 
24 Emmanuel Levinas 'The Paradox of Morality' in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the 
Other edited by Robert Bemasconi and David Wood (London, Routledge, 1988). p. 173. Cited 
by David Wood in 'Responsibility Reinscribed (and How)'. Responsibilities of Deconstruction 
(Pli: Warwick Journal of Philosophy volume 6) edited by Jonathon Dronsfield & Nick Midgley 
(Summer 1997), pp. 103-113; p. 109. 
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concerning responsibility that can be said to hover vaguely about a concept 
that is nowhere to be found, even if we can't go so far as to say that it 
doesn't correspond to any concept at all. ' [GD 851 
As Derrida notes (his voice comes to the fore, here, in the fourth section) 
civilised society is monopolised by 'monotonous complacency' such that those 
who seek to interrogate the concepts seriously are labelled as relativists or 
subject to the 'inexhaustible resources' of eristical reasonin g25. Der-rida 
explicitly gestures towards the outmoded functioning of these concepts in their 
inability to grasp the structures and forces organising the current world order. 
Whilst at the same time, this logic of sacrificing is instituted in the very real 
operations of that "world". 
'Not only is it true that such a society participates in this incalculable 
sacrifice, it actually organises it. The smooth functioning of its economic, 
political, and legal affairs, the smooth functioning of its moral discourse and 
good conscience presupposes the permanent operation of this sacrifice. ... That this order is founded upon a bottomless chaos (the abyss or open 
mouth) is something that will necessarily brought home one day to those 
who just as necessarily forget the same. ' [ GD 861 
Crucially, the third chapter has seen a commentary on Fear and Trembling, 
which by virtue of the conjuncture of this text with those of PatoC'ka, Heidegger 
and Levinas, has enabled a transformation of that text. At the fulcrum of this 
transformation is the footnote on page 78. There Derrida cites Levinas's 
reservations with respect to Kiekegaard's interpretation of the sacrifice of Isaac. 
Troubled by the elevation of the singularity of the self above ethical discourse, 
Levinas suggests instead that the 'most intense moment of the drama' of 
Abraham's intended sacrifice of Isaac is the 'attention Abraham pays to the voice 
that brings him back to the ethical order by forbidding him to carry out the 
human sacrifice.... It is there, in the ethical, that there is an appeal to the 
uniqueness of the subject and sense is given to life in the defiance of death. ' 
26 
25 This is not confined to "Anglo-American" philosophy. See Wood's essay for an example of 
reversion to dominant tropes of reasoning when faced with these analyses from both Levinas and 
Derrida (ibid. ]. 
26 Levinas Noms Propres (Montpellier. Fata Morgana, 1976), p. I P. Cited by Derrida [GD 78 
fn. I 
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Running the two texts across each other, Derrida instigates a general trembling of 
the distinction between the ethical and the religious. 'If God is completely other. 
the figure or name of the wholly other, then every other (one) is every (bit) other. 
Tout autre est 'tout autre. ' [GD 77-78] This structure, displaced from 
Kierkegaard's discourse, traverses the whole of ethical generality. everywhere 
there is found to be something wholly other [tout autre]: 'Translated into this 
extraordinary story, the truth is shown to possess the very structure of what 
occurs every day. Through its paradox it speaks of the responsibility required at 
every moment for every man and every woman. ' [GD 78] 
Such decisions as are required to sacrifice the demands of some others before the 
demands of other others is a decision, whereby we are required to act like knights 
of faith 'at every mornent': these decisions remain secret and unjustified unless 
they collapse into banal formulae. 
DerTida. commences the fourth and final section with an examination of this tout 
autre est tout autre. In its apparent tautology it calls forth two incompatible 
themes: 
e The quality of being wholly other is reserved for God alone; 
9 The infinite alterity of the wholly other is recognised in each man and 
woman. 
This sentence becomes the site of contestation: Levinas against Kierkegaard. 
Yet, what the apparent tautology performs is the very impossibility of deciding 
and differentiating between the two positions. In attempting to distinguish God 
from the human other, Levinas would be forced to perform a move analogous to 
Kierkegaard's separation of the religious and the ethical. 
'If every human is wholly other, if everyone else, or every other one. is 
every bit other, then one can no longer distinguish between a claimed 
generality of ethics that would need to be sacrificed in sacrifice, and the 
faith that turns towards God alone, as wholly other, turning away from 
human duty. .-- Neither one nor the other can assure 
himself of a concept of 
the ethical and of the religious that is of consequence; and consequently they 
are especially unable to determine the limit between those two orders. 
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Kierkegaard would also have to admit, as Levinas reminds him, that ethics 
is also the order of and respect for absolute singularity, and not only that of 
the generality or of the repetition of the same. --- Levinas is no longer able to distinguish between the infinite alterity of God and that of every human. 
His ethics is already a religious one. ' [GD 84] 
Now, this passage conflicts with my own reading, developed earlier, which 
would insist on a rigorous distinction between lAutre and lAutrui - with only 
the latter being described as a positive infinite by Levinas in Totality and Infinity 
(which appears to be Derrida's main reference here and elsewhere amongst these 
later writings). Even if God in Levinas is refigured into the focus of a religion of 
social relations, this passage of religious tropes into the ethical renders such a 
categorisation unstable. "Ethics" cannot avoid being religious. On Derrida's 
reading, the negotiation or management of the ethical obsession by the demand 
of justice is refigured as sacrifice of the far off for the closest - though Levinas 
notes the impossibility of 'passing by the closest 27 , for Derrida it is not clear that 
this can be justified independently of its residue of good sense. 
Moreover in analysing the unmarked citation from the Sermon on the Mount 
[GD 107]28 , Derrida develops a reading of the economy of sacrifice that persists 
in the attempt to move to a direct relation with God. This equates to a 
demystification of the giving that is made in secret (interior and known only to 
God who is not seen or comprehended); operating as a wager on a dual economy; 
the laying up of treasures in heaven rather than on earth breaks with the external 
body - do not let the left hand know what the right hand is doing. The interior of 
the soul valorised by PatoC'ka as the authentic future of Europe is reduced to the 
calculation of a displaced but not purified economy: 
'Another economy? Perhaps the same one in simulacrum, an economy that 
is ambiguous enough to seem to integrate noneconomy. ... It begins by 
denouncing an offering that appears too calculating still; one that would 
27 
... justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no 
distinction between those close 
and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the closest. The 
equality of all is borne by my inequality, the surplus of my duties over my rights. The forgetting 
of self moves justice. ' [OtB 159] 
28 'Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where 
thieves break through and steal: But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither 
moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal: For where your 
treasure is, there will be your heart also. ' Matthew 6: 19-21. 
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renounce earthly, finite, accountable, exterior, visible wages, one that would 
exceed an economy of retribution and exchange only to capitalize on it by 
gaining a profit or surplus value that was infinite, heavenly, incalculable, 
interior and secret. This would be a sort of secret calculation that would 
continue to wager on the gaze of God who sees the invisible and sees in my 
heart what I 'decline to have seen by my fellow humans. ' [GD 109] 
In arranging this conjuncture of voices, where does Derrida. himself stand? If. as 
I have argued, it is illegitimate to extract a few quotations from this work to get 
29 
at what Derýfida holds to be true , what can one say instead? The Gift of Death is 
interlarded with passages that specifically relate to this problem of writing as it 
ranges across the themes of pseudonymy, citation, keeping silent, and irony. 
Derrida chastises those who would hold on to the dogma that only a writing 
made clearly as a statement of personal belief is responsible: 
'One often thinks that responsibility consists of acting and signing in one's 
name. A responsible reflection on responsibility is interested in advance in 
whatever happens to the name in the event of pseudonymity, metonymy, 
homonymy, in the matter of what constitutes a real name. Sometimes one 
says or wishes it more effectively, more authentically, in the secret name by 
which one calls oneself, that one gives oneself or affects to give oneself, the 
name that is more than naming and named in the pseudonym than in the 
official legality of the public patronym. ' [GD 58] 
There is a reading that does not simply see "Johannes de Silentio" as a disguise. 
Similarly, and not coincidentally, when considering the question of irony and 
unmarked citation (quotation without quotation marks) in relation to Abraham 
and the text signed in Kierkegaard's own name (The Concept of Irony), the figure 
of Bartleby suddenly appears. Bartleby's dictum, 'I would prefer not to , 
becomes a 'sacrificial passion that would lead him to death' [GD 75]. 
Developing the thought that Bartleby's responses evoke the future without either 
predicting or promising', Derrida comments: 
29 An example of a hasty reading of this text here is Peter Hallward's summary: 'For Uvinas. as 
for Derrida, after him, the other is other only if he immediately evokes or expresses the 
absolutely (divinely) other. Since the alterity of the other is simultaneously 'the alterity of the 
human other [Autrui] and of the Most High% so than our responsibility to this other is a matter of 
'unconditional obedience', 'trauma', 'obsession, 'persecution' and so on. ' [op. cit. pp. xxii-xxiiij 
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'There is concentrated within them a sort of sublime irony. Speaking in 
order not to say anything or to say something other than what one thinks. 
speaking in such a way as to intrigue, disconcert, question, or have someone 
or something else speak (the law, the lawyer), means speaking ironically. 
Irony, in particular Socratic irony, consists of not saying anything, declaring 
that one doesn't have any knowledge of something, but doing that in order 
to interrogate, to have someone or something (the lawyer, the law) speak or 
think. Eirdneia dissimulates, it is the act of questioning by feigning 
ignorance, by pretending. ' [GD 76] 
This is no longer simply a comment on Bartleby or on Kierkegaard. It relates 
now to Derrida's own writing. By suppressing his own voice, in bringing to 
together this network of authors someone or something else is to speak. An 
intrigue is underway. 
The book concludes with a proliferation of voices, including the appearance of 
the author, as the phrase, tout autre est tout autre, is interrogated and 
appropriated. As a consequence, theoretical distinctions central to Levinas's 
system are displaced and demystified. Derrida's achievement is to generate a 
reading of Levinas which does not exactly domesticate him, but allows him to be 
situated in a context, a tradition, or on the terrain where a choice is demarcated. 
Appearing in the final pages, Baudelaire and Nietzsche serve to illustrate what 
has had to be bracketed off for this problem to be constructed - the problem of 
credence, credulity and credit which marks the secular situation. The thematic 
extraction of passages which ignores this framing device is doomed: the whole 
essay in its engagement with "God" and theology, operates under a global 
concesso non dato. 
The secret economy of Christianity cannot escape the economy of gift that will at 
some point be returned. Its internal secret eschews exteriority for the gaze of 
God who will reward in the next life. Derrida concludes with the question of 
whether we know what believing means or whether we think it is all make- 
believe [a moins qu'il n'entende lefaire accroire]. Derrida heightens a problem 
not often noted by commentators: what would it mean to choose between these 
contesting positions? And moreover, what would it mean to present that choice 
such that it achieved the level of philosophical presentation" With respect to the 
second question, the deflationary collapse of philosophy into opinions the 
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individual 'philosopher' holds is here resisted. 'As often happens, the call of or 
for the question, and the request that echoes through it, takes us further than the 
response. ' [GD 115] Not everything uttered by those taken for philosophers 
counts as philosophy, except in the limited sense of world-view. I take this to be 
an example of what Hobson means by a 'dynamic demonstration' of paradoxes 
[OL 222] that does not reduce to discursive or thematic meaning [OL 211 ]. 
As the inheritor of critical as opposed to dogmatic philosophy, Derrida here 
exposes the limits of philosophical reason. In approaching the Issues raised by 
Levinas, we begin to see the difficulty in referencing "Judaism" and 
"Christianity" as if they named discrete objects. In addition, Derrida raises the 
question that philosophy might be comprised by a doubled gesture of repeating 
religion without the religious [GD 49-50]. The contiguous reading of PatoC'ka, 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Levinas emphasises the difficulty of winnowing 
philosophical content from theological. Akin to the structuring of Fear and 
Trembling, The Gift of Death concludes with this disjunction unresolved by 
philosophy: what does it mean to decide and distinguish between the two 
economies? How do we understand the Levinasian production of the Good on 
earth in contrast to the decision to store up treasures to be rewarded by the order 
to come? Further, how do we understand Levinas with respect to the Christian 
theological tradition which has been polarised around these very questions? If 
there is a repetition of the religious without religion, is it a one-time repetition -a 
single bound to free ourselves? Or is it an iteration? A slow eradication of that 
which still determines philosophical thinking in surreptitious ways. 
To recap, the reservation of authorial opinion performs the aporetic conclusions 
limned above. As a performative critique of Levinas's methodogy, it highlights 
the inadequacy of phenomenological intuition when faced with these questions 
and decisions. Instead, such macro-systematics must be addressed through an 
examination of the history of philosophy and theology. The restoration of a 
genealogical, hermeneutic dimension addresses the amnesia to which Levinas 
appears as a novel thinker, but it does not coalesce into the reflection of the 
subject. 
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'A Word of Welcome' 
In many ways, Derrida's essay in six parts, 'Word of Welcome' is deserving of a 
book-length commentary. It deals with an enormous number of Levinasian 
themes while proceeding out of the seemingly innocent gesture of examining the 
trope of hospitality in Levinas's work. For the purposes of this chapter, I will 
examine only certain structural features while paying particular attention to the 
interruption of the Levinasian context by the figure of Kant, who introduces the 
immigrant or visitor into the politics of the Other. 
As in The Gi of Death, 'Word of Welcome' is marked by the complicated 
movement of Derrida's own voice - often it seems to retract behind philological 
motivations only to appear at points where this philological movement has 
pushed certain problems to the fore. In many ways, one could read this gesture 
as fundamental to Derrida's later engagement with Levinas. I mentioned 
hermeneutics above, but we could also see here an echo of Derrida's insistence 
on the relation of the third as it introduces justice in the ethical relation. Levinas 
is abused if he is not read in relation to the tradition: to that extent it is more 
important to allow the tradition to appear in the writing. 
Early in the essay, Derrida turns to the issue of the third [le tiers] and pursues a 
reading that builds to the point where the necessity of justice inaugurated 
troubles the originary ethical relation. Derrida asks whether there is not an 
aporia here: the third interrupts the face to face and protects against the 'vertigo 
of ethical violence 1. Although Derrida does not develop the problematic as I 
have done earlier in this thesis, his analysis coheres with that there. Except that 
he intensifies the aporia at the heart of the speculative enterprise by insisting that 
the ethical relation itself (that is where the relation to the third is subtracted) 
would be beyond good or evil [Adieu 32-33]. This seems to be precisely the 
problem of fanaticism, and one could agree that it is crucial to understanding 
Levinas's "ethics" to insist on this non-moral aspect of the encounter with the 
idea of infinity. But in the call for justice that is motivated by this encounter 
with the infinite, Derrida notes that the third conunits the subject to an initial 
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30 
ontological peýury Peýury is not a theme for Levinas, but the poss ble 
delusion of the encounter with the infinite in the face of the Other demands its 
production in the finite as apology or ipseity. This does betray something of the 
initial encounter, 'but what guides Levinas is the religious inheritance such that he 
has faith that the peýury, the institutionalisation, will not involve running such a 
great risk. 
For Derrida this produces a 'scandal': '. -- in the operation of justice one can no 
longer distinguish between fidelity to oath and the peýury of false witness, and 
even before this, between betrayal and betrayal, always more than one betrayal' 
[Adieu 34]. Although Derrida notes that he is far now from Levinas, this 
problem has been produced from an immanent reading: the commentary has 
intensified a certain problem, from which Derrida then moves away (that is, 
away from Levinas) towards his own problematic. Levinas holds to the line that 
one can distinguish the law that betrays the Other from the law that preserves it. 
Derrida instead insists that this is not possible, it is always marked by 
pervertibility: 
'This spectral "possibility" is not however, the abstraction of a liminal 
pervertibility. It would rather be the impossibility of controlling, deciding, 
or determining a limit, the impossibility of situating, by means of criteria, 
norms, or rules a tenable threshold separating pervertibility from perversion. 
This impossibility is necessary. It is necessary that this threshold should not 
be at the disposal of a general knowledge or a regulated technique. ' [Adieu 
351 
Here, we find the repetition of the theme of 'At this Very Moment ... ': the 
logic 
of pervertibility in the relation between the Other and justice is the same logic (or 
4 syntax' in Hobson's terms [OL 3]) as that of seriature. And in addition, it is not 
at the disposal of introspection or intentional analysis, since it is precisely at this 
point that the self-certainty of intentionality has been ruptured. As Derrida notes, 
the possible hospitality to the 'worst' cannot be closed off in advance. For 
Derrida responsibility is thereby intensified, since it cannot be regulated by what 
sets it in motion. 
30 See also Derrida ... Le Parjure, " Perhaps: Storytelling and Telling' [20001 translated by Peggy 
Kamuf in Without Alibi edited by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, Stanford University Press, ' 20(2). pp. 
161-201. 
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But this theme of perjury and the third registers at a different level. For %%c 
might present Derrida's own writing presentation here in its consistent 
conjuncture as perjuring fidelity to Levinas -a fidelity to Levinas again and 
again demands a 'fidelity to more than one memory' [Adieu 451. Wnitinc, itself 
becomes a hospitality to other authors. 
And chief amongst these other authors is Kant. In emphasisimF the theme of 
hospitality at the heart of reason and the possibility opened thereby for peace - 
31 Levinas invites comparison with the former's essay on those very themes . It is 
in this complex interrelationship that Derrida develops the following question: 
How can infinite and unconditional hospitality be regulated in a particular 
political or juridical practice? That is, how does the ethical interact with the 
political? This question assumes a greater importance from the contemporary 
political setting in which DeMda is writing, where the French government had 
just made it a crim-inal offence to take in an illegal imm-igrant. 
Kant, seemingly following Hobbes, takes war to be a natural condition on which 
peace must be instantiated: that is, peace does not come to a halt without a 
political order being imposed. Kant's essay, 'Toward Perpetual Peace', outlines 
the juridical and republican conditions necessary for such a structure. Among C) 
these stnctures, hospitality is limited to a right to temporary s *ourn - this right 01 
is not natural and amounts only to a right to visit another territory. Z: ) 
For Levinas, such a universal hospitality would only ever be juridical or political 
and hence limit the unconditional welcoming of the other. In addition, the 
cosmopolitan constitution will only be approached indefinitely. This deferral to 
indefinite progress is at odds with the political instantiation required to give 
meaning to the world. The institutions desired by Kant would retain the trace of 
natural hostilit-v, and be subject to the collapse into the State as totality. In 
contrast, Derrida is concerried to reposition the importance of specific 
institutional conditions as conditions of possibility for hospitalit% 
31 Immanuel Kant 'Toward Perpetual Peace' [ 17,95 1 in Practical Philosoph ,v 
translated &- edited 
b\ Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge. Cambridge Uni\ersitN Press. 1999). pp. 1 1. 
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Kant defines the limitations and conditions of the state. Levinas commences 
from the encounter with the face of the Other in peace. Derrida describes this 
encounter as an "immediate and quasi-immanent interruption in the illcitý of the 
third' [Adieu 90]. In the ten pages that conclude Section V [Adieu 91- 101 ], Kant 
and Levinas are read across each other along this point of departure. The 
juridical concept of peace produced by the state versus Levinas's invocation of a 
peace that precedes the 'labour of the negative'. In contrast to de Vries. I resist 
the urge to push this chiasmus into a syncretist position to reach a theory of 
modem institutions. This tension is more directed at a contemporary theory of 
communicative action to which Levinas's excess would be a rebarbati%*c 
reminder of what might be lost in such practices of consensus. This is a problem 
that would require much more detailed treatment than can be undertaken here3_2. 
I will instead briefly demarcate certain disagreements: 
33, Kant is invoked as a corrective to Levinas, rather than vice versa . 
The 
unpreventable problem of pervertibility in Levinas's intuition requires 
more engagement with the institutions of the law - it cannot succeed as a 
different spirit animating those structures. To this end, Derrida's 
distinction between law (1ol) and justice as law (droit) is already more 
nuanced than the notion of justice and law taken over by Levinas without 
much redevelopment-, this political insufficiency in Levinas's work is 
34 recognised by de Vries 
I Derrida does not understand Levinas to have been able to achieve v, hat he 
claims to have done. In this way, it is difficult to agree that the 'most 
important threads of Derrida's arcrument' are 'distilled' from Totality and C 
Infinity35. Chiefly, Derrida does not appear to side ývith a reading that 
would find the structure of welcome presupposed in phenomenahtý, and 
32 De Vries accepts that he pushes his surveyed authors beyond what the% might mean and . 11so 
concentrates on Derrida's writings on the university, which I am unable to do here. 
33 Cf. de Vries R,, h,,, ion and Violence p. 294. 
Ibid. p. 307. 
Ibid. p. 16. 
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intelligibility36 . The imposition of welcome into intelligibility would be 
an external imposition - itself a mututation: 'That is indeed a mutation, a 
leap, a radical but discreet and paradoxical heterogeneity introduced into 
phenomenology by the ethics of hospitality. 37 [Adieu 51] 
3. In mortgaging his reading of Derrida to a religious interpretation, de 
Vries perhaps misses the critical dimension of Derrida's relation to its 
institutions. Those forms inherited from religious traditions are precisely 
those unable to escape from logocentnsm. 
Derrida's reservations regarding Levinas can be discerned from both the 
questions he poses to Levinas and the example he chooses to develop. Derrida 
asks where one can find the 'mediating schema' (note the Kantian language) t: ) 
between the face-to-face and the politics which provides its 'framework'. How 
does the "beyond the State" become instantiated in the "State"? His example, 
developed earlier, is the relation between Israel and Palestine, where one speaks 
of a peace process [Adieu 91-92]. 
These are the crucial questions, since Levinas marks his distance from 
Kierkegaard and Rosenzweig along this fault line - the manifestation of 
goodness cannot simply equate to the protests of an egoist subjectivity 'still 
concerned with happiness or salvation' [TI 305 quoted at Adieu 94]. Somehow 
the peace that 'starts from an I and goes to the other' does not succumb to this 
danger (over which Hegelian universalism would be superior - as Levinas 
himself notes). However, in the earlier imposition of peýury, Derrida insists that 
any political instantiation has to betray the particularity of the original epiphany: 
'The violence of the political mistreats the face yet again by effacing its unicity 
in a generality. ' Politics can therefore never be 'left to itself', but again Derrida 
remarks that this topology is now 'rather convoluted' [Adieu 981. The State 
provides the framework but, since it cannot do so in such a way as to preserve an 
4 enclave of transcendence', this limit is no longer tenable: 
36 Nor for that matter would Levinas without explicit demarcation of the 'intelligibility' of 
proximity fTom the intelligibility of being. 
37 See Appendix B for a discussion of the manner in which 'mutation' registers. 
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'We spoke earlier of an enclave of transcendence. The border between the 
ethical and the political here loses for good the indivisible simplicity of a 
limit. No matter what Levinas might have said, the determinability of this 
limit was never pure, and it never will be .---A hyperbolic transgression brings about a disjunction in the immanence to self. ' [Adieu 991 
In what again returns to the repeated critique offered by Derrida, Levinas has 
recourse to a language drawn from Kant (war, peace, hostility. hospitality, ethics, 
politics, law, justice), even at the moment when he is opposing Kant, for 
example, with respect to the value of 'conatus' 38 . 
It is not that this marks a sceptical contradiction: it is that he has not justified this 
borrowing. The language operates as a shorthand which deflects critical 
attention. To be explicit, Kant limits the analysis of peace to the cosmopolitan 
constitution which would preserve it. Levinas, in aspiring to a pre-political 
concept of peace, effaces the difficulties thus generated for incorporating it back 
into a political framework, which he nevertheless invokes to differentiate him 
from the "egoism" of Kierkegaard and Rosenzweig. In particular, given that no 
process is specified which moves from the "ethical" to the "political", his 
writings on Israel would seem to gain in importance as examples of the 
articulation of the pertinent features of a state of justice. But, as Derrida 
repeatedly notes, he seems to lapse into uncritical optimism in treating Zionism 
as something more than a nationalism. As argued in Chapter Two, there appears 
to be no critical space from within Levinas's own position to evaluate political 
frameworks. As for Derrida himself, he seems to want something quite different: 
'Our task here is simply - between Kant and Levinas - to sharpen a 
difference that matters today more than ever with regard to this right of 
refuge and all the most urgent matters of our time, everywhere that - in 
Israel, in Rwanda, in Europe, in America, in Asia, in all the Churches of St. 
Bernard in the world - millions of "undocumented immigrants", of 
"homeless", call out for another international law, another border politics, 
another humanitarian politics, indeed a humanitarian commitment that 
effectiveýv operates beyond the interests of Nation-States. ' [Adieu 1011 
38 Kant: nature works towards its goal through self-seeking actions of individuals; the conflict of 
unpeaceable dispositions leads towards submission to otherwise coercive law without inner 
morality. 
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The achievement of Levinas is to bring the idea of wider, universal hospitality 
back into play [Adieu 3]. But a purely juridical concept of cosmopolitanism is 
insufficient without a rethinking of the right to visit and citizenship (especially 
when as Derrida notes the difference between an economic and a political 
migrant is more than ever harder to discem). So the invocation of the face and 
welcome, requires breaking with both the 'sweet dream of the pacifist 
philosopher' and the philosophy that is unable to interTogate Israeli state policy. 
Levinas's commentary is liberated from that structure towards a new thought of 
politics that recognises that the Nation-state will never open itself to hospitality 
without restriction [Adieu 89-90]. The 'hospitable France' that welcomed 
Levinas 1s no longer participating in the 'messianic order' [Adieu 7? 1 39 . And, 
further, this hospitality has been moved from that offered to the stranger in one's 
domicile to concrete political questions facing us today -a political inflection of 
Levinas's problematic out beyond the ethical. Contra de Vries, by highlighting 
these 'allusions', in an opposition to political positivism, or political precautions 
and cautions, Derrida's political mutation of Levinas presages an intelligibility to 
come that would think law and politics otherwise and calls for another 
institutional politics. 
Cosmopolitanism 
If Derrida, in Adieu, says that Levinas is against cosmopolitanism, what does it 
mean for Derrida to adopt that as his call? Derrida's essay, 'Cosmpolites de tous 
les pays, encore un effort! ' is the near contemporary of 'A Word of Welcome'. 
It was delivered at the International Parliament of Writers in 1996 and published 
in France the following year. It contains many of the references found in the 
essay discussed above but instantiates a more direct call for the reinvigoration of 
the traditional concept of the City of Refuge [ville refiugel in face of recent 
crackdowns on migrants in France and Europe. 
39 'One belongs to the messianic order when one has been able to admit others among one's 
own. ' Levinas In the Time of the Nations translated by Michael B. Smith (London. The Athlone 
Press, 1994), p. 98 & pp. 113-14. 
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Here I highlight the development of the themes discussed above, following 
Kant's trajectory as it marks a departure from Levinas. The City of Refuge is 
adopted by Derrida for several reasons: 
* the idea of the city of refuge has a long history within Europe; 
9 there now appear to be more transformational possibilities at the horizon of 
the city rather than the state; 
* it registers with 'those who cultivate an "ethic of hospitality"'. 
Firstly, let us briefly note that the long history of the city of refuge bridges 
several traditions: Derrida concentrates on Greek Stoicism, Pauline Christianity 
and Enlightenment political thought. The insistence on Paul and Kant at the 
crossing of these traditions perhaps allows us to note the absence here of 
reference to the Judaic tradition; or rather, this element of Judaism has already 
been incorporated into the Christian tradition - it is not simply Greek, and 
perhaps need no lessons in Hebrew. In 'Violence and Metaphysics' Derrida 
attempted to contest Levinas's reading of the history of Western philosophy, here 
the references to a conflicting tradition of hospitality within Christian thought 
tacitly reject Levinas's monolithic history of the same and suggests that we do 
not need to translate Hebrew ethical concepts into modem philosophy - the 
tradition already has the resources. That the modem philosophical tradition 
contains moments of rupture and break is illustrated by reference to Kant's 
Besuchsrecht, which is based on the principle of 'common right of possession' to 
the surface of the earth -a principle of which it is always necessary to be 
reminded given the contemporary liberal appropriation of Kant. 
More importantly, Derrida offers, again tacitly, an important gloss on his reading 
of Levinas: 
"To cultivate an ethic of hospitality' - is such an expression not 
tautologous? Despite all the tensions or contradictions which distinguish it, 
and despite all the perversions that can befall it, one cannot speak of 
cultivating an ethic of hospitality. Hospitality is culture itself and not 
simply one ethic amongst others. Insofar as it has to do with the ethos. that 
is, the residence, one's home, the familiar place of dwelling, inasmuch as it 
is a matter of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to 
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others, to others as our own or as foreigners, ethics is hospitalitV .... But for this very reason, and because being at home with oneself ... supposes a 
reception or inclusion of the other which one seeks to appropriate, control, 
and master according to different modalities of violence, there is a history of 
hospitality, an always possible perversion of the law of hospitality (which 
can appear' unconditional), and of the laws which come to limit and 
condition it in its inscription as a law. ' [Cosmo 16-17] 
Perhaps one can push this passage too far, but is it innocent to introduce the word 
culture here? In light of the analysis presented earlier, where the anti-relativism 
of Levinas was developed and stressed, can we not see a double charge to the 
introduction of both history and law? If there is no ethic of hospitality that can 
be cultivated, then has the principle by which one was able to judge been 
removed? Derrida explicitly argues that there is a history of the culture- and laws 
pertaining to hospitality; consequently hospitality is not transparent to the first 
person perspective of the individual. Not only is there no transcendent principle, 
but the conditioned perversion of hospitality can always appear as unconditional. 
To this extent genealogy, rather than phenomenology, is required. 
As the essay concludes, Derrida italicises his belief in the importance of a 
politics of experience and experimentation. This practice takes place within the 
law, within the tradition. 
'It is a question of knowing how to transform and improve the law, and of 
knowing if this improvement is possible within an historical space which 
takes place between the Law of an unconditional hospitality, offered a priori 
to every other, to all newcomers, whoever they may be, and the conditional 
laws of a right to hospitality, without which The unconditional Law of 
hospitality would be in danger of remaining a pious and irresponsible desire, 
without form and without potency, and of even being perverted at any 
mornent. ' [Cosmo 22-23] 
If we have been correct in our analysis of Levinas, then here we can see an 
enormous structural point of differentiation. Politics as transformed by Levinas 
is the production of the idea of the infinite qua strategic imposition on being, or 
the construction of an ipseity foreign to it - what exists and its history are inert 
material to be transformed, surpassed or evaded. For Demda, historical space 
(of philosophy and more generally) is differently constituted. From DerTida's 
perspective, Levinas still appears idealist to the extent that the idea of the infinite 
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as unconditioned remains suspect. There is no possibility of justifying this idea 
except through its realisation and its resonance with a certain religious tradition. 
Derrida refuses to appeal to a transcendent idea to guide a speculative projection 
from out of history and tradition. While Levinas projects a future, where a 
conceptual system and strategy are to be implemented, Derrida works negahveýy 
with the minimal opposition to any thinking that wallows in or valorises 
immanentism. The future-to-come, avenir as opposed to fiutur, has neither the 
guarantee of the religious tradition nor the inspiration of or aspiration to a divine 
moment. The weak messianism, messianic without messianism, merely holds 
out hope for something better than this here now, while recognising that there is 
the risk of the monstrous, the unanticipated, the worse. Yet there are those (and 
they occupy the majority position) for whom the current order is already 
deserving of those epithets. 
Similarly, Derrida's insistence on fractured and twisted, plural temporalities (in 
Specters of Marx) contests Levinas's subjective perception of past, present and 
future (received from grammatical categories), since, for Derrida, the avenir may 
have already arrived without its recognition (and it perhaps should not be too 
quickly conceived as singular). Alternatively, Derrida's future as avenir names 
the arrival of what is unanticipated as event; Levinas's future is the 
programmatic institutionalisation of '(. religion" - that which prevents the idea of 
the Infinite from being a delusion. 
From this reading of 'A Word of Welcome' and 'On Cosmopolitanism', we can 
mark Derrida's distance from Levinas with respect to history and political 
philosophy. This transforms the respective -conceptions of the other: Derrida is 
chiefly concerned with the other as Autre - the other in its otherness (heteron) as 
that which breaks from or is suppressed by the current instantiation. Any 
political philosophy for Derrida must begin from a critique of current law 
oriented by a concern for exceptions and singularity; Levinas's stress on the 
priority of the encounter with the "transcendent" is always subject to possible 
appropriation by the dominant ideology - this is the danger of religion espoused 
by Levinas and de Vries. 
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'Force of Law' 
In contesting the general idea of Levinas's influence over Derrida, much space 
has had to be devoted to textual analysis. This is due in part to the subtle and 
insightful works of Robert Bernasconi. Often his dense essays will cover a great 
deal of ground and open up new and interesting vistas in footnotes or brief 
asides. One such essay is his analysis of Derrida's reference to "justice" in 
'Force of Law'. 'Justice without Ethics' rests at little over ten pages, but surveys 
the trajectory of Derrida's writings in relation to Levinas, while concentrating on 
the manner in which Derrida's analyses of the relationship between justice and 
40 law mirror Levinas's examination of ethics and justice 
Bemasconi correctly notes that too little attention has been paid to the manner in 
which the third interrupts the face-to-face in its demand for justice. Similarly, 
attention to the differences hidden by the homonym, "justice", is crucial to any 
understanding of the relationship between Derrida and Levinas: for Levinas, 
justice is institutionalised negotiation between competing demands, whereas, 
Derrida introduces the further distinction between justice as law (droit) and that 
'justice' which is concerned with what escapes the instantiation of law, yet 
resonates with the demand of that institution. 
However, in a strange coda, Bernasconi breaks off from this patient reading and 
refers to the recent publication of Specters. of Marx 41 . 
Hesitating before 
Derrida's admonition (from 'Passions') not to seek to restitute morality under the 
aegis of deconstruction, Bernasconi refers to 'genuine parallels' with Levinas, 
which however have a 'difference of focus'. In this concluding paragraph, he 
worries that the references to a justice "beyond being" in Specters of Marx mean 
that the affinity between Levinas and Derrida is more fundamental than his 
analysis has suggested. Bernasconi concludes with two points: 4D 
40 'Justice without Ethics', Responsibilities of Deconstruction (Pli: Warwick Journal of 
Philosophy volume 6) edited by Jonathon Dronsfield & Nick Midgley (Summer 1997). pp. 58-69. 
41 'We would be left marking the difference between Derfida's justice and Levinas's ethics. and 
yet at the same time showing certain similarities in the way they are presented, were it not for 
another text by Derrida that has recently appeared. ' [ibid. p. 611 
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1. For the victims of oppression, any distinction between Uvinasian "ethics" 
and Derridean "justice"' (makes no sense'. 
2. The political' engagement of Specters of Marx forces Derrida into using 
concepts which return Derrida to the charge he himself levelled at Levinas 
back in 'Violence and Metaphysics': a failure to submit these concepts to 
genealogical investigation. By which I take him to be suggesting that his Cý 
inheritance from Levinas is left unexamined (indeed, there are only two 
direct references to Levinas in the entire book). 
In some ways, my thesis as a whole is directed against the first point. My aim is 
to demonstrate the systematic differences between the speculative projects of 
Levinas and Derrida. I would suggest that it is a major deficiency of 
Bernasconi's essay that he does not examine the central problem of temporality 
in Specters of. Marx as it chimes with what Derrida has previously written on 
Levinas. As was pointed out in our examination of 'On Cosmopolitanism', we 
are dealing with two fundamentally distinct models of political time. That is why 
the apparently straightforward reference to justice beyond being in Derrida is 
misplaced. Against the idea that justice comes from without and is imposed on 
being (Levinas), Derrida stresses the fractured, discontinuous nature of what is 
given in its historicity and temporality - it is from out of the experienced 
disjunctions of this tradition that "justice" appears. First the law in its 
contradictions, whereas Levinas first has the idea of the infinite. 
The following reading of 'Force of Law' will attempt to draw out this structure. 
It will do so by insisting on the methodology adopted by Derrida. Bemasconi 
notes that Levinas nowhere conducts a genealogy of his concepts, but does not 
realise that this is not an accidental missed opportunity42. It marks a fundamental 
structural schism between the two projects. Similarly, the importance of citation 
in Derrida is not simply used to justify his writing with reference to precedents or 
authorities: it emphasises the fragmentary tradition which cannot be reduced to 
the history of ontology as domination of the Other by the Same: the tradition is 
42 Ibid. p. 60. 
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already other to itself. Fundamentally, Levinas remains limited in its dependence 
on the first-person perspective of the subject, whereas genealogy is a 
methodology that responds to the discovery of a lack of transparency (the illusion 
of Sinngebung) in passive synthesis. Levinas frees words from their historical 
determinations because he nowhere asks the question of the subject's ability to 
use language and nowhere troubles himself with the justification of that 
language. 
The first stage for Derrida is mapping - where is it that the subject finds itself. It 
is no coincidence that many of Derrida's essays stop at the point where 
philosophical presentation ends and decision beginS43 . Although Bemasconi 
often mentions Derrida's insistence on differences in idiom and language, no 
attempt is made to do justice to these sentences by positioning them at a 
systematic level. This is mirrored by a failure to examine the formal structure of 
the essays from which Bernsconi draws his evidence. Here, we shall examine 
the movement of "justice" across 'Force of Law'. - 
This essay has attracted attention because within its pages appears the statement: 
deconstruction. is justice. I will argue that to isolate this fragment is illegitimate. 
The word "justice" is subject to a variety of transformations within the text. My 
aim will be to try to articulate the importance of this formal structural effect. In 
this way, I develop Hobson's idea that 'justice' in 'Force of Law' is a 'strange 
attractor' [OL 145-46 & 232]. 1 attempt to cash this out with reference to the 
critical relation to the history of philosophy thus demonstrated. 
'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"' is published in two 
sections which were delivered on two occasions during 1989-1990. The second 
43 Bernasconi has the acumen to register the manner in which Derrida turns to Kierkegaard. 
'Perhaps one could argue that Derrida sees Kierkegaard as the third party who looks at him in the 
eyes of Levinas. ' [ibid. p. 69. fri. 221 Unfortunately this remains an undeveloped aperqu. Yet, it 
touches on the heart of the matter, Derrida refuses to allow Levinas to write in the bracketed-off 
absence of the philosophical tradition. Derrida also sees other writers in the eyes of Levinas, but 
Kierkegaard provides a telling comparison in many ways. As we have repeatedly tried to 
demonstrate, the understanding of deconstruction as cl6tural reading reduces both Derridean and 
Levinasian philosophy to the recognition of the simultaneously necessity and impossibility of 
interrupting the current instantiation of being. As has been argued here, in fact, both writers 
reject the reduction of philosophical practice to recognition or reminders of the structure of the 
given, and instead wrestle with the problem of transformation. 
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part is a close reading of Benjamin's essay from 1921, 'Critique of Violence'. I 
have elsewhere examined at length the reading of Benjarrun contained therein 
and suggested that it is ill-served by either Derrida's admirers or those opposed 
to deconstruction44. Here I will concentrate on the first section, subtitled 'Of the 
Right to Justice / From Law to Justice 1) . 
In a familiar manner, Derrida begins his reflection on the relationship between 
deconstruction and justice (a title he did not choose himself), with an extended 
detour on the differences between French, German and English in addressing this 
problem. He notes that it is difficult to translate the German Gewalt into English 
or French without'losing the specific register of law, authority, violence and 
force. S. imilarly the English expression 'to enforce the law' is rendered into 
French as 'appliquer la 1oP - the connection of force and law is lost. 
This examination of idiom does not simply prepare the way for a consideration 
of the problem of the migrant or sojourner who falls foul of the laws of a foreign 
land. Or indeed the plight of the minority culture when forced to speak in the 
language of the majority. Derrida emphasises the material conditions of 
language which enable the development of certain themes: he insists that 
language and idiom is 'at the heart of what I say' [FoL 233]. Translation and 
attention to the argumentative moves available in a particular idiom form part of 
a concern with philosophical presentation. On this occasion, Derrida insists that 
such a concern for language is pertinent to the- questions of justice and the law; 
that to consider these problems of translation and conceptuality underpins more 
concrete philosophical and legal problems. 
In fact, Derrida proceeds to demonstrate that it is impossible to address justice 
except obliquely; something which he takes to have recurred throughout his 
writing career 45 . But this oblique strategy is not simply an anti - 
foundationali st 
scepticism regarding the possibility of a just instantiation, rather it stnves at a 
44 Andrew McGettigan A Hoky-Sober Violence: Walter Benjamin and the possibility of a 
Romantic political theory MA, Middlesex University, 200 1. 
45 'It goes without saying that discourses on double affirmation, the gift beyond exchange and 
distribution, the undecidable, the incommensurable or the incalculable, on singularity, difference 
and heterogeneity are also, through and through. at least oblique discourses on justice. ' [FoL 235) 
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form of intervention: 'Not to change things in the no doubt rather naive sense of 
calculated, deliberate and strategically controlled intervention, but in the sense of 
maximum intensification of a transformation in progress, in the name of neither a 
simple symptom'nor a simple cause; other categories are required here. ' [FoL 
236] Already here, the essay marks its difference from Levinas in this break 
with foreseen strategic imposition. 
In seeking to intensify something that comes out of the tradition, Derrida begins 
with what Bernsconi notes is a rather 'unremarkable' citation from Pascal 46 . 
Again, we stress that it is far from innocuous that Derrida begins a section that 
will conclude with the evocation of Levinas with a quotation from the Christian 
tradition. ' Secondly, he begins with a citation that was expunged by the original 
compilers of the Port Royal tradition. Attempting to break from the dominant, 
conventional interpretation of this passage as an expression of nihilistic 
scepticism it becomes the point from which Derrida develops three aporia'e. And 
finally, before moving on, the passage draws from a reading of Montaigne 
47 
to 
So, to recap, the essay's second incipit, after the reflection on language and 
idiom, takes up a previously suppressed Pascalian pensee which has been 
constructed from a reading of Montaigne, but which can be brought into 
conversation with Rawls, Fish and Hart [FoL 242]. As Derrida notes it touches 
on an intrinsic structure of the relationship of justice and law. 
The brief philological analysis of this gobbet has already demonstrated a 
structure in the history of philosophy which escapes Levinas's flat reading of that 
46 op. cit. p. 66. 'Justice, force - Il est juste que ce qui est juste soit suivi, il est nicessaire que ce 
qui est le plus fort soit suivi. Justice sans la force est impuissante; la force sans la justice est 
tyrannique. La justice sans force est contredite, parce qu'il ya toujours des michants; la force 
sans la justice est accusie. Ilfaut donc mettre ensemble la justice et la force: pour celafaire que 
ce qui estjuste soitfort, ou que ce qui estfort soitjuste. Et ainsi ne pouvantfaire que ce qui est 
fort)'Wtjuste. ' (298,470) Pensges: Notes on Religion and Other Subjects edited by Louis Lafuma 
[ 1947] translated by John Warrington (London, J. M. Dent & Sons. 197 3). 
47 In a connected pensge, Pascal cites, without quotation marks, a phrase which says that custom 
is the 'mystical foundation of authority' - Derrida takes the subtitle of 
his essay from this phrase. 
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history. Further, and to develop Bernasconi's unimpressed reference to Pascal, 
this 'intrinsic structure' appears amenable to a common sense interpretation or as 
Derrida puts it, one could find in it a 'desedimentation of the superstructures of 
law that both hide and reflect the economic and political interests of the 
dominant forces of society' [FoL 241]. In putting together justice and law, the 
founding, performative moment of instantiating power is emphasised. 
Derrida then argues that deconstruction is only possible because law is founded 
and constructed upon 'interpretable and transformable textual strata' and that its 
ultimate foundation is itself unfounded. This is the mystical moment of 
authority. Mystical in a Wittgensteinian sense, as Derrida himself notes. That is, 
its limit c. an be shown but it cannot be spoken about. It is important to stress this 
passage, as it comes before Derrida's notorious assertion that deconstruction is 
j ustice. 
'In the structure I am here describing here [sic], law is essentially 
deconstructible, whether because it is founded, that is to say constructed, 
upon interpretable and transformable textual strata ... or because its ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded. The fact that law is deconstructible 
is not bad news. One may even find in this the political chance of all 
historical progress. But the paradox that I would like to submit for 
discussion is the following: it is the deconstructible structure of law or, if 
you prefer, justice as law, that also ensures the possibility of deconstruction. 
Justice in itself, if such a thing exist, outside or beyond law, is not 
deconstructible. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exist. 
Deconstruction is justice. ' [FoL 242-2431 
We should note here: 
1. One could present a reading that stresses the opening subclause, which, in the 
emphasis on describing, suspends the question of proscription. The 
difference between ought and is runs through this essay: does Derrida. offer a 
political theory of law and justice that is to be adopted? Or does he comment 
upon a structure we inhabit, unpicking aporiae immanent to common sense 
and a certain strand of tradition? 
2. The reference to history should come to the fore. The impossibility of a just 
founding marks the movement of history. In contrast, Levinas seeks a just 
imposition that would be achieved as peace. 
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3. Inquiry begins with the law and the contradictions of those strata fornuing it 
with their various, and sometimes subterranean, connections. 
4. The reference to a justice outside or beyond law is not a justice outside or 
beyond being. 
5. The references to justice and deconstruction have both been qualified by the 
fragment, "if such a thing exist" and glossed as a 'paradox ... submitted for 
discussioni. 
It is vital to insist on the nature of the claims made by Derrida here. 
Deconstruction is only possible because of the historical, constructed nature of 
the given, whether it be language or law, etc.. Deconstruction is an analysis of 
convention and custom. But it does not simply show this limit and then restrain 
itself in a quietism. "Justice" has been underdeveloped so far in the essay - 
about ten pages in and it has not yet had any positive determination beyond this 
notion of 'undeconstructibility'. Of Pascal's own interpretation in terms of 
natural laws corrupted by advancing reason or a divine reason beyond human 
instantiations, neither appeals to Derrida [FoL 241]. It is not clear that it exists, 
but it seems to have been transformed into the aspiration for that which might 
escape the destructive conditions so far experienced in history: it becomes a 
demand for the impossible (or the not possible today). In a Heideggerian 
register, Derrida glosses it as a call [FoL 244]. The call is produced from out of 
the history of instantiations, and it is this which is preserved in deconstruction's 
activity. 
'Consequence: Deconstruction takes place in the interval that separates the 
undeconstructibility of justice from the deconstructibility of law. 
Deconstruction is possible as an experience of the impossible, there where, 
even if it does not exist, if it is not present, not yet or never, there is justice. 
Wherever one can replace, translate, determine the X of justice, one would 
have to say: deconstruction is possible, as impossible, to the extent (there) 
where there is X (undeconstructible), thus to the extent (there) where there is 
(the undeconstructible). ' [FoL 243] 
What is the form or nature of this undeconstructible? What judgments frame it? 
The aporia developed at the end of the section present it in something akin to an 
apophantic logic - the undecidable, the incalculable - yet within the economy of 
the decidable and the calculable and indeed demanding of that economy, 
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inconsequential without it. Towards the close, Demda, evokes an 'emancipatorýý 
ideal' that cannot be disqualified, though needing re-elaboration, ivithout 
'thoughtlessness' and 'complicity' in the worst. 
However unlike Heidegger the call is subjected to investigation. Not only is 
justice characterised as this positive aspiration, but deconstruction*s concern for 
justice interrogates this call - to avoid hypostatising it in good conscience, 
normative interpretation, etc. Crucially, it is inflected so that it 'stops before any 
inherited determination of justice'. Derrida calls this moment the "first justice". 
Deconstruction is already engaged by justice and its demand, but one cannot 
allow this to rest at the level of 'mystique', at the limit, or at the beyond: 
'One must be juste with justice, and the first justice to be done is to hear it, to 
try to understand where it comes from, what it wants from us, knowing that it 
does so through singular idioms (Diki, Jus, justitia, justice, Gerechtigkeit, to 
limit ourselves to European idioms, that it may also be necessary to delimit, in 
relation to others ... ). One must know that this justice always addresses itself 
to singularity, to the singularity of the other, despite or even because it 
pretends to universality. ' [FoL 248 ]48 
To emphasise this first justice - the necessity of submitting to genealogy (not to 
mention anthropology and psychoanalysis 'to try to understand where it comes 
frorn') - displaces the valorisation found in Levinas of the infinite beyond being. 
'[A]Iways to maintain a questioning of the origin, grounds and limits of our 
conceptual, theoretical or normative apparatus surrounding justice' seems 
perilously close to undermining the sens that gives meaning and direction to 
history. But this suspension, this epochi, in Derrida, marks the necessity of 
opposing the dogmatic slumber which endangers the Levinasian project. The 
subject determined by tradition, is a limited subject - subject to delusions. 
It is this 'first justice' that prompts Derrida to suggest and withdraw the idea that 
nothing is more just today than deconstruction. It 'leads to a reinterpretation of 
the whole apparatus of limits within which a history and a culture have been able 
to confine their criteriology' [FoL 247]. Derrida equates this to the double 
48 This passage is cited by Bernasconi as evidence of a Levinasian influence, but we should note 
that autres, here refers to other languages or idioms not other individuals. 
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movement of deconstruction and its writing practice. What is imposed and 
sedimented needs to be subject to a 'historical and interpretative memory' 
Before concluding with the aporiae, Derrida notes that there are mainly two 
styles of deconstruction (though, most often they are grafted together): 'One 
takes on the demonstrative and apparently ahistorial allure of logico-formal 
paradoxes. The other, more historical or more anamnesic, seems to proceed 
through readings of texts, meticulous interpretations and genealogies. Allow me 
to devote myself successively to both exercises. ' [FoL 250] The aporiae follow 
the first and are therefore deficient with respect to the historical memory praised 
above but which 'suppose, make explicit or produce an unstable distinction 
between justice and law' a distinction, which as we have seen is inherited and 
taken up (a distinction, which he notes is not a 'true distinction' )49. 
There are three: 
1. The epochi of the rule - if a decision is not to be simply programmed it 
must suspend the criteria it is using to judge; but if it uses no criterion it is 
only arbitrary rather than legitimate [FoL 25 1] 50 ; 
2. The ghost of undecidable - the decision to calculate or not, the decision 
over the criterion used, is not of the order of calculation; it is an ordeal or 
madness [FoL 253-54]; 
49 One should note the meta-level variation in strategy which means that David Wood's 
comments in 'Differance and the Problem of Strategy' are perhaps slightly awry. 'Derrida's 
general strategy is surely this: to infiltrate differance into the syntax of foundationalist and 
generative thinking with a view to depriving it of its attraction. (One might compare the release 
of sterile mate mosquitos as an anti-malarial measure. ) But once we realise this is the strategy, 
it 
is impossible to ask whether this substitutive infiltration is acceptable. ' On Wood's reading, its 
69 acceptability" would be premised upon its transcendentality, but the disjunction 
he offers 
ignores the historical sensibility noted above. David Wood 'Differance and the Problem of 
Strategy' in Derrida and Differance edited by David Wood & Robert Bernasconi 
(Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press, 1998), pp. 63 - 70; pp. 64-5. 
50 'This non-response conditions my responsibility, there where I alone must respond. 
Without 
silence, without the hiatus, which is not the absence of rules but the necessity of a 
leap at the 
moment of the ethical, political, or juridical decision, we could simply unfold 
knowledge into a 
program or course of action. Nothing could make us more irresponsible; nothing could 
be more 
totalitarian. ' (Adieu 1171 
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3. Urgency obstructs the horizon of knowledge - we need a decision now; 
this expediency cuts through deliberation; there is no horizon of 
expectation or hope for increasing justice. 
Derrida 'dryly addresses' these aporiae and then makes reference to Levinas in a 
manner that has been seized upon by Bernasconi: 'I would be tempted, up to a 
certain point, to bring the concept of justice ... closer to Levinas's. ' What do we 
make of this strange expression? Derrida is tempted? And in the conditional? 
Derrida nods towards the notion of infinity and the 'heteronomic relation to the 
other [autrufl'; he connects Levinas's droiture to "law" to "address" to 
"direction" through an unspecified common relation. 'But since I would have 
other difficult questions about Levinas' difficult discourse, I cannot be content to 
borrow a conceptual trait without risking confusions or analogies. And so I will 
go no further in this direction. ' [FoL 250] We could also note that Levinas has 
no deliberations around the concept of decision and its relation to subjective 
temporalization. 
Given that a major concern of the previous pages has been to think about 
problems of philosophical discourse, this final reference needs to be considered. 
It operates as a retraction: he goes no further than registering a temptation. 
Bernasconi offers an interesting analysis of the quotation Derrida takes from 
Totality and Infinity, but seems to miss the nesting structure around this phrase. 
Bernasconi claims that Derrida 'attempts to enlist Levinas's support for' his 
concept of justice or that he 'appeals to Levinas's usage in order to juStift his 
own adoption of the word Justice"51. But Derrida does nothing of the sort, at 
most he nods towards a resonance, but one that cannot be systematically pursued 
because of his own difficult questions 52 . If anything, this passage should serve 
as 
a warning - to Bernasconi and Critchley - return to my earlier texts - 
do not be 
swayed by the superficial similarities of homonyms. 
51 ibid. p. 61 & 63, 
52 Here we should note that to ask questions Is not to eschew a critical moment even if such 
questions cannot be cashed out as concrete cnticisms. 
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We might even ask what Bernasconi has to mind when he refers to Derrida's 
6concept of justice': for it is not clear that any concept has been formulated 
unequivocally. It appears instead that "justice" has been exposed to a variety of 
considerations paratactically. By the second aporia, justice has mutated into an 
"idea of justice" against the presumption of present justice, but 'indestructible in 
its affirming character In a manner almost identical to that prized by 
Bernasconi in justifying the connection to Levinas, Derrida writes: 'I would 
hesitate to assimilate too quickly this "idea of justice" to a regulative idea in the 
Kantian sense, to whatever content of messianic promise ... or to other horizons 
of the same type. ' [FoL 254] Derrida's treatment of justice seems to be 
constellated between several historical residues. As he admits, we appear to 
occupy a singular historical place where the "exemplifications 11 of these 
promised ideas or advents can be surveyed. Derrida offers the strange metaphor 
of the running track, where one is no longer running on the inside lane, but is not 
simply a spectator. 
The final reference to Levinas appears in the third aporia, but in the context of a 
representation of the relation of law and justice in terms of the constative and the 
performative. 
'Since every constative utterance itself relies, at least implicitly, on a 
performative structure ..., the dimension of justesse or truth of theoretico- 
constative utterances ... always thus presupposes the 
dimension of justice of 
the performative utterances, that is to say their essential precipitation, which 
never proceeds without a certain dissymmetry'and some quality of violence. 
That is how I would be tempted to understand the'proposition of Levinas, 
who, in a whole other language and following an entirely different discursive 
procedure, declares that "la verit, 6 suppose la justice". ' [FoL 2561 
Again, Levinas is a possible temptation, but again this temptation is held at bay 
by the other language and 'discursive procedure' of Levinas. And let us note that 
it is only a 'proposition' (1a veriti suppose la justice) and not one central to the 
system. Derrida concludes by displacing an "idea of justice" to a "perhaps", 
continuing a deflationary trajectory (a negative dialectics? ). This "perhaps" 
contrasts avenir with futur, where the former marks an openness to the coming of 
the other (who is not Yet here). 
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More intriguing, and not recognised by Bernasconi, is the possible tacit 
appropriation of Levinasian themes in the final two pages of the section. 
1. The concept'of excessive overflowing of the performative which is always 
presupposed in the constative appears to overwrite the opposition of the 
53 
saying and the said found in Otherwise than Being 
2. In particular, the operation of performative (as founding) and constative (as 
conserving) remains within history as an open, discontinuous system, which 
respects a structural urgency that must always be prepared to break with a 
'horizon of expectation' [FoL 256]. Derrida contrasts avenir with fiaur, that 
is the open system contests the Levinasian idea of the infinite coming from 
outside of history and being produced within it. History is not simply an 
economic history of the Same. 
3. Within history, alterity then takes on a different hue. No longer the wholly 
other that remains outside the order of the Same, alterity marks the difference 
(of idiom, demand, history) of the other. It is the other in its otherness as 
difference within the world that animates the demand for justice to submit to 
the "first justice" and the to-come of the event. 
4. Of justice, Derrida writes: 'Abandoned to itself, the incalculable and giving 
idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can 
always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation. ' [FoL 2571 If 
there is a temptation to draw close to Levinas, let us note that Derrida's 
emphasis doubles back; on the one hand, if. -there are 'tears that dfunctionary 
cannot see', then, on the other, justice. cannot be left to the retortion of the 
victim or the vigilante. Should one not read this admonition in light of the 
discussion of Levinas's relation to Zionism in 'A Word of Welcome'? In 
particular, if Derrida does not share Levinas's opinions and judgments, and if 
his "political culture" is completely different, what does this mean for 
calculation? 
I conclude with a further quotation, which is the final enunciation of theoretical 
endeavour. It is not always correct to stress the final statement, but in this essay. 
53 We have already emphasised the manner in which the pair of constative and performative 
contest Levinas's own pairing of Saying and Said - see Chapter Five. 
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it is no less correct than concentrating on the isolated claim that deconstruction is 
justice. The structure of the essay is complex but appears as a critical dialectical 
deflation of the notion of justice into something perhaps more amenable to the 
emancipatory demands of the day: 
'Not only must one Ul faut] calculate, negotiate the relation between the 
calculable and the incalculable, and negotiate without a rule that would not 
have to be reinvented there where we are "thrown", there where we find 
ourselves; but one must [ilfaut] do so and take it as far as possible, beyond 
the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of 
morality, political, or law, beyond the distinctions between national and 
international, public and private, and so on. The order of this ilfaut does not 
properly belong either to justice or to law. It only belongs to either realm by 
exceeding each one in the direction of the other, which means that in their 
very heterogeneity, these two orders are indissociable: de facto and de Jure. ' 
[FoL 2571 
If indissociable, it is not clear that they mark two distinct orders or even poles 
which necessarily mediate each other. The il faut of negotiation Is a minimal 
structure of attention and response to difference which might seem to come close 
to pragmatism (or pragmaticism) were it not for the demand to 'go as far as 
possible' beyond the anchors of common sense discourse in these areas. This 
displacement complicates the relationship of deconstruction and justice. As 
'hyper-aporetic' '[i]t would be the arche-prelin-linary condition of another 
experience or another interpretation of friendship, and, by this very fact, the 
condition, at least negative, of another political thought - that is, another thought 
of decision and responsibility as well. '. [PoF 199] One could possibly identify 
deconstruction exclusively with the "first justice" which submits instantiated 
institutions, languages and concepts to investigation; this final section troubles 
this understanding through consideration of the third aporia of urgency. It is this 
urgency which intensifies the question of responsibility and strategy, the very 
parameters of writing. 
0 Philosophical Ecriture versus Ethico-Political Theory 
Writing on different levels is perhaps the key structural feature of The Politics of 
Friendship. We can pick out three here, though there are more that one could 
isolate. Firstly, one could examine the references to Nietzsche regardiniz the 
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future-to-come and the task Of Philosophy - whether one is a posthumous writer. 
Can we discuss the possibility of a 'new species of philosopher' [PoF 34] whose 
arrival might be prepared by a new, rigorous thinking of the 'perhaps' [PoF 261? 
Does friendship to 'those who are not yet here I inaugurate a responsibilitY that 
would contest the friendship of the present? How does a 'to-come that precedes 
the present' relate to the Heideggerean ek-stasis of the future that produces the 
present in its passage to the 'having-been' 54,? How does it relate to the 
contingent historical judgment that today 'we need to be scarecrows'? How can 
the writing of the 'to-come' avoid invoking 'unrecognisable enemies' [PoF 42] 
in favour of 'a new language or new use for old words' that would advance peace 
[Adieu 471? 
Secondly, the genealogical investigation into the philosophical use of the concept 
of fraternity in ethics and theories of communal bonding could be seen as a 
demonstration of the heterogeneity of a tradition [PoF 233], the effects of which 
are unstable in the present and not locked down by a unified discourse or 
intention. In this regard, Levinag's evocation of a fraternity beyond blood and 
race might still remain 'andro-phratro-phallego-centric' - these tropes are not 
simply determined by, or dependent on, explicit biological theorieS55 . 
This 
philological work is the pre-condition for a philosophical move, 'springboard for 
a leap further out' [PoF 234], emphasizing that the material limiting conditions 
of this tradition are not overcome by a single conceptual leap or by a reflexive 
self-awarenes. s. or reminder. 
. 
Though not explicitly referencing Levinas, The 
Politics of Friendship should be seen as extending the brief comments towards 
the end of 'At this Very Moment ... 
' where Derrida rebuts a particular gesture 
made by Levinas on his commentary on Genesis: 'And God Created Woman 
156 In a reading barely departing from the intellectual rigour of James 
54 See Martin Heidegger Being and Time §65 'Temporality as the ontological meaning of care', 
pp. 370-80. Though in Derrida this is neither related to self-projection nor to a resolute, authentic 
relation towards death. 
55 cf. Visker Truth and Singularity p. 314. In Rogues, Derrida asks why one, and Nancy 
specifically, would seek to preserve the 'figure of the father and the brother' in the trope of 
fraternity [Rogues 58-91. 
56 Emmanuel Levinas 'And God created Woman' in Nine Talmudic Readings [19701 translated 
by Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1990). pp. 169- 
76. 
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Brown's 'It's a Man's World', woman is defined by being created second: she 
comes after man and is a home for man. It concludes by noting that in coming 
second in creation, after man, woman is 'not thereby slighted' since second is 
still pretty good. Disingenuously attempting to forestall criticism of these 
sentiments, Levinas notes that he is merely commenting on these passages. 
Derrida firmly points out that 'commentary is not neutral': '... the position of 
commentator corTesponds to a choice: to at least accompany and not displace, 
transform .. .' [ECM 421. And here, Levinas in no way distances himself from 
what is affirmed in those ancient books. 
Thirdly, this suspicion of fraternity does not render all it inhabits unusable. 
Citing figures such as Blanchot and Nancy, Derrida notes that their attempts to 
rethink the community are amongst those he values most but still they persist in 
valorising 'fraternity' without sufficiently taking responsibility for its history 
[PoF 46-47 fn. 15 ]57 . This meditation on the community does not result in any 
guaranteed outcome or programme, sometimes thinking does not reach such 
conclusions: it may be important to say things which are 'Insane and absurd' and 
exposed to the derision of 'philosophical good conscience' [PoF 42]. 
I seek to demonstrate the thematic and structural variety of writing in this text 
troubled by the future, inherited past and present demands. In its original form, 
The Ethics of Deconstruction concluded with an analysis of the 'political 
impasse' of Derridean deconstruction58. In the preface to the second edition, 
Critchley modifies his position by noting that he is more doubtful about the 
4 persuasive force' of Levinasian ethics and in light of the publication by Derrida 
of Specters of Marx and Politics of Friendshi , he is 
'more positive about p 
political possibilities of deconstruction'. But he still persists with a particular 
problem: how does one account for the passage from the deconstruction of 
57 Maurice Blanchot The Unavowable Community [1983] translated by Pierre Jons; Tarrytown 
(New York), Station Hill Press, 1988. The Inoperative Community [1986,19901 edited by Peter 
Connor, translated by Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland & Simona Sawhney 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 199 1) 
58 See also Giorgio Agarnben's opposition to deconstruction's 'endless negotiations with the 
door-keeper'. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life [19951 translated by Daniel Heller- 
Roazen (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 54-7. 
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ethical responsibility to a political questioning and critique ? 59 Given that 
Levinas was supposed to introduce a 'wholly other' concept of ethics into 
Derrida's work, this question looks like a very traditional problematic 
The concerns of philosophers such as Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, both 
influenced by deconstruction, are misread. Critchley asserts that: 'Only a 
philosopher could declare the impossibility of politics. ' But again, the key issue 
is that of philosophy as a discipline which justifies its language and takes care 
over its terms, even to the point of troubling the determination of the term, 
4politics'. The problem is whether any politics can be presented at the level of 
philosophy by justifying its language without slipping into opinion or assertion 
artificially, or artfully, raised to the level of metaphysics. What procedures 
distinguish mere opinion expressed from political philosophy? It cannot be 
because these comments are uttered by someone deemed to be a 'philosopher'. 
To see Derrida as offering a competing ethico-political theory is to 
misunderstand what is at stake in the attempt to escape the logic of logocentrism. 
The idea that justice marks a 'moral orientation' but that there is no rational 
procedure for legitimating and testing decisions and judgments in Levinas and 
Derrida, is a framing idea that owes its pertinence to that concept of determining 
60 logos challenged by both Levinas and Derrida 
Critchley writes: 'I would claim that for Derrida there is also only one source of 
moral orientation, namely justice, and there are an enormous number of aponas 
one has to confront when thinking of the relation of justice to its concrete 
determination in law. ' [EoD 275] From my reading of 'Force of Law' above, we 
can see that to refer to a unique, singular source ofjustice is simply unwarranted 
for Derrida. 
59 'The rigorous undecidability of deconstructive reading fails to account for the activity of 
political judgment, political critique, and the political decision. ' [EoD 190] 
60 'Let us assume, concesso 
"non dato, that there is no assured passage, following the order of a 
foundation, according to a hierarchy of founding and founded ... between and ethics or a 
first 
philosophy of hospitality ... and a law or politics of hospitality .... 
Let us assume that one cannot 
deduce from Levinas's ethical discourse on hospitality a law and a politics, some particular law 
or politics in some determined situation today. ' [Adieu 20] 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to insist on a plurality of writing styles as 
appropnate to the determinate text and context that cannot simply be understood 
as descriptive phenomenology6l. In contrast, the reading offered by Critchley in 
his more recent work is suspect. He argues that Derrida's 'performative 
experiments' have been left behind as Deriida has been concerned to conduct a 
quasi-phenomenological investigation of subjective life - in particular, the 
ethico-political life exemplified in decisions and responsibility. For the 
description of the manner in which the other both exceeds my cognitive powers 
and leaves a pre-cognitive trace in my experiential forms marks a point at which 
normative contents can be derived. In a radio broadcast in 1998 62, he sees the 
task of philosophy as 'providing us ... with reminders of what we already know 
but continually pass over in our day-to-day life. Philosophy reminds us of what 
is passed over in what passes for common sense. ' [EoD 283] Philosophy helps 
us with the achievement of everyday tasks, by understanding the moral grammar 
of everyday life and trying to teach that grammar. 
However, grammatology, genealogy and speculative writing exceed 'the careful 
description and analysis of particular phenomena ... [with] their deeply aporetic 
, 63 or undecidable structures ... [and] micrological detail of everyday 
life 
Moreover, Derrida's formal structurings encapsulate a continuity with the 
concerns developed in the 1960s regarding language, being and history. A far 
richer possibility is being occluded by returning to what is familiar. For Derrida, 
one must think and write against 'hegemonic language in public space' especially 
when that language seeks to determine what would count in public: 'If there were 
a community, or even a communism of writing, it would above all be on 
condition that war be waged on those, the greatest number, the strongest and the 
61 It is worth thinking about the failure of Husserl to achieve the ultimate move from descriptive 
to 'critical' phenomenology as outlined in Cartesian Meditations §63. 
62 Included as an appendix in the second edition of The Ethics of Deconstruction. 
63 Critchley 'Deconstruction and Pragmatism - Is Derfida a Private Ironist or a Public 
Liberal"', 
p. 32. 
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weakest at the same time, who forge and appropriate for themselves the 
dominant usages of language ... ' [PoF 7 11 And such a 'war' need not be 
conducted in the game of thesis exchange. 
To conclude, let us emphasise that by attending to the variety of forms of writing 
utilised by Derrida we have demonstrated thematic differences between him and 
Levinas. These differences are structured around fundamental disputes over the 
ontological constitution of language and history, which then translate into 
differences of political philosophy. We have stressed how this dispute 
additionally revolves around an understanding of what constitutes philosophical 
presentation. The possibility of simply gainsaying Levinas would in many cases 
breach this principle and reduce writing to the presentation of dogmatic opinion, 
hence the attention to the "formal" dimension in Derrida's presentations. 
Yet even when this gainsaying is explicit, it appears to be ignored: 
'Those who think that responsibility or the sense of responsibility is a good 
thing, a prime virtue, indeed the Good itself, are convinced however that one 
must always answer (for oneself, to the other, before the other, or before the 
law) and that, moreover, a nonresponse is always a modality determined in 
the space by unavoidable responsibility. ' [Passions 17] 
In contrast, Derrida emphasises that: 
1. one always has the right not to respond; 
2. if one does not have an answer, offering one amounts to a lack of respect: 
3. a certain nonresponse can 'attest to politeness' or conversely, 'polite 
silence can become the most insolent weapon and most deadly irony. ' 
[ibid. ] 
'Is there a worse violence than the demand to give an account of 
everything? ' [Passions 25] 
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From a certain perspective, this thesis has pursued a narrow course. It has sought 
to refute, or at least radically circumscribe, a general consensus about the relation 
between Levinas and Derrida. At times its work has been mainly philological, 
convinced of the need to systematically reconstruct the claims of the key texts of 
both authors. What I believe to have been revealed thereby is not simply that 
Derrida is not Levinasian, and Levinas not Derridean, but that the two have 
conceptions of philosophy and its task that are distinct in every regard at a 
fundamental 'metaphysical' level. Owing to these different approaches, any 
apparent homology in discussion of the 'other' is superficial at best. 
In treating the claim to 'influence', mutual or otherwise, seriously, as a 
philosophical claim, this thesis has rejected any claim that would rest solely on 
index or citation counting or on any use of similar terminology, such as 'trace' 
by the two authors. Following Skinner's first requirement, I have demonstrated 
that the 'characteristic form' of the two authors shares no 'general similarity'. In 
this way, Derrida does not inherit any concepts from Levinas and there is no 
basis for arguing, pace Critchley, that Derrida's deconstruction is 'ethical' if it is 
understood in Levinas's use of the term. Similarly, any suggestion that the 
'later' Derrida undergoes an 'ethico-political turn' due to the influence of 
Levinas has three severe drawbacks. 
1. Proponents of such a thesis have yet to demonstrate the manner in which 
Derrida's commitment to a philosophy of 'originary finitude' has been 
rejected or altered; nor does the central Levinasian theme of the infinite 
appear. In fact, Derrida's continual insistence on the primacy of the law 
in its contradictions and a genealogical propaedeutic contrasts with 
Levinas's diagnosis of the limitations of being. 
2. The main themes ascribed to this later stage of Derrida's output. such as 
responsibility, undecidability, event and urgency were already formulated 
in the first works on Husserl. 
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3. The later writings can be seen to maintain a relation to the earlier 
development of deconstruction and grammatology through formal and 
structural devices. In general, Derrida's practice of citation has been read 
in a manner which avoids the main theoretical problems involved in 
understanding it. 
In this regard, Derrida's repeated and consistent criticisms of Levinas with 
respect to language, being and the 'otherness' of the Other can be given full 
weight, as can the rejection of any developmental model that depends on a 
'break' or 'turn'. Any reference to 'influence' can only be maintained at the 
loosest level: for example, that Levinas 'prompted' Derrida to attend to certain 
questions . or, and this is more important, that in a certain socio-historical 
conjuncture it becomes important to write again on and about Levinas. To 
reiterate, the nature of the latter two claims are of a different order to those dealt 
with in this thesis. 
Despite this narrow focus on the question of influence, several other conclusions 
with wider import have been produced. My claim has been that the misguided 
ascription of influence follows from the distortion of both figures in the English- 
language reception. In particular, a difficult and strange theoretical teff ain has 
been abridged through privileging received assumptions or expectations about 
the form and content of Levinas's philosophy - this is chiefly to be located in the 
received understanding of ethics and its. relation to an equally received notion of 
politics, but could be seen to extend to an occlusion of the problems of practical 
philosophy in favour of description. More generally, an idealized image of 
academic philosophy as a Platonic symposium has effaced crucial theoretical 
problematics. 
Perhaps the most ambitious aspect of this thesis is the two new readings of 
Levinas offered. The chapters in which Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than 
Being are reconstructed with reference to their philosophical systematIcity are 
justified solely through the philological labour that produced them and the 
weight and consistency of citation in their presentation. Pointedly, given the .0 
framing discussion of influence, it argues that the neglected influences on 
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Levinas are Franz Rosenzweig, Hermann Cohen and to a lesser deg ee Jean-Paul Yr 
Sartre (although the influence of the later has been recogn g 
ised, it has not been 
extended in the manner I suggest). Here the characteristic form of Levinas's 
theorization of the face, the infinite, time and being depends, and is only 
explained with reference to, a metaphysical, Neo-Kantian supplement to 
phenomenological methodology. The attempts to isolate a notion of the other (or 
Other) from this metaphysics (or religion) can no longer be understood to be 
Levinasian and are, in fact, the anticipated object of Levinas's own criticisms of 
4contemplation' and 'recognition' (though I have yet to find an advocate for 
penitential glory in spite of a general championing of "Levinasian ethics"). 
Despite the move to proximity and hostage of Otherwise than Being, and the 
move from apology to nazirate, this metaphysical structuring remains in place. 
Two more general questions relating to Levinas have been thrown up by this 
work. First, in what sense can Levinas be understood to be doing 
phenomenology? It more and more seems to me that Levinas takes up certain 
phenomenological results and reinterprets them or stitches them together in a 
systematic fashion. As noted by Derrida, the disregard for transcendentality, 
sense-explication and the primacy of the theoretical perhaps renders these results 
into quasi-empirical 'facts' and puts in question the universality of its claims. Is 
it simply a systematic confession of worldview? 
Second, and this follows from the first, what is the philosophical status of 
Levinas's writing? There appears to be an absence of concern for the generation 
of warrant with respect to the constructions and assertions. What enables 
Levinas to espy or postulate the Beyond Being? The testimony of the religious 
tradition? Plotinus and Descartes? Or should we see Levinas as a Rortyan 
(. strong poet' beyond the myth of rational presentation? A Counter-Nietzsche as 
well as a Counter-Hobbes? 
One final point regarding Levinas: the fulcrum of Levinas's philosophy is the 
claim to the excellence of the West as evinced by the connected notions of the 
infinite and the other. The geo-political writings and asides with reference to 
Asian philosophy are not merely incidental or biographical ephemera. Coupled 
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to the second point above, I have reservations with respect to any project that 
would attempt to find in Levinas resources for a multiculturalist project. -Nor can 
Levinas help to reanimate the 'human' in the 'humanities I: the structure of 'what 
binds us morally' can find in Levinas only a representation of a specific religious Cl 
tradition'. 
The presentation of Derrida is less ambitious, or, at least, more consistent with 
contemporary reception. However, part of my resistance to the model of the 
'ethico-political turn' is based on a resistance to a precipitous, or premature, rush 
to thematic paraphrase cashed out in terms of constative declarations of position. 
Common to both 'analytic' and 'continental' philosophy is the idea that 
philosopfiical presentation is exclusively the statement of what an individual 
holds to be true. 
'I am not sure ... that taking a position [in philosophy], at least as a show of force or as a force of rupture with the norms of traditional philosophical 
discourse, is essential to every materialism, to materialism as such. Are we 
agreed that there is no effective and efficient position, no veritable force of 
rupture, without a minute, rigorous, extended analysis, an analysis that is 
differentiated and as scientific as possible? Analysis of the greatest number 
of givens, and of the most diverse givens (general economy)? And that it is 
necessary to uproot this notion of taking a position from every 
determination that, in the last analysis, remains psychologistic, 
subjectivistic, moral and voluntaristic? " 
What distinguishes Derridean deconstruction and grammatology is a writing on 
more than one level; a writing that requires attention to these problems of 
performativity; historical conjuncture and urgency; warranted assertibility; 
responsibility for all conceptual resources (Selbstbesinnung); not to mention the 
dimension cursorily opened in Appendix B: grammatology as a form of 
anthropology. It is this variety of levels that my different chapters have tried to 
encapsulate while insisting on the underlying, 'theoretical' valency that persists 
under the aegis of the Greek decision to treat philosophy as science. 
' Compare: Judith Butler 'Precarious Life' in Precarious Life: The Powers of mourning and 
violence (London & New York, Verso, 2004), pp. 128-15 1. 
2 Jacques Derrida with Jean-Louis Houdebine & Guy Scarpetta 'Positions' in Jacques Deffida 
-) d Positions [1972] translated and annotated by Alan Bass 2' edition (London 
& New York, 
Continuum, 2004), pp. 35-78; p. 76. 
2-91 
-1 
Conclusion 
It is this perhaps excessive commitment to the theoretical that is condemned by 
Levinas as it animates "structuralism". What has been absent from this thesis for 
reasons of space is an attempt at evaluation of this suggestion to take 
grammatology qUa the science of writing seriously. This would involve an 
appreciation of DerTida's writing on the university, the media and the public 
sphere more generally, in its structuring by nonphilosophical as well as 
philosophical forces and the testing of this theoretical endeavour beyond 
philological reconstruction. 
Although this thesis has been content to demonstrate the disjunction between 
Derrida and Levinas with respect to speculation, anticipation and futurity, the 
strain of this imposed limitation is evident in Chapter Three where the 
philological summary is not opened up to a critical, philosophical treatment of 
the various claims regarding "history" and epochality. We could query how a 
ýstrategy sansfinalite' avoids unwarranted assertion. How does the clOture of an 
epochal understanding of history in terms of origin, meaning and telos, relate to 
the later writing on history and temporality of Specters of Marx, where 
Fukuyama's notion of the end of history is rebutted? 
The necessary precondition for assessing these speculative claims is the 
presentation of the centrality and persistence of such claims in Derrida's 
endeavour and the distinguishing of them from Levinas's strategic imposition of 
an idea upon being, whose meaningfulness. depends upon an infinite time 
produced by fecundity and the family. Both authors have a speculative 
dimension but it has to date been mollified by the dominant, tacit understandings 
of Philosophy and philosophical presentation in contemporary English-language 
philosophy. 
This is most evident in the collapse of the notion of lAutrui, and transcendence, 
into an acknowledgement of the humanity of the other. Carl Levinas really be the 
'hidden king' of twentieth century of French philosophy if he can be so 
conveniently assimilated into a melange of cod phenomenology, late 
Wittgenstein, and Cavell? The 'shrewd pates' have mollified precisely what is 
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mournful from Levinas, (In the sense attributed by Nietzsche to Diogenes: what 
use is a philosopher who does not make one mourn? ). 
Is there not a LeVinasian irony here? The "master"' is domesticated: no longer the 
one who brings our tradition more than it contains, but the one who shores up our 
parochial hypostasis, our excrescence. There really would be no need to insist on 
any specificity to "continental" or "European" philosophy since we would 
already have what it could bring us. 
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Husserl and The Crisis of European Humanity 
Our concern to situate Levinas within a certain neo-Kantian context, should not 
occlude the relationship to Husserl, whose later work Adorno describes as a 
return to 'a subtly modified neo-Kantianism". We find in Levinas's 'Meanincy C" 
and Sense' a reference to Husserl's writings from the 1930s. Championing a Zý 
philosophical culture, which arose in Greece and understands 'the infantile 
character of historical cultures', Levinas remarks that: 
'Platonism, as an affirmation of the human independently of culture and 
history, is found also in Husserl, in the obstinacy with which he postulated 
the phenomenological reduction and the constitution ... of the cultural 
world in the transcendental and intuitive consciousness. We are not obliged 
to follow him down the way he took to rejoin this Platonism, and we think 
we have found the straightforwardness of meaning by another method. That 
intelligible manifestation is produced in the straightforwardness of morality 
... ' [MS 58-91. 
Instead of locating the idea of the infinite and its realisation in the objective 
practice of sciences, Levinas situates it in the face. But the goal is the same, 
offering humanity as a whole an orientation of existence, such that barbarism is 
evaded by reconnecting philosophy to everyday life. 
Though it is true that Husserl does pay more attention to this 'Platonist' element 
of his work after 1930, the themes associated are already present in his 1911 
essay, 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science' 2. In- opposition to the historicism of 
Dilthey, phenomenology is presented as the foundation of philosophy of spirit 
that would overcome the anarchy of 'Weltanschauungen. Valorising the latter as 
self-sufficient, concrete expressions of historical life, Dilthey's historicism 
destroys belief in 'progress' and universal validity [PRS 123 ff. ]. But, for 
1 Theodor W. Adomo Against Epistemology: A Metacritique [1956] translated by Willis 
Domingo (Oxford, Blackwell, 1982), p. 2. Rose has argued that even the Logical Investigations 0 
should be understood as a 'reformulation' of Marburg neo-Kantianism tHegel contra Sociology 
pp. 23-24). 
2 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science* [ 1911 ] translated by Quentin Lauer in Phenomenology and 
the Crisis of Philosophy (New York, Harper & Row, 1965). pp. 71-147. Hereafter abbreviated to 
PRS followed by page reference. 
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Husserl, this underplays the very principles which enable the empirical research 
conducted by Dilthey. 
Husserl extracts* the strong idea of science from the study of 'the subjective 
immanence of Weltanschauung' by discovering the common spirit throughout 
this history and historical constructions; this idea is supragenerational and 
oriented by goals the value of which can give a sense to life in general [PRS 
135]. The aim of science gives an ethical ideal of human development by 
projecting the practical unifiability of Weltanschauung and science into a 
teleology with a unified future that is worked towards: science approaches 
eternal goals 'asymptotically' in the infinite [PRS 136-37]. 
This essay, presaging the works from the Crisis-period 3, rejects the 
understanding of history as an 'unending concatenation of illusory progress' 
[Crisis 7] which leads to a spiritual malaise, nihilism )exacerbated with the rise 
of European Fascism and Nazism). 
'But can the world, and human existence in it, truthfully have meaning if the 
sciences recognize as true only what is objectively established in this fashion, 
and if history has nothing more to teach us than that all the shapes of the 
spiritual world, all the conditions of life, ideals, non-ns upon which man 
relies, form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it always was 
and ever will be so, that again and again reason must turn into nonsense, and 
well-being into miseryT [Crisis 6-71 
Identified as a specifically European phenomenon as early as 1923 in his articles 
for the Japanese publication KajZ04, this malaise is explicit in the title of his 1935 
lecture in Vienna: 'Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity'5- 
Phenomenology is tasked with averting this nihilism - Husserl understands the 
3 Collected in Edmund Husserl Husserliana Band VI: Die Krisis der Europdischen 
Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phdnomenologie edited by Walter Biemel (The Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1954). Hereafter abbreviated to Krisis followed by page reference. 
4 'Fijnf Aufsdtze Uber Emeuerung' in Husserliana Band XXVII: Au/sdtze und Vortrdge edited by 
Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), pp. 3-93. 
5 'The Vienna Lecture' [1935] in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy translated by David Carr 
(Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 269-299. Hereafter abbreviated to Vienna 
followed by page reference. 
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role of phenomenology as the uncovering of what is unconditional Iy universal in 
the spiritual order, a universality we 'obtain': 
"... not through the critique of some present or handed-down system, of some 
scientific or prescientific "Weltanschauung" (which might as well be 
Chinese, in the end), but only through a critical understanding of the total 
unity of history - our history. For it has spiritual unity through the unity and 
driving force of the task which, in the historical process ... seeks to move through the various stages of obscurity toward satisfying clarity until it 
finally works its way through to perfect insight. ' [Crisis 71] 
Moreover, transcendental phenomenology demonstrates that this 'extraordinary 
teleology' is 'innate only in our Europe' thereby overcoming this sickness by 
illustrating the essential core of the idea of Europe 6: 'In this way a character is 
given to Persons, associations of persons, and all their cultural accomplishments 
which binds them all together. ' [Vienna 273-74] 
Already tacitly animating European history this idea forms a culture produced by 
the repeated irruption of the idea of the infinite (Greeks, Galileo, etc. ). This 
paradoxical historicity of truth, noted by Derrida, sees scientific idealities, 
omnitemporal validities, produced in history by a generation upon generation of 
scientists 7 instantiating the theoretical attitude: '... community of scientists as a 
community of knowledge living in the unity of a common responsibility' 
[Ursprung 165]. This is the 'profoundest and purest tradition' for Husserl, the 
sense of which must be explicitly taken up and generalized as sense qua 
orientation. Crucially, such a task is a task for humanity as a whole in communal 
activity and co-responsibility - it is fundamentally co-operative in its 
intersubjective structure8. 
Europe was born from ideas of reason, from which the modem world finds itself 
14 alienated into 'barbarity , an annihilating conflagration of 
disbelief' (Vienna 
6 In The Other Heading, Derrida observes that 'national hegemony always presents itself as a 
philosopheme'. The Other Heading p. 3L 
7,... every science is related to an open chain of generations of those who work for and with one 
another, researchers either known or unknown to one another who are the accomplishing 
subjectivity of the whole living science. ' [Ursprung 1591 
Derrida: Tgological subjectivity cannot be responsible for this development, which Is 
continually totalized in an absolute Present. Only a communal subjectivity can produce the 
historical system of truth and be wholly responsible for it. ' [Origin 601 
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2991. Phenomenology aims to reanimate a 'heroism' of Europe through faith in 
its historical teleology. Once this self-image is secure, a new human epoch can 
emerge self-consciously embracing the 'free shaping of its existence, its 
historical life through ideas of reason, through infinite tasks' [Vienna 274]. 
Europe capitalizes on the doubled meaning of sense (Sinn, sens) - 
phenomenological sense and teleological sense - orientation and meaning. For 
late Husserl, ideality, or rather idealization qua infinitization (as indefinite linear 
extension), produces a new historicity and history instantiated in philosophy as a 
new cultural form: 'one which, living in finitude, lives toward poles of infinity' 
[Vienna 27719. 
It aims at infinitely distant, normative shape in anticipation, but this presentiment 
is not without warrant according to Husserl, it is based on and already orients our 
historical development: 'Now all of this is not intended as a speculative 
interpretation of our historicity but as the expression of a vital anticipation which 
arises through unprejudiced reflection. ' [Vienna 275] [translation modified] That 
is, there is a 'first step' in which infinity is discovered: the natural sciences and 
the linear extension of mathematics. This infinity is then attenuated (this is its 
novelty) to aim at 'a great and distant human future' - this 'phoenix of life- 
inwardness aims at immortality' [Vienna 299]10. 
'What is new, unprecedented, is the conceiving of this idea of a rational 
infinite totality of being with a rational science systematically mastering it. 
An infinite world, here a world of idealities, is conceived, not as one whose 
objects become accessible to * our 
knowledge singly, imperfectly, and as it 
were accidentally, but as one which is attained by rational, systematically 
coherent method. ' [Crisis 22] 
9 For Husserl, this logos is inseparable from monotheism. 'In the concept of God the singular is 
essential. Proper to it, from the human standpoint, is that fact that God's ontic validity and his 
value-validity are experienced as an absolute internal bond. The next step here is the coalescence 
of this absoluteness with that of philosophical ideality. In the general process of idealization. 
which proceeds from philosophy, God is logicized [and) becomes the bearer of the absolute 
logos. ' (Vienna 288] 
10 Derrida: 'Whenever a telos or teleology comes to orient, order, and make possible a historicity. 
it annuls that historicity by the same token and neutralizes the unforeseeable and incalculable 
irruption, the singular and exceptional alterity of what comes, or indeed of who comes. that 
without which, or the one without whom, nothing happens or arrives. ' [Rogues 128] 
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As in 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science', philosophy 'teaches us how to carry 
on the eternal work of humanity' [PRS 73], where spirit alone is immortal and 
science, underpinned by transcendental phenomenology, is the only cultural form 
to be a 'culture of ideas', to set itself infinite tasks, 'capable of an absolute self- 
responsibility on the basis of absolute theoretical insights' [Vienna 283]. This 
task is reason itself - the struggle for truth [Crisis 13] - rational through seeking 
to be rational [Crisis 34 1 ]11. 
In this way, phenomenology establishes a 'modem European humanity' [Crisis 
121, through which it exercises 'its function as one which is archontic for 
humanity as a whole. ' [Vienna 289] This function is not bound to 'the soil of 
national fradition', but 'aliens' only participate in it by first coming to understand 
it. In the 'Vienna Lecture', this idea is expressed as follows: 
'Historical mankind does not always divide itself up in the same way in 
accord with [the category of historicity]. We feel this precisely in our own 
Europe. There is something unique here that is recognized in us by all other 
human groups, too, something that, quite apart from all considerations of 
utility, becomes a motive for them to Europeanize themselves even in their 
unbroken will to spiritual self-preservation; whereas we, if we understand 
ourselves properly, would never Indianize ourselves, for example. I mean 
that we feel (and in spite of all obscurity this feeling is probably legitimate) 
that an entelechy is inborn in our European civilization which holds sway 
throughout all changing shapes of Europe and accords to them the sense of a 
development toward an ideal shape of life and being as an eternal pole. .-- 
The spiritual telos of European humanity, in which the particular telos of 
particular nations and of individual men is contained, lies in the infinite, is an 
infinite idea toward which, in concealment, the whole spiritual becoming 
aims, so to speak. As soon as it becomes consciously recognized in the 
development as telos, it necessarily also becomes practical as a goal of the 
will; and thereby a new, higher stage of development is introduced which is 
under the guidance of norms. normative ideas. ' [Vienna 2751 [my italics] 
Transcendental phenomenology brings 'proper self-understanding' to Europe; it 
brings this 'entelechy' to the fore such that the higher stage of humanity is 
instigated as soon as a 'practical goal of the will' is assumed. These sentiments 
are repeated in The Crisis q European Sciences, but the productive realization of !f 
'The faith in the possibility of philosophy as a task, that is, in the possibility of universal 
knowledge, is something we cannot let go. We know that we are called to this task as serious 
philosophers. ' (Crisis 17] Derrida here identifies the Kantlan 'Interest of reason': science wants 
to be unconditional truth (Rogues 132]. 
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such normativity is positioned in slightly different terms recognising the possible 
illegitimacy of this feeling of 'inborn entelechy 
'To bring latent reason to the understanding of its own possibilities and thus 
to bring insight to the possibility of metaphysics as a true possibility - this is 
the only way to put metaphysics or universal philosophy [universale 
Philosophiel on the strenuous road to realization. It is the only way to decide 
whether the telos which was inborn in European humanity at the birth of 
Greek philosophy - that of humanity which seeks to exist, and is only 
possible, through philosophical reason [ein Menschentum aus 
philosophischer Vernunft sein zu wollen und nur als solche sein zu kdnnen], 
moving endlessly from latent to manifest reason and forever seeking its own 
norms through this ... whether this telos, then, is merely a factual, historical delusion, the accidental acquisition of one accidental humanity fein 
zufdlliger Erwerb einer zufdlligen Menschheit], of merely one among many 
other humanities [Menschheiten] and historicities [Geschichtlichkelten], or 
whether Greek humanity was not rather the first breakthrough to what is 
essential to humanity as such, its entelechy. Humankind in general is 
essentially [basic] human being in generatively and socially tied humanities, 
and the human is a reasoning being only insofar as the whole of their 
humanity is a humanity [governed or directed by] reason (Menschentum 
iiberhaupt ist wesenmdflig Menschsein in generativ und sozial verbunden 
Menschheiten, und ist der Mensch Vernunfiwesen (animal rationale), so ist er 
es nur, sofern seine ganze Menschheit Vemunftmenschheit ist]. ... Philosophy and science would accordingly be the historical movement of the 
revelation of universal reason, "innate" in humankind as such. ' [Crisis 15-16 
translation modified, Krisis 13-14] [Husserl's italics, my emphasis in bold] 
I have emphasised the setting up of the opposition between a universal 
philosophy and a delusion. It is presented in stark terms - either one or the other 
- that is the demand placed on the claims of European reason, to demonstrate the 
universality of its claims through their accomplishment: 'Together with the new 
task and its universal apodictic ground, the practical possibility of a new 
philosophy will prove itself: through its execution. But it will also become 
apparent that all the philosophy of the past, though unbeknownst to itself, was 
inwardly oriented toward this new sense of philosophy. ' [Crisis 18, my 
emphasis] 12 
12 It is this ultimate element of 'bootstrapping', proving itself through its execution, that connects 
Cohen. Levinas and Husserl. 
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In the aspiration to absolute ideas, Europe is distinguished, from the 'merely 
empirical anthropological types' of China and India [Crisis 16] which though 
sharing superficial common features are distinguished by 'essential differences 
of principle': they have a thoroughly different orientation [Vienna 279-80] 14 . For 
example, Husserl refers to a determinate Indian historicity [die indische 
Geschichtlichkeit] distinct from that felt by Europeans [Vienna 274]. Although, 
Husserl's essay on the origin of geometry attempts to demonstrate that the 'same 
reason functions 
_in 
every man ... no matter how primitive he is' [Origin 180] 
(and does so by appealing to a general EinjWhlung), cultural particularities that 
are developed over history on top of that basic formation are such that they gain 
autonomy' 5 
Is this problem not to the fore in the discussion of the Geschichtlosigkeit of 
'archaic', or 'primitive' societies? 'Stagnant' and 'locked into their own 
horizons', their comparison with Europe seems to unsettle the notion of a 
transcendental historical a priori. If the idea of infinite task and tradition has not 
yet irrupted in them, this would suggest that their transcendental historicity is 
distinct. Even if sociality and culture belong to all humanity, thereby indicating 
a general base-level historicity, these 'empirical types' are differentiated at a 
lower level by Husserl. 
13 As Derrida asks in his dissertation, '... how can one distinguish rigorously between the 
empirical types of human groups and the transcendental typesT The Problem of Genesis in 
Husserl's Philosophy p. 157. 
14 , But within their own framework of meaning this world-view and world-knowledge are and 
remain mythical and practical, and it is a mistake, a falsification of their sense, for those raised in 
the scientific ways of thinking created in Greece and developed in the modem period to speak of 
Indian and Chinese philosophy and science (astronomy, mathematics), i. e.. to interpret India, 
Babylonia, and China, in a European way. ' [Vienna 284-5] 
15 Here, we might see the covert reference made by Levinas with reference to Durkheim and 
"levels of being" cited in Chapter One. See also, Husserl's own correspondence with Uvy-Bruhl 
from 1935, which is precisely concerned with the relation of the various humanities 
[Menschheiten] with their particular Umwelt, logics and ontologles. There is also reference to 
supernational formations [Obernation] - such as Europe, and, again, China. Husserl 
Briefwechsel: Band V11, pp. 159-65 (especially pp. 161-163). 
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To explicate the possible plurality of historicities, Derfida references the three- 
stage model outlined in the fragment, 'Stufen der Geschichtlichkeit. Erste 
Geschichtlichkeit" 6 
1. Basic socialisation as the most general historicity of human existence. 
2. European culture, the theoretical project (philosophy). 
3. The "conversion of philosophy into [transcendental] phenomenology". 
Europe is not simply a good example, as on Derrida's reading, which awakens a 
latent potential in stage 1. Its creation of the theoretical attitude brings a new 
form of historicity, distinct in its own right. Phenomenology brings that 
historicity to the fore and makes of it a willed, common project. This is quite 
distinct from Derrida's deflationary account of each stage as a 'sense- 
investigation of a hidden intention' [la prise de la conscience d'une intention 
cachee] [Origin 115-16, OG 121-22]. Indeed, it is important that Europe, in 
modernity, does not realise, in full awareness, its distinctiveness and can valonse 
the idea of cultural relativism, and as such is in need of phenomenology for its 
full Selbstbesinnung. Only phenomenology would be such an explicit coming- 
to-consciousness; without its explicit infinitization, no standard could be invoked 
to decide between the value of different projects 17 . 
16 'Stufen der Geschichtlichkeit. Erste Geschichtlichkeit' [1934] Beilage XXVI in Krisis [Krisis 
502-3]. Cited by Derrida [Origin 115-16]. 
17 Phenomenology tends to position such teleologies on scale that includes animality on the basis 
of cognitive ability. We find the following consequences. The question of primitive or 
underdeveloped humanity is projected onto this spectrum, so that developed humanity is 
differentiated from underdeveloped humanity where the latter lies closer to animality. Thus 
Husserl in the Crisis can write: 'Just as man and even the Papuan represent a new stage of animal 
nature, i. e. as opposed to the beast, so philosophical reason represents a new stage of human 
nature and its reason. ' The Papuan is an advance on the animal but the philosophising human is 
an advance on the Papuan - on the same scale: thought distinguishes humans from animality; 
philosophical thought distinguishes certain humans from others. Europe is then the site where 
humanity has achieved, and can extend, its apogee. Philosophical thought is valonsed as a 
distinct stage of human possibility against which everything else is abnormal or deficient. In the 
Cartesian Meditations, Husserl writes: 'Among the problems of abnormality the problem of non- 
human animality and that of the levels of "higher and lower" animals [Tierheit - animalityl are 
included. Relative to the animal (Tier], man is, constitutionally speaking, the normal case -just 
as I myself am the primal norm constitutionally for all other men [wie ich selbst konstitutivfiUr 
alle Menschen]. Animals are essentially constituted for me as abnormal "variants" of my 
humanness, even though among them in turn normality and abnormality may be differentiated. ' 
[CM 126] (translation altered] This combination of the categones; of animality and abnormality, 
where I, as philosophising (European) subject, am the normal, advanced case, drives a logic of 
Eurocentrism which is hard-pressed to avoid racism. Derrida has noted that Husserl is forced by 
his own logic to include the colonies as spintually part of Europe. while excluding the gypsies 
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The phenomenological attitude which takes responsibility for this active 
valuation is 'comparable in the beginning to a religious conversion' [Crisis 137]. 
It foregrounds the teleological function of human: the 6 Ought-to-be' of reason 
'that alone makes humanity blessed' [Crisis 400]. The value of this specific 
theoretical attitude lies in the projected fifth part of the Krisis: the possibility of 
humanity taking responsibility for itself, for which phenomenology, as the 
culmination of theory and philosophy, is suited". 
who traverse its internal boundaries. Racism might then be not a deficiency that can be isolated 
from phenomenology, but is produced from its constitutive allergy to anImality and 
psychologism. Derrida Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question: Lranslated by Geoffrey 
Bennington & Rachel Bowlby (Chicago & London, University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 120- 
122 n. 1. 
18 See Appendix X to the Crisis (pp. 397-400): 'Fink's Outline for the Continuation of the Crisis' 
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'The anxiously havering, Brownian motion-like movement of the argument 
Derrida is mounting puts out filaments, stems and extensions, which 
gradually and over time put out discursive space through sen-ý -repetition and 
occupy it. ... It is as if Derrida throws back ropes to his own work, while 
allowing the future to come back to us not as a set of calculated 
compossibles, but as a force proceeding back to us from strands that have 
been projected out. For such a mode of composition, the phrase is like a 
point of accumulation in its context, it acquires weight and effect in a way 
which is not in simple posterity to the situation it is in. ' 
Marian Hobson Opening Lines [OL 193] 
A constitutive 'hesitation' in Derrida's writing attempts formally to foreground 
Derfida's'own problematic in its concern for language and its determination of 
philosophy at a meta-level. In this regard, one can understand the motivation 
comparing Derfida and Wittgenstein's interest in showing the limits of language 
and philosophy'. Additionally, this hesitation is perhaps exacerbated in the 
refusal to consider that limit as natural or transcendentally determined. 
'Perhaps patient meditation and painstaking investigation on and around 
what is still provisionally called writing, far from falling short of a science 
of writing or of hastily dismissing it by some obscurantist reaction, letting it 
rather develop its positivity as far as possible, are the wanderings of a way 
of thinking that is faithful and attentive to the ineluctable world of the future 
which proclaims itself at present, beyond the closure of knowledge. ' 
[Gramm 4] 
Attending to that future in anticipatory closure of knowledge marks a going- tý 
beyond-the-limit without guarantee of that exorbitance being recuperated 
meaningfully. 
If classical philosophy's attempt to master language's equivocality through 
technical devices is undecidable, and empiricism revels in an unavoidable fall or 
finitude, Derrida insists that this techno-theological legacy '... must be 
abandoned in order to think the originary appurtenance of desire to discourse, of 
discourse to the history of the world, and the already-there-ness of the language 
in which desire deludes itself. ' [Gramm 139] This abandoning cannot be 
1 See Henry Staten Wittgenstein and Derrida (Oxford, Blackwell, 1985). 
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achieved in one blow; any appurtenance is not simply thought but coaxed or 
precipitated in the subsequent consumption and circulation of these writings in 
their hesitations and detours'. 'To recognise writing in speech, that is to say 
differance and the absence of speech is to begin to think the lure fbricolej. ' 
[Gramm 139] This lure or trap generates material that connects grammatology to 
a form of serniology liberated from the dominance of a linguistics presenting 
itself as a model for human sciences [Gramm 28]3. 
This would seem to open up a further dimension to Derrida's writing in which it 
comes close to a new empirical form of human science that attends to the 
materiality of language and the sign. That is, the critique of a triumphalist 
scientism, exemplified by the linguistic turn, does not remain simply dogmatic - 
made from a transcendental or phenomenological position. Insofar as the results 
of the work on Husserl remain not simply a negative demonstration, it is in the 
rethinking of the Saussurian sign that this is best seen. The critique of intuition 
as grounding evidence provides the resources for expanding the notion of the 
sign, so that the differential (diffigrantial) structure of the (conceptual) signified is 
now not qualititatively distinguishable from the differential (diffigrantial) 
structure of the signifier. The materiality of this structure of the sign can no 
longer be nailed down by an animating intention such that equivocality is 
evaded'. 
2 Compare the passages on Joyce and Hegel in the 'Introduction to the Origin of Geometry' 
(Origin 100 ff. ]. 
3 Grammatology opposes itself to linguistics insofar as the latter adopts a naive psychology to 
determine the limit of its object of study: '... the serniological project ... in spite of its greater 
theoretical extension, remained governed by linguistics, organized as if linguistics were at once 
its center and its telos. Even though semiology was in fact more general and more 
comprehensive than linguistics, it continued to be regulated as if it were one of the areas of 
linguistics. The linguistic sign remained exemplary for semiology, it dominated it as the master- 
sign and the generative model: the pattern. ' [Gramm 511 The explicit reference to Barthes in Of 
Grammatology serves as a correction - Barthes did not recognise that serniology (equivalent to 
Peirce's rhetoric) is more general than linguistics and allowed the latter's metaphysical 
interpretation of the sign to dominate its own project [Gramm 521. 
4 Writing is then not to be 'decoded' for a reference to a signified and thereby a reference. When 
Deffida asserts that, 'There is nothing outside of the text' [il n'y a pas de hors-textel, he is 
insisting that the text is not a signifier pointing towards a single. given signified which would 
determine the Nachleben of that signifier. The text cannot refer to some one thing. Nor should it 
be understood at the level of the referent: whether for reality or the author's intention. His 
infamous phrase is directed at the 'tranquil confidence that leaps from text to its presumed 
content'. Marrati notes that the 'sense of a text is never unveiled by a hermeneutic that takes the 
infinite as the temporal horizon of its task' (Gensis and Trace p. xiii I ). 
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It is important to realise that this marks the connection between Speech and 
Phenomena and Of Grammatology. The deconstruction of Husserl's distinction 
between meaningful expression and indication results in the generalization of 
indication: 'We now know in fact that, for the order of signification in general, 
the whole of psychic experience (under the surface character of its acts - even 
when they intend idealities and objective necessities) contains only indicative 
concatenations' [SP 29-301 - 'the totality of speech is caught up in an indicative 
web' [SP 31]. 
To think, then, 'the originary appurtenance of desire to discourse' requires 
techniques to think the originary nature of indicative association from which, 
contra Husserl, science cannot inure itself5. It is the ineliminable precondition 
for meaningful expression: the 'already-there-ness' of language is central to this 
materiality of the signifie?. 
Grammatology, as a 6speculativa grammatical, is this displacement of linguistics, 
now necessarily subordinate to generalized semiology of association. It 
investigates the 'formal doctrine of conditions which a discourse must satisfy in 
I order to have sense . There are three aspects to this research 
(taken from 
Peirce): 
1. Pure Grammar; 
2. Logic - the study of what may hold true of an object; 
3. Rhetoric - the laws by which one sign gives birth to another - to wit, 
association [Gramm 48-49]. 
5 CC 'It is easy to see that even in [ordinary] human life, and first of all in every individual life 
from childhood up to maturity, the originally intuitive life which creates its originally self-evident 
structures through activities on the basis of sense -experience very quickly and in increasing 
measure falls victim to the seduction of language. Greater and greater segments of this life lapse 
into a kind of talking and reading that is dominated purely by association-, and often enough, in 
respect to the validities arrived at in this way, it is disappointed by subsequent experience. ... 
[science] is obviously concerned from the start to put a stop to the free play of associative 
constructions. ' [Ursprung 165] See also Husserl Logical Investigations 'Investigation F §4 
'Digression on the Associative Origin of Indication' pp. 273-74. 
6 Unfortunately, there is no space here to discuss the path opened up to Lacan N'la this idea. 
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This applies equally to philosophical writing'. The process of presentation is not 
simply a medium or vehicle for thought - the materiality of the signifier and 
syntactical apparatuses mean that '... we must not confound the meaning of the 
architecture with, the declared intention of the work' [Gramm 195]. In fact, one 
of the constitutive features of philosophy has been its efforts to effect precisely 
this break between signified and signifier. 'Philosophy is, within wnting. 
nothing but this movement of writing as effacement of the signifier and the 
desire of presence restored, of being, signified in its brilliance and its glory. ' 
[Gramm 2861' 
here one would have to mediate even more patiently the irreducible 
complicity, despite all of the philosopher's rhetorical efforts, between 
everyday language and philosophical language; or, better, the complicity 
between certain historical languages and philosophical language. 
philosophical language belongs to a system of language(s). Thereby, its 
nonspeculative ancestry always brings a certain equivocality into speculation. 
... Since this equivocality is original and irreducible, perhaps philosophy 
must adopt it, think it and be thought in it, must accommodate duplicity and 
difference within speculation, within the very purity of philosophical 
meaning. No one, it seems to us, has attempted this more profoundly than 
Hegel. ' [VM 141-142] 
There are at least two separate dimensions to these considerations: 
1. The written nature of philosophy means that it draws on a 'set of tropic 
resources older than philosophy': hence, the fundamental 'ambiguity of 
the metaphysical text". Philosophy cannot 'dominate' these features, 
even if it can be defined as this constitutive 'forgetting' of 
metaphoricity". 
7 This is perhaps the best illustration of the intimate interweaving of phenomenology and 
Gstructuralism' in Derrida's deconstruction and grammatology. Indeed, one could suggest an 
analytical division between the two, such that deconstruction displaces the phenomenological 
function and grammatology the structural or ontological function. 
8 See also: '... [the philosophical text] although it is in fact always written, includes, precisely as 
its philosophical specificity, the project of effacing itself in the face of the signified content 
which it transports and in general teaches. ' [Granim 1601 
9 Marrati Genesis and Trace p. 139. See also Jacques Derrida 'Qual Quelle: Valdry's 
Sources' 
[19711 translated by Alan Bass in Margins of Philosophy (Brighton. Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 
273-306. 
10 'Philosophy would be this process of metaphorization which gets carried awaN, in and of Itself 
Constitutionally, philosophical culture will always have been an obliterating one. ' 
Derrida 'White 
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy' [19711 translated by Alan Bass in Margins of 
Philosophy (Brighton. Harvester Press, 1982). pp. 207-27 1; p. 21 L 
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2. The separation of these 'tropic', formal or metaphorical resources from 
the philosophical content depends itself on a philosophical gesture which Cý 
means that no other discourse or exterior position can dominate these 
features either. Metaphor itself is a philosophical concept. 'Each time 
that a rhetoric defines metaphor, not only is a philosophy implied, but 
also a conceptual network in which philosophy itself has been constituted. 
... What is defined, therefore, is implied in the defining of the 
definition. "' 
Thus philosophy understands itself to be grounded, or inscribed, in a 
nonphilosophical and rhetorical context of force. Rhetoric concerns the 'livingo 
circulation of discourse' which Derlida notes Hegel never investigated'. The 
potential rhetorico-associative effects of grammatology are simply absent from 
most discussion of Derrida's writing; as such it would bring the grammatologist 
close to a sort of serniologist or anthropologist, thereby infecting Derrida's texts 
with the question of whether they are designed to elicit 'first-rate ethnographic 
material' the better to continue its veiled transformation in response to closure. 
Wherein 'painstaking analysis' into writing might necessitate an ironic 
dissemblance of agenda, the better to observe those signs producing each other. 
The movement towards what is other to reason, the nonphilosophical text (chain 
of traces), can only occur from within this determining structure, this process, 
this economy. 
Resisting Mutation 
'Emmanuel Levinas slowly displaced, slowly bent according to an inflexible 
and simple exigency, the axis, trajectory and even order of phenomenology 
or ontology .... Once again, he completely changed the 
landscape of 
thought; he did so, in a dignified way, without polemic, at once from within, 
faithfully, and from very far away, from the attestation of a completely other 
place. ... [This] 
is a discreet but irreversible mutation, one of those powerful, 
singular, and rare provocations. ... This happened, this mutation 
happened, 
through him, through Emmanuel Levinas, who was conscious of this 
immense responsibility in a way that was, I believe, at once clear, confident, 
calm and modest, like that of a prophet. ' [Adieu II- 12 J 
11 ibid. p. 230. 
12 Dissemination p. 36. 
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In Adieu, Levinas's work is described as a 6mutation' and a 'provocation' that 
has awakened us to themes that have changed 'the course of philosophical 
reflection"'. What does it mean to describe the work of a philosopher as a 
mutation? 
In this vocabulary of mutation there may be a veiled reference to Proust, who 
writes: 'For theories and schools, like microbes and globules, devour one another 
and, by their struggles, ensure life's continuance"'. Or might it point away from 
debates about the robustness of thematization in Levinas, towards a broader 
impact on 'the spirit of the age', the Zeitgeist? This marks a change of terrain. 
Levinas's status within the philosophical community and beyond has been 
transformed since the time of 'Violence and Metaphysics', where Derrida 
explicitly criticised Levinas' interpretation of Husserl and Heidegger and paid 
particular attention to the problems associated with a phenomenological 
treatment of the other qua wholly other. Importantly, there is no retraction of 
these criticisms in Derrida's later work. 
In the absence of any homology of 'characteristic form', we are faced with the 
following conundrum: why does Derrida's writing on Levinas undergo such a 
shift after the publication of 'At this Very Moment... '? Our suggestion will be 
that it coincides both with a shift to a more grammatological writing and to the 
changed historical conditions regarding the reception of Levinas. Published in 
1964, 'Violence and Metaphysics', is the first sustained philosophical 
engagement with Levinas's work. At the time of writing in the 1960s, Levinas 
was not widely read. Indeed many argue that Levinas benefited from a broadly 
sympathetic treatment by Derrida, who includes him among the 'community of 
those who question . However, as 
has been pointed out by both Badiou" and 
13 'We already see innumerable signs ... in all the translations, courses. seminars, conferences. 
etc., that the reverberations of this thought will have changed the course of philosophical 
reflection in our time, and of our reflection on philosophy .. .' [Adieu 4] 
14 Marcel Proust Sodom and Gomorrah [ 1921-22] translated by John Sturrock (London, Allen 
Lane, 2002), p. 216. 
15 Badiou Ethics pp. 18-25 
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Dominic Lecourt", Levinas now occupies a quite different position (from quasi- 
theological peripheral thinker to 'communal surety') within the general 
dominance of an ethical discourse of the other 
17 
. 
It seems pertinent here to raise the question of writing strategy. In Positions, 
Derrida insists that, 'the incision of deconstruction is not a voluntary decision - it 
does not take place just anywhere- it can only be made according to lines of 
force' [Positions 82]. Such an assessment may not be foregrounded, since to do 
so may discharge the force of its intervention in a weakened fashion. The 
urgency of a contemporary scene may modify the manner in which one writes 
regarding certain figures: we need xeadings but not the way the idler in the 
garden of knowledge needs them. How does one contest mutation? 
This idea of mutation seems to govern Derrida's own presentation. One can 
track through Adieu two key moves (neither innocent). Firstly, one should note 
the choice to use the word 'hospitality', which Derrida admits occurs only rarely 
in Levinas, but is justified 'by ... 
links and discursive logic' [Adieu 21]. 
Tff - Hospitality is described as a 'quasi-pseudonym of welcome' (Adieu 45]. 
Secondly, if one tries to count the number of times that Derrida makes the 
following. gesture, one soon gets into double figures: '[Levinas] would not say it 
in this way'; 'this is a language that is no longer literally Levinas'; 'this is not a 
theme in his work', 'I would like to approach him today by way of this non-way' 
etc. [Adieu 25,32,33,48, etc. ]. Derrida notes that we ought to explore patiently 
this particular Levinasian idiom of welcome, but this concem is interrupted by 
'fidelity to more than one memory' [Adieu 45]. 
Thirdly, Chapter Six already noted the manner in which Derrida connects 
'hospitality' to immigration - not a theme for Levinas. 
16 Dominique Lecourt The Mediocracy: French Philosophy since the mid-1970s translated by 
Gregory Elliot (London & New York, Verso, 200 1). 
17 Critchley supports their analyses in noting two conditions for the changed reception of Levinas. 
1. Les nouveaux philosophes return to questions of ethics, politics, law and democracy as an 
attack on the anti-humanism of the 1970s. I Levinas' work only appears in affordable paperback 
editions in the mid to late 1980s. 'Introduction' to The Cambridge Companion to Levinas. p. 3. 
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This idea of mutation, displacement and interruption of fidelity returns us to our 
earlier discussion of bricolage and polyphony: what disrupts the intimate 
encounter between Derrida and Levinas such that the replacement of welcome by 
hospitality is required? 
The lexicon of the Other, justice and responsibility promulgated by Levinas 
produces effects beyond providing support for his own particular ethico-political 
position. This potency is excessive and can perhaps be fruitfully extended and 
exploited in opposition to its domestication. In offering this as a task, Derrida 
suggests that its possible realisation depends on a translation to be invented and 
an ethicai conversion or visitation that 'disjoins and disturbs' [Adieu 62]. 
If there is the possibility of philosophical writing as 'stirring up' towards a new 
intelligibility, then it cannot simply be promulgated as a new theory. In order to 
rupture the dominant political forces, perhaps Derrida has recruited or assembled 
an ally in the 'community of the question', or sought to exploit a certain appeal; 
one that is manifested in changed conditions, in part wrought by the attraction of 
Levinas's own idiom (an attraction, which is not necessarily produced by the 
appreciation of the technical difficulties of that project, but which might be 
marked instead by an enthusiasm for a particular slogan or the possibility for 
recuperation into everyday good sense). 
Philosophical discourse has nonphilosophical effects, viz. the fate of 
'deconstruction'. Moreover, it has an ideological dimension which it is not 
always easy to discern. Lukacs observed that the novel is privileged for 
revealing the ideology of his day". Philosophy may be more so; the desire to 
speak of the other or a different manner of conducting philosophy away from the 
dominant models of refutation, truth and knowledge (pace Bemasconi) bespeaks 
more than that desire. That it is able to be generalised beneath a certain 
4 pluralism' may indicate even more. 
18 Gyorgi Lukdcs The Theory of the Novel: A Historico- Philosophical Essay on the Forms of 
Great Epic Literature [ 1913] translated by Anna Bostock (London, Verso, 197 1) 
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The challenge to philosophy from anthropology comes from its reducing 
philosophy to an object of study. Uvi-Strauss comments: 'To the anthropologist 
... [philosophy] affords a 
first-class ethnographic document, the study of which 
is essential to an* understanding of the mythology of our own time. "' We have 
already observed how Derrida resists the total reduction of philosophy to the 
field of empirical cultural studies, but this does not mean that elements of 
ethnography have not been taken over. As noted, the development of 
grammatology goes beyond the deconstructive concern with the unjustifiable 
valorisation of presence in logocentrism. 
The determination of persisting, unthought residues of 'closed off' philosophies 
and philosophical practices requires a certain form of experimental precipitation 
-a provocative agitation. To study the 'the originary appurtenance of desire to 
discourse, of discourse to the history of the world, and the already-there-ness of 
the language in which desire deludes itself' , to think the lure or materiality of 
language with the always altering laws 'by which one sign gives birth to 
another', might require a writing that is not simply classically "philosophicall' - 
its effects may involve a certain solicitous writing (or a solicitous level of writing 
that may also be philosophical). This would be an original and originary irony, 
serious in Hobson's sense [OL 86] ", that undercuts straightforward reading 
protocols given its connection to earlier theoretical developments - this would 
4 multiply detenninate possibilities' for interpretation [OL 86] but would not 
simply be demonstrating a general meta-linguistic thesis regarding irreducible 
equivocation", even if: 
4... something of literature will have begun when it is not possible to decide 
whether, when I speak of something, I am indeed speaking of something ... 
or if I am giving an example, an example of something or an example of the 
fact that I can speak of something, of my way of speaking of something, of 
19 The Savage Mind [ 1962] (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 249 footnote. 
20 'The syntactic irony available at certain points in Derrida's text is not that of signals to a reader 
sent out by a transcending consciousness; it is much more like a sudden change of frequency in 
emission, which can momentarily be received in a different way and at a different place. ' [OL 
228] 
21 See the discussion of Nietzsche's fragmentary marginalia. 'I have forgotten my umbrella', in 
Spurs - Nietzsche's Styles / 
tPerons - Les Styles de Nietzsche translated by Barbara Harlow 
(Chicago & London, Chicago University Press, 1979). 
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the possibility of speaking in general of something in general, or again of 
writing these words. ' [Passions 142 fn. ] 
To risk an analogy, and one always have to beware of the nonphilosophical 
character of anal ogies, one can compare this aspect of grammatology with the 
activity of marine biologists (imagine a Twin Earth Derrida). If one wants to 
study the behaviour of sharks, one hires a boat, sails out into the ocean and drops 
a bucket of 'chum' into the water. Chum is a mixture of fish oil, fish entrails and 
blood. The pungent scent attracts predatory fish to the boat. One can then study 
their behaviour. If one wants to study the ideology of academic philosophy 
today and the way sediments of common sense folk metaphysics continue to 
structure its workings, then to drop Levinas into discourse is to 'chum the 
waters'. Discussion of Levinas is an effective way to precipitate deep-seated, 
neglected residues of reactionary humanism. As originally formulated, 
grammatology requires something like a grammatologist who in some ways 
operates as a field anthropologist hoping to elicit certain behaviour to better 
understand where we are today in the associative web of indicative signs. 
Philosophers could be useful objects of study as they have a tendency to express 
and justify their prejudices. 
Derrida noted that: 'In the best of cases, the discourse of bricolage can confess 
itself, confess in its desire and its defeat ... ' [OG 139] Part of grammatology's 
historico-strategic calculations must include the assessment of when the situation 
pertaining to the 'best of cases' is compronused by an urgency. In the early 
formulations, polemically directed against the dominance of linguistics as true 
science of the humanities, the undermining of structuralism could possibly be felt 
as a real urgency. Over twenty years later in The Politics of Friendship, Derrida 
suggests that the conditions of receptivity can be such that the confessional 
mode, the ultra-transcendental trace, might need to be sacrificed: 
'And what if tomorrow a new political wisdom were to let itself be inspired by 
this lie's wisdom, by this manner of knowing how to lie, dissimulate or divert 
wicked lucidity? What if it demanded that we know, and know how to 
dissimulate, the principles and forces of social unbinding, all the menacing 
disjunctions? to dissimulate them in order to preserve the social bond and the 
Menschenfreundlichkeiff [PoF 60] 
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Or, in an interview with Antoine Spire, he admits it might be better sometimes to 
'simplify a little' so that something might be allowed to happen, or pass like 
6 contraband', sometimes under the pretext of 'never being able to get the 
measure of the complexity of things"'. 
If one were studying the way certain signs within current academic philosophy 
produced or connected to others, one might not announce one's working 
hypotheses or motivations. Spivak has noted that certain features of 
deconstruction as originally formulated have 'gone underground 123 . The explicit 
references to citation, 'erasure' and paleonymy surface only intermittently in the 
more recent writings, most notably in 'Passions'. Much of the response to that 
essay has concentrated on the early comments regarding the 'moralisation' of 
deconstruction". But few have gone on to analyse the workings of the remainder 
of the text, which deal both with the problem of the secret and the potentially 
duplicitous workings of citation. When discussing the secret and a certain form 
of mimesis, as it disrupts the distinction found in Kant's Second Critique, 
Derrida writes: 
'The same words, the same grammar, can satisfy two functions. No more 
than in irony, and other similar things, does the difference between the two 
functions or the two values need to be thernatised (sometimes it must not - 
and that is the secret), neither explained earnestly, nor even marked by 
quotation marks, visible or invisible, or other nonverbal indices. ' [Passions 
143 fn. ] 
As a consequence, one might argue that an effective intervention in this field 
requires that one is read and that this general problematic be exploited for 
strategic purposes - to repeat, sometimes the quotation marks must not be 
revealed - that is the secret. When faced with the ossification into 'a communal 
22 'Mais je me dis aussi que, peut-9tre, peut-itre, il vaut mieux simplifier un peu en jaisant passer 
quelque chose, comme en contrebande, plut6t que de se taire sous p4texte qu'on ne peut jamais 
etre a la mesure de la complexitg des choses. Il n'y a jamais de garantie, de norms de protection, 
d'assurance contra le risqui ainsi pris. Si cette simplification est une trahison, arritons-nous un 
peu sur ce mot de ýKtrahison>>-' Jacques Derrida & Antoine Spire Au-deld 
des Apparences 
(Latresne, Bordeaux, Le Bord de PEau, 2002), p. 40. 
23 'Limits and Openings of Marx in Derrida' in Outside tit the Teaching Machine (London, 
Routledge, 1993), pp. 97-119. 
24 See the passage cited in the Introduction to this thesis [Passions 15 cited infra page 261. 
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surety', and one who is not well-read, one may decide that citation operates as a 
password, a lulling into false security, a Trojan horse - it need not simply be 
homage. 
If one were conducting investigations into the structure of intelligibility or 
receptivity of current academia with an eye to precipitating some modification, 
or preparing a translation, one might seek to mine certain sedimented tensions 
whilst not announcing that explicit aim. A certain 'banalisation' might be the 
condition of possibility for a mapping, or could one even say, a quasi- 
phenomenology of academic thought; certain subterranean features may need to 
be lured to the surface. 'Banalization' is developed by Derrida in The Postcard. 
Referring to the ordinary appearance of 'undercover', unmarked police cars, it 
appears in the writing of Barthes, for whom text in advertising can serve to 
repress certain features of an image and hence to 'banalize' the message". 
Fittingly, Barthes writes in Mythologies": 'Freedom, for the critic, is not to 
refuse the wager (impossible! ), it is to make his own wager obvious or not. ' 
Freedom can be exercised in the extent to which one shows one workings, 
declares one's hand. This would elevate the problem of responsibility for one's 
writing to a different level; as Derrida observes in his comments on Tristes 
Tropiques, Levi Strauss's behaviour could be questioned insofar as he solicits the 
secret names of group members from the children of the tribe: the problematic of 
re sponsibility and urgency pertains precisely to the gathering of knowledge with 
respect to political potential". 
If on Austin's definition, the performative speech act is that which produces the 
event of which it speaks, perhaps there is a different kind of performative, which 
in seeking to produce events in a subtler way, shares certain features with the 
25 'Rhetoric of the Image' [1964] translated by Stephen Heath in Image- Music-Text edited by 
Stephen Heath (London, Fontana Press, 1977), pp. 32-5 1; p. 40. 
26 1ýythologies [ 1957] translated Annette Lavers (London. Vintage, 1993), p. 82 
27 , The Battle of Proper Names' [Gramm 107-118]. 
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performativity of the lie'. As the lie is directed by an intention which seeks to 
produce an event unannounced by utterance (that is, there is a disjunction 
between speech act and its event), so a certain kind of writing, 'stirring up'. 
might depend on this dissemblance. It would depend on more than the 
presentation of what one holds to be true and the winning of converts. One may 
be compelled to write at many different levels, in different registers, obliquely, 
indirectly. 
For example, one should be attuned to the low-level conceptuality of 'Force of 
Law', and other essays, from this perspective of accessibility and bricolage. 
Then one could see the manner in which certain sediments of common sense are 
allowed io react against each other. Instead of a theoretical turn in Derrida's 
writing, one could instead see a change in the rhetoricity of the writings: a 
change in the way certain signs produce other signs - an attempt to stir up 
thoughttoday. 
The late essays collected in Rogues return to many of the earlier themes and the 
relation between the constative and the performative is discussed there. The 
constative analysis of the concept tells you 'what you are saying when you use 
this inherited word democracy which may exceed the individual subject's 
discursive representation of it. Alternatively, one may write about democracy 
with the intention to 'win conviction'. Then, with respect to 'democracy to 
come', he introduces a further nuance: 'The to of the "to come" wavers between 
imperative injunction (call or performative). and the patient perhaps of 
messianicity (nonperformative exposure to what comes, to what can always not 
come or has already come). " [Rogues 911 These modalities can alternate: 
28 See Jacques Derrida 'History of the Lie: Prolegomena' [1994] in Without Alibi edited and 
translated by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 28-70. 
29 The injunction differs from the exposure to the event: 'For if there is any, if there is any such 
thing, the pure singular eventness of what arrives or of who arnves and arrives to me ... it would 
suppose an irruption that punctures the horizon, interrupting any performative organisation, any 
convention, or any context that can be dominated by conventionality. .-- It is too often said that 
the performative produces the event of which it speaks. One must also realize that, inversely, 
where there is a performative, an event worthy of the name cannot arrive. ' Derrida 'The future of 
the profession or the university without conditions (thanks to the "Humanities, " what could take 
place tornorrow)' in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader edited by Tom 
Cohen (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 24-57; pp. 53-54, 
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'... they can be addressed to you by turns, or else they can haunt one another, 
parasite one another in the same instant, each becoming by turns the alibi of 
the other. In saying this myself right now, in cautioning you that I can by 
turns or simultaneously play on the two turns of phrase, I withdraw Ue me 
retire] into the secret of irony, be it irony in general or the particular 
rhetorical figure called irony. But here is yet one more turn, and it is 
political: is it not also democracy that gives the right to irony in the public 
space? Yes, for democracy opens public space, the publicity of public space, by granting the right to a change of tone (Wechsel der Tdne), to irony as well 
as to fiction, the simulacrum, the secret, literature, and so on. ' [Rogues 91-21 
Do I alone hear the reference to Habermas here? Could 'reminiscence' and 
influence be governed by a sensus communis? The attention to the performative, 
the secret and the lie seem to challenge the very virtues of democratic 'publicity' 
[Offentlichkeit] which deter-mine communicative agency. 
But if a certain perceived urgency might prompt a displacement of writing style, 
might not that same urgency suspect such writerly writing? Is it not 'too 
philological, micrological, readerly - complacent, too, with the time it allows 
itself when matters are urgent, at just the moment when one should no longer 
wait. At a moment when our world is delivered over to new forms of violence, 
new wars, new figures of cruelty or barbarity... ' [PoF 78]? The considerations 
above would exacerbate any responsibility. 
I stress that this dimension may be ineliminable from thinking through the full, 
continuing consequences of Of Grammatology, and is perhaps more challenging, 
more disturbing; a havering that bespeaks more than the inability of Derrida to 
separate himself from Levinas. By entertaining a veiled return to Of 
Grammatology, a whole new question has been raised - what is the socio- 
political significance of the general 'take-up' of Levinas? How is it best 
investigated? Even if one need not debate whether this is indeed Derrida's 
intention, it is undeniable that what has been precipitated by his writing has 
produced invaluable material for any such work of socio-cultural history. 
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